


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THE GREAT WORLD WAR



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THE GREAT WORLD WAR

A HISTORY

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VOLUME II


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
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NOTE

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(Vol. II)

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THE GREAT WORLD WAR

VOLUME II

CHAPTER I

THE CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS

(October–November, 1914)

The Belgian Canal System—The “King of Furnes”—The British Positions—The Chief of the German Staff superseded—The German Attacks on our 3rd Army Corps—Efforts of the British Cavalry—The Indian Troops and the Territorials in Action—The London Scottish—Prince Maurice of Battenberg killed.

THE autumn and the early winter of 1914 were unusually damp in northern France and Belgium. Misty and rainy weather was frequent. Under the best of circumstances trench life naturally has many discomforts, which bad weather increases. Along the Aisne the Germans had endeavoured to drain their trenches by digging the rear part deeper than the front, in such wise that the trench had two levels. In Flanders, however, particularly near the coast, this was generally impracticable, for water may be found at 4 feet from the surface of the ground, and after heavy rains is reached at half that depth. The country is intersected both by an infinity of little streams and by a network of canals.

These canals are often very ancient, several of them, for instance, dating from the time when Nero Claudius Drusus, the son-in-law of Mark Antony, governed the country of the Belgæ. In mediæval times the canal system was perfected, and already six hundred years ago, Ghent, Bruges, Nieuport, Ostend, Courtrai, Ypres, Tournai, and Alost were connected in this way. Before the Great War broke out a tourist of leisure could easily have travelled from Nieuport by canal into either France or Germany, according to his preference.

It is hard to say whether the first or the second line of the allied armies was the most severely pressed during the last days of October and the first ones of November, 1914. Certain it


is, however, that the comparatively few square miles which remained of uninvaded Belgian territory were defended inch by inch. One was reminded of the ancient saying of the Knights of Rhodes which, during the German invasion of France in 1870, was applied by the great advocate Jules Favre, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government of National Defence, to his own country: "Not an inch of our territory, nor a

stone of our fortresses!" The fortresses of Belgium—Liège, Namur, Antwerp—had unhappily fallen, and fifteen-sixteenths of the country had been overrun by the ruthless invaders. But the remaining sixteenth was guarded with reckless heroism. In a spirit of spiteful derision the German reptile press gave brave King Albert the title of "King of Furnes"—Furnes, a pretty little town, the architecture of many of whose buildings recalls the

Spanish occupation of the Netherlands, being the only place of any slight importance that actually remained to him of his dominions. Time was, however, when a certain King of France, whose title our ancestors would not acknowledge, and whom they regarded only as the Dauphin, was with equal derision styled the King of Bourges, the Anglo-Normans and the Burgundians holding by far the greater part of France. Nevertheless that sovereign figures in history as Charles the Victorious, though it is true that (altogether unlike King Albert of the Belgians) he owed his salvation and that of his country to two women—



Still defending Belgian soil: King Albert issuing instructions at the Head-quarters of his heroic army



Sketch Map showing Lines of the Allied Armies in Northern France at the end of October and beginning of November, 1914

- 1, Yser line, defended by Franco-Belgian forces. 2, Ypres to La Bassée line, guarded chiefly by British troops.
3, French lines to a point above Verdun. 4, French lines adjacent to the Alsace-Lorraine frontier.

Agnes Sorel, his favourite, who would not suffer him to continue in dalliance, and Joan the Maid, who led his armies to glory.

A glance at the map given in Vol. I (facing p. 25) will show that the British line stretched almost vertically from south to north. We held, with Sir Douglas Haig's troops, some of the country north of Ypres, and there linked up, though not perhaps

quite perfectly, with the Franco-Belgian troops defending the Yser line. Next, going southward, we held, with General Pulteney's command, a stretch of country extending downward from a position not far from Ypres; and thirdly came Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's men, who were striving to turn, isolate, and eventually capture La Bassée, against which point the French were constantly

directing more or less frontal attacks, their men at this point linking up with the armies which extended in a great line along the Aisne positions and others to the very east of France.

The sketch-map on p. 3 will roughly indicate the situation.

There were, of course, points where the lines became more or less concave or convex, according to the nature of the ground and the successes of the Germans in gaining certain positions. Smith-Dorrien's men held the lower part of line 2, Pulteney's men being above him, and Haig's above Pulteney's. It was this British line, short in comparison with line 3—which a million of Frenchmen defended—that the Germans, at the period we have reached, particularly desired to pene-



Lieut.-General Wild von Hohenborn, who succeeded General von Falkenhayn as German War Minister

trate, in order that they might have—as they imagined—an easy march to Calais. The Kaiser himself was a spectator of that endeavour, which was frustrated by the stanchness of our troops. With the same object of reaching Calais, desperate attempts were also made to seize line number 1 in the diagram. But the very character of the country and the opening of the sluices at Nieuport, which resulted in extensive floods, checked that enterprise, and during many weeks there were repeated attacks, now on line 1 and now on line 2, all of them resulting in failure. Rumour had it that these attempts to break through the allied positions with the object of reaching Calais were made by the Kaiser's express



General von Falkenhayn, who superseded General von Moltke as Chief of the German Staff, and was succeeded in his former post of War Minister by Lieut.-General von Hohenborn

desire and in opposition to the wishes of the Chief of the German General Staff, who would have preferred to penetrate the right extremity of line 3, and then again advance towards Paris. In any case the Chief of Staff, General von Moltke—a nephew of the great strategist—became more or less diplomatically ill, and was ultimately replaced in his position by the War Minister, General von Falkenhayn. The new Chief of the Staff resigned his old post as War Minister in January, 1915, to Lieutenant-General von Hohenborn, a close personal friend of the Kaiser.

In order to complete the story of the failure of these repeated attacks it is necessary to revert to the proceedings of the 3rd Army Corps, under General Pulteney, which occu-

pied the centre of the British line, the 1st Corps being on the north, before Ypres, and the 2nd on the south, near La Bassée. On October 20 circumstances compelled a brigade of the 4th Division to withdraw from its positions, with the result that the enemy occupied Le Gheir, near the western bank of the Lys, whence we were threatening Tourcoing, which is some 10 miles across the French frontier. A counter-attack was planned, however, by General Hunter-Weston and Lieutenant-Colonel Anley, and, thanks to the staunchness shown by a battalion of the King's Own and one of the Lancashire Regiment, the Germans were driven with great loss from the trenches which they had taken. From October 22 to 24, repeated attacks were delivered against



Ready for the Enemy: British troops in the trenches at the Front

the 3rd Corps, but the enemy was repulsed every time. On the night of the 25th the Leicestershires had to withdraw from their trenches owing to severe shell-fire, and it was then decided that the part of the line which they had been occupying should be temporarily thrown back. On the 29th there came another vigorous attack on our forces at Le Gheir. In the course of the attack a body of Germans broke through a gap in the line held by the Middlesex at La Boutillerie, and occupied a communication-trench. There was nothing to stop them, no wire being available in those days for entanglements. After heroic fighting, in which their commanding-officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Rowley, was severely wounded, the "Die Hards" succeeded in dislodging the enemy in a vigorous counter-attack, 34 Germans being bayoneted and 14 surrendering. The gap was subsequently held by a detachment of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who came up as reinforcements.

The front of General Pulteney's Army Corps was already unduly long, ranging in extent from 12 to 13 miles. Topographically the line was weak at several points, and in some parts the troops were astride of the River Lys, though in others the enemy was in strong force on the eastern bank of that stream. On October 31 it became necessary to extend the line still farther, the 4th Division taking over the trenches which the 1st Cavalry Division had hitherto been holding. Virtually every day from October 20 onward the Cavalry Corps (General Allenby's command) had been vigor-

ously attacked by the Germans. The 1st Division was stationed from St. Yves to Messines, astride of a little stream called the Douvre. The positions of the 2nd Division (under General Gough) stretched eastward from Messines to Garde-Dieu, whence they ran northward to Houthem and Kortewilde on the canal going towards Ypres. On October 22, however, the last-named division had to fall back to a line on the Warneton-Hollebeke roads. The greater part of the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade was thereupon brought up to Wulverghem, some 2 miles west of Messines, in order to support the cavalry corps generally, and two battalions went more northward to assist General Gough's troopers. Various attacks delivered against our cavalry on the next three days were repulsed. On the 26th, General Allenby attempted to regain a more forward line in conjunction with the 7th Division, which was stationed more to the north on his right. At an early hour the troops under Lord Cavan (the 4th Brigade, belonging to the 7th Division) endeavoured to co-operate in the movement but were unable to make progress, and the attempt was therefore abandoned. Four days later very heavy infantry and artillery attacks were made on our troopers, some of whom were then compelled to retire. Sir John French therefore deemed it expedient to bring up a brigade of Sir H. Smith-Dorrien's command (which was operating more to the south), as it had lately been relieved from its trench duties by the arrival of the Indian troops at the front.



Dixmude-under Bombardment: a remarkable photograph taken at the moment of the bursting of one of the German shells

The picture was taken by a photographer standing only a few yards away, and shows the effect of a single shell



More Results of the Fight for the Channel Coast: a street in Nieuport after a German bombardment

The brigade, which was commanded by General Shaw, came as far northward as Neuve Église in order to support Allenby's cavalry, and to it was added the London Scottish Territorial Battalion. For forty-eight hours, pending the arrival of French reinforcements, the cavalry corps, with the support which has been indicated, resisted the pressure of two German army corps composed of almost fresh troops. The resistance offered by our men proved completely successful, and the critical nature of the struggle ceased on the arrival of the vanguard of the 16th French Army Corps and General Conneau's cavalry, which last took over the duties of Gough's Cavalry Division (the 2nd), this being temporarily withdrawn to Bailleul.

Throughout all these proceedings the 1st Cavalry Division retained possession of its trenches east of

Wulverghem, and during the ensuing week or so the two divisions often relieved each other, their artillery supporting the attacks which the French 16th Army Corps delivered in the neighbourhood of Hollebeke, Wytechaete, and Messines—to which points, south of Ypres, the Germans succeeded in advancing. Nor was the artillery and infantry of General Pulteney's command less conspicuous in vigour and determination. The gunners of the 4th Division repeatedly co-operated in the French attacks, and as for the infantry, although it may seem invidious to single out any special units for praise, the East Lancashires, the Hampshires, and the Somersetshires rendered excellent service.

Among the combatants who seemed likely to be the more severely tried by life in such a damp and, in the winter,

bleak region, were the men of the Indian contingent attached to the British forces. But from whatever part of the Indian peninsula they came they showed great endurance, and acquitted themselves admirably. As was previously mentioned, the Lahore Division was the first to arrive at the front. Two of its battalions gave able support to General Allenby's cavalry when its situation became critical, and suffered severely in doing so. Others, attached to Smith-Dorrien's Army Corps, were also heavily engaged while supporting different detachments of our men. During the first weeks the Germans often singled them out for attack. On October 13 the 8th Gurkha Rifles were very hard pressed in their trenches, and on the 28th the 47th Sikhs and some of the Indian sappers and miners had to contend—victoriously as it proved—against an attack at Neuve Chapelle, north of La Bassée. When the Meerut Division reached the front it took over, in con-

junction with most of the Lahore Division, the duty of holding the line previously occupied by Smith-Dorrien's Corps, a part of the latter remaining to assist, while the remainder, being in great need of rest, was drawn back into reserve. When on November 2 a portion of our line west of Neuve Chapelle was to some extent pierced and deflected, the 2nd Gurkha Rifles under Colorel Norie prevented the situation from becoming serious. As time went on the Germans learned to know and fear our Indian troops, who in more than one fierce counter-attack wrought havoc among them. At the last Durbar held in India the King decided very wisely that the native forces should henceforth be eligible for the coveted distinction of the Victoria Cross. It was in the fighting north of La Bassée that this decoration was first won by an Indian soldier, Havildar Gagna Singh of the 57th (Wilde's) Rifles. With only fifteen men of his regiment



With the British Army at the Front: Heavy guns arriving at one of the head-quarters

Havildar Gagna Singh resisted a strenuous German attack, shot a German officer dead, and with the latter's own sword slew ten more of the enemy before he fell from the effects of a shot-wound. In reporting on the behaviour of the Indian troops during their first engagements in Flanders, Sir John French stated that he had been much impressed by their initiative and resource. "Some of their ruses to deceive the enemy", added the Commander-in-Chief, "have been attended with the best results, and have doubtless kept superior forces in front of them at bay."

During October and the next few days eight units of our Territorial forces were actually engaged in the fighting. They included five regiments of Yeomanry cavalry, those of Leicestershire, Northamptonshire, Northumberland, Oxfordshire, and North Somerset; and three bodies of infantry, the London Scottish, the

Queen's Westminster Battalions, and the Hertfordshire Regiment. To the foregoing the Hon. Artillery Company may be added. The manner in which these men carried out the various duties assigned to them imbued Sir John French with the highest hopes respecting the value of the Territorials generally. The very first body of the infantry to go into action was the 1st Battalion of the London Scottish. On October 31 it was ordered to support some regular cavalry which was holding the trenches at Hollebeke and Messines, south of Ypres. Our troopers had retired before an overpowering Bavarian onslaught, but that same evening, after a terrific artillery duel between our gunners and the enemy's, the London Scottish crept forward until a search-light found them, whereupon they received the order to charge, and leaped forward with fixed bayonets, driving the Bavarians from the position which we had previously



After their "Glorious Lead and Example": London Scottish lining up for roll-call after their charge at Messines, October 31, 1914

lost. Sir John French afterwards telegraphed to Colonel Malcolm, who commanded the Scots: "I wish you and your splendid regiment to accept my warmest congratulations and thanks for the fine work you did on Saturday. You have given a glorious lead and example to all the Territorial forces fighting in France."

It cannot be denied that we suffered heavy casualties during all the fighting which has been recounted in this chapter. But we were confronted by vastly superior forces, who only succeeded in driving us temporarily from a few positions here and there, and the losses which we inflicted on them were far greater than our own. A conspicuous feature of those we suffered was the number of officers who fell in the fighting. While they included many men of experience, the greater number were young officers who had never previously been in action. Among the young men of great promise who fell in the last days of October was Prince Maurice of Battenberg, who held the rank of lieutenant in the King's Royal Rifles. A cousin of the King, and the youngest of Princess Henry of Battenberg's sons, he had just completed his twenty-third year when he was struck down. He had previously distinguished himself by great gallantry during the fighting on the Marne and the Aisne, on one occasion, for instance, leading his men over a barricaded bridge in pursuit of a large body of Germans. Prince Maurice was buried before Ypres, near the spot where he had fallen and under the shadow of a yew-tree. His cousin, Prince Arthur of Connaught,



Prince Maurice of Battenberg, youngest son of Princess Henry of Battenberg, who died from wounds received in action with his regiment, the King's Royal Rifles, October, 1914

(From a photograph by Bassano)

acted as chief mourner. A great artillery duel was in progress at the time, and so terrific was the din that the chaplain's voice could scarcely be heard.

At the outset of November the general situation in Western Europe was favourable to the Allies. Every desperate effort which the enemy had made to break through our lines in his wild desire to reach the sea-coast had been frustrated. The British as well as the French artillery had repeatedly proved its superiority over the enemy's, thus powerfully contributing to the result; and all along the trenches, from Nieuport to Verdun—a distance of 260 miles—French, British, and Belgians offered ever the same firm resistance to the enemy's most violent attacks.

E. A. V

CHAPTER II

SECOND PHASE OF THE FLANDERS CAMPAIGN

(November–December, 1914)

Renewed Attacks of the German Army—Defeat of the Prussian Guard—Yet another Attack in Force—Prince of Wales goes to the Front—Death and Burial of Lord Roberts—King George with his Troops in the Field—Historic Meetings—Honours for General Joffre and Sir John French—Visit to King Albert—Honours for Belgian Monarch and his Premier—December Warfare—Givenchy and the Indians' Losses—Christmas at the Front—Royal Gifts—The Unofficial Truce—How 1914 came to an End.

THOUGH it had so stubbornly held its own against the repeated onslaughts of the Germans, the British army defending Ypres was allowed only a brief respite after the fierce fighting lasting from October 29 to November 2, described in the preceding chapter. That critical struggle was but the culminating point of the first phase of the enemy's determined plan to crush the British, and force a way through to the coast. Foiled in these early onslaughts, he gathered fresh strength for what has been officially described as the second phase of this protracted action. Some fifteen battalions of the famous Guard corps—the Corps d'Élite of the Kaiser's army—were now brought up to carry out the task in which so many other regiments had failed. This supreme attack was made on November 11. Happily its full fury did not fall upon our devoted troops until after the timely arrival of French reinforcements on the southern re-entrant, and to the north of Ypres, these enabling the thin khaki line to shorten and strengthen its front. Just sixty years previously, almost to a day, another British army had similarly welcomed a French force marching to its relief at the battle of Inkerman.

As usual the grand assault of November 11, 1914, began at daybreak with a prolonged and concentrated bombardment of the British positions, which would have shattered the nerves of any but seasoned and determined troops. A few hours later, when this devastating storm was judged by the enemy to have done its work, the Guard Corps surged forward with its traditional contempt for death, and in such overwhelming masses as to succeed in some places in hacking a way through the British lines. Only at isolated points, however. Elsewhere the German guardsmen were mowed down in heaps by our frontal fire, and taken in flank both by artillery and machine guns. Only one section which succeeded in breaking through the British line to the woods beyond, and in surviving the counter-attack that drove most of the Germans back, managed to hold a certain portion of our trenches. The cost was frightful. The number of dead which they left in the woods alone amounted to 700. What the losses must have been in the direct assault it is impossible to say, but that they were sufficiently appalling, even to Germany's ideas of the grim necessities of warfare, was proved by their failure

during the next five days to undertake any serious attempt to push home a fresh advance against our line in front of Ypres. On the following day Sir Douglas Haig issued a special Army Order to the men of all ranks of his heroic 1st Army Corps, which had borne the brunt of this last desperate fighting, containing Sir John French's

pride, "whether the annals of the British army contain any finer record than this."

Reluctant to abandon the advance on which such high hopes had been raised throughout the Fatherland, the Germans made yet another attack in force in the same direction before the end of the year. This was on Tues-



On the Belgian Frontier: German infantry in the trenches

"congratulations and thanks for the splendid resistance to the German attack yesterday". Since its arrival in that neighbourhood, the Army Order proceeded, the 1st Corps, assisted by the 3rd Cavalry Division, 7th Division, and troops from the 2nd Corps, had met and defeated the 23rd, 26th, and 27th German Reserve Corps, the 13th Active Corps, and finally a strong force from the Guard Corps. "It is doubtful", concluded Sir Douglas Haig, with pardonable

day, November 17, when, after the customary cannonade, no fewer than three separate assaults took place. Regular troops were engaged, though not the shattered Guard. The preliminary storm of shells on this occasion had forced our troops to evacuate some of the British trenches, but no sooner were these seized by the advancing German infantry than our own men rushed to the counter-attack, and not only hurled the enemy out again at the point of the bayonet, but forced

him back some 500 yards beyond. In neither of the two subsequent assaults did the Germans succeed in reaching our trenches. Their losses may be estimated from the fact that they left 1200 dead within a space of some 600 yards of our front.

Our own losses in all these weeks of fighting against tremendous odds had also been very severe, though not so heavy as those of the enemy; and not in vain; for our troops had kept the vital line intact, and added glorious chapters to our military history. On November 20 the sorely-tried line on that part of the battle front against which the main German attacks had spent themselves, was finally relieved by further French reinforcements. Not till then did the battered troops leave the trenches which they had so gallantly and so successfully held during a solid month of such infuriated fighting and nerve-racking strain as will live among the finest records of human endurance. In another Special Order issued at the time by Sir John French, the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief paid a glowing tribute to his men for what they had done in these momentous weeks, concluding as follows:—

I have made many calls upon you, and the answers you have made to them have covered you, your regiments, and the Army to which you belong with honour and glory. Your fighting qualities, courage, and endurance have been subjected to the most trying and severe tests, and you have proved yourselves worthy descendants of the British soldiers of the past, who have built up the magnificent traditions of the regiments to which you belong. You have not only maintained those traditions, but you have

materially added to their lustre. It is impossible for me to find words in which to express my appreciation of the splendid services you have performed.

Baffled in their repeated attempts to hack a way through to Calais, just as they had previously failed in their reckless dash for Paris, the Germans, during the last weeks of 1914, were reduced to the strategic defensive throughout almost the whole length of the long-drawn battle line in Northern France and Flanders. In



H.R.H. the Prince of Wales in full marching order dress

(From a photograph by the Central News)



H.R.H. Prince Albert
(From a photograph by Speaight, Ltd.)

their struggle for the coast they had vainly sacrificed the equivalent of more than five Army Corps, losses which were doubly disastrous in view of the rapid growth of the Russian peril, and the urgent need of reinforcements on their Eastern front.

Before, however, the attack slackened—while, indeed, fresh German forces were reported to be gathering for an onslaught more furious than ever—the Prince of Wales received the permission which had been denied him two months previously to join the British army at the front. Cutting short his Oxford career—for he was to have returned for yet one more term—his Royal Highness joined the 3rd Battalion of the Grenadier Guards immediately after the outbreak of the war, his younger brother, Prince

Albert, serving at the same time with Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's Grand Fleet in the North Sea. The sailor prince was unlucky enough to develop appendicitis a few weeks later, and had perforce to be landed in order to undergo an operation, returning for duty at the Admiralty, however, before the end of the year, as a preliminary to rejoining his ship. Meantime the Prince of Wales, who was gazetted on August 8, threw heart and soul into his duties as second lieutenant, and when the 1st battalion of his regiment was ordered to the front claimed the right to accompany it. Lord Kitchener deemed it best on that occasion to withhold his sanction, submitting to the King that as the Prince had not completed his military training it was not desirable that he should be sent. Two further months of assiduous work, however, earned for his Royal Highness the desired permission, and on November 16 he crossed to France, joining as aide-de-camp on Sir John French's Staff on the following day.

By a tragic coincidence the Prince arrived to receive his baptism of fire when the Last Post had just been sounded for the senior Field-Marshal of the British army. Lord Roberts had landed in France on November 11, mainly to greet the Indian troops among whom so many years of his illustrious life had been spent. "I must go and see the Indian soldiers," he told an old friend before starting. "It is the most useful thing I can do at this moment." That was Lord Roberts all over: to do "the most useful thing" at the right moment, and to do it with all his might. And

so, in his eighty-third year, all but twenty of which he had given to the British army and the British Empire, he started on that last journey to the



Lord Roberts—photographed on his eighty-second birthday

war which he had so clearly foreseen, and solemnly and persistently warned his countrymen against in vain. During his three crowded days at the front he visited the various headquarters of the Indian troops, where he was received by the native princes,

as well as by the staffs and guards of honour. He also found time to inspect numerous units and detachments of the British army, and to visit the commander of one of the French armies. Needless to say he was greeted on every side with the greatest enthusiasm and affection. On the Friday, unhappily, Lord Roberts contracted a chill, which rapidly developed into congestion of the lungs and pleurisy; and in spite of the devoted attention of the eminent medical men on the spot, and of the care of the nurses, he gradually grew weaker, relapsing into unconsciousness, and dying at eight o'clock on Saturday evening, November 14, at General Headquarters. Tragic though it was, and heavy the blow to the whole British Empire, it was a fitting close to an ennobling life. He would himself, as Lord Kitchener said in his moving tribute in the House of Lords a few days later, "have wished for no happier end than to pass away, the greatest soldier of our day, in the midst of the greatest army the Empire had ever put into the field, with the sound of the shells and the cheers of his comrades still ringing in his ears". Conveyed from France amid a parting fanfare from the French army, the body rested for the last time at the Field-Marshal's home at Ascot; and on November 19, removed thence to the station on the gun-carriage which his son lost his life and won the V.C. in endeavouring to save at Colenso, was borne to London, to be buried that day in solemn state where Wellington and Nelson lie, in St. Paul's Cathedral.

Ten days after attending the funeral of Lord Roberts at St. Paul's, King George himself crossed to France to spend a week among his heroic troops on the field of war. There was nothing on this historic journey of the pomp and pageantry which accompanied

of the expedition, "as Neptune never saw before; saluted with such firing of guns from the ships and from the towers, you would have thought the world was coming to an end". Henry VIII would have sailed less noisily had he lived in these days of lurking



Drawn by Christopher Clark

The Funeral of Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, November 19, 1914: the Procession to St. Paul's Cathedral

From Charing Cross Station to the Cathedral the body of the great commander was borne on a gun carriage of the Royal Horse Artillery, immediately preceding which in the procession came a mountain battery with Indian drivers and gunners. The pall-bearers included Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, Sir Evelyn Wood, Lord Grenfell, Lord Methuen, and Lord Nicholson, Admiral of the Fleet Sir E. H. Seymour, and Admiral Lord Charles Beresford.

Henry VIII when he went to France some four hundred years previously, to join Maximilian—the German Emperor who betrayed him in the following year—in the campaign against France which is now chiefly remembered for its Battle of the Spurs. Henry VIII crossed with such a fleet on that occasion, says John Taylor, clerk of the Parliament, in his diary

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submarines and sudden "bolts from the blue"; but in one respect the conditions were the same, for the soldiers were up to their knees in mud in both campaigns when the Kings arrived at the front. And just as the English army of 1513 was heartened and inspired by "a little touch of Harry in the night", so the gallant troops under Sir John French were gratified and

encouraged by the simple, informal visit of His Majesty King George V, the first British Sovereign since George II to take his place among his soldiers on the field of battle. The King had broken through tradition and precedent as a constitutional monarch, but none who saw the faces of the war-worn troops among

ceived by Field-Marshal Sir John French on the following day, there were no merely spectacular displays, or rhetorical speeches of the Kaiser's type, claiming special dispensations of Providence. Instead, there was a plain, orderly plan of inspection, arranged for each day of the Royal visit so that no branch of the vast



War Honours on the Field of Battle: King George presenting medals for bravery to British heroes in France

whom His Majesty passed, or heard their outbursts of whole-hearted cheers, had the least doubt as to the intense enthusiasm and pleasure aroused by his presence.

Leaving London on Sunday afternoon, November 29, he crossed the Channel in a warship, and was met on the French coast by the Prince of Wales, who left the front to meet his father there. At the General Headquarters of the British Expeditionary Force, where His Majesty was re-

ceived by Field-Marshal Sir John French on the following day, there were no merely spectacular displays, or rhetorical speeches of the Kaiser's type, claiming special dispensations of Providence. Instead, there was a plain, orderly plan of inspection, arranged for each day of the Royal visit so that no branch of the vast army in the field, British or Indian, was overlooked. Sick and wounded heroes were visited at the base hospitals; a call was made at the headquarters of the different army corps, where the divisional generals and brigadiers, with their respective staffs, had the honour of being presented; units of all arms were inspected, and those on whom French and British decorations had been conferred received these personally at His Majesty's hands. Passing swiftly from point to

point by motor-car, piloted by the Prince of Wales, the King tramped on foot through the lines of heroes whenever time permitted, heedless of mud and rain, and everywhere taking the deepest interest in learning at first hand the real conditions of the fighting line. Here and there the Royal route passed not far distant from the enemy's advanced posts, where the sounds of the sudden outbursts of lusty British cheers as the King passed by must have sorely puzzled German ears. The dress which excited the King's special curiosity during these tours of inspection was the winter "Trench Kit", consisting of a short greatcoat of goatskin, with the hair outside, woolly Balaclava caps, and sometimes sandbags filled with straw for the legs and feet.

On Tuesday, December 1, M. Poincaré, the French President; M. Viviani, the French Premier; and General Joffre, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, arrived at the headquarters of the 4th Army Corps to greet His Majesty on French soil. The glitter and magnificence of the Field of the Cloth of Gold, when Henry VIII and François I of France poured out their hollow professions of friendship near Guisnes in 1520, were entirely absent, but this meeting on the battle-fields of France on December 1, 1914, was incomparably truer in its ring of sincerity, and fraught with far deeper significance for the history of mankind. It set the seal upon the Allies' success in the West, where Prussian militarism, if not yet beaten back within its own borders, had recoiled from its first stupendous

attacks, the keen edge of its sword blunted, and its shining armour soiled for ever. The meeting was commemorated by King George by the investiture of General Joffre with the Order of the Grand Cross of the Bath. A tour was also made round the divisions of the 4th British Corps, the King and the President riding together in an open car between continuous lines of cheering troops. On the homeward journey the Prince of Wales's car met with a slight accident, but was able to proceed at a reduced speed. The story is told by the "Eye-Witness", whose graphic account of the King's week in France was published by the British Press Bureau, that the car passed on its way a derelict soldier trudging along in the cold and wet without either hat or coat:

"The Prince stopped the car to enquire what had happened, and on discovering that the man had been left behind by a supply train, with his usual kind-heartedness not only insisted on taking the man back to General Headquarters in his car, but gave him his waterproof coat to wear."

After the return of the Royal party, M. Poincaré and M. Viviani had the honour of dining with His Majesty, General Joffre, after a brief visit to Sir John French, having to return to his duties. Every day of this memorable week was crowded with multifarious visits and inspections. The day following the meeting with the French President included a parade of cavalry—heroes of many battle-fields—which would have filled any monarch with justifiable pride. His Majesty left his car to march between lines of mounted men stretching as



The Visit of King George to the Head-quarters of the Belgian Army: the Royal Review of the gallant Belgians at Furnes, December 4, 1914

Behind His Majesty and the King of the Belgians stands the Prince of Wales, with Sir Pertab Singh and the Maharajah of Bikaner, A.D.C.'s to King George, in attendance

far as the eye could reach—a larger body of British cavalry, according to “Eye-Witness”, than most people have ever seen; yet it represented only a fraction of the mounted troops in the field. Walking slowly through this double line, “taking the salute and smilingly acknowledging the cheers of the troopers as he reached the end of each unit”, the King arrived at length at the head-quarters of the General commanding the corps—a charming château which had been visited by the Germans in their un-availing dash for Paris, but not damaged. Having inspected various other units of the forces which had been drawn up there, His Majesty bestowed a number of decorations upon officers and men who had distinguished themselves in the field, including several *Médailles Militaires* awarded to British soldiers by the French President. At the close of this ceremony the King visited the Baroness who owned the château, and signed his name in a sixteenth-century volume which she preserved among her most cherished treasures. That royal act, she is said to have declared, repaid her for all her sufferings.

On the following day—December 3—King George drove within sight of the battle-field of Ypres; and even as he watched, several German howitzer shells burst on the devastated town, sending up their peculiar black powder which has inspired the British Tommy to dub them “Jack Johnsons” or “Coal Boxes”. Before he left the hill on that occasion His Majesty had the satisfaction of watching some of

his own batteries open fire, and of observing the effect on the enemy's trenches.

It was on this same December 3 that the King invested Sir John French with the Order of Merit. On the following day His Majesty, led as usual by the Prince of Wales, with Maharajah Sir Pertab Singh and the Maharajah of Bikaner, A.D.C.'s to the King, in attendance, crossed the frontier to the last strip of Belgian territory then remaining to King Albert, where he invested that gallant monarch with the Order of the Garter, and Baron de Broqueville, the Belgian Premier and Minister of War, with the Grand Cross of St. Michael and St. George. King Albert, who had never once left Belgian soil since the German invasion, met the British Sovereign and the Prince on the frontier, and escorted them to Furnes, in which the head-quarters of his decimated army were then situated. Here, in the picturesque old market-place, the Belgian troops who were not in the fighting line marched past the allied monarchs, King George taking the salute. The next day, the last spent by His Majesty with his troops in the field, began with the presentation of the Victoria Cross to Naik Darwan Sing Negi, of the 39th Garhwal Rifles, one of the first native soldiers to win that distinction since King George, at the Delhi Durbar, granted to Indian soldiers the privilege of being eligible for it. Naik Darwan Sing Negi gained his, “for great gallantry”, on the night of November 23–24, near Festubert, France. His Majesty's last visit of all was paid to the head-



King George's Visit to the King of the Belgians, December 4, 1914: Their Majesties crossing the Square at Furnes, followed by the Prince of Wales and the aides-de-camp

quarters of the Royal Flying Corps, which had so greatly distinguished itself since the very beginning of the war, and all through the King's visit had ensured his safety by maintaining a continuous aerial patrol above the royal procession, wherever it went. Before leaving for London, after lunching with Sir John French at General Head-quarters, the King issued the following Special Order of the Day to the army:—

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY
BY
HIS MAJESTY THE KING

"OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED
"OFFICERS, AND MEN:—

"I am very glad to have been able to see my Army in the Field.

"I much wished to do so in order to gain a slight experience of the life you are leading.

"I wish I could have spoken to you all, to express my admiration of the splendid manner in which you have fought and are still fighting against a powerful and relentless enemy.

"By your discipline, pluck, and endurance, inspired by the indomitable regimental spirit, you have not only upheld the tradition of the British Army, but added fresh lustre to its history.

"I was particularly impressed by your soldierly, healthy, cheerful appearance.

"I cannot share in your trials, dangers, and successes; but I can assure you of the proud confidence and gratitude of myself and of your fellow-countrymen.

"We follow you in our daily thoughts on your certain road to victory.

"GEORGE, R.I.

"GENERAL HEAD-QUARTERS,
"December 5th, 1914."


Letters from the front at the time bore eloquent testimony to the inspiring influence of the King's presence.

It spurred on his troops to face the increasing hardships of the winter campaign with the cheerfulness and resource which had characterized them from the day when they first marched to the war with "Tipperary" on their lips. Happily, by a system of reliefs, the severe strain endured by the men in the fighting line was minimized, while the trenches themselves were improved as far as possible by military science and ingenuity. By the beginning of December the German army in the Western theatre had been considerably reduced in order to meet the critical situation in Poland described in another chapter. Even while King George was visiting his troops this movement of troops from West to East was in progress, but, as

Lord Kitchener afterwards stated in the House of Lords, the enemy still remained on the Western front "in sufficient strength to hold the elaborate system of parallel lines of entrenchments, and with the support of an effective though reduced artillery to contain the Allied troops". His positions were infinitely stronger and better organized than they were when the British reached the Franco-Belgian frontier at the beginning of October, before the Germans brought up their full force and assumed the offensive. By December all the German positions constituted parts of a practically continuous defensive zone, consisting in some places, as "Eye-Witness" pointed out in his narrative of December 17, of several lines of cun-



The Prince of Wales in Flanders: His Royal Highness, with Prince Alexander of Teck on his left, leaving for the British Head-quarters after the Royal Visit to the King of the Belgians



Siege Warfare in Flanders: Trench mortars captured from the Germans

ningly sited and carefully constructed works:—

“This zone really amounts to a maze of fire trenches and obstacles. Every known form of obstacle is used, the entanglements—to select the most common—varying from loose coils of wire to securely staked networks of from 18 in. to nearly 6 ft. in height and of different widths.”

In face of this, and the appalling state of the ground, it was impossible to attempt any major tactical operations except at losses wholly disproportionate to the possible advantages in view. British progress, however, was made at various points: a wood here, a few trenches there, as the tide of battle ebbed and flowed with varying success. But though no great strategical advantage was won in the

geographical sense distinct progress was made in another and more subtle way—the strategic progress of time. The vast initial advantages enjoyed by the Germans at the outbreak of hostilities by reason of their readiness for war, and the numerical superiority of their army, were steadily diminishing, while with every day the Allies were increasing those resources of men and material which—again to quote Lord Kitchener’s words—“would enable them to prosecute the war to a triumphant end”.


For the most part the fighting had now resolved itself into a phase of siege warfare into which every old idea and new invention were employed for bombarding the trenches, often at a distance of no more than

a hundred yards. Taught by the costly lessons of earlier charges in the open, the Germans endeavoured to achieve the same end by shortening the distance underground, moving forward foot by foot by narrow, end-on approaches, zigzagged where open to prevent enfilading. Often these saps were a foot or so beneath the surface of the ground, excavated by means of a special earth-borer worked by hand; and in either case, when carried near enough to the enemy for charging purposes, would be joined up at their heads by a lateral trench—running parallel to that being attacked—where the storming-party would gather for the assault. Sometimes a “blinded” sap would be driven right up to the parapet of the hostile trench. This would then be blown up, and a charge made through the opening right into the trench, the stormers working right and left in their efforts to drive the defenders back. It was a game, of course, that two could play. The throwing of large bombs from trench mortars, and of smaller bombs or grenades from rifles or by hand, became general on both sides, ordinary firing from longer-range weapons being rendered unsafe by the nearness to each other of the front lines of either force.

Before dealing with the only important engagements on this battle-front during December, it is necessary to record a number of minor operations which brought the month of November to a close. On November 23 the enemy launched a powerful attack against one of the Indian positions, and succeeded in capturing some 800 yards of their trenches. It

was only a temporary success, however. The general officer commanding the Meerut Division organized a counter-attack, which lasted right through the night, and by daybreak on the following day the whole line was re-established. It was a costly operation, as Sir John French bore witness, but the enemy suffered far more heavily than ourselves, leaving behind them over 100 prisoners, including three officers, together with three machine-guns and two trench mortars.

Letters found upon captured Germans proved that the enemy had been specially charged by its chiefs



Winter Kit among the Germans: Landsturm in their new fur coats

not only to inflict the severest possible punishment upon the hated British, but to do their very worst to Britain's coloured allies, whose civilization they denied, and whose qualities as fighting-men they affected to disparage. The Indians, however, proved in many a hard-fought fight that they had lost none of their ancient martial instincts, and coped extraordinarily well with the unaccustomed difficulties by which they were surrounded. In an utterly strange country, knowing no language but their own, and with all their instincts trained to conditions essentially different, it was not surprising that they were sometimes outwitted by the audacity of the enemy. On one well-authenticated occasion they were only saved by the shrewdness of the British officer in charge. The story was told by an observer serving with the Indian Army Corps in the following account published by the Press Bureau:—

"A figure, silhouetted in the moonlight, and wearing a complete Gurkha uniform, approached the end of the trench and delivered the message: 'The Gurkhas are to move farther up the trench; another Gurkha contingent is advancing in support.' Puzzled by this announcement, the officer in charge replied, 'Who are you? Where do you come from?' To which the only answer was, 'You are to move up to make room for other Gurkhas.' The English was good, but something (or many small things) excited the officer's suspicions. 'Answer, and answer quickly,' he said, 'if you are a Gurkha, by what boat did you cross?' This question was, under the circumstances, no easy one to answer, and the German (for such he was) turned at once and fled. But he had not gone five yards before he fell riddled by bullets. If the officer had been deceived, the trench, of course, would have

swarmed with Germans almost before the Gurkhas had made room for them."

In the remaining minor operations on the same front during the last week in November the British troops took the offensive, and were successful in each case. The first was on the night of the enemy's disastrous attack on the Indians, when three of the German advanced trenches opposite the 25th Brigade were carried by a small party of the 2nd Lincolnshires under Lieutenant E. H. Impey, who cleared out the enemy and then withdrew without loss. On the following night fifteen men of the Royal Engineers and Royal Welsh Fusiliers, under Captain J. R. Minshull Ford, of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and Lieutenant E. L. Morris, Royal Engineers, crept up to a group of farms immediately in front of the German trenches on the Touquet-Bridoux road, which had served the enemy's snipers as a lurking-place only too well. Having mined these buildings, the whole group was blown up before the British party retired.

Other dashing attacks followed on the night of November 26-7 by a small detachment of the 2nd Scots Guards under Lieutenant Sir E. H. W. Hulse, Bart., who rushed the trenches opposite the 20th Brigade, and returned with useful information regarding the enemy's strength and the position of his machine-guns; and by a patrol of the 2nd Rifle Brigade under Lieutenant E. Durham, who similarly rushed the trenches opposite the 25th Brigade. These minor engagements, heroic in themselves, served only to emphasize the position



Drawn by A. C. Michael

Reinforcements for the Battle Front: the London Motor Bus on Active Service in Flanders

In describing the sketch from which the above drawing was made, Mr. Frederic Villiers, the war artist, writes: "The strenuous fighting of the last week has necessitated the quick transportation of men from the base to fill up the gaps. A fleet of motor-omnibuses has assisted in this work; in fact, the London motor bus has had much to do with the stemming of the German onslaught."

of stalemate reached by the operations as a whole in this theatre of war. The limitations of weather, as the British Commander-in-Chief said in one of his dispatches, almost entirely controlled the operations of his army during the period now dealt with.

The signs already referred to, however, that the enemy had withdrawn considerable forces from the Western front, became so marked in December that arrangements were made between Sir John French and the commander of the 8th Army Corps for a combined attack on the 14th on the German positions near the village of Wytschaete. The British objectives were the Petit Bois and the Maedelsteed Spur, lying to the west and south-west of the village, and the task of capturing them fell respectively to the Royal Scots and the Gordon Highlanders. How gallantly they played their part is attested by Sir John French in his dispatch of February 2, 1915, published fifteen days later, for it was not

until February 17 that the details were made known:—

“Operations began at 7 a.m. by a combined heavy artillery bombardment by the two French and the 2nd British Corps. The British objectives were the Petit Bois and the Maedelsteed Spur, lying respectively to the west and south-west of the village of Wytschaete. At 7.45 a.m. the Royal Scots, with great dash, rushed forward and attacked the former, while the Gordon Highlanders attacked the latter place. The Royal Scots, commanded by Major F. J. Duncan, D.S.O., in face of a terrible machine-gun and rifle fire, carried the German trench on the west edge of the Petit Bois, capturing two machine-guns and fifty-three prisoners, including one officer. The Gordon Highlanders with great gallantry, advanced up the Maedelsteed Spur, forcing the enemy to evacuate their front trench. They were, however, losing heavily, and found themselves unable to get any farther. At nightfall they were obliged to fall back to their original position. Captain C. Boddam-Whetham and Lieutenant W. F. R. Dobie showed splendid dash, and with a few men entered the enemy's leading trenches; but they were all either killed or




After the Battle: German trenches used as a grave for the killed

captured. Lieutenant G. R. V. Hume-Gore and Lieutenant W. H. Paterson also distinguished themselves by their gallant leading. Although not successful, the operation was most creditable to the fighting spirit of the Gordon Highlanders, most ably commanded by Major A. W. F. Baird, D.S.O.”

Unfortunately, the 32nd French Division operating on the British left had been unable to make any progress, and though possession of the western edge of the Petit Bois was retained, the further advance of the British infantry into the Wytschaete Wood was not practicable. The appalling condition of the ground—it was so waterlogged that our men sank deep in the mud at every step they took—and the entire absence of cover had rendered the attack a costly affair, the British casualties amounting to some 17 officers and 407 other ranks. But the enemy also had lost heavily, both in the Petit Bois and up the Maedelsteed Spur. In the communicating-trenches in front of the Gordons on this last-named position over a hundred dead were counted. The combined offensive operations continued for several days, though confined chiefly to artillery bombardment, and on the 17th the plan of attack was modified, further advance by the British against Wytschaete Wood being impossible until the French could make sufficient advance to afford protection to the left flank.

The difficulties in the way of any appreciable progress on either side in the face of the prevailing conditions were shown in the last of the principal engagements on this battle front before the end of 1914. In the early hours



Map illustrating the chief engagements on the British Front in December, 1914

The scene of the attack by the Royal Scots was the Petit Bois, and that of the Gordon Highlanders on the same date (December 14) was the Maedelsteed Spur, both near Wytschaete. The furious fighting round the positions of the Indian army took place at Givenchy, near La Bassée, on December 19-23.

of December 19 the Indian Corps, under Sir James Willcocks—completed twelve days previously by the arrival of the Sirhind Brigade from Egypt—launched a formidable attack against the advanced German trenches on their front round Givenchy. The Meerut Division succeeded in storming, and, for a time, in holding, the enemy’s advanced trenches on the left,

only to be driven back later on to their original position with considerable loss. The attack of the Lahore Division—carried out by two companies each of the 1st Highland Light Infantry and 1st Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles, of the Sirhind Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. H. Ronaldson—was more successful, two lines of the enemy's trenches being carried before daybreak, and filled with as many men as they would hold. Daylight, however, found the captured position practically untenable. Supports were launched in vain, though not without the bravest attempts to

reach the goal; and although Lieutenant-Colonel Ronaldson held on till dusk, there remained no alternative but to evacuate the position and fall back to the original line. Thus practically all the ground so gallantly gained in the morning had been lost by nightfall.

The turn now came for the Germans to deliver their counter-attack, which they did in especial force early on the 20th against Givenchy, and between that village and La Quinque Rue. Forcing back the Sirhind Brigade after raking the whole front of the Indian Corps with their heavy guns



The Struggle for Givenchy: Part of the Sirhind Brigade which took part in the desperate fighting round the Indian positions in Flanders shortly after its arrival from Egypt



Heroes of the Fight for Givenchy: Indian reinforcements who helped to turn the tide against the German attack of December 20-22, 1914

and mortars, the German infantry succeeded in capturing a considerable portion of Givenchy and holding on. It was not until first an infantry brigade of the 1st Corps and then the whole of the 1st Division of the same corps, with Sir Douglas Haig in supreme command, arrived to assist the Indians that the position—at one time not a little critical—was practically re-established. This was on the 22nd. Meantime, however, much had been done to relieve the situation by British and French supports. When the Sirhind Brigade fell back before the German onslaught on December 20, the 57th Rifles and 9th Bhopals, of the Ferozepore Brigade, north of the La Bassée Canal, and the Connaught Rangers, of the same brigade, south

of the canal, stood firm, and maintained their position until the broken line was finally restored. The Garhwal Brigade, with the 6th Jats, also held on to its original line throughout, though heavily attacked, and having their trenches and loopholes sorely battered.

As soon as the news was received of the enemy's success at Givenchy, reinforcements of Sikhs were at once sent to support the Sirhind Brigade, while the 1st Manchester Regiment, 4th Suffolks, and two battalions of French Territorials, under General Carnegie, were ordered to launch a vigorous counter-attack, a battalion of the 58th French Division being sent to Annequin in support. It fell to the 1st Manchesters and one com-

pany of the 4th Suffolks to recapture Givenchy after a gallant attack at 5 p.m., but the enemy retained possession of our trenches to the north of the village. The recapture of these was only a question of time, but their recovery, trench by trench, cost us dearly. It was in one of these attacks that the 7th Dragoons, gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Lempiere, D.S.O., reached the trenches only to be driven out by enfilade fire, their heroic commander being killed. The 1st Seaforth Highlanders also suffered severely on the northern section of the defensive line, where the retirement of the 2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkha Rifles on the 20th had left their flanks much exposed. With the retreat of the Sirhind Brigade shortly afterwards the Seaforths were left completely "in the air", and, though they made strenuous efforts during the afternoon to clear the trenches to the right and left, heavy artillery-fire for the most part pinned them down and played havoc with their ranks. They were at length relieved by troops of the 1st British Army Corps. These reinforcements began to arrive in increasing numbers on the 21st, and by nightfall the broken line had been largely restored by the 1st South Wales Borderers, the 2nd Welsh Regiment, the 1st Gloucestershires, the 1st Loyal North Lancashires, and the 1st Northamptonshires, with the 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps in reserve. "Throughout this day", as Sir John French himself bore witness, "the units of the Indian Corps rendered all the assistance and support they could in view of their exhausted

condition." By the 23rd the enemy had not only been cleared out of all the captured trenches, but his activities had ceased, leaving the whole British position restored very much in its original formation. Three weeks later Sir John French made his inspection of the Indian Corps under Sir James Willcocks, and declared in his next dispatch that their appearance was most satisfactory, fully confirming his first opinion, "that the Indian troops only required rest, and a little acclimatizing, to bring out all their fine inherent fighting qualities". Elsewhere in the same report the Commander-in-Chief testified that "the Indian troops have fought with the utmost steadfastness and gallantry whenever they have been called upon".

More and more as the year 1914 drew to a close other units of Britain's increasing army at the front were given their baptism of fire, and it was remarkable how rapidly the so-called amateurs settled down into seasoned and reliable troops. More than once the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief had occasion to refer to the splendid work of the Territorials, and with characteristic generosity did not forget to award honour where honour was due to those who had laboured hard and unselfishly to bring that force to its high state of efficiency:

"The Lords-Lieutenant of Counties and the Associations which worked under them bestowed a vast amount of labour and energy on the organization of the Territorial Force; and I trust it may be some recompense to them to know that I, and the

principal commanders serving under me, consider that the Territorial Force has far more than justified the most sanguine hopes that any of us ventured to entertain of their value and use in the field. Commanders of cavalry divisions are unstinted in their praise of the manner in which the yeomanry regiments attached to their brigades have done their duty, both in and

was tried about this time by Sir John French in establishing the Artists Rifles as a training-corps for officers in the field. Here, in the best possible training-ground, cadets not only learned the theory of their duties within sound of the guns, but also acquired full practical knowledge by



A Crack Regiment of Territorials: King George inspecting the Honourable Artillery Company before their departure for the Front

out of action. The service of divisional cavalry is now almost entirely performed by yeomanry, and divisional commanders report that they are very efficient. Army corps commanders are loud in their praise of the Territorial Battalions which form part of nearly all the brigades at the front in the first line, and more than one of them have told me that these battalions are fast approaching—if they have not already reached—the standard of efficiency of regular infantry.”

What proved a valuable experiment

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turns of forty-eight hours in the trenches, visits to the observation-posts of batteries, and so on. When first started the school was able to turn out officers at the rate of seventy-five a month, but it was not long before this increased to a hundred. Reports received by Sir John French, from divisional and army corps commanders, on officers who had been trained in this way, were most satisfactory.



Winter Kit for the British Army in the Field: troops in their goatskin coats ready for the trenches

The furious fighting round Givenchy, which has been already described, practically brought the operations on the allied front in Flanders to a close for 1914.

On Christmas Eve both sides confined themselves for the most part to bombardment with mortars and hand-grenades, though several of our aeroplanes went up, and were duly shot at by the Germans. Then, as the day drew to a close, there was complete silence, and a Christmas Day was ushered in which will live in the memory of every veteran of the war. The post brought Christmas comforts and luxuries to the troops which they were able for the most part to enjoy in peace. Of Christmas puddings alone it was officially estimated that over eighty tons were received at the various railheads. Every officer and man in the field, as in the Fleet at sea, also received a Royal Christmas

card, bearing portraits of the King and Queen on one side, and on the other side the following greeting in the King's writing:—

“With our best wishes for
Christmas, 1914.

May God protect you and
bring you home safe.

MARY R.

GEORGE R. & I.”

A special card was sent for the sick and wounded, on which the inscription ended with the words: “May you soon be restored to health”. The unexpectedness of the card, and the proof which it afforded of their Majesties' unfailing thoughtfulness, were an obvious delight to all the troops. Princess Mary's special fund for providing seasonable gifts for those on active service—varied according to whether the recipient was a smoker or a non-smoker—also played no small part in bringing a

touch of home, and something of the true spirit of Christmas, to the trenches. Ever since the war began, indeed, the Royal Family had borne its full share of the nation's heavy responsibilities, not only in official acts, and in countless ways of kindness and philanthropy of which these Christmas gifts were the outward symbol, but in ceaseless activities of which the world knew nothing. Their Majesties set the highest example to the nation in thus calmly and quietly doing their duty, choosing that much of their self-sacrificing labour should pass unrecorded. They, too, had fully earned the brief respite which Christmas brought them in their Norfolk home at Sandringham.

For the men in the British fighting line this respite began at many points on Christmas Eve. Miniature Christmas trees burning along the parapets of the enemy's trenches—especially those of the Saxon trenches—as well as carol singing on both sides, had temporarily conquered racial hatred. Unauthorized, and apparently unpremeditated, the private soldiers of Britain and the private soldiers of Germany met halfway, exchanged cigarettes and cigars, and arranged an armistice which lasted in some cases twenty-four hours, in others forty-eight. Nothing in writing was exchanged. It was just a mutual understanding between the men of one army and the men of the other. Such things had happened before in the Peninsular and other wars, but never after such frightful slaughter as had marked the closing months of 1914. When Christmas Day dawned

the truce was confirmed by further exchanges of songs and cigars. The enemy, in places, even played the British National Anthem, and gave those Tommies who ventured among them wine in which to drink the King's health. Germans and Britons were to be seen arm in arm between the trenches; at one point an impromptu football match was arranged between them, at which the Saxons beat the British by three goals to two; and officers from both sides, though conversation languished where neither understood a word of the other's language, fraternized with a politeness worthy of a fashionable drawing-room at home:

“‘All this talk of hate’, as an officer of a Highland regiment wrote in a letter printed in *The Times* a few days later, ‘all this fury at each other that has raged since the beginning of the war, was quelled and stayed by the magic of Christmas. Indeed, one German said: ‘But you are of the same religion as us, and to-day is the Day of Peace’! It is really a great triumph for the Church. It is a great hope for future peace when two great nations, hating each other as foes have seldom hated, one side vowing eternal hate and vengeance and setting their venom to music, should on Christmas Day, and for all that the word implies, lay down their arms, exchange smokes, and wish each other happiness.’”

Here and there along the line fighting had not altogether ceased either on Christmas Eve or Christmas Day itself, a British trench being blown up at one point—with the loss of all the Germans who stormed it—and a short length of German trench captured by us at another. But for the most part there was peace, and it was



With the Indians in Flanders: a mule column halting by the roadside to permit the passage of French troops for the battle front

not surprising that neither side seemed anxious to re-start killing one another at the close of this remarkable truce. Soon, however, the war was resumed in grim earnest along most of the British line, the fateful year of 1914

closing with a desperate struggle for a post close to La Bassée Canal which, after changing hands four times on the night of December 31, became so untenable that it was occupied by neither side. F. A. M.

CHAPTER III

HOME WATERS AND GERMAN RAIDS

(November–December, 1914)

Measures of Precaution taken to restrict the Movements of Hostile Submarines—The *Berlin* and Mine-laying—Difficulties of the British Government—The U 18—Submarines in the Channel—U 21 on French Channel Coast—Loss of H.M.S. *Bulwark*—The Raid of December 16.


MENTION has already been made of the measures of precaution adopted to restrict the enterprises of the German submarines and mine-layers. In the course of the later part of November and the month of December further action had to be taken. During the night of November 17 an incident which was not fully appreciated by the public had occurred on the coast of Norway. The German steamer *Berlin* ran past the Agdenes fort at the entry to Trondhjem Fiord in the dark and under cover of a snowstorm. She is said to have carried in her crew a German who was qualified by knowledge, if not by licence, to act as a pilot in those dangerous waters. The successful performance of this feat did credit to the efficiency and seamanship of the Germans. It aroused some anxiety and searchings of heart among the Norwegians. And not without good cause, for the action of the *Berlin* proved that there was in

the navy to which she belonged no lack of either the audacity or the knowledge required to make an abuse of the neutrality of Norwegian waters. There are many small islands and solitary anchorages on the coast, and the possibility that the Germans would make use of them had not been overlooked. Further precautions were ordered to be taken by the authorities. But these were details which primarily concerned the Norwegians themselves. The fortunes of the *Berlin* had a peculiar significance for the British Admiralty.

It was known at once that the *Berlin* was very short of coal when she got into the fiord, that she was fitted to lay mines, and that she had none on board when she reached harbour. These facts led to obvious deductions. She must have been at sea for some time without being detected by British cruisers. There is in this nothing either surprising in itself or discreditable to the vigilance of our watch.

It is at all times, and in the best of weathers, impossible to keep every 10 miles square of a great expanse of water under simultaneous watch. During the autumn and winter months it is frequently, or even generally, impossible to see more than two or three miles in northern waters. A vessel might well escape detection in a wide stretch of sea and under cover of haze and fog. If the *Berlin* had come from distant seas, and was only trying to run the blockade, her escape into Trondhjem Fiord would have been a small matter. But from what was known otherwise, and from the character of her equipment, it was manifest that this was not what she had been doing. She had been provisioning German submarines and laying mines. The submarine being

less visible than other vessels, when she can be seen at all, is proportionately more difficult to detect. The main check on her activity is that she requires frequent supplies of fuel and food. The *Berlin* may have been engaged in supplying them, perhaps under cover of the Norwegian islands. That she had laid mines was to be taken for granted. The question was just where. The Admiralty on December 4 declared that she had been engaged in placing them in the open sea, and on the track of trade. The enemy asserted that they were laid on the British coast. But what was meant by "on the coast"? Was it five or ten, twenty or forty miles off? And however close they were laid it was obvious that wherever they were on the route to a British port they



Winter Work with the Northern Patrols: coaling ship in 36 degrees of frost

were on the track of trade. In fact, while war-ships and merchant-ships used the same waters, the obstacles which were put down to endanger the first must equally menace the second.

If it had been possible to suspend all movement of trade on the North Sea, and in the Channel which is dependent on the North Sea, the problem would have been comparatively simple. But this drastic course was not open to the British Government. Apart from the fact that a summary stoppage of the movement of trade would have amounted in its effect to an act of hostility not only to Holland and the northern nations, but to the United States, which would have driven them to retaliate, such a measure would have been most injurious to ourselves. It would have paralysed a great part of our own necessary trade, and would have been ruinous to the Channel and East Coast ports. It would, in short, have done us all the hurt which Germany could have inflicted if she had gained a great victory in the North Sea, short of covering the passage of an invading army.

The question was how to provide that neutral and native overseas trade should still go on, and yet restrict the activity of the German navy. There was but one possible way. Routes must be marked whereon the trader could pass in safety so far as we could guarantee him. But here it is necessary to bear certain conditions in mind. Since these routes were meant for general use their existence and their limits could not be concealed from the Germans. Hostile craft which were prepared to take risks could make use

of them. And then we have to allow for the fact that, since the superiority of the British fleet had suspended the overseas trade of the enemy, he had nothing to lose by rendering the sea unsafe—nothing, that is to say, except the indirect services which the neutral might render to him. With the neutral debarred from bringing him necessities, he had nothing at all to lose. Therefore he would be tempted to retaliate without scruple under the sting of the suffering which the blockade inflicted. The situation thus created can be studied in the history of the war with Napoleon, when neutral trade was ground between the upper and the nether millstones of the French “decrees” of Berlin or Milan, and the British Orders in Council.

The atmosphere created by a struggle in which one side is endeavouring to subdue the other by actual starvation, and that other is resolved not to yield without the most prolonged resistance possible, tends to produce a true savagery of rage. Nor can we ignore the fact that the submission of the neutral to the evils which the conflict must needs impose on him will be limited by his sense of his own strength. The immense development of the power of the United States has brought into action an element which did not exist in the Napoleonic epoch and cannot be neglected. As the year 1914 drew to an end the problem before the British Government was to limit the military activity of the Germans in home waters, to provide for the continuance of native and neutral trade in them, yet to take precautions that this neutral trade should

not serve the military power of Germany, while so using its strength at sea as not to arouse the hostility of the United States. The power which commands the sea may fight in a just quarrel, and its justice may be recognized by neutrals; yet because the power which commands the sea can interfere with neutral trade, it must needs run the risk of provoking the hostility of those whose interests it damages by the exercise of its force.

In addition to the steps taken earlier in November—the marking out of the open route from the coast of Northumberland to the Naze of Norway—the Admiralty took further measures after the 23rd of the month. It was then announced that after the 27th pilotage would be made compulsory on all vessels entering or leaving the Humber or the Tyne, the Firth of Forth, Moray Firth, and Scapa Flow. Examining-vessels were placed at Hoxa and Hoy Sound, and their directions must be followed, Hoy Sound could be entered only from Stromness. The purpose in all cases was to enable the trade to avoid our own counter-mines. In the beginning of December these additional precautions were extended to the east end of the channel. It was announced that from daybreak on December 10, “in the English Channel and the Downs eastward of a line joining Selsey Bill and Cape Barfleur, and to the southward of the parallel of 51 degrees 20 minutes north latitude, all light-vessels and buoys are liable to withdrawal or alteration in position, the lights, and lights of light-buoys are liable to be extinguished, and the

fog-signals altered or discontinued without further notice”. Warning was given that navigation without the aid of qualified pilots would be very dangerous, and that they could be found at St. Helens, Isle of Wight, Great Yarmouth, Dover, the Sunk Light Vessel, and London. The danger of capture, bullet, and mine is not all the



Map of Pentland Firth and Scapa Flow

Examining vessels were placed by the British Admiralty at Hoy and Hoxa Sounds to direct all vessels through Scapa Flow

trader has to suffer from naval war—nor perhaps the worst. Those perils strike the imagination, but what injures far and wide is the combination of obstruction, delay, and increase of expense.

These progressive precautions were the outward and visible signs of a sense of increasing pressure. British command of the sea remained unshaken. But “command of the sea” is a rhetorical phrase which is not

capable of strict definition as if it were a term of art. The British navy could cover the passage of troops to the Continent, it could have convoyed an invading force to the coast of Schleswig-Holstein, it could suspend the whole movement of German merchant-shipping. Our enemy could not do these things to us. Therefore the British navy might be said to command the sea while the German could

achievements of their French predecessors in the altered conditions of to-day. They were the submarines.

Practice, familiarity with the conditions of the life, and the stimulus of war combined to teach the crews of these vessels to show an independence and an enterprise which had not been generally expected. And the rather disconcerting discovery was made that the craft themselves were tougher than

had been generally supposed. On November 23 the German "Unterseeboot" (U)18 was rammed by a British patrol vessel. If the calculation that the submarine is so lightly built as to be unable to survive a blow had been correct, the U 18 ought to have gone down at once; but she was found to be afloat an hour later by the



A Call from "Somewhere in the North Sea": taking out the Spurn life-boat on an errand of mercy

not. It did not follow that no hostile craft could find the means of acting with success against any part of our naval forces. No fullness of command of the sea has ever given such absolute security as this. To the end of the war against Napoleon, when the superiority of the British fleet was unquestioned, French privateers and commerce-destroying frigates escaped from port, cruised with more or less success as far away as the Bay of Bengal, and returned home without being intercepted. During the months of November and December, 1914, certain German craft repeated the

destroyer *Garry*. Her deck was awash, that is just on the surface, and her crew were on it. They showed a white flag and were taken prisoners by the *Garry*. From this incident it appeared that a submarine does not necessarily sink at once because she is rammed. She is built with such a margin of buoyance as gives her the power to rise quickly. Effort and careful adjustment of her rudders are required to keep her down. By ejecting water ballast and turning her rudders so as to give her an upward-turning direction she will rise even after an injury. The U 18 did indeed sink after

her crew were taken off, but a certain doubt remained as to whether she went down because of the injury done her when she was rammed. One of her crew perished in her, and it was said that he had deliberately opened valves to sink her, and had sacrificed his own life to prevent her from becoming a prize. Though it has always been counted dishonourable on the part of her crew to destroy, or even to damage, a vessel after she has surrendered, this would have been an act of devoted courage. There was, however, no security that the story was true. All that we could be sure of was that the U 18 did not sink instantly when rammed. If she had been close to a port of her own she might possibly have escaped into it. The U 18 was not one of the newest of the German submarines, but belonged to the middle numbers of those built at Danzig (U 1 to U 27) between 1906 and 1913.

The mere fact that she was found on the north-east coast of Scotland was enough to show that neither watch, nor precaution, nor counter-mine-laying, had so far succeeded in checking the aggressive enterprises of these craft. With favour of fortune the U 18 might have equalled the success of the U 21, which is credited with having sunk the *Pathfinder* at an earlier stage of the war. As has been already noted, the German submarines did not confine their cruises to the North Sea. The loss of the *Hermes* proved that the mine-bed laid off the Straits of Dover had failed to contain them. During November they became increasingly active in the Channel. It was, as a

matter of course, impossible to follow the movements of these furtive raiders closely. They concealed their activity, and the British Admiralty very properly did not tell the world all it knew. We could not even say whether they were able to make use of Zeebrugge. The first bombardments of that port were renewed later, but the effect produced was uncertain. It was not really known whether the lock gates of the canal were destroyed. If not, then the place could be used for naval purposes even though its houses and commercial magazines had been reduced to utter ruin.

Wherever they came from, the German submarines were undoubtedly prowling, and now and then making themselves felt, in the Channel all through November and December. It was obvious that the German Government had the strongest possible motive for making every conceivable use of them in that region. They might already have become a terrible peril to British transports engaged in serving the army in France. That they did not thus succeed proved the excellence of the Admiralty's arrangements and the vigilance of the navy's watch. Such successes as they won in the period here dealt with were gained over merchant-vessels. It is supposed that the French *Amiral Ganteaume*, which was carrying refugees to Britain, was sunk by one, and not, as was at first supposed, by an explosion of her boilers. The passengers were taken off by the British steamer *Queen*. If the supposition (for it is no more) is correct, this was an example of the "frightful-

THE NORTH SEA AND THE BALTIC

English Miles
0 100 200

Fortified Towns



Shetland Is.

Orkney Is.

Na h-Eileanan Siar

Wick

Thurso

Presburgh

Aburdeen

Montrose

Quadee

Port of Breth

Newcastle

South Shields

Woolwich

Sheerness

Gravelly

Woolwich

Woolwich

Woolwich

Woolwich

Woolwich

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Longitude East 12 of Greenwich

ness” which Admiral Tirpitz and Count von Reventlow threatened us with. Yet why did not the supposed German submarine sink the British steamer which was giving her assistance? The sinking of the steamers *Malachite* (November 23) and *Primo* (November 26), near Havre, were not done by the use of the torpedo. The German submarine which destroyed them is said, on the uncertain authority of a Copenhagen newspaper, to have been the U 21. She carried guns and attacked the vessels on the surface. They

were treated as the *Glitra* of Leith was—that is to say, the crews were allowed to escape in their boats and the valves were opened. Till the end of December the presence of German submarines in the Channel was known, but was not much felt. The U 21 escaped on the 25th from the attack of three French destroyers on which she launched two torpedoes.

On November 26 the British navy suffered a disaster by the loss of the battleship *Bulwark*; but this most deplorable event cannot be said to have been a consequence of the war.




German Warfare on the British East Coast. how many of the houses suffered in Hartlepool on December 16, 1914


The *Bulwark*, a battleship of 15,000 tons, completed in 1902, and carrying a complement of 781, blew up at Sheerness. The misfortune was horribly sudden and complete. The battleship was torn to pieces in an instant. A cloud of livid smoke hid her from sight, and when it cleared away no trace of the ship remained. Her captain, G. L. Sclater, perished in her, and the whole of her crew, except a few who were ashore on duty, and fewer still who were taken out of the water. A court of enquiry was held at once, and came promptly to the conclusion that the explosion was not due to any act of the enemy. All explosives, and modern high explosives more than the gunpowder of former times, consist by the very nature of things of elements which are for ever tending to disintegrate with frightful violence. Only by the exercise of constant care can they be kept from bursting out to the ruin of of all about them. The strength of explosives keeps pace (to say the least of it) with the growing strength of ships. When the 32-gun frigate *Amphion* blew up in Plymouth dockyard on September 22, 1796, the ruin caused was about equal to the destruction of the *Bulwark*. Of the 310 or 312 persons then on board, including about a hundred of the wives and children of the crew who were there as visitors, 300 perished. This additional horror was spared in the case of the *Bulwark*. Her crew came mostly from Plymouth, for she had been stationed in the west of England. The number of survivors was only fourteen.

The dominating event of the month of December in the North Sea is one which will probably long remain a subject of debate and recrimination. On the 16th a German squadron repeated the raid of six weeks earlier on Yarmouth. It appeared off Scarborough, Whitby, and West Hartlepool, shelled all three, and disappeared.

It is necessary to begin by pointing out that until full and authentic reports have been made on both sides no quite satisfactory account of this attack as a military operation can be written, nor even to be sure whether the Ger-



The Raid on the East Coast, December 16, 1914: Damage done to Scarborough lighthouse by one of the German shells



The Raid on the East Coast, December 16, 1914: the damage done to the coastguard station at Whitby

man ships seen were all that were at hand to be called up if occasion served. The number and composition of the German squadron can only be deduced from observations which could not be well made in the circumstances, and from such indications as the size of the shells they fired. The strict official reticence maintained by the Admiralty does not allow us to know what were the composition and positions of the British patrol squadrons on which the country had necessarily to rely to repel an attack of this character or to intercept its retreat. From the available evidence we may presume that the German squadron was composed of all the new battle cruisers in home waters. We may therefore take them to have been the *Derfflinger*, a battle cruiser launched only in June, 1913, which carried eight 12-inch guns; the

Seydlitz, launched in March, 1912, carrying ten 11-inch guns; the *Moltke*, a sister ship to the notorious *Goeben*, launched in 1910, and carrying the same armament as the *Seydlitz*; the *Von der Tann*, of 1909, with eight 11-inch guns; and the *Blücher*, of 1908, which carries twelve 8-inch guns. The identity of others cannot be obtained, and the supposition that the *Lützow*, a vessel launched only in June, 1913, was one of them is judged to be improbable. The total number is supposed to have been six. It is safe to say that all of them must have been capable of going at a rate which would bring them from the Heligoland Bight to the coast of Yorkshire in the course of one long night. All the German cruisers named above are credited with speeds ranging from 26 to 28 knots.

There is nothing to be said concerning the strength of the British patrol squadrons—nothing, that is to say, of a positive kind. Certain negative deductions can, it is true, be drawn. Harwich, for instance, lies two hours' steaming nearer the starting-place of the German squadron than the coast of Yorkshire. A force starting thence could presumably have intercepted the enemy while in retreat. That this was not done must be held to show one of two things. Either there was no available force at Harwich or it was one which could not be expected to measure itself with the German raiders, or, still more, to encounter the battleships which on a very plausible hypothesis were at hand to support them. The patrol squadron which did come up at the close of the bombardment, and before which the

Germans retired, presumably came from another quarter. Its composition is unknown, nor can we tell how far, if at all, it was restricted by mine-fields laid by ourselves. A mine-field which is placed to obstruct an enemy equally spoils the road for those who place it there. One deduction from very obscure premises we must make. It is that the Germans must by some means or another (in all probability the observations of their submarines and air-ships) have learned as much about the distribution of our forces as gave them reason for believing that they could come upon our coast and


remain there for a couple of hours or so without incurring too great a risk of being attacked by superior forces or being intercepted while on their return. The news of the disasters which had overtaken their cruisers in distant seas before the date of the raid is known to have exasperated the Germans even unreasonably, and anger is a bad counsellor. None the less it is inconsistent with all we know of their character and methods to suppose that they plunged into a mere adventure in a fit of blind rage without looking before them.

The mere events of the bombardment, the purely military part of it, are of necessity simple and easily told. The bare truth was contained in the official statement published on December 16 by the War Office:—

“At 8 a.m. to-day three enemy ships were sighted off Hartlepool, and at 8.15 they commenced a bombardment. The ships appeared to be two battle cruisers and one armoured cruiser. The land batteries replied, and are reported to have hit and damaged the enemy. At 8.50 the firing ceased, and the enemy steamed away. None of our guns were touched. One shell fell on the Royal Engineers' lines, and several in the lines of the 18th Service Battalion of the Durham Light Infantry. The casualties amongst the troops amounted to seven killed and fourteen wounded. Some damage was done to the town, and the gasworks were set on fire. . . . At the same time a battle cruiser and an armoured cruiser appeared off Scarborough and fired about fifty shots, which caused considerable damage, and thirteen casualties are reported. At Whitby two battle cruisers fired some shots, doing damage to buildings, and the following casualties were reported, viz. two killed and two wounded. At all these places there was an entire absence of panic



The Raid on the East Coast, December 16, 1914:
Boy scout searching for pieces of shell amid the
damage done to Whitby Abbey



The Last of the *Emden*: the battered German cruiser ashore on the Cocos Islands after her encounter with His Majesty's Australian cruiser *Sydney*

and the demeanour of the people was everything that could be desired."

To this may be added the Admiralty statement that the raiders were—

"engaged by the patrol vessels on the spot. As soon as the presence of the enemy was reported a British patrolling squadron endeavoured to cut them off. On being sighted by British vessels the Germans retired at full speed, and favoured by the mist, succeeded in making good their escape."

So much for the bald facts, save that the amount of loss of life and wounds was at first underrated. The casualties ashore were found in the end to have amounted to 92 killed and 300 wounded, many of whom afterwards succumbed. The naval

casualties are less accurately known but seem to have reached some fifty or sixty. The German claim to have sunk two destroyers was entirely unfounded.

When we look at the raid from the moral point of view, and judge it as an operation of war, we have first to note that it did not differ in kind, but only in intensity and proximity to ourselves, from the *Emden's* bombardment of Madras. Ten victims were made on that occasion, and they were natives of India. But the number does not affect the principle, and the unfair killing of coloured people is not less barbarous than the same act performed at the expense of white men. It is not because of any difference in

the events themselves that more vehement indignation was excited by the attacks on the Yorkshire coast than by the similar assault on Madras. Nor does the mere fact that the vast majority of the victims were civilians of both sexes affect the principle. Every siege and bombardment, every battle fought among inhabited villages, brings suffering and death to the civil population. They are, in fact, inseparable from the prosecution of all war, whether on land or sea, though they are commonly far worse on land. The question is always whether the operation is in itself a legitimate one—that is to say whether it is undertaken to gain a definite military advantage, and not merely for the purpose of causing suffering and terror to the unarmed population.

When we look at this aspect of the raid, and the excuses the Germans have made for it, the utmost we can say in reason, and with a desire to be fair even to an enemy, is that the operation had at the best only a technical justification. There was a naval telegraphing station at Whitby, and it was a fair object of military attack. There was a battery in Scarborough of minute military value, but none the less an instrument of war which an enemy might legitimately wish to destroy, and a "wireless" station. The case of Hartlepool was better for the Germans; it possessed fortifications which claim to have inflicted injury on the assailant, and there was a military camp. We cannot say that such places ought not to be attacked. Hartlepool, too, has docks which can be used for naval

warlike purposes. It was so far in the same position as Zeebrugge, which we have bombarded—not, we may be sure, without doing some harm to the civil population, who are not even our enemies. The rule that before a bombardment time should be given to the civil population to retire is humane, but it is also "a counsel of perfection" not now often acted on.

The Hague Conference of 1907 tried to make rules which would have forbidden such operations as these. But the "rules" of the Conference were, in plain fact, recommendations which have not been universally accepted. Moreover, the Conference had to allow that military exigencies may justify a disregard of humanity. The Germans might argue that if they had allowed time for the civil population to retire before the bombardment, they would have been intercepted before they could fire a gun. In the case of the siege of a town the civil population is not allowed to retire when it wishes so to do. The garrison is not permitted to increase its power to prolong resistance by ridding itself of the "useless mouths". That is the barbarous law, but none the less the law, of war on which all civilized nations have acted. On such grounds as these the raid can be technically justified.

The weakness of the pleas advanced by the Germans is that they are purely technical. When we go beyond the merely formal excuses and consider "the direction of the intentions", which makes the difference between the lawful and unlawful character of the same physical act, the raid must

be condemned. This was not a case in which, as in a siege or battle, suffering is incidentally inflicted on the civil population in the pursuit of a fair military operation. Like the previous bombardment of Madras by the *Emden*, it had for its object the destruction of life and property for the purpose of propagating terror. The Germans can hardly maintain that the temporary disablement of the telegraph station at Whitby, the ruin of the ornamental battery at Scarborough, or even of the defences of Hartlepool and its dock, were in themselves ends for which it was rational to risk a whole squadron. There must have been a more serious purpose than this, and they have not scrupled to say what it was.

The service they hoped to perform for their own advantage was to spread terror throughout the whole of Great Britain. This is just the policy of subduing by "frightfulness". In itself it is barbarous, and it is not the less abominable because it is almost certain to fail. Destruction must be carried to the point when it threatens or seems to threaten every inhabitant of a country before it can enforce submission. There was positive absurdity in the supposition that the harm which half a dozen German cruisers could do to three coast towns in the

course of less than an hour of bombardment would throw all Great Britain into a panic. That fear and suffering were caused on the spot need not be denied. But they were confined to the spot and to individuals. The very places assailed were not panic-stricken.

As Lord Kitchener subsequently declared in the House of Lords:—

"No military advantage was gained, or could possibly have been gained, by wanton attacks on undefended seaside resorts, which had as their chief result fatal accidents to a certain number of civilians, among whom women and children figured pathetically. The people in the three towns bore themselves in this trying experience with perfect courage and coolness, and not the least trace of panic could be observed."

In the rest of the country the only sentiment aroused was indignation. Before the Germans could do more than inflict local injury at long intervals and for short spaces, they needed a superiority on the water which could not belong to a squadron even of powerful ships so small that it must take to flight whenever it appeared to be in danger of being brought to battle. The raid could do nothing to shake the naval superiority of Great Britain, and therefore the injury it inflicted was purely malicious.

D. H.

CHAPTER IV

MINOR OPERATIONS OF FOREIGN NAVIES

(August–December, 1914)

M. Augagneur and his Description of the Position at Sea—The Fields of Action of the non-British Navies—The Adriatic, the Baltic, the Black Sea—The French in the Adriatic—Germany and Russia in the Baltic—The rôle of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*—Russian and Turkish Fleets—The Action of the Chersonese Lighthouse—The Turkish Retaliation in Tuapse—B 11 in the Dardanelles.

WE must make our survey of the operations of foreign fleets in this war very largely by the light of certain remarks uttered by M. Augagneur, the French Minister of Marine. M. Augagneur was speaking to a representative of *Le Petit Parisien*. It is pretty obvious that the journalist was in the same case as many of his countrymen. He would have liked to know more than he was allowed to learn of the work done by the French fleet. That feeling is certainly shared by a good number of Frenchmen. Admiral Degouy, writing on the naval side of the war in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, shared the sentiment. He may not have said so in definite words, but the pointed praise he bestowed on the candour of the British Admiralty more than implied a murmur of expostulation with his own Government. M. Augagneur was, of course, well aware that this was the case when he decided to give the representative of the *Petit Parisien* an interview. It was highly probable that the Minister's confidences appeared somewhat barren to the readers of that paper. They knew already that the allied fleets had driven German shipping off the sea, and had covered the passage of hun-

dreds of thousands of men from French and British oversea possessions to the seat of war in France and Flanders. What they wished to learn was how it was done, and they were not told. M. Augagneur was no doubt in the right when he said: "Our fleet on the seas has accomplished all that we had to expect from it. After four months of warfare it is absolutely intact"; and he was not unduly optimistic when he added that "on the day on which it will, as it so ardently desires, have recourse to fighting it will have nothing to fear from any adversary. It is ready." A Minister of Marine could hardly be expected to say anything else.

In fact M. Augagneur was not in a position to say much more. When a naval force is so distinctly superior that its enemy cannot venture to give battle, a Minister of Marine cannot, with the best will in the world to be candid, find much or even anything to say. The position is an advantageous one for the strongest party no doubt, but then in that case the overpowering fleet is in the position of the happy country which has no history.

When we look at the operations of foreign fleets as a whole during the early months of the war, we find they

had one common feature. They had been confined to inland seas; the Adriatic (which is indeed comparatively open, but is none the less nearly landlocked), the Baltic, and the Black Sea. The Japanese fleet, it is true, had access to the open ocean, but then it found no adversary; and if its operations were not restricted by physical

Adriatic, rendered an essential service to the general cause. We, not in this country only but in France, could wish we knew more clearly how it was being done, but the French Government established a rule of strict discretion. We have no doubt that M. Augagneur was well justified in saying that French submarines had performed



Photo. Crlbb, Southsea

With the French Fleet at Sea: a Broadside from the Battleship *Marseillaise*

barriers, they were limited in space by political considerations, or were ancillary to the work of troops ashore. It does not follow that the work done in inland seas was without influence outside their bounds. When, for instance, the French fleet confined the Austrian war-ships to harbour in the Adriatic it covered the whole Mediterranean from attack. Transports could move to and fro, and trade could move freely without fear of interruption by Austrian cruisers. Therefore the French fleet, which dominated the

daring raids. Their navy kept a blockade in the Adriatic in circumstances of much difficulty—for its own ports were remote—and thereby promoted the general cause; but the circumstances, the weakness of the Austrian fleet for one, and the disadvantage in which a squadron must needs be in attacking fortifications on land, made its duties largely a matter of endurance.

When we turn to the Baltic, which corresponds on the north to the Adriatic, the position is reversed. In

that sea the superiority belongs to the enemy. It has been from the first a secure training station for the German fleet. Here the Russian fleet was at as great a disadvantage as was the Austrian in the Adriatic. Both served their causes to a certain extent—that is to say they detained, and in so far they neutralized, part of the forces of their respective enemies, which might conceivably have been employed elsewhere to advantage. Rumour was peculiarly busy in both scenes, and from time to time was absurd. The imagination of a journalist in pursuit of copy no doubt accounts for a story which went about in the early days of December. We were told that the Russian fleet under Admiral von Essen had artfully mingled with the Germans in a fog, and had fired on them with effect. The invention did no great credit to the fancy of the author.

When we did obtain credible information it was of a character to show that the naval war in that sea followed the course which would be normal in

the circumstances. On November 18 the Germans made another attack on Libau by bombarding it for six hours and sinking vessels to spoil the fairway. As Libau is a naval station it was a fair object of attack, and as it is an ice-free port the Germans had special reason for spoiling it if they could. Ice-free in the Baltic means not absolutely frozen in. The whole sea is more or less pestered by ice from the end of December to March, or in years of bad winter even till April. With the end of the year there would inevitably be a suspension of naval operations, at least on any great scale. Apart from the restrictions put on the movements of ships, there was also the question of the health of the men.

It was easy to believe—though absolutely trustworthy information was difficult to obtain—that the Germans lost some vessels. The *Hertha*, a cruiser of 5660 tons, dating from 1897, was reported as lost near Libau. The loss of the destroyer S 124, by collision with the Danish steamer *Anglo-Dane*,

was a disaster of navigation, not of war, for, like the explosion in H.M.S. *Bulwark*, it might have happened at any time of peace. In so far as the loss of the S 124, a “big torpedo boat”, according to the German classification, of 470 tons, was of significance for the war, it was a reminder that the German trade in




The Russian cruiser *Pallada*—sunk by a German submarine in the Baltic in one of the early encounters of the war

the Baltic had not been suspended. The *Anglo-Dane* was on her way from Stettin to Copenhagen when she came into collision at the entry to the Sound with the German craft, and this is a fact of some consequence. The neutral who carries contraband is liable to be stopped by a belligerent, but he does not necessarily commit an offence against the law of his own country. In the absence of German cruisers on the ocean routes contraband was freely brought to the Allies, and there were many articles described in the terminology of writers on international law as being *incipitis usus*, conditional contraband—food being one—of which Germany had need. There could be no doubt that she drew supplies of both from Sweden and other Scandinavian countries. It was not equally certain, for obvious reasons, but it was highly probable, that Russian produce reached her indirectly through Sweden. The advantage for Germany was considerable, and the relief to Russia, which was deprived of much of its means of exporting its produce, was appreciable. The naval superiority of Germany in the Baltic was therefore of no small value to her.

The Black Sea and the approaches to it were the scenes during November and December of events which, if not all quite trustworthily reported, were numerous and comparatively lively. The escape of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* from the Mediterranean, as already mentioned, had been one of the earliest incidents of the war. From the moment they had entered the Dardanelles they

became objects of active interest to diplomacy. Their collusive transfer to the Turkish flag makes a story for which it would be very difficult, if it were even possible, to find a parallel. From the date when Turkey entered into the war the two vessels were in fact part of the naval forces of Germany. They had really never ceased to be so. German officers and men remained on board, or if they did pretend to land, they returned immediately. The real function of the two ships was to co-operate with the Young Turk party in forcing the reluctant Sultan into war with Russia. But this was a form of service which, besides being by the very nature of it obscure, belongs directly to the history of Turkey.

When war was declared against Turkey, it afforded little opening except for raids. The presence of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* added sufficient strength to the Turkish fleet to render a Russian blockade or attempt to land troops very hazardous. The Russian Black Sea fleet included on paper three Dreadnoughts of 22,500 tons, but only one of them, the *Imperatritsa Maria*, had been launched—in November, 1913—and she was far from complete. Apart from her, and ready for service, there were two pre-Dreadnought battleships of nearly 13,000 tons dating from 1906, armed with four 12-inch guns and lighter armament—the *Ivan-Zlatoust* and the *Sviatoi-Evstaffi*. There were five other battleships—*Panteleimon* (formerly *Potemkin*) of 1900, of 12,580 tons and four 12-inch guns; the *Rostislav* of 1896, of nearly 9000 tons and



four 10-inch guns; the *Tri-Sviatitelya* of 1893, 13,500 tons and four 12-inch guns; the *George Pobjedoносetz* of 1892, 11,200 tons and six 12-inch guns; and the *Sinope* of 1887, 10,180 tons and six 12-inch guns. These vessels, with the support of four cruisers and some twenty destroyers, represented a force much more than equal to the Turkish fleet, which was represented by three old battleships only—the *Kairredin Barbarossa* and *Torgut Reis* of 1891, 9900 tons and six 11-inch guns; and the *Messudiyeh*, built in 1874, and reconstructed at Genoa in 1903, of 9120 tons, two 9-inch and twelve 6-inch guns. Even with the support of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, the Turkish naval forces were

outclassed. The *Goeben*, with her ten 11.2 guns and 22,640 tons, was bigger and more heavily armed than any of the Russian battleships, but she was less well protected, and was not a match for a whole squadron. Her greater speed allowed her to avoid the enemy, but in a limited sea mere power to escape was not of peculiar value.

The available evidence does not allow us to give a coherent account of the movements of the opposing forces. So far as we can judge, the course adopted on both sides was to pay flying visits to the coast of the other, bombard a fort or destroy coasting vessels if an opportunity offered, and then return to port. The

only approach to a serious encounter took place on November 18, and was brief and inconclusive. On that day the Russian squadron, after cruising along the coast of Anatolia, was abreast of Sebastopol, and sighted the two Turco-German ships at a distance of 25 miles off the Chersonese Lighthouse. The Black Sea is generally covered by mist or fog, and this occasion was no exception to the rule. The Russian official report claimed to have seen the *Goeben* at a distance of 4 miles. Their squadron took "a battle formation" (we were not told what it was, nor in what order the ships were going up to then), opened fire before the *Goeben* could reply, and damaged her so severely that she ran away after making a feeble reply. The action is reported to have lasted for fourteen minutes, and the Russian loss as very trifling. The *Breslau* took no part in the action.

We are not told that there was any pursuit, which would indeed have been of little use in view of the high speed of the German ships. But it was obvious that no watch could have been kept on the Black Sea end of the Dardanelles, for, ten days after this action, the Turkish cruiser *Hami-dieh*, a vessel built in 1903, of 3800 tons, carrying two 6-inch guns and eight 4-inch, escorted by several torpedo boats, bombarded Tuapse, without apparently either doing or suffering any considerable damage.

None of the daring submarine raids of which M. Augagneur spoke can have surpassed one which took place in Turkish waters on December 14, 1914. The scene was the Darda-

nelles, and the feat was achieved by Lieutenant Norman D. Holbrook of the submarine B 11. The weakness of the Turkish fleet debarred it from any action in the Mediterranean. It could hope to act anywhere on the south coast of Asia Minor, or Syria, or among the islands. They were all as much in the undisturbed possession of the Allies as was the western Mediterranean. All the Turks could do was to mine the Dardanelles, and man the fortifications on either bank so as to bar the entry to the allied fleet. As mines can be removed with no great difficulty they must be watched. The old reconstructed Turkish battleship *Messudiyeh* was stationed for that duty. A blow at her would in the first place facilitate an attempt to



Lieutenant Norman D. Holbrook, who received the Victoria Cross for his daring submarine raid in the Dardanelles on December 14, 1914
(From a photograph by Russell & Sons Southsea)

remove the mines, and then have the effect of shaking the confidence of the Turkish rulers at Constantinople. If once the approach to the city could be cleared, it was extremely vulnerable to attack from the water. This danger had at all times been one to which the Turks were very susceptible. The enterprise so gallantly executed

From the wording of the statement it would appear that the submarine must have been in the straits for a prolonged period, during which she had been alternately awash and submerged. The overflow from the Black Sea and Sea of Marmora maintains a constant current in the Dardanelles, which must have tested the skill of



Drawn by G. H. Davis

A Change of Diet: British submarine approaching a smack for a supply of fresh fish

by Lieutenant Holbrook was therefore something more than an isolated event. In the words of the Admiralty statement he entered the Dardanelles and—

“In spite of the difficult current, dived under five rows of mines and torpedoed the Turkish battleship *Messudiyeh* which was guarding the mine-field. Although pursued by gun-fire and torpedo boats, B 11 returned safely after being submerged on one occasion for nine hours. When last seen the *Messudiyeh* was sinking by the stern.”

the submarine's crew to the utmost. Perhaps the best proof of the reality of the effect produced by Lieutenant Holbrook's feat was the extreme care taken by the Turkish and German authorities to persuade the public in Constantinople that the *Messudiyeh* had sprung a leak. The V.C. conferred on Lieutenant Holbrook was gallantly earned by his demonstration of the scope of the submarine's action.

D. H.

CHAPTER V

THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN

(August–December, 1914)

Austrian Positions on Rivers Save and Drina—Serbian Interior Lines—Jardar Valley Operations—Austrian Check—Reorganization of Austrian Forces—Advance into Serbia—Forced Retreat of Serbian Army—Evacuation of Belgrade—The new Austrian Plan of Campaign—Description of Main Features of Serbian Terrain—The Austrian Attempt to reach the Western Morava—Serbian Successful Counter-attack—Rout of the Austrians—Reoccupation of Belgrade by Serbian Army—The Spoils of Victory.

TO the operations in the neighbourhood of the Jardar valley, which resulted in the rolling up of the Austrian line at Shabatz—August 18, 19—the Serbians gave the name of the Battle of Jardar. A dispatch from Nish on August 31 amplifies the brief description already given at the beginning of Chapter XIII. According to this semi-official Serbian narrative the Austrian forces of 200,000 men were strung in a semicircular formation of ten divisions along a front of 120 miles. The configuration of the line is indicated by joining Liubovje through Srebrenitzza to Shabatz with a prolongation to Klanek. This Austrian line was in an excellent position for crossing both the River Save and the River Drina without severe losses. This they did on August 12. Their forces may then be figured as advancing in five sections; the first consisting of the 8th Army Corps against Credi Tzer; the second, in which the 13th Army Corps was reinforced by a division and a half, marched towards the Jardar valley. The third section, consisting only of a brigade, was pushed towards Matihwa, while the fourth, which was

constituted of three mountain brigades, advanced into the difficult country of Petzkojo. The strongest section of two army corps, the 4th and 9th, were directed on Shabatz. Behind their lines the Austrians were well served by road and railway communications. Their troubles began when, having crossed the great loop which is formed by the River Save and its confluent the Drina, they had to traverse country which is intersected with mountains. The loop of the rivers is not unlike an irregular **D** reversed, thus **∩**, the upright of the letter representing the position which the Serbian army took up when, after fighting delaying actions for three days, it concentrated. Its strength lay in the twin facts that it occupied what are called interior lines, not readily turned on either flank, and that owing to the way the country is cut up by mountains and valleys an army advancing from the loop of the **∩** cannot easily advance at a uniform rate of progress among all its sections. Its victory depends on holding every part of the line while smashing its way through at one section, and so "turning" the enemy at the others. That was precisely what the Austrians

failed to do. It was what the Serbians, taking the counter-offensive, contrived to do. They held the strong Austrian left wing at Shabatz, with difficulty no doubt, but triumphantly; the Austrian right-wing attack never presented any difficulties to its opponents; and at the centre, in the Jardar valley, the Serbians counter-attacked, and threatened to turn the Austrian position. The Austrians perforce retired with losses estimated by their opponents at 10,000 men and 150 guns. The semi-official narrator at Nish accounts for the extent of the losses by the disorder of the Austrian retreat, and remarks that they advanced in the close formations prescribed by the textbooks and shown already in the Western field of war to be so costly to attacking troops. Whether the Serbian victory was exaggerated or not, the Austrian advance was checked, and their hold on Serbia was limited to precarious positions in the mountainous country about Gachevo, Boranje, and Yargodina, where fighting was intermittent but fierce.

After the check at Jardar the Austrians withdrew the bulk of their forces from Serbian territory in order to reorganize them. The operations in Galicia, where the Russian menace had now to be faced, subtracted the 4th Army Corps from the Expeditionary Force against Serbia, and probably part of the 7th and a division of the 9th Army Corps. On the other hand, the Austrian divisions in Bosnia were now brought up to full strength and were reinforced, and Austria was soon ready again with a new concentration of some 250,000 men. The plan of the Austrian

General Staff was to attack again over much the same semicircular front as before, but not to make their main attack at the most obvious point, where the Drina joins the Save and the country lends itself to rapid advance. This section was merely to be held and a feint attack made there, while the real attack was to be entrusted to a strong force crossing the frontier between Loznitza and Liubovje. Their sections of advance were as follows:—

On the extreme right of their line the 16th Army Corps advanced from Srebrenitza almost at the bottom of the loop of the **D** of the Drina.

A little farther north the 15th Army Corps was directed from Zvornik on the Drina.

The 13th and 14th Army Corps were to operate through Leshnitza and Loznitza, just on the Serbian side of the Drina, and guarding the way to Liubovje.

The 8th Army Corps was based on Bielina, in the angle of the junction between the Drina and the Save.

The 9th Army Corps was directed through Mitrovitza, north of the Save.

One and a half divisions prolonged the line thinly to Semlin, between the junction of the Save and the Danube, and within striking distance of Belgrade.

The Serbian view of the Austrian project was that the new attack was intended to push right on to Valievo, which is well inside that part of Serbia enclosed by the **A** of the Drina and the Save, and rather to the east of this figure. Valievo is the principal township of the Serbian highlands,



Back to the Fighting Line: Serbian reservists on their way to the Front

and together with Shabatz and Belgrade is at one of the three angles of a rough equilateral triangle which encloses the less wild and more traversible portion of Serbia. The first Austrian object in any serious invasion of Serbia would naturally be to occupy this portion, making it then the area from which a new advance might be pushed to the old capital of Nish. The most obvious road to take in seeking the accomplishment of this aim would be the northerly one, that is to say, nearer Shabatz than farther south, where the difficulties increase with the jumble of hills which afford a natural defence; and the Serbians felt justified in anticipating that this was the way which would be taken, because it was in the hilly district that the first Austrian attack had faded out. Consequently they placed comparatively feeble retaining-forces in the hills and prepared

to concentrate to meet the northerly attack. The Austrians, however, were sufficiently strong in numbers to hold any Serbian counter-attack in the north, while themselves making their chief effort in the more difficult country. They appear to have co-ordinated their movements very well. The Serbian semi-official account speaks of attempts to invade Serbia, by four army corps, from Bieline and Bossut, and of another advance which endeavoured to cross between Leshnitza and Loznitza. All these were "repulsed" according to the Serbian statement, or made only slight progress. But on September 7 it is clear that the Serbian line was pierced somewhere in these sectors of the battle line, and that the Austrians entered Serbian territory, establishing a division and a half in a strong position north of Liubovje. Holding this position the Austrians were able

to reinforce it, till on September 11 they had a compact force of some 30,000 men, with mountain brigades, massed at this pivot. The northern Serbians had no other course but to withdraw to the south-east, and when the Austrians used their pivot for a turning movement on the front Zvornik-Ljubovje, the southern Serbians had nothing to do but to retreat in conformity with the rest of their line.

The new front which they opposed to the invaders was on the line Ganchevo-Kostajnik-Krupanje. On this shortened line they were able to reform themselves into more compact resisting units, and to re-engage the Austrian forces still pressing on. The fighting continued throughout the 12th, 13th, and 14th, and the Serbian centre and wings were tested successively. At last the Austrians forced Ganchevo, and the Serbians, still fighting desperately for another three days, had slowly to give ground. According to their own accounts they "gained several important positions", doubt-

less in the bloody fighting about the heights of Ganchevo, Boranje, and Yargodina.

For a number of weeks the situation developed little. The Austrians were content with holding the Serbian border tight by the process of holding it within Serbian territory, and, though the policy was expensive in men, the price being paid, it was successful. The Austrians were able to bombard Belgrade, which they did in the prescribed German fashion, killing and wounding civilians, destroying dwellings and the university; but as yet no attempt was made to occupy the city. Then at the end of the first week in November a certain liveliness along the Serbian front, Loznitza-Krupanje-Ljubovje, which was defended by 120,000 Serbians under General Sturm Bojovic, heralded a new attempt on Austria's part to force the fighting. It was clear that they now proposed to execute the plan with which the Serbians had credited them in September, by seizing Valievo, so as to



Austria's Shortlived Triumph: the Serbian retreat from Ganchevo
(From a photograph taken by a Serbian officer at the front)



Serbia's Mountainous Battlegrounds: Serbian Infantry Regiment going into action
(From a photograph by a Serbian officer at the Front)

put themselves in occupation of that triangle of open or moderately hilly country of which Valievo is the south-easterly apex. When that was accomplished they would be in a position to make their next great stride towards the other two "open country" districts which intersect mountainous Serbia. If the Austrians could advance over the mountains south-eastwards from Valievo towards Nish, the ancient capital, they would presently arrive at a broad finger of flattish country pointing from Nish towards Valievo. This is roughly the valley of the Western Morava, or Galitza Morava, which rises among the mountains and

falls into the Morava River some distance north of Nish. Here the flattish country joins the far more important plains which constitute the chief avenue of Serbia, and run from Nish along the Morava till it joins the Danube. The Morava valley has one or two narrow places, and it broadens as it reaches the still broader lowlands along the Danube.

These stretches of open country might be figured as a reversed capital F, thus \neg . The Austrian plan was to advance along two fronts. The first or chief advance was to be made on the ShabatZ-Loznitza front, or, as it may be described figuratively, along

the top bar of the ∇ , while the other advance was on a front of Losnitza-Krupanje-Ljubovje, or toward the middle bar of the ∇ . The ultimate purpose of the movement was to seize the stem of the ∇ , and so to advance along the Morava valley and seize Nish, which lay at its foot. The Serbians fought them most fiercely along the more northerly line, that is to say, along the Shabatz-Loznitza front, which involved the Danube-valley lowlands. But it became plain that with their far inferior numbers they could not at the same time hold the Austrians in the more southerly Loznitza-Krupanje-Ljubovje theatre. The Austrians at length seized the hills to the eastward of Loznitza and to the south-eastwards of Krupanje, and it became plain that the Serbians must either risk the rolling up of their northerly face or retreat along their whole line farther eastwards. The falling back along the more northerly portion was the more serious for them, because it opened up the way for the Austrians towards the key of Serbia, the Morava valley. In order to contest this advance more fiercely the southern section of the Serbian army gave up Valievo, which is doubly important because it is at the foot of the mountains and is at the head of the line of railway to Belgrade. It is 30 miles inside the Serbian frontier.

The Serbians, having retired to the east of this point, were, however, in a position to contest more effectively any Austrian advance from Valievo to the Western Morava. The mountainous country made every farther step along this line more difficult than the

last. The Austrians naturally did not occupy themselves with unnecessary efforts in this direction while an easier way north lay open to them, and continued to press the Serbians along the more northerly front. The Serbians slowly gave ground, fighting hard to resist the converging pressure put on them, and engaging in delaying actions on November 19 and 23. At no stage in their retreat were they disastrously hustled, though it appears likely that had the Austrian advance been more enterprising the Serbians might have been seriously damaged in the process of taking up a new position on the River Kolubara. But they reached this new line safely, their artillery being sufficient to keep off the Austrians, and, reorganizing their defences and supplies, remained established there after November 19 till the end of the month. They were, however, compelled, in conformity with the new disposition of their forces, to evacuate Belgrade—which had never been defensible, nor, for that matter, a proper object of Austrian military operations. Its capture could have only a political value, though its loss, no doubt, would be deplored for sentimental reasons by the Serbians. They evacuated it on Sunday, November 29. It was occupied almost immediately by the Austrians, and on December 2 General Fank "laid Belgrade at the feet of the Emperor Francis Joseph on the 66th anniversary of his accession".

It was no doubt a wound to Serbian pride, but on a review of the campaign they had not done ill, their one mistake having been a failure to follow



**AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
AND
NEIGHBOURING LANDS**

English Miles
French Kilomètres
Nautical Miles

up their first success against the Austrians in late August. Instead of attacking the temporarily disorganized Austrian forces they engaged in a rather futile advance on Sarajevo in Bosnia—here substituting a political object for a military one. The raid towards Sarajevo wasted itself in the air, and the Austrians countered it in


Serbian in their new positions on the Kolubara awaited what they believed to be a fresh Austrian attempt to push down the valley of the Morava to Nish, they could at any rate reflect that during this long period they had tied 250,000 Austrian troops to the Austro-Serbian frontier, and so had prevented them from joining in the urgent opera-



Belgrade in Austrian hands: Ruins of the British Embassy after the Austrian bombardment

the right way by opposing it with merely delaying forces while gathering themselves together for the advance which eventually they themselves made on Valievo. That advance by itself rendered the Sarajevo enterprise impossible of further prosecution and led to its abandonment by the Serbians. Fortunately for Serbia, the Austrian movements till the November advance in force were equally disjointed and spasmodic. When at the end of the four months' operations the

tions in Poland and Galicia. They had done more than that, for they had inflicted considerable losses on the enemy in September and October, and even during the last stages of the retirement in November, in delaying engagements at Knashnitsa, Lazarevatz, and Dudovitza. Their difficulties had been great, greater than those of the Austrians; for though they were fighting on their own soil, they had been continually harassed by difficulties of supply. Behind them lay the



Map showing the Scene of Operations in Serbia

bad roads, the rugged passes, and all the hampering obstacles to obtaining food enough to feed an army extending over a 130-mile front. More than that, they were short of ammunition. Fresh supplies of ammunition they were now to obtain, and the bad roads were to hamper their enemies no less than themselves. In the official survey which the Serbian Press Bureau furnished of the decisive operations in December, and of the movements which led up to them, they defined their shortened line as extending through Sibnitcha, Kalagnevica (or Kalanievatz), Vrncham, Gojna-Gora to Markovitz, south of the Western Morava. The Austrian forces, conformably with those of their opponents, were disposed:—

On the front from Gojna to Markovitz in the following order:—

Four mountain brigades of the 16th Corps to operate in the direction of the Western Morava valley, on the front Kojelij, Kriva, Reka, and Beotchin.

The remainder of the 16th Corps and the whole of the 15th Corps to operate from the direction of Valievo and Milanovatz against the front of the villages Zukovatz, Batrchevatz, and Karjelij.

The 13th Corps to operate in the direction of Lazarevatz, Arandjelovatz.

The 17th and 8th Corps were to carry out movements along the Lower Kolubara towards the east in order to be able to throw back these troops from the Kolubara on to the new theatre of operations in the direction of Belgrade and Mladenovatz.

These definitions of the positions

are comprehensible in detail only with the aid of large-scale Austro-Serbian maps, for several of the places named are villages; but a consideration of the nature of the country over which the fighting took place will make the general intention of the Austrians clear.

With their large and well-supplied forces, with good railways, and the navigable rivers of the Save and the Danube behind them, they could easily occupy the open country to the north near the rivers. They had, with less ease, but with comparative certainty, occupied Valievo at the head of the easy country, and at the foot of the hills. Having done this they had extended in two directions, one in the lower flat country towards the north, where they had pushed west to east till their forces were at the point where the valley of the Morava meets the

valley of the Danube. The other extremity of their line they had pushed north to south-east to Ushitza, which was south of the Serbian position. This Serbian position may be defined as lying in an east-west direction, roughly parallel to the Rivers Save and Danube, and facing the Austrian positions in the northerly flat country. Valievo was to the north, Tchatchak (or Cuzac) equidistant to the south. The Austrians could not thrust their main attack from the valley of the Danube along the valley of the Morava, though that valley is so important as the highway to Nish and though the railway runs along it. The reason of the impracticability of advance is that a natural obstacle is opposed by the narrowing of the valley at about a third of the way along from the Danube to Nish. (There are other narrows nearer to Nish, but these



Serbia's Triumph in December, 1914: Austrian prisoners—part of some 46,000—arriving at Uskub
VOL. II.



Peter I, King of Serbia

need not be immediately considered.) The Serbians could have established an almost impregnable resistance at the first gorges.

The Austrians could, however, turn any defensive at the narrows if they could get behind the position. The only way to do so was to cross the mountain ridges that separate the lowlands at Valievo from the lowlands which begin about Tchatchak on the other side of the watershed and continue along the course of the Western Morava till that river falls into the Morava itself—below the second series of narrows.

In other words, it was more practicable to force a way across the watershed ridge, and so render a Serbian position at the narrows untenable, than it was to force the narrows and

so to turn the position on the mountain ridge. This ridge is very clearly defined to the south of Valievo. Its culminating point to the east is the big mountain mass called Rudnik. Thence the mountains sink confusedly down to the lower Morava to the north of Krajujevac or Kraguievatz. This ridge itself can be turned on the westward, and the Austrians had attempted so to turn it by going up the Drina valley and by getting behind it at Ushitza. They had up to the first day of December slowly pushed their way up the ridge near Valievo, and had occupied the northern slopes of Rudnik.

Such was the position when the Serbians, concentrated and reinforced with new munitions of war, determined to take the initiative from the Austrian hands, wherein it had re-



The Crown Prince of Serbia
(From a photograph by Jovanovitch)



Prince George of Serbia
(From a photograph by Jovanovitch)

maintained for two months. They recognized the turning movement in the west, and before it could be developed took the offensive themselves. According to their account, which there is no reason to doubt, the Austrians were completely taken by surprise. The Serbians thrust them down the watershed ridge and back along all the northern slopes of Rudnik, and, maintaining a continuous pressure on December 3, 4, 5, inflicted a complete defeat upon them—"that is to say, we routed the 8th Brigade of the 16th Corps and the whole of the 15th Corps less the 11th and 12th Brigades". This portion of the Austrian forces fell back in complete disorder on Valievo.

The Austrians endeavoured to redress the effect of this hammer blow on their centre by pressing their flank

attacks. But these attempts were fruitless, for the southern right flank of the Austrians was firmly held or beaten back on December 5 and 6, and on the same days their other column was checked on the front Liupet-Smrdikovatz.

"The remaining Brigades, the 11th and 12th of the 15th Corps and the greater part of the 13th Corps, were obliged to flee in the greatest disorder."

The isolation of the defeated portions of the Austrian line continued. On this part of their front the Serbians continued to press close on their heels, till by December 8 they were masters of the line Ushitza-Valievo-Lazarevatz, and thus had succeeded in driving a wedge in between the northern Austrian forces and the 15th, 16th, and part of the 18th Corps. These battered corps retreated routed towards the Drina and Shabatz, leaving behind them a trail of guns, mortars, ammunition-wagons, and rifles.

Part of the Serbian forces kept in close touch with the fugitives. Another part turned to engage the Austrian left wing on the northern lowlands in the direction of Belgrade and Madenovat. Here the Austrians were well situated with the 8th and 10th Corps, and awaited the Serbian onslaught along a line Stepojevatz-Borak-Lisovitch-Partsani-Mala Ivantcha-Begalatza-Grotska. On this line the Austrians are credited by the Serbians with having made "a desperate resistance"; but the Serbians, flushed with victory, gave them no rest, and fought them out of their positions. In any case the Austrians,

with their centre smashed, and with the position of their right wing towards Ushitz made entirely hopeless (they had already evacuated their most southerly positions), had no choice but to retreat. By the 13th they were falling back on Belgrade, fighting rear-guard actions. Their rear-guards were finally thrust in by the repeated attacks of the Serbians, and at last the Austrians had no choice but to cross the Save and the Danube.

At dawn on December 14 the Serbians were within sight of the positions at Belgrade which they had abandoned a fortnight before. Austrians occupied them, and attempted to defend them, but it was a half-hearted business. On the morning of the 15th the Serbians re-entered Belgrade richer than they had left it.


Their captures, officially described, deserve mention.

"We captured, between December 3 and December 15: 274 officers; 26 surgeons;

about 46,000 non-commissioned officers and men; three flags; 126 guns; 29 gun-carriages; 362 ammunition-wagons; 70 machine-guns; 2000 horses; three bands of music; 32 field-kitchens; 39 field-bakeries; and a very large number of rifles with a large supply of ammunition. These figures are not final, since they do not include the most recent captures at Belgrade, where the enemy lost more than 60,000 *hors de combat*."

Even that imposing category was not the sum of their successes. They recrossed the Drina, where they joined hands with the Montenegrins, who had pushed on to Vishegrad, and on December 11 and 12 had accelerated the retreat of the Austrian southern right wing. King Peter entered Belgrade with the Prince Regent and Prince George at the head of his troops, and went at once to the Cathedral, where a Te Deum was sung to give thanks for the victory.

E. S. G.



Montenegro's Call to Arms: King Nicholas's infantry marching past the Royal Palace



Photo. Underwood & Underwood

Montenegro's Forces at the Front: a Fortress Battery operating against the Austrians

CHAPTER VI

MONTENEGRO AND THE WAR

(July–December, 1914)

Mobilization of Montenegro's Army—Declaration of War against Austria—Organization of the Army—Its Arms and Characteristics—Shortage of Ammunition—Early Operations in the War—Fruitless Plans against Serajevo—Montenegrins established at Vishegrad.

MONTENEGRO'S participation in the war had not the dramatic quality of her entry into the Balkan campaign of 1912, when she fired the shot which, in a series of intermittent explosions, echoed through Europe right down to the Great World War. But her army was mobilized on July 28, 1914, before the nature of the conflict to be realized in full in Britain, and the Crown Prince was recalled to Cetinje, the capital, on the same date. Thenceforward the situation developed rapidly. The next day the Montenegrins heard that Austria was to

occupy Mount Lovtchen: that disturbance was already simmering on the frontier and in the Border villages. Consequently with the same disregard of consequences with which she had entered on the previous campaign against Turkey, Montenegro declared war against the greater adversary, Austria, on August 6, and took steps to join hands with her brothers in racial antipathy, the Serbians. The German representative was asked to leave Cetinje immediately afterwards.

A preliminary concentration of the Montenegrin army was easy to effect. King Nicholas of Montenegro once

proudly said that he ruled a nation of men; he might have added, a nation of soldiers. Every man in the country is liable to service between the ages of eighteen and sixty, and is theoretically a soldier during these forty-two years. That is to say, he has two years' training as a soldier, though only serving in a corps during part of those years, and thereafter with diminishing periods of field or corps training passes into one or other of the reserves. The organization might be termed a militia system on a basis of clans: but there is a permanent nucleus of the army which consists of a standing corps of officers. Montenegro is too poor a country to maintain a standing army, but of her fighting men, whose numbers are variously estimated at figures from 32,000



Mitar Martinovitch,
Generalissimo of Montenegro's army



King Nicholas of Montenegro
(From a photograph by Kuntzemuller)

to 40,000, some 20,000 can concentrate at a given spot within forty-eight hours. The telegraph has superseded older ways of carrying the fiery cross through this country of mountains, but only those who have been to Montenegro can have any idea of the primitive simplicity of the army or of the democratic brotherhood which is its chief characteristic. When war begins the whole country joins in it. There is said to be an ambulance corps, but it is regarded by the Montenegrins as a new-fangled superfluity. Transport is deficient; but every horse, mule, and ox in Montenegro can be commandeered: and the wives and daughters of the troops provide the commissariat and carry the ammunition. Mr. Price, a correspondent who went through the recent Balkan war, observed that

many old men accompany the fighting columns. They do not necessarily go to fight—though every Montenegrin kisses the rifle—but to look after their sons.

The troops are armed with repeating rifles of a not very novel pattern; most of them a present from Russia. The artillery is more modern, and, besides siege-guns, comprises field-guns, mountain-guns, and machine-guns. With this equipment and these characteristics it can readily be understood that the Montenegrin army is one of the best guerrilla armies in the world, and one which it would be possible to subdue among its own chaos of mountains only by exterminating both the army and the population from which it is drawn. But on the other hand the deficiency of the army in numbers and in artillery; the entire absence of cavalry or of any efficient substitute for them in motor traction; and the unfamiliarity of the staff with concerted operations on a large scale—all these things contribute to reduce the effectiveness of the Montenegrin army when waging war against Austrian divisions in open country. Another cause which probably has reduced the Montenegrin effectiveness in this war has been the shortage of ammunition. Three days after the declaration of war against

Austria, two Austrian cruisers bombarded Antinari, on the Montenegrin coast, destroying the wireless station and doing other damage. Later, a more or less effective blockade was kept up. Montenegro therefore must have been kept very short of ammunition early in the war; a letter in the *Times* in September made it clear that the country was short of other necessities, including hospital comforts, as well. Serbia was not in a position early in the war to remedy the shortage of ammunition by lending any to her ally; and thus while Montenegro might be, and was, a nuisance to Austria, the operations she conducted were rather of the nature of the sting of the gadfly.

These operations began with a raid on Southern Herzegovina, which is directly to the north of Montenegro. A telegram from the Serbian capital



His Royal Highness Prince Mirko of Montenegro

of Nish reported that by August 7, the day after the declaration of war, the Montenegrins to the number of 4000 were over the border, had occupied the villages of Spizza, Pachtsovitch, and Budua, and had taken by storm the Austrian frontier outposts of Metelka and Sienokos. By August 10 the Montenegrins had got into touch with some outposts of the Serbian army at Plevlje on the Serbian-Montenegrin frontier, and it was reported that the joined forces would advance northwards towards Fotcha in Bosnia—a project not strategically sound. But at any rate the Montenegrin army was able to occupy the southern corner of Herzegovina, and with the Serbians held some considerable portion of the Drina river. It seems probable, as far as a judgment can be formed on evidence which is incomplete, that the line of the Drina should have been the sole limit of Serbian-Montenegrin co-operation.

On September 8, however, the Serbian army began the invasion of Bosnia by crossing the River Save near Mitrovitch; and a telegram from Nish announced that the Montenegrins were to support this movement in the north by advancing through Herzegovina from the south. More

than once a juncture with the Serbians was reported; and on September 13 the Montenegrins were said to have defeated an Austrian force near Kouli-lovo, towards Krasatz and at Gratchka. It is quite clear that this victory was won over small forces of the Austrian which were no part of the main body. Five days later the Montenegrins were at Girazhda, and were exchanging signals with the Serbians at Vishnegrad. What the combined armies were projecting appears to have been an attack on Serajevo, which would no doubt have been a feat of a spectacular kind, though its usefulness, even when accomplished, was very doubtful at the time. But though it was reported that Serajevo was attacked or invested, the plan never reached fruition. The Montenegrin army so distant from its base was an army in the air, and the Serbians were enticed by the glittering prospect from their proper duty of concentration in their own borders. The project came to nothing in 1914: and the Serbians suffered loss in having attempted it. The Montenegrins ultimately established themselves at Vishegrad on the Drina.

E. S. G.



Photo Underwood & Underwood

Russia's Invasion of East Prussia: General Rennenkampf (third from right) and Staff
in one of the captured towns

CHAPTER VII

THE FIGHT FOR WARSAW

(October–December, 1914)

The German Withdrawal to East Prussia—The Advance towards the Middle Vistula—The Approach to Warsaw—The Plans of the Grand Duke Nicholas—German Cavalry advance on Warsaw—Austrian Participation in the German Campaign—Positions of General von Hindenburg's Troops—The Germans and the Poles—The Grand Duke takes Action—Hindenburg's faulty Information—Warsaw during the Battle—The main German Line—Hindenburg decides on Retreat—The Rear-Guard Fighting—The Siberian Regiments—The Austro-Germans South of the Pilitza—The Enemy's Line pierced—The German Retreat—The Russian Captures—Further Fighting in Galicia—Indecisiveness of the Russian Successes—German Re-invasion of Russian Poland—Descent on Lowicz—The Fighting near Lodz—Russian Successes in Galicia and Bukovina—Lodz, the Polish Manchester—Promotion of General von Hindenburg—Russian Evacuation of Lodz—Renewed German Attempts on Warsaw—A New Austrian Army thrown back across the Carpathians—The Germans defeated on the Bzura—The Position at the End of the Year—Austrian and German Prisoners in Russia.

EARLY in October, 1914, after severe fighting near Augustovo, north-west of the city of Grodno, the German forces which had followed General Rennenkampf on his retirement from East Prussia were constrained to return thither, pursued so closely by the Russian army that they abandoned several guns and convoys, large stores of ammunition,

and numbers of wounded on their way. One column became entangled in a bog, and was cut up severely before it could extricate itself. On reaching Lyck, across the frontier, the enemy received reinforcements from Königsberg, and thereupon rallied and made a determined stand. At several points the Russians were again successful, but, on the whole, the fight-

ing remained indecisive, though the Russians could at least claim that in this particular sphere of operations they had driven the enemy from their territory and confined him to his own.

The Germans were advancing, however, in much greater force towards the line of the middle Vistula, with the object of making a direct attack on Warsaw. On their right flank they were strongly supported by Austrian troops, and two important towns, Lodz, the Polish Manchester, and Radom, fell into their hands. Further, the Austrian columns threatened the town of Ivangorod, south-east of Warsaw. The enemy's successful advance in these directions gave rise to considerable apprehension in the capitals of the Allied Powers, but the Grand Duke Nicholas was not taken unawares by the emergency. Indeed, he once again lured the enemy onward, preferring to choose his own ground for battle, much as General Joffre and Sir John French had done, when withdrawing from Charleroi and Mons to the Marne. Nevertheless, towards the middle of October the position appeared serious, for the Germans had advanced beyond Skierniewice and Zwolen, thus threatening Warsaw both from the south-west and the south-east, and at the same time one of their columns was drawing towards the city from Pultusk on the north.

So far, little opposition had been offered to their progress. When, at an earlier date, the Russians had learnt that large bodies of the enemy were assembling along the frontier from Posen to Silesia—the extreme points being Kalish and Olkusz—they

had decided to deploy their chief forces on the right bank of the Vistula, merely covering their movements by a screen of cavalry and various infantry detachments on the left bank. In order to carry out the Grand Duke's plan some of the Russian corps had to be brought a distance of 130 miles by forced marches under incessant rain and along roads which were little better than sloughs, the rivers being in flood and their valleys resembling marshes. All this led to some delay.

Meantime the Germans advanced to the positions which have been previously indicated, and fortified them strongly in all sorts of ingenious ways, being provided with considerable artillery, including guns of powerful calibre. On October 13 the Russians began to take action in order to enlarge their sphere of operations to the west of the Vistula. Nevertheless the enemy continued advancing, some of his cavalry appearing within 7 miles of Warsaw, which seemed to have been left so inadequately defended that thousands of the inhabitants took to flight. After a sharp engagement, the venturesome Uhlans were thrown back by the Cossacks; but large German forces remained massed only some thirty miles away.

In view of the emergency the Russian advance in Galicia had been stopped, the troops there being withdrawn to a line running from the Carpathians, south of Przemyśl, and then northwards along the San and the Vistula. According to the Austrians this withdrawal enabled them to throw some troops into Przemyśl, thereby strengthening its garrison. Their chief desire,

however, was to participate in the operations against Warsaw, and with this design the reinforced army of the previously defeated General Dankl was hurried to the scene of action. The Germans were under the orders of the much-vaunted General von Hindenburg, who exercised, indeed, the chief command of all the forces threatening Warsaw. His best troops were stationed to the north of the Vistula's tributary the Pilitza (sometimes written Pilica), it being his intention to break the Russian centre and either rout it or throw it, as well as the Russian right wing, towards the River Bug on the north. At the same time Hindenburg had some strong columns, including the Prussian Guard Reserve, to the south of the Pilitza, and these bombarded

Ivangorod and endeavoured to drive a small Russian force out of its entrenched positions near Koziencice, on the Vistula's left bank. This effort, which lasted a couple of days and nights, virtually began the battle for Warsaw, which city the Germans felt confident of capturing. Their success would have greatly strengthened their position in Poland generally, and have seriously endangered the Russian operations in Galicia, besides having a considerable moral effect on the Poles, whom the Germans on their first advance into the country had striven to propitiate, though afterwards they had resorted to pillage, incendiarism, and cruelty in their exasperation at finding that, far from receiving a welcome, they encountered in some localities



Repaid in their own coin: Houses destroyed by Russians at Nochenstein, East Prussia

only the most sullen submission, and in others the sturdy resistance of guerrilla bands.

The time had now come for the Grand Duke Nicholas to act. While the battle was being engaged on the southern front near Kozienice and

sian forces to the north and to the south of the city, and he was ignorant of the fact that great columns had been assembled on the east, ready for dispatch by rail directly the decisive moment should arrive.

The general engagement began at



On the Heels of the Invader: a Cossack patrol occupying a Polish village

The German troops had been in occupation of this village only the night previous to the arrival of the Cossacks

Ivangorod he poured his main forces into Warsaw, whence they dashed to the western suburbs, within a few miles of which was the flower of Hindenburg's army. Apparently he was not prepared for the movement. All the information which he had gleaned, chiefly from German Jews resident in Warsaw and acting as his spies, was to the effect that there were Rus-

so short a distance from Warsaw that for hours the streets echoed and the windows rattled with the booming of the guns, while regiment after regiment passed by, hastening to the front. In spite of the previous panic the Varsovians evinced but little alarm while the fighting was actually in progress. Now that they saw so many thousands of troops advancing to the

defence of the city they recovered confidence, and the shops and the cafés remained open, the latter being thronged with people who eagerly discussed the various rumours which came in from the fighting area. German shells were falling, however, only 4 miles away, and presently some of the enemy's aeroplanes hovered over the city, and dropped bombs near the railway bridge, the Russian Staff head-quarters, and elsewhere. More than fifty people were killed and a hundred were wounded by the explosions, but apart from those casualties the only effect of this aerial bombardment was to exasperate the inhabitants. They still felt confident of Russian success, the more especially as they soon saw large bands of German and Austrian prisoners being escorted through the streets, while yet further detachments of the Tsar's army arrived to take part in the fighting.

The actual battle lasted from the 23rd to the 27th October. The principal German line extended from a point near the confluence of the Bzura and the Vistula through the woods of Blonie, almost west of Warsaw, and thence irregularly to Pruszkow, Piesieczno, and Gora Kalwarija on the south and south-east. Attacked, however, from a point which had not come within his calculations, and fearing lest his main forces should be cut off from the Austro-German columns operating near Kozienice and Ivanogorod, General von Hindenburg did not put up so strenuous a fight with his chief corps as he might perhaps have done, but preferred to fall back, and even to remove several columns

northward so as to ensure their safety. The Russian official report stated, indeed, that the enemy's resistance was far weaker to the north of the Pilitza than to the south of that river.

Nevertheless, even in the former direction, there was some fairly severe fighting while the German withdrawal was in progress. The troops which covered the retreat contested energetically with the Russians the possession of various villages, factories, and country houses, whose positions rendered them strategically important. Moreover, both hamlets and patches of woodland were fired in order to delay the Russian advance. In Eastern, as in Western Europe, the Germans pursued exactly the same methods. Their trenches before Warsaw were found to be works of art, with strong bomb-proof shelters and even comfortable underground snuggeries provided with chairs, tables, and looking-glasses.

North of the Pilitza, the bulk of the fighting on the Russian side was borne by some splendid Siberian regiments, which displayed great dash and bravery. They particularly distinguished themselves at Pruszkow and Ratitna, which last locality was strongly held by the enemy under the cover of woods and gardens. The German commander had placed some machine-guns on the roof of the church there, and it is said that although the Siberians suffered severely from the fire thus directed upon them, they long refrained from returning it, being influenced by religious scruples such as the enemy had long since cast to the winds.



The Winter Campaign in the Carpathians: Austrian troops in their "dug-outs" on the crest of the mountains

While the German columns which had anticipated an early, in fact an almost immediate, entry into Warsaw were retiring for fear lest the Russians coming from the north and the east should seize them as with a vice, the composite Teutonic forces in the direction of the fortified town of Ivangorod were offering a more determined resistance. Their collapse would probably have enabled the Grand Duke Nicholas to outflank the troops which were withdrawing. For some days, indeed, rumours were current at Petrograd that a part of Hindenburg's army was surrounded. This was prevented, however, by the energetic fight put up to the south of the Pilitza. The battle there raged for four days in forest-land stretching from the river, through Glowaczew (sometimes written Glovatcheff) to Politchna and thence to Janowiec and

Kazmierz, this line covering the important road to Radom, which ensured the Austro-German communications. At Kazmierz another Siberian regiment figured conspicuously in the fighting, driving the Austrians back through the woodlands at the point of the bayonet, for which achievement it received a telegram of congratulation from the Grand Duke Nicholas. It was, however, between the Pilitza and Glowaczew that the Russians achieved their greatest success. At that point, on October 26, their columns coming from Ivangorod drove the 20th German Army Corps and the Prussian Guard Reserve Corps from their positions, thereby momentarily severing their communications with Hindenburg's retreating men, and virtually compelling the whole Austro-German army to fall back. That, in fact, became the more necessary as its

right flank was suddenly threatened with an attack from the south, the Russians having crossed the Vistula at Solec, south-east of Radom.

The enemy's retreat was at first carried out in a very methodical fashion. He blew up all the bridges, wrecked the railway lines, cut the telegraph wires, and obstructed the roads behind him. At certain points, however, the retreat soon became a rout, whereupon the exasperated Germans took to their customary courses of burning villages and murdering the Polish peasantry. At the same time the vigour of the Russian pursuit compelled them to abandon no little of their impedimenta. Before many days had passed the more northerly columns had fallen back to a line extending from Kutno towards Lodz, both localities being more than 70 miles from Warsaw; while in a more southerly direction their retreat was carried to Novo Miasto, 40 miles

south by west of the capital of Russian Poland. As far west and south as Lowicz and Skierniewice the country was promptly recovered by the troops from Warsaw, while those advancing from Ivangorod took possession of Radom, where the Germans shot a number of Cossack prisoners before continuing their retreat. Warsaw was delighted at its deliverance, in recognition of which a solemn *Te Deum* was sung by order of the Archbishop, who received a special message from the Tsar thanking the Roman Catholic population for its prayers and declarations of loyalty.

All the independent observers—British, French, Americans, and others—who were in Poland at this juncture, testified to the loyalty referred to, pointing out that it had naturally been increased by the many German acts of cruelty, pillage, and destruction. It may not be out of




The Winter Campaign with the Austrian Army: Breaking ice for the transport of troops across the river

place here to show how numerous the Polish race remains. Before the war the province of Warsaw alone contained 8,700,000 Poles, and 2,400,000 were scattered through Lithuania, Little Russia, and the interior of the Empire. Austria, on the other hand, counted 4,080,000 Polish subjects, chiefly in Galicia; while the population of Prussian Poland was 3,530,000. It has been estimated, moreover, that America has furnished an asylum for about 2,000,000 Poles, and thus one finds a race of over 20,000,000 people which has survived every attempt to stamp it out. Assuredly so numerous a population were well entitled to reunion and self-government, in accordance with the Grand Duke Nicholas's proclamation at the outset of the Great War.

About a week after the deliverance of Warsaw a Russian official statement set forth that, taking the entire front of hostilities, that is from Thorn

to the vicinity of Cracow, there had been captured, between October 23 and November 4, 274 German or Austrian officers and 18,500 men, in addition to three howitzers, forty field-guns, thirty-eight machine-guns, and large supplies of ammunition and weapons. These figures applied apparently not only to the pursuit of the Germans from Warsaw, but also to the operations which the Russians had again resumed in the north of Galicia, and notably in the vicinity of the River San. They had drawn back and suspended hostilities in that direction at the moment when Warsaw was particularly menaced. The offensive was resumed by the Austrians, both on the San front, and towards the south of Przemysl, even while the troops beaten before Ivan-gorod were falling back towards Sandomierz. Here, between October 28 and November 2, they were again badly beaten; but on the 4th the Aus-



With the Germans at the Front: a foraging party's return



With the Russians: a Red Cross convoy escorted by Cossacks

trian Galician forces made a vigorous effort to drive the Russians from the San. The endeavour failed, and the Austrians being forced back at all points, began to retreat in a somewhat southerly direction, so that on November 6 the line of the San was well in possession of the Russians, thus enabling them to resume once more their advance in the direction of Cracow. At the same time, not content with these successes, the Tsar's troops had resumed the offensive in the direction of Prussian Poland and Silesia, threatening both Posen and Breslau. These movements were covered, however, by the army of General von Hindenburg, which by November 10 had almost entirely evacuated the province of Warsaw.

Unfortunately for the cause of the Allied Powers, the success of the Russian armies was not decisive. The troops in the more northern zone undoubtedly re-invaded East Prussia, and defeated the Germans once more in the neighbourhood of Soldau, subsequently occupying several small towns and villages, where, as some retaliation for the German exactions

in Belgium and the pillaging in Russian Poland, they proceeded to levy so-called war contributions. More to the south, near the frontier of the provinces of Posen and Warsaw, the Russians had prevented the enemy from making a stand on the Warta line by defeating him near Sieradz. In this direction the Russian cavalry even crossed the Posen frontier, but, it becoming apparent that the new German plan was to inveigle the Tsar's troops into intricate operations on the line between Thorn and Breslau—a district where elaborate defensive preparations had been made—and then to fall upon both their flanks, the Grand Duke Nicholas deemed it expedient to check any farther advance, except in the northern part of East Prussia and the region of Cracow on the south.

To relieve the pressure at those extreme points, General von Hindenburg resolved to invade Russian Poland once more—this time from the direction of Thorn, in which district his troops had been considerably reinforced. The new line of invasion—which implied a further movement on

Warsaw—stretched chiefly from the Vistula to the Warta River. On the other hand, from Wielun to Cracow by way of Czystochowa and Olkusz, the Germans remained at first strictly on the defensive. Some of their forces coming from the Thorn district, between Rypin and Wloclawek, were repulsed, but those which advanced southward of the latter town, in the direction of the Warta, proved more successful, and on November 17 an important engagement developed on this front. Five German army corps, relying on the Vistula and the Warta to protect their flanks, joined issue with two Russian corps, which, after a gallant resistance, had to fall back towards the Bzura River. On the 21st the enemy was reported to be in great strength in the vicinity of Lowicz, between which locality and Skierniewice he made yet another attempt to advance upon Warsaw, which city was also threatened by an attack made by some Austro-German forces on the Russian line extending between Kielce and Radom. In this last direction the enemy was promptly thrown back along his whole front. He was also repulsed between Lowicz and Skierniewice, the Russians thereabouts having been reinforced. Fierce fighting then ensued at Strykow, Brzezín, Koluszki, and Rzgów, to the east of Lodz, where the Germans, under the immediate command of General von Mackensen, had their right flank driven back with such heavy losses in killed, wounded, prisoners, guns, ammunition, and stores, that once again a decisive Russian victory seemed to be imminent. But

although the Germans undoubtedly retreated from several points with great precipitation, and although a part of their forces barely escaped being surrounded, they continued to hold their trenches at Zgierz and Zdunska, near Lodz, and offer a stout resistance.



Field-Marshal von Hindenburg

Such exaggerated reports of the Russian successes obtained currency that a warning against them was issued from Petrograd, where the military authorities only claimed that the enemy had fallen back with heavy losses in various directions, but that, as he still resisted obstinately in others, it was "impossible to regard the operations as concluded". On the whole, the situation was favourable to the Russian troops, but a really vigorous offensive on their part was rendered difficult by climatic conditions and the state of



General Dankl, one of the Austrian commanders
in Galicia

the roads, which had already been badly cut up during the previous German irruption into the province of Warsaw. It must also be admitted that although many Germans suffered from frost-bitten feet—this was noticeable among those who surrendered as prisoners—their mobility generally was superior to that of the Russians, whose transport service, moreover, appears to have been less efficient than the enemy's.

In the southern section of the Polish area of conflict more progress was made against the enemy during the last days of November and the beginning of December. The advance towards Cracow was continued steadily. On November 26, 4000 prisoners were taken on the Czystochowa line. At the same date a battalion of Hun-

garians surrendered near the Szreniava, on the Galician frontier, and a fortified position on the Raba—one of the Vistula's southern tributaries—was carried by storm. In this neighbourhood the Austrian forces holding the town of Bochnia, between 20 and 30 miles from Cracow, offered a desperate resistance, but were driven out with a loss of 2000 prisoners and ten guns. The Russians were also active in another direction. From Lemberg and Halisch they had come down on the little duchy of Bukovina, east of the Carpathians, and on November 27, after a fierce assault, they expelled the Austrians from Czernowitz, the capital town, where they were received with enthusiasm by the Rumanian and Ruthenian inhabitants.

Meantime matters remained almost stationary in the Lodz district of the province of Warsaw. Lodz figured so prominently in the Great War at this period that some particulars concerning the city may well be given here. Some ninety-five years ago Lodz was merely a paltry village of 800 people, situated in a marshy and deserted region. But a few hundred Saxon and Silesian weavers settled there, and the place gradually became an important centre of the textile trade, having 100,000 inhabitants in 1878, and more than six times that number in 1913. For rapid growth and increasing magnitude of business Lodz may be likened to certain cities of the United States. Before the war the German population was estimated at no more than 90,000 people, but all the city's trade and industry were in their hands, and they were financed

almost exclusively by German banks. The Polish inhabitants were for the most part wretchedly-paid operatives, ministering to the wealth of the German magnates who thrive on the city's trade, the output of woollen and cotton goods being estimated to represent about £30,000,000 annually. Taken and retaken by Germans and Russians more than once during the hostilities, Lodz was on one occasion cannonaded by the former, whose air-craft also dropped bombs on the city, damaging several public buildings and factories, and killing a number of people; but whenever the German troops were in possession of Lodz, the fact that its chief inhabitants were Germans, and that German financial institutions were so largely interested in the locality's prosperity, induced the commanders of the forces of occupation to give orders that the city

should be respected as far as military requirements allowed. However, a shortage of food supervened and the distress among the poorer classes then became very great.

In the latter days of November General von Hindenburg, who must certainly be accounted a commander of pertinacity and resource, was rewarded for the new invasion of Russian Poland by promotion to the rank of Field-Marshal, whereupon he issued a grandiloquent manifesto, claiming that his troops had already captured 60,000 prisoners and 150 guns, but admitting that the enemy was "not yet annihilated". Hindenburg had at this period twelve army corps at his disposal. Five were under his personal orders, five were commanded by General Mackensen, an officer of Scotch descent—in fact, a Mackenzie—while two, which had come from



Austria's Call to Arms: Recruits at the Military Academy in Vienna receiving the benediction from their priest

East Prussia, were led by General François, a descendant of one of the Huguenot families which emigrated from France to Germany after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. In spite of his numerous forces, which were repeatedly strengthened by reinforcements, the Field-Marshal completely failed to achieve his principal object, which was to pierce the centre

defend by reason of its great extent. It formed, moreover, a salient point on the Russian front, one liable to attack from west, north, and south, and so, on December 6, after some street-fighting in the suburbs, Lodz was finally evacuated, the Germans claiming that they followed the Russians in their retreat and captured a number of guns and men.



Scrapped! Wrecked Motor-cars captured from the Germans at the Front

of the long Russian lines, and thereby secure possession of Warsaw. Every offensive movement which he made for that purpose was effectively checked, and Lodz being still held by Russian troops he contented himself for the time with bombarding that town and then sending strong columns forward to seize it. The Russians, having thwarted his designs on Warsaw, allowed him to occupy Lodz. The town was unfortified, and was difficult to

The re-occupation of Lodz was undoubtedly of advantage to the enemy, the city having direct railway communication with Germany, and being therefore suitable as a base for future operations. These, however, the Russians met by taking up an easier line of defence. At the same time some German forces which attempted to descend towards Warsaw from East Prussia, by way of Mlava, were thrust back, while in the south General

Ruszky's army continued to make progress in the direction of Cracow, again defeating the Austrians in various minor engagements and capturing some thousands of prisoners.

But both the Germans and the Austrians were pertinacious. The former, on being foiled in their march from Mlava, increased their efforts on the front between the Vistula and the Warta, and the latter—in order to save Cracow from occupation and Silesia from invasion—threw large forces across the Carpathians. The object of the two movements was to outflank the Russians both on the north and on the south. Although the descent from Mlava was foiled, and the Germans on the line from Iłowo to Łowicz west of the Bzura were thereby placed in a somewhat dangerous position, the strong fortress of Novo Georgievsk being almost on their left flank, they attacked the Russians so vigorously that they compelled them to withdraw to Sochaczew, which is on the Bzura's eastern bank and only some 27 miles from Warsaw. This occurred on or about December 16, by which date both the German and the Austrian armies had received very large reinforcements, it being estimated that there were at this time twenty-three army corps operating on the front from East Prussia to Cracow. The enemy's great strength in the direction of the Pilitza, south-west of Warsaw, constrained the Russians to withdraw their line in that region from Piotrków to Opoczno, a distance of five-and-twenty miles, but, on the other hand, General Radko Dmitrieff threw back the Austrians, who de-

bouched from the Carpathian passes, between the salt-mines of Wieliczka and the headwaters of the San, and some desperate sorties of the Przemyśl garrison were also rendered abortive. The result of the operations, which lasted over Christmas on the Galician front, was that the Russians took some 15,000 Austrian and Hungarian prisoners, besides many guns and great quantities of *matériel*. Moreover, several important Carpathian passes were seized by the Russian troops.

Meantime events had also taken a favourable turn for the Russian arms on the Bzura front. The Germans, pursuing their previous success there resolved to cross the river, and on the night of December 22 they managed to do so in the immediate vicinity of Sochaczew. Some 15,000 men appear to have got across the Bzura, but the Russians then fell on them, and great slaughter ensued. On the same night and on the following day the enemy also crossed the Rawka—a tributary of the Bzura—to the east of Łowicz, and the fighting in this direction was prolonged until the 26th, when the enemy was decisively driven back at every point. Warsaw had again experienced a somewhat anxious time, but the enemy's efforts had been defeated, and the city was cheered again by the sight of some 10,000 prisoners, who were marched through the streets prior to entrainment.

The pertinacity of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg in endeavouring to seize the lines of the Bzura and the Pilitza may be compared to the stubborn attempts made by the German

commanders to capture the lines of the Yser and the Aisne in Belgium and France. There was no little trench-fighting during the operations which have been recounted in this chapter. At times Germans and Russians were only some 300 yards apart on the Bzura and Pilitza fronts and around Lodz.

The close of the year 1914 found the Russians still holding the positions which they had taken up in the province of Warsaw after their evacuation of Lodz, while in Galicia they were still making steady, if somewhat slow, progress towards Cracow. They were also threatening Hungary from the Carpathians both on the north and the east, and, still prosecuting their advance in Bukovina, they were almost on the threshold of Transylvania. It will be remembered, moreover, that the Russians were also at this time

contending against the Turks in the Caucasus, and had already inflicted a first defeat upon them. Both sides claimed to have made enormous captures of prisoners. According to an official statement, issued at Petrograd, from the outset of the war to December 23, 1914, the Russian armies opposing the Austrian and German forces had captured no fewer than 4326 officers and 353,184 men. Of these 3186 were officers and 221,447 men in the Austrian service, the German captives comprising 1140 officers and 131,737 men. Some 240 officers and 45,000 men were being treated for wounds in Russian ambulances and hospitals; over 100,000 men were at *étape* points or on the railways, the remainder being already interned, partly in Northern Russia and partly in Western Siberia. E. A. V.

CHAPTER VIII

THE COLONIAL CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

(September–December, 1914)

Contrast between European and African Wars—Situation in East Africa—Germany's Lost Opportunity—Distinguished Intelligence Officers—Germany's Futile Attack on Mombasa—Heroism of a Native "Non-com."—Conglomeration of Races on British Side—Fate of the *Königsberg*—Turn of the Tide in East Africa—British attack and occupy Longido—Defeat at Tanga—Cause of the Disaster—Second British Bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam—Operations on Uganda, Nyasaland, and Rhodesian Frontiers—Progress of Anglo-French Campaign in the Cameroons—More German Misrepresentation—Mission Work and Dynamite—Capture of Edea, Buea, and Victoria—Driving the Germans North—Marking Time in South-West Africa—Botha prepares for Bigger Campaign—Commandeering New South African Army.

IT would be hard to imagine a greater contrast in campaigning than that which offered itself during the closing months of 1914 between the titanic struggle on the

battle-fields of Europe, with their biting winds, their snow, and their dreary deluge of rain, and the tropical wars in the wilds of Africa. These last were little wars only by comparison;

for in normal times any one of them would have been counted among the great events of history. Physical difficulties played their part in the European conflict, but in Africa they handicapped and controlled the operations at every turn. The impassable nature of many of the forests, the deadly swamps, the trackless wastes of deserts, and the mighty lakes and rivers offered obstacles which neither side found itself prepared to overcome at the first onset of the war. Man-eaters and other wild beasts added unspeakably to the danger of being wounded and left behind. After one fierce engagement in British East Africa, for instance, some of the wounded were missed in the bush, "with the result", writes one of the survivors, "that they spent a most horrible night, surrounded by lions, leopards, and hyenas all night long. As it was, many of the dead bodies were almost entirely eaten." In the tropical belt of British East Africa, stretching from Mombasa to within 50 miles of Nairobi, the capital, neither horses nor mules can live. Elsewhere in the same Protectorate are vast desert tracts and impenetrable forests, so that the size of British East Africa on the map, where it equals Great Britain and France put together, is extremely deceptive from the campaigning point of view. Lord Cranworth has estimated, in his authoritative book on the subject,¹ that when all these uninhabitable regions are left out of account, together with the reserves set apart for the natives and big game, the area

¹ *A Colony in the Making*, 1912.



Map illustrating the scene of the chief operations in East Africa, October-December, 1914, and the "bottling-up" of the German cruiser *Königsberg* in the Rufiji River

that is left does not amount to more than ten million acres.

"Ten million acres", writes Lord Cranworth, "do not constitute a large area on which to form a colony. It is absurd to

think of it as on the same plane as Canada, Australia, or South Africa. Yet such are the advantages that this small area offers, and such are its possibilities, that it is not premature to suppose that on it will live a population comparatively dense and essentially prosperous, forming not the most insignificant portion of the British Empire."

Official reticence rendered it difficult at the time to follow the course of any of the African campaigns, but it was not impossible to gather a fairly clear idea of the different operations from such reports as were published, and the censored letters home of officers taking part in them. Mr. Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, lifted a corner of the veil at the end of January, 1915, when he gave a meeting of the Victoria League in London a hint of the thrills and romance of thinly defended frontiers contained in the still unpublished telegrams and dispatches from the tropical firing line:

"Of gallantly captured posts, of conquest and reverse, of strategy and organization. Sometimes a cruiser—more often a launch or a lighter—capturing a defended port or taking an enemy ship; bridges blown up or repaired, railways attacked or defended, wireless stations destroyed or erected, the tentacles of an impregnable and united Empire stretching out in its embrace, unflinching, unyielding, the personification of the power of the seas."

The first conclusion to be drawn from the connected story of the war in East Africa is that the German colonists in that part of the continent lost a great opportunity when they failed to make prompt use of all their superiority in military strength at the outbreak of hostilities. It has already been shown how their ineffectual raids during the first month or so were repulsed by the small force of troops then available, splendidly assisted by the British settlers, who responded as one man to the urgent call to arms. Lord Delamere, "who", as Lord Cranworth has said, "has attempted and effected as much as any two other men for the good of the Protectorate", was one of the first to volunteer. It was Lord Delamere, it may be remembered, himself the mightiest lion-hunter in East Africa, who entertained Mr. Roosevelt on his vast estate, and provided him with some of the best sport of the ex-President's tour. Lord



The German Cruiser *Königsberg*, "bottled-up" in the Rufiji River, East Africa, by H.M.S. *Chatham*



Official Photograph

The "Handy Man" Ashore: British landing-party firing with a heavy charge at long range

Delamere had previously served as a captain in the 3rd Battalion Cheshire Regiment, and joined the fighting force as an officer in the Intelligence Department. Another Intelligence officer was Lieutenant Grey—brother of Sir Edward Grey—who, unfortunately, was wounded in one of the early frontier engagements, and lost his left arm. It was only after the desultory fighting described in Chapter XI (Vol. I) that the Germans attempted the attack in force on Mombasa which the British more than half expected as soon as war broke out. Mombasa, the finest seaport on the coast, and of great strategic importance, though within tempting distance of the German border, was not aimed at until towards the end of September, by which time the King's Royal Rifles had been recalled from their punitive expedition to Jubaland, on the British East African border of Italian Somaliland; Indian reinforcements had arrived under Colonel J. M. Stewart; and the hurriedly mobilized volunteers had become highly effi-

cient. The Germans postponed their attack until September 29, apparently in order to act in conjunction with the cruiser *Königsberg*, which, according to a concerted plan, was due to arrive off Mombasa about that date and at once bombard the town. Mombasa, it should be explained, stands on a small coral-line island close to the

mainland, to which it is connected by the Salisbury bridge. It was the *Königsberg's* part to seize this island after bombarding the town and effecting a landing, while the German troops, marching from the frontier to arrive at the same time, destroyed the bridge. Unfortunately for the success of this scheme it was started too late. The German troops, some 600 strong, with six machine-guns, advanced into British territory along the coast from Vanga, but were pluckily held at Margerini, on September 25, 12 miles from the border, by Captain Wavell, with 130 armed Arabs and motor-cyclist volunteers, who hurried to the scene as soon as news of the invasion became known. Though forced back by overwhelming numbers and considerable losses, the little British force, strengthened on the 27th by the timely arrival of some of the King's African Rifles from Jubaland, under Captain Stonor, continued to hold up the German troops until October 2, when Indian reinforcements arrived and saved the situation. The

enemy's advance was finally beaten back at Gazi, 25 miles from Mom-basa, after heavy losses on both sides. Our native troops supported the British and Indians magnificently all

fire from the enemy's six machine-guns. Sergeant-Major Wale, of the Bombay Volunteer Rifles, who was serving on this occasion with a Maxim-gun section, wrote in the course of a letter, quoted by the *Times of India*:

"We counter-attacked and sent them on the run in disorder. We captured a German flag, which we hope to bring back with us. Four British officers on my right (out of the five) were wounded, and two men killed and a large number wounded. The German casualties were severe. We hope to be on the march driving them back into their own territory shortly, and our men are anxious for it. The whole behaved splendidly during their baptism of fire, and I am quite proud to be with them."

Highest praise, however, is perhaps due to the native "non-com." of the King's African Rifles, who, when all his British officers—Captain (temporary Major) G. M. P. Haw-



Germany's Colonial Allies: Native Infantry in East Africa

The hats have the Prussian Eagle on the front

through. Of Captain Wavell's Arabs, one of the volunteers present wrote:

"You must remember our troops were only hard little water-carriers, Askaris in fact, who had never been under fire before, and we thought they did marvellously well considering all things."

The Jind Infantry also distinguished itself at Gazi in face of a murderous

thorn, Captain W. G. Stonor, Lieutenant (local Captain) J. M. Llewellyn, and Lieutenant R. S. J. Faulknor—had been wounded early in this engagement, calmly took command, gave the order to charge, and led his men to victory. This splendid soldier, be it recorded, was Colour-Sergeant Sumani.

One of the remarkable things about this East African campaign was the extraordinary conglomeration of races fighting side by side in the cause of the British Empire—Arabs, Sikhs, Punjabis, Nubians, Sudanese, Nigerians, and other African tribes, as well as English, Scots, Irish, Welsh, and Boers—for the Boers of the Vasin Gishu were among the first volunteers to respond to the call by forming themselves into an extremely useful commando under Captain Wessels. "A terrible mix-up it seems," as a British volunteer with this miscellaneous force wrote at the time, "but to see them all march out together in their thousands you can't help thinking how great is the British Empire. An indescribable bond of brotherhood binds these strangely different races together, and the result is remarkable harmony."

Meantime the threatened attack of the German cruiser *Königsberg* had failed even more completely than the assault by land. Presumably she declined to run the risk of approaching British war-ships. In any case she did not put in an appearance at Mombasa, though the local authorities, under the Governor, Sir Henry Belfield, so fully expected her that all women and children were sent inland to Mazaras, and specie was dispatched for safety to the capital. The *Königsberg*, as pointed out in Chapter X, was all but a sister ship of the *Emden*, but her only outstanding achievement on her cruising-ground, which was the east coast of Africa, was the sinking of the British war-ship *Pegasus* on September 20, while that smaller cruiser lay at her



Sir Henry Belfield, Governor of British East Africa.
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry, Ltd.)

mercy at Zanzibar, cleaning her boilers and repairing her machinery after her destructive bombardment of the German East African port of Dar-es-Salaam. It was not long before the *Pegasus* was avenged. A concentration of fast cruisers was arranged in East African waters by the Admiralty, and a thorough search made until the *Königsberg* was discovered by H.M.S. *Chatham* (Captain Sidney R. Drury-Lowe) hiding in shoal water about 6 miles up the Rufiji River, opposite Mafia Island, which will be found on the map lower down on the German East African coast. Mafia Island was captured, but owing to her greater draught the *Chatham* could not follow the German cruiser up the river. The *Königsberg's* career, however, was effectually ended by sending colliers as far as possible up the stream and sinking them in the only navigable

channel—a dangerous task for the naval crews placed on board for the purpose, especially on their return in launches and boats, seeing that they had to run the gauntlet of the Germans landed and entrenched on either bank. Many were wounded, though for the most part not seriously. The *Königsberg* had meantime concealed herself so cunningly among the tropical palms—actually disguising her masts as trees—that it was not until a British aeroplane arrived on the scene that the exact position could be located.

Even then it was not possible to get near enough with the big guns available to deal a death-blow. Some months later the Admiralty decided to send two river monitors, H.M.S. *Severn* (Captain E. Fullerton) and H.M.S. *Mersey* (Commander R. A. Wilson), to assist the Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Station, Vice-Admiral H. King Hall, D.S.O., in these operations. It was not until the following July that the monitors, having arrived on the scene, and accompanied by air-craft, entered the river and opened fire. The *Königsberg* replied immediately, firing salvos of five guns with accuracy and rapidity. The *Mersey* lost four men killed and four wounded by one shell. The task of the monitors was an extremely difficult one, owing to the dense jungle surrounding the *Königsberg* and the almost impracticability of accurate "spotting", but after six hours' firing, and a number of hits early in the action, a British salvo burst on board, which, although it did not totally destroy her, probably put her out of action. In any case she ceased firing. To make sure, the Commander-in-Chief ordered an-

other attack by the same monitors about a week later, as a result of which he was able to send home the satisfactory report that the ship had at length been left a total wreck. In any other circumstances the *Königsberg*, which was about three times the monitors' size, "could have made mincemeat of them both", as one who took part in the action said, "in five minutes". They were assisted by H.M.S. *Weymouth* (Captain Denis Crampton), flying the Commander-in-Chief's flag, which followed them across the bar of the river and engaged small guns on the banks, H.M.S. *Pioneer* (Acting-Commander T. W. Biddlecome) engaging the guns at the river's mouth.

For the land operations we must now return to the first flight of the doomed *Königsberg* up the Rufigi in the autumn of 1914. This incident coincided with the turning of the tide in East Africa. With the arrival of both naval and military reinforcements it was Britain's turn to take the offensive on land. For some weeks after the fight at Gazi, when the Germans were not only defeated but forced back to their own frontier, leaving behind them a considerable amount of arms and ammunition, there had been little activity on either side. On November 2, however, after a small action above Mzima, on the Tsavo River, a British force, 1500 strong—1200 Indian troops and 300 volunteers—made an attack upon the enemy's position at Longido, on the German side of the frontier. It was to Longido—a steep, rugged hill, a little to the north of Mount Kilimanjaro, with the German camp half-way up—that the enemy had retired after

his raid earlier in September, when, as stated on p. 201, Vol. I, he was very successfully attacked by a gallant handful of the East African Mounted Rifles, the name given to the volunteer force raised in the Protectorate upon the first call to arms. The assault of November 2 began at daybreak, and continued until 7.30 in the evening. According to the account afterwards published by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, our troops behaved with the utmost bravery under determined opposition, the 29th Punjabis taking three of the enemy's positions in succession. Although considerable ground was gained, and a German counter-attack defeated, it was found impossible to maintain the position owing to lack of water, and our troops accordingly retired in good order to their base. The enemy, who was known to have lost thirty-six Europeans and eighty-four natives killed and wounded in this engagement, evacuated Longido shortly afterwards, and the place was occupied by our troops. Our own losses were considerable, including ten Europeans killed and ten wounded, all, with one exception, belonging to the East African Mounted Infantry, who again covered themselves with glory.

"The taking of German East Africa", as an officer on the British General Staff remarked in one of his letters home, "is obviously a much tougher proposition than the authorities ever anticipated." This was proved by the failure of the combined naval and military attack on the port of Tanga, on the German East African coast, some miles south of the

British border, at the time of the fight at Longido. According to a letter from one of the British volunteers, it had been arranged that the attack in each case should be made on the same day. Tanga is important not only as a flourishing seaport, but also as the coast terminus of the Usambara railway to Kilimanjaro and Moshi, and the starting-point for all caravans to the interior as far northward as the Victoria Nyanza. It was chosen for attack by a strong force of both British and Indian regulars, as well as Imperial Service troops, also from India. This expedition arrived off Tanga at daybreak on November 2, and, if we are to believe the first detailed account, published in the *Pioneer Mail* of December 18, 1914, it lost its advantage by a scrupulous regard for those very recommendations of the Hague Conference which the Germans callously ignored in their own attacks on the East Coast of Great Britain.

"As Tanga", to quote from the account referred to, "was an open town and reported to be undefended by the enemy, it was apparently deemed right to give notice of the intention to occupy the place, and to summon it to surrender before commencing a bombardment. This action was largely responsible, as after events proved, for the failure of the attack. The summons to surrender made by H.M.S. *Fox*, the escorting war-ship, was refused by the German governor, who, it appears, had already received news of the intended attack, and energetically employed the respite thus offered him in preparing the place for defence and in getting up reinforcements from the interior by rail."

How strong was the defending force in Tanga on the arrival of the British

expedition is not known, but it subsequently transpired that some 2000 to 3000 European troops took part in the actual operations. Had the British not been misinformed regarding the strength of the place, it is only fair to assume that the attack would have been pressed home without thus jeopardizing its success, in accordance with the clause to that effect in the Hague agreement. The German governor having refused to surrender, the British commander in the evening landed one and a half battalions at a distance of nearly 2 miles from the town. These troops at once advanced on the place, but as the enemy was discovered in much superior strength they were compelled to fall back and await reinforcements. The attack was renewed on the 4th at 11 a.m. The British artillery would have been practically useless on land, owing to the density of the bush, and was accordingly left to give what support it could from the deck of a transport. The town itself is half concealed by mango-trees and cocoa-nut groves, and the shores of the bay are mangrove swamps, with bush so dense that, although the distance from the town was so short, it took two and a half hours of strenuous marching to arrive within striking distance of the enemy. Knowing every inch of the country, the Germans were able to take full advantage of its natural defences. "The country was appalling", wrote one of the British staff officers engaged in the fight, who proceeded to describe how some of the Germans had hidden themselves in the rubber-trees of the dense forest through which the British

had to march, and, having let them pass, picked off troops one by one. The defenders were in such unexpected numbers that they were able not only to hold their own, but to beat back the attack with very heavy losses. The *Pioneer Mail* states that:

"The 101st Grenadiers, making a fine effort to fill a gap in the firing-line due to the difficulty of advancing in line through the dense bush, came under exceedingly heavy cross-fire of rifles and machine-guns. They were unable to advance, but tenaciously held their own. The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the Kashmir Rifles on the right had meanwhile slowly gained ground and entered Tanga, to the outskirts of which they held on, despite a heavy fire from the houses, which had been loopholed and strongly prepared for defence. Unfortunately the somewhat extended disposal of the troops, due to the thick bush, rendered it impossible to support these regiments at the moment when efficient support might have enabled them to carry the town."

The official account states that the 101st Grenadiers did succeed, like the other regiments mentioned, in entering the town, and actually crossed bayonets with the enemy. There was no help for it, however, when darkness came, but to retire and re-embark. This the troops were able to do without interference from the enemy. The experience had proved that a considerably stronger force would be necessary to take Tanga under its existing garrison with such topographical difficulties to deal with. Although this attack had been so unsuccessful and so costly—the casualties were given as 795, including 141 British




The Disillusionment: German prisoners under escort of French colonial troops

officers and men—the offensive in East Africa remained for the most part with the British. Certain other points within German territory were occupied, and a second bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam was carried out in December. The enemy's port was shelled on this occasion by H.M.S. *Fox* and H.M.S. *Goliath*. The town suffered considerably in consequence, and all the German vessels in the harbour were entirely destroyed. Fourteen Europeans and twenty natives were taken prisoners, our losses being one killed and twelve wounded. A German raid into Uganda was made on November 20, to the west of Lake Victoria, where our troops retired from Kyaka Fort on the south bank of the River Kagera, but held their ground at all other points, and repulsed the enemy. The German casualties were reported to be about sixty; our own casualties were six wounded. On the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian frontiers the policy of frightfulness on the part of the German commandant, who warned the British commander that his native soldiers would come and massacre all whites across the border, was turned to his own hurt:

"The German forces", wrote one of the missionaries shortly after the receipt of this message at Karonga, "were repulsed there after a hot contest, and, as at Abercorn, they have retreated into their own territory. They lost seven officers and sixty-five native soldiers all killed, and we took two field-guns, and, I think, two Maxims. We are sorry to hear, however, that it has cost us the lives of five of our fellow-countrymen, including Colonel F. Maning, who was in command of the forces.'

In the German Cameroons, on the other side of the continent, the Anglo-French expedition under the command of General Dobell, D.S.O., was left, in our last article on the subject (Vol. I, pp. 190-205), forcing the enemy back in three directions at the beginning of October, after the successful operations which resulted in the occupation of Duala and Bonaberi. Such steady progress was made that by the end of six months the Colonial Secretary could speak of the business as "already more than half done—and splendidly done". This, too, in spite of a climate revelling in intense heat, tropical downpours, and violent



Map of the Cameroons, showing the boundary of the German colony. The inset shows on a larger scale the scene of the Franco-British operations on the coast



Brigadier-General C. M. Dobell, D.S.O., in command of the operations in the Cameroons
(From a photograph by Speaight, Ltd.)

tornadoes, and a country incredibly trying to negotiate.

"Sometimes", wrote an officer with the British Expeditionary Force in a letter quoted in *The Times*, "it is the low, thick bush of the Sierra Leone Protectorate, more often of the wild West African forest. There are great trees hung and festooned with creepers, lianes, and tendrils—a perfect orgy of luxuriant vegetation, but always with man-high undergrowth, varied by mauve convolvuli and large ferns."

And German spies were everywhere, rendering it almost impossible to obtain reliable information. For, as the Cameroons had not escaped the customary campaign of German lies regarding Britain's motives in going to war, the native mind had been insidiously poisoned. One of the official reports stated that the Resident of British Bornu, nearly a month before Turkey joined in the

war, came into possession of a German proclamation in Arabic addressed to the Chief of Marua, an important town in the north of the Cameroons, describing the Sultan of Turkey as the friend of Germany and Chief of the Faithful, and ascribing the war to Britain's desire to take Constantinople and give it to the pagans. With so much misrepresentation it was not surprising that the British authorities in West Africa, as elsewhere, found it difficult to distinguish dangerous enemy subjects from those more peaceably inclined. One of the discoveries made after the occupation of Duala was that the German chiefly responsible for the attempts to blow up the British gunboat *Dwarf* with an infernal machine, in the Cameroon River, as mentioned in the earlier chapter referred to, was a missionary. When asked how he found such an action compatible with his profession, this individual replied that he was a soldier first and a missionary afterwards.

After the advance already described along the Duala railway to the Japoma bridge, along the Bonaberi railway to Susa, and along the Wuri River to Jabassi, a further advance was made up the Duala line on October 26, when a French force, under Colonel Mayer, with the co-operation of a British naval and military force, occupied Edea, an important town on the Sanaga River, 56 miles from the coast. In communicating the news of this expedition to the Governor of French West Africa, General Dobell stated that the fighting was severe, but that the conduct and bravery of

the Allies were excellent. Meantime preparations were being made to capture Buëa, the seat of the German Colonial Government. These preparations having been completed on November 13, the French cruiser *Bruix* and the Nigerian Government yacht *Ivy* bombarded Victoria—the seaport of the capital—which was then seized and occupied by a force of Royal Marines landed for the purpose. At the same time large allied contingents, naval as well as military, proceeded to converge on Buëa from different points, and two days later had the town in their possession, scattering the enemy in all directions. While these operations were in progress another column advanced along the Bonaberi railway from Susa, the station captured during the preceding month, and, driving the enemy farther north, occupied Mujuka, a station some 50 miles from Bonaberi. The advance in this direction continued until, by December 10, the whole of the northern railway had fallen into our hands, and the enemy had been driven back into the interior. Bare, a prominent native town beyond the railway terminus, also surrendered, a large quantity of rolling-stock and two aeroplanes being captured at the same time. The British losses were slight, and those of the enemy were not reported, but about sixty European prisoners were taken. Apart from these main movements there was little to record in the Cameroons, during the period under review, save patrol encounters and small German incursions of little importance on the Nigerian frontier.

In South-West Africa, Germany's only other remaining stronghold in what remained of her colonial empire, insufficient time had elapsed since the quelling of the South African Rebellion to permit any material change in the situation since we last had occasion to refer to it. Lord Kitchener, in the House of Lords, accorded unqualified praise to General Botha—"that single-minded and most resolute man", as Lord Curzon described him in endorsing the War Minister's words—for handling that dangerous situation in such a masterly manner: a result, he added, which gave us great confidence in the sterner task which lay ahead in the neighbouring German colony. Fully realizing the magnitude of this larger campaign, the whole burden of which had been undertaken by the Union Government before the misguided revolt, General Botha and his colleagues decided to employ the constitutional powers they possessed to commandeer men for service, and not wholly to depend on volunteers. The Government had not relied on volunteers alone in crushing the rebellion, and the commandeering order was more than ever necessary for the campaign against the German colony, seeing that the enemy, powerful enough from the first, had made the most of those precious months in strengthening his forces—reinforced by the rebels who had escaped over the South African border—and in consolidating his positions:

"In view of the danger of invasion", to quote from the official *communiqué* issued at the end of the year, "it will be necessary to employ much larger forces than at

first intended in order to destroy the enemy and rebel forces, so that they may never again menace the peace of South Africa. There can, therefore, be no distinction between guarding the borders from invasion and the prevention of invasion by dealing with the enemy beyond the borders. The Government consider that the burden of this effort should not be borne entirely by those who volunteered their services. Another reason for not relying on the voluntary principle is the attitude of the rural population. There is a very large section of the Dutch-speaking community with the most excellent military qualifications and war experience, who are perfectly ready to give their services in freeing South Africa from the menace of German militarism, but who have a fundamental prejudice against the principle of volunteering; shortly, their attitude is that if the Government require their services, they should commandeer them."

Therein General Botha proved both his profound knowledge of his own countrymen and his full realization of the military situation ahead. From

the beginning he had grasped the issues at stake with rare statesmanship, and placed them fairly and squarely before the country. In the proclamation which followed the *communiqué*, the Government expressed a wise desire to avoid unnecessary hardship in the mobilization of the new army, calling upon certain areas to contribute a reasonable quota of the men required, and leaving the local officers to make the most suitable selections, retaining, however, the right of legal compulsion.

In the meanwhile, Lüderitzbucht, which had been occupied by troops of the South African Defence Force since September 18, remained in British hands as the base of the forthcoming expedition, while the Engineer Corps busied itself in repairing the damaged railway and devising block-houses for the defence of such portions of the line as could be brought into running order again. There for



The Campaign in South-West Africa: German Colonial Horse

the time being we must leave them. It was good news, as Lord Curzon said in the House of Lords, to read of Boers and Britons marching side by side, and commandoes meeting in order to take their part in the campaign. We felt we could safely leave

the matter in the hands of General Botha; that he could be trusted to defeat the plot that had been organized for years against the South African States, and relieve them for all time of any such menace.

F. A. M.

CHAPTER IX

THE WORK OF THE RED CROSS


The Royal Army Medical Corps—Huge and Unprecedented Task of the British Non-Combatant Wing—Organized for an Army of 150,000 and Expanding for One of 2,000,000—Its Great Allies the Red Cross Society and the Ambulance Associations—Treatment of the Wounded—From Battle-field to Hospital and Home—How an Officer Won the V.C.—Splendid Recoveries—The Nursing Part—Wonderful Ramifications of World-wide Effort.

IN so far as the inevitable horrors of war can be mitigated by attention to the health of the troops and care for the wounded, the British people have reason to be proud of what has been accomplished during the great campaign. This work is the province of the Royal Army Medical Corps, which performs the duties connected with the care of the sick and wounded, and is also charged with everything appertaining to the sanitation of camps and to the water supply. Its task on this occasion was of an unprecedented magnitude. Never before had so large an army left these shores; never before had all the perfected instruments of warfare been brought into operation over so vast a front. At the outbreak of the war the total strength of the R.A.M.C. was about 5000 officers and men, under Surgeon-General

Sir A. T. Sloggett, K.C.B., Director-General of the Army Medical Service. But of course the number rapidly expanded under the exigencies of the demand. No survey of the treatment of the wounded, moreover, could omit to give credit to the Red Cross Society, the St. John Ambulance Association, the St. Andrew's Ambulance Association, and numerous voluntary hospitals and workers who supplemented the efforts of the R.A.M.C. and co-operated with it in achieving splendid results.

A battle, we will say, has just taken place, and the wounded are being collected. Their wounds are dressed as near to the fighting-line as possible; they are then taken to the clearing-station for further examination and attention, and from the clearing-station to the train which takes them to the base. This sounds a simple sequence, but a vast network of organi-

zation is involved. There are four classes of hospitals with an army in the field; namely, field-ambulances, clearing-hospitals, stationary hospitals, general hospitals. The scheme of medical organization is due to the late Sir Thomas Longmore, for many years Professor of Military Surgery at the Army Medical School, Netley. In the field there are three zones, called respectively the "collecting", "evacuating", and "distributing" zones. In the collecting-zone the separate constituent parts, so to speak, are the field-ambulances and those medical establishments which go with each unit of the fighting-force. A field-ambulance is not a mere wagon for transporting wounded: it is a large unit of organization comprising a bearer division and a tent division, altogether 234 officers and men with sixty-six horses. Its transport equipment includes ten ambulance wagons, each capable of carrying 4 men lying down or 12 sitting, or 2 lying down and 4 sitting. The division is organized into three sections, each having six stretcher squads, with six bearers in each squad. It is the business of the bearer division to collect the wounded men from the field after the battle—or, if practicable, during the fighting. To each victim a specification tally is attached, giving his name and regimental number and an indication of the nature and severity of the wound. In the stretchers or ambulance wagons the men are conveyed to the dressing-station, which is formed by a tent subdivision—it may be in a building if there is one convenient, or it may be in a tent.



The Ladder of Good Progress

There never was a war in which the wounded were handled so perfectly. The above shows at a glance the general scheme followed, connecting the turmoil of the Continental battlefield with the calm of the British home-land.



British Red Cross Nurses for the Front: Acknowledging a hearty reception on their arrival at Dieppe

At the dressing-station only the most urgent operations are performed, and as soon as possible the wounded are passed into the evacuating-zone. This zone comprises clearing-hospitals and ambulance trains. A clearing-hospital (for 200 patients) is mobilized for each division of the army, and is available for its use at the head of the lines of communication. Here the wounded get temporary treatment, which enables them to be passed on, as opportunity offers, to the distributing-zone. The ambulance train that conveys them may possibly be a quarter of a mile long and have as many as 400 wounded. When they get out of that train they are in the distributing-zone, which means that they are disposed of in a stationary hospital, a general hospital, a convalescent depot, a hospital ship, or a military hospital outside the theatre

of war. In theory, therefore, the method of caring for the wounded from first to last contains the following stages: (1) the field-ambulance; (2) the clearing-hospital; (3) the ambulance train; (4) the stationary hospital; (5) the general hospital; (6) the hospital ship; (7) the home hospital. Thus the field-ambulances, being immediately in rear of the firing-line, render first aid; the clearing-hospitals treat the severely wounded in a more thorough way than is possible to the field-ambulances, and also classify cases, sending those which need prolonged treatment to the stationary hospitals in the rear; at the stationary hospitals those capable of being treated and returned to the firing-line are kept, while others who are going to be protracted cases go to the general hospitals, which are staffed and equipped to deal with all cases that may be sent

to them from the other three classes of hospital. Stationary hospitals, it may be noted, are those established along the line of communications, and equipped for 200 beds; while general hospitals, which are at the base and other suitable places, are equipped for 520 beds. Such are the main features of the system which has been adhered to as closely as possible by the British.

The conditions at an early period of the campaign were against this systematic routine being regularly observed without flaw. Owing to the overwhelming strength of the enemy, our troops were forced to retire; and, as the battle-fields upon which our wounded were lying became speedily occupied by German troops, the sites of dressing-stations could not be used for that purpose, while clearing-hospitals came within the range of attack. Some wounded lay forty-eight hours without being collected. Among the first batch of 102 who arrived at Plymouth in September were a number who had been travelling four days with only a first-aid dressing on their wounds. But these were strictly exceptional cases. Matters righted themselves very soon. The lessons of experience, moreover, were quickly grasped as the campaign proceeded. Thus, after the inconvenience and discomfort of having to remove wounded to the railhead in motor lorries had been proved, motor ambulances were hurried forward. Some of these vehicles were sent by the British Red Cross Society, and, at the suggestion of the War Office, the American Women's War Relief Fund postponed their original intention of equipping

an ambulance ship and presented six motor ambulances. The first motor ambulance convoy to be used as a complete unit was contributed by firms in the motor and allied industries, and became a permanent unit of the Army Service Corps, under Captain George Du Cros. It consisted of forty-one ambulances, two travelling workshops, three stores lorries, three officers' cars, and ten motor-cycles, with a personnel of 5 officers and 144 non-commissioned officers and men.

While the lines of communication remained short, both stationary and general British hospitals were in the same town—Boulogne. Dieppe and Havre were the corresponding distributing centres for the French; while Calais became the evacuation centre



Surgeon-General Sir A. T. Sloggett, in command of the R.A.M.C. at the Front
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry, Ltd.)

for the Belgian sick and wounded, who were sent to the United Kingdom to finish their cure. By December, 1914, Boulogne was full of hospitals, of which the largest, known as "No. 13 General", was most happily accommodated in the splendid Casino. Big hotels had been converted into hospitals at a few hours' notice. Apart from these hospitals, those of all classes in the United Kingdom formed an extensive distributing-zone for our wounded. As compared with the South African War, this proximity to Britain was an immense advantage, with important effects by increasing the percentage of wounded who recovered and were able to return to the fighting-line. In the permanent military hospitals of the United Kingdom there were 7000 beds; the base hospitals of the Territorial Force (called into being on mobilization) number twenty-three, each with a complement of 520 beds; and there were, among others, the large civil

hospitals, with traditions of fine service and splendid equipment in every branch of treatment.

We can picture the scene at the sugar sheds on Boulogne quay when the wounded on their progress from the front were transferred to the hospital ship, the Channel link with the home hospital. Lowered gently on stretchers by orderlies into the hold of the vessel, they were soon in their bunks and made comfortable with blankets and hot bottles.

"The boat seems so oddly quiet this voyage", writes an Army sister, "after the work and crowded state it was in for the last voyage with our 150 sick and wounded. I never saw a braver, more uncomplaining set of men. Their first demand was for a smoke, then something to drink, and then food and sleep, and more sleep."

Arrived at Southampton, they were distributed by ambulance trains throughout the country according to available beds, from lists supplied twice weekly to the embarkation



With the Royal Army Medical Corps in France: one of the Red Cross wagons



"The Happy Warrior": a wounded Indian's return from the front

officer, the most serious cases being allotted, of course, to the nearest hospitals.

No praise can be too high for the devotion and bravery of the medico-military service in the field. Twenty-two hours' work a day was not uncommon. They dared to go to the trenches to render first-aid, knowing that many Germans regarded the annihilation of trained doctors as legitimate warfare. The *London Gazette* of November 16, 1914, announced the grant of the Victoria Cross to Captain Harry Sherwood Ranken, R.A.M.C., for attending wounded in the trenches under rifle

and shrapnel fire at Huatvesnes on September 19, and on September 20 continuing to attend to wounded after his thigh and leg had been shattered. "He has since died of his wounds", added the official record of this great act of heroism. It was an officer of the R.A.M.C., too, who, a little later in the campaign, earned the unique distinction of a clasp to a Victoria Cross which he had already won in South Africa. This gallant officer was Lieutenant Arthur Martin Leake, whose clasp was awarded "for most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty throughout the campaign". We see the staff in our mind's eye collecting the wounded in the dark, crossing a river bridge under shell-fire, or working in hospital, perhaps operating by an imperfect light, while bombs are falling or shrapnel bursting quite close to the "theatre". A look-out had to be kept not only for bombs, but in case the insidious spy should be prowling around. One of the meanest acts of the enemy was performed by a German doctor, who visited a Red Cross ambulance early in the war to discover in what parts of the body the British had been shot. At this time the wounds were chiefly in legs and feet; trench warfare was not yet the rule. As a result of the visit the German rifles were elevated to hit higher. In addition to the medico-military profession, the British War Office had the services of distinguished members from the civil side. In November a sanitary committee, which was sent to the front by Surgeon-General Sir Alfred Keogh, returned with the assurance that the sanitary condition of the actual trenches



With the French Red Cross at the Front: Bringing in wounded soldiers from the fighting-line to the field hospital

left nothing to be desired. Special credit was due to Colonel W. H. Horrocks, Expert in Sanitation on the Army Medical Advisory Board. Every precaution that science and experience could suggest was taken. After three months, tetanus was very rare, owing to the injection of antitoxin, and gangrene was in comparative abeyance. Of enteric there were very few cases, thanks to the inoculation treatment, which, although not compulsory on the troops, was widely adopted on the strong advice of the highest medical and scientific authorities. The antiseptic treatment was so general that the War Office sent out to each officer and man a small amount of iodine, in order that he might give immediate treatment to the wounds himself when possible. For the first time the X-ray apparatus was also able in this war to play a most valuable

part in locating bullets and internal wounds. The percentage of deaths from wounds showed that unless the modern rifle bullet kills outright it inflicts a wound from which the individual has more than a fair chance of recovery. Most of the wounds, however, were those of shrapnel, and the vast majority of an almost novel type. In the French army, from the beginning of the war to December 1, 1914, the number cured and returned to the front was 54.5 per cent; cured but given convalescent leave, 24.5 per cent; the remainder included those still under treatment in hospital and a small number of invalided. The proportion of deaths among the wounded was only 3.48 per cent. No corresponding figures are available regarding our own army at the time of writing, but Mr. Asquith stated in the House of Commons early

in February, 1915, that about 60 per cent of our wounded recovered and became fit for service—a record far above the mark of any previous war.

Two ladies chiefly were responsible for the organization of the whole Army nursing system at the front—Miss M'Carthy, one of the principal matrons, who visited all the hospitals at the front, and Miss Becher, Matron-in-Chief at the War Office, who dispatched nurses by the next boat on hearing from Miss M'Carthy that more were required. At home important work devolved upon Miss Sidney Browne, Matron-in-Chief of the Territorial Force Nursing Service. Nurses did not get nearer to the firing-line than the clearing-hospitals. The heavier work was done by orderlies drawn from the R.A.M.C. or from the St. John Ambulance Corps, and the nursing by the thoroughly trained ladies who constitute Queen Alex-

andra's Imperial Military Nursing Service, as well as by the equally well-trained nurses supplied by the Red Cross Society, the St. John Ambulance Association, and the St. Andrew's Ambulance Association. Certain instances of misguided zeal at the first among amateurs ill-qualified for the hard work at the front led to a good deal of not unnatural criticism, but to say this is not to decry the vast amount of devoted personal effort by people who voluntarily spent themselves and their means in the work of alleviating suffering.

Need we say that the suffering was bravely borne? Professional men and women trained to endure painful sights owned that they had to choke back their tears. During the wintry and wet weather the plight of the men on admission was beyond description. We read of ice-cold feet, socks sodder, and like paper and stuck to their feet,



The Red Cross in Flanders: Bringing in the wounded to the Base Hospital, with priests following behind



With the Red Cross in France: the Duchess of Westminster (on the right, with her favourite dog) and some of the nurses at her military hospital at Le Touquet

clothes all gore and mud dried in for many days, and many cases of gangrene, peritonitis, fractures of all sorts, injuries in some cases from head to foot. "It is grand to see so many rallying from the jaws of death", wrote a member of the National Union of Trained Nurses; "another day on the lines would have meant the end of a great many." It is work that makes no distinction between friend and enemy. A London doctor (Dr. Ludwig Tasker), relating his experiences with the R.A.M.C. in September, 1914, says:

"To-day I have amputated the arm of a German officer who in civil life is the first judge in Berlin. Yesterday and to-day we have buried over fifty Germans and English.

They lie side by side in the same grave in an orchard. The German prisoners and our boys stood round as the major read the burial service."

Lady Gifford, who visited the hospitals in France towards the end of October, reported that the wounded were pouring into Boulogne at the rate of 1500 to 3000 a day. Again from her—as from every observer—we have a tribute to the extraordinary, the "perfectly amazing", bravery of the wounded:

"There is never a word of complaint and their patience is an example to anyone. It is pathetic to see so many young men minus a leg, an arm, and an eye, and perhaps two eyes. When the war is over what is there left to them in life? They

are quite unfitted to earn their living in most cases."

It is satisfactory to record that the conscience of the British people was awake as it had never been during any previous war to the debt owed to the men who were fighting our battles. A non-party committee of leading politicians sat to draw up an adequate scale of war pensions.

The ramifications of the work of tending the wounded and sick in this war were world-wide and almost endless. New Zealanders were dispatched to Samoa to nurse our wounded there. Japanese Red Cross staffs were seen at Netiey and in Petrograd, as well as in France. An Arab and an acrobat were among the patients at the Edinburgh and Border Hospital at Malo-les-Bains, Dunkirk. Americans took over a school in Paris as a hospital,

and, in the words of a wounded British officer, "a more delightful set of people I never met—they are kindness itself"; Canadians and Australians crossed the seas to help with the Expeditionary Force and give hospital service to their own contingents of the Empire's fighting-men; a North Tyrone Ulster Volunteer Force—originally prepared, we may suppose, for the eventuality of the civil war which the United Kingdom might have witnessed but for the Kaiser's lust of power—was accepted for Pau by the French Government, one of many hospital services which this country was delighted to be able to render our brave allies. Among the Belgians, British effort was conspicuously in evidence: the British Field Hospital at Furnes changed its name to "Belgian". To Serbia there went out from London, in charge of



Imperial Nurses with the Russian Red Cross: the Tsarina (seated on the right) and her daughters nursing wounded soldiers from the eastern theatre of war

Lady Paget, wife of the former British Minister at Belgrade, a complete hospital contingent; and other units were also sent to succour the same brave little Ally. Consideration for the Indian wounded at Brighton was a branch apart. The question of caste

in the hospitals, so in the United Kingdom there were hosts of willing workers, organized by the Volunteer Aid Detachment or in other ways. Hundreds of private houses in Great Britain and Ireland received or stood ready to receive convalescent



Searching for Victims of German "Frightfulness": a Red Cross tour in Flanders

among these troops renders the acceptance of service from British hands at such times difficult; and as a matter of fact no women were employed in the actual nursing of the men. Just as in Russia (whose medical methods were highly efficient and precautions against sepsis at the front very strict) all classes, from the Tsarina and her daughters, gave personal assistance

wounded; while even in the heart of London this department of the campaign was reflected by such examples as Fishmongers' Hall in the City being converted into a hospital for officers, and the Stationery Office in Stamford Street becoming a splendidly equipped hospital for 1650 beds.

G. T.

CHAPTER X

STORIES OF THE AIR-CRAFT SERVICE

Perils of Bomb-dropping—Shots from the Enemy—Mistaken for a German—Charging an Air-craft Gun—Dual Control of Air-craft—Lessons of the War—Naval Sea-plane's Narrow Escape—Some Accidents and Incidents—The Cuxhaven Raid.

AVIATORS, while flying on active service in the Great War — scouting, fighting, directing artillery, or dropping bombs — have met sometimes with strange adventures. In all of these there has been necessarily an element of danger; while in some there has been that gleam of humour which is so welcome a relief in war.

A bomb, dropped from the releasing-gear of a British biplane, failed for some reason to free itself, and hung suspended below the machine. The two occupants of the craft were in an unenviable plight. So long as the bomb hung where it did they could not descend. If they had attempted to do so the bomb, swinging below the alighting wheels, would have come first into contact with the ground and burst, blowing the machine and its occupants to pieces. It seemed impossible either for the pilot or his passenger to get at the bomb, which hung far beyond their reach. The pilot strove to shake it free by erratic turns of his machine, but it refused to move, and there appeared no prospect, at the moment, but to fly on aimlessly till the petrol in the tank was exhausted, and then plane down to an almost certain death. But the passenger, refusing to accept such a fate in a spirit

of lethargy, began furiously to kick against the floor-boards of the hull. Several of these, after a time, he managed to break away, leaving a hole through which, when he lay prone, he could stretch one arm. This just permitted him to reach the attachment in which the bomb hung fouled, and after a vigorous shaking the missile, to his inexpressible relief, detached itself suddenly and fell away from the machine.


An incident even more perilous occurred during a raid made by a French air-ship. A bomb which had been fitted with a time-fuse stuck fast in its releasing-tube, and threatened in a moment or so to explode and destroy the machine. Fortunately, one of the crew, by vigorous use of an axe, was able to hack away the tube, and this fell clear of the air-ship, carrying the bomb with it, before the fuse had time to do its work.

An unpleasant experience was that of a pilot who, while scouting above a German position, had the ailerons shot away at one side of his machine. These are the small, hinged planes by which the lateral stability of an air-craft is maintained. With very great skill, however, using his rudder so far as was possible to keep his machine from tilting over, the pilot managed

to steer round in a half-circle, and descend near the British lines without losing control of his machine. In another case a British biplane, while under shrapnel-fire, was struck by the base of a shell, which tore a large hole

menced a gentle glide—seeking to bring the least possible air-pressure on the damaged wing—and, largely owing to his delicate handling, the craft was brought safely to earth.

It has been exasperating for our



Winged! An Air-scout's Narrow Escape over the German Lines

The pilot of this scout-type biplane, while reconnoitring above the Germans, had one of his ailerons, or balancing planes, shot away. This rendered the control of the machine extremely difficult; but he managed none the less, by a display of great dexterity, to turn in a half-circle and regain the British lines.

through the lower plane, broke several of the inter-plane struts, and embedded itself in the hull just between the pilot and his passenger. The moment was, for the airmen, one of painful suspense. They expected that the machine, being so badly damaged, would collapse in the air, and this would have meant almost certain death. The pilot com-

aviators when, as has often happened, they have been subjected not only to the enemy's fire but to that of our own troops or of our Allies. Aeroplanes, if flying high, are difficult to identify, even though they carry distinguishing marks; and so the troops over which a machine may pass, failing to recognize it, and eager to use


their rifles upon a foe, direct sometimes a hot fire against what may prove to be a friendly craft. In one case a British pilot, flying from the rear of the Allies on a voyage of reconnaissance over the German lines, was subjected to volleys of rifle-fire from a detachment of French troops. He was a man of conspicuous courage and ability, but with rather a quick temper; and when bullets from French rifles began to pierce his planes he became so angry that—intent only on teaching the transgressors a lesson—he dived towards those who fired. Descending in a steep vol-plane, bullets whistling all round him, he landed in a field next to that in which the marksmen stood. They, still unconscious that they had been firing at a friend, broke through the hedge and ran towards the aeroplane, intending to capture its occupant should he prove to be alive. Their astonishment was great when, instead of seeing a German before them, they observed a gesticulating figure in a British uniform climbing hastily from the machine. The aviator, pushing aside the soldiers who crowded round him, strode up to the French officer who was in charge of the detachment, exclaiming hotly:

"I say! Confound it! This *isn't* good enough."

After which, having braved death at least a hundred times to make this typical protest, he delivered to the astonished Frenchman a lecture in which he indicated how on future occasions they might distinguish between British and German craft.

It is not often that the men handling a high-angle gun, such as is used

to fire at aeroplanes, have the tables turned on them by aviators, and are attacked from the air. Such an incident, however, is recorded in connection with the fighting in Flanders. A German anti-aircraft gun, mounted on a motor-car, came into action against a French biplane. The latter was one of those large, weight-carrying machines, such as the French have equipped with a machine-gun. Its pilot, observing that the armoured car was standing by itself on an open road, with no artillery to support it, determined on a counter-offensive. Diving steeply, and swinging as he did so to avoid the German shells, he came to a low altitude; then, turning his craft rapidly, till it was heading directly towards the armoured car, he bore down on the enemy at 70 miles an hour, his passenger opening fire with the machine-gun that was fitted in the air-craft's bow. The quickness of this manoeuvre, and its unexpectedness, and the speed at which the biplane sped towards them, demoralized for the moment the crew of the armoured car. They maintained their fire from the high-angle gun, but the shells flew wide. Then they used rifles in a hasty volley. The biplane, however, admirably handled, sustained nothing worse than a few punctures of its wings. The stream of bullets from its gun now began to reach the car, the occupants of which discovered to their cost that, although armoured to resist gun-fire from the ground, it lay exposed to an attack from above. As bullets began to whistle round them, they deserted their vehicle, making a dash for a clump of trees



After the Duel: German "Taube" brought down by one of the Allies' airmen in Flanders

that stood near the road. But the biplane, now, was close above them, and two of the car's crew fell dead and two were wounded before they gained the shelter of the trees. Then the air-craft flew unharmed upon its way.

It is considered a safeguard in the light of war experience, that, when two men fly together on a reconnoitring flight, the machine they use should be fitted with a system of dual control. This means that, in front of the seats both of the pilot and his passenger, there are fitted such levers as may be necessary for the handling of the craft. Thus, should the pilot be shot, and fall dead in his driving-seat, the passenger may assume control of the machine, and either guide it in a descent or continue in flight till he has regained his starting-point. It is essential, of course, in the use of a machine so equipped, that the passenger as

well as the pilot should have a knowledge of handling air-craft. It is necessary also that, if need be, the passenger should be able to disconnect his system of levers from that of the pilot, and *vice versa*. The aviator may, for instance, when he is hit, fall forward on his levers, so that they are rendered immovable; and in such a case, if the passenger's controls work in conjunction with them, and cannot be disconnected,

he will find it impossible to make the movements that may be required. A drawback of a system of dual control is that it entails a certain amount of extra weight. More than once, however, when a pilot has been wounded so seriously that he has been unable to control his machine, the passenger has been able to take charge and bring the craft safely to earth. In one case, while scouting above the lines of the Allies, a two-seated German monoplane was exposed to a heavy fire. Its wings and hull were hit, and eventually a rifle bullet reached the pilot in his driving-seat, wounding him so badly that he became unconscious. The passenger who sat behind him, and was a skilled pilot, was provided with duplicate controls. As soon, therefore, as the pilot collapsed, he was able to take charge of the machine and bring it to earth without injury.

Had this craft been without dual control it is probable that both men would have lost their lives. The system is the more necessary, having regard to the fact that, in many machines built for speed, which have tubular, finely tapering hulls, it is impossible for the passenger, in the case of an emergency, to move forward to the pilot's seat. The hull, as a rule, has two apertures in it, one in front of the other and unconnected in any way. Into one of these apertures the pilot lowers himself, sitting so low in his driving-seat that nothing but his head protrudes above the level of the hull; while his passenger, seated either before or behind him, is sunk in the same way within the machine. Between the two men, separating them effectually, is a portion of the hull; and it is necessary, therefore, if two lives are not to be sacrificed, that the passenger should have his levers quite distinct from those of the pilot.

A lesson the war continues to emphasize is that the hulls of aeroplanes should, so far as is consistent with the weight a machine can carry, be armoured against rifle or machine-gun bullets. Unless there are sheets of bullet-proof steel below the seats of the pilot and passenger, the floor-boards offer no protection against the penetration of a bullet, which may rip through these thin boards and pierce the aviators either in the legs or body. While returning from a reconnaissance, in which he and a passenger had gained valuable information, a French airman came suddenly into a danger zone. He had been obliged to fly low, owing to a mist that prevailed, and his craft was within rifle range. Several volleys were fired at him before he could ascend to a higher altitude, and his machine was struck. One bullet, striking up through the boards of the hull, passed through a map the observer was studying. A



Ships of the British Air-craft Service: the Gamma and Delta

Photo. Cribb, Southsea

second wounded him in the hand, while a third, penetrating the machine nearer the bow, buried itself in one of the pilot's legs, inflicting a serious wound. The air-craft was not one of those which are fitted with dual control, and it was impossible for the observer to take charge of it should the pilot be struck down at his levers. So the position of the two men was perilous in the extreme. The pilot, faint from shock, and losing blood rapidly, might at any moment sink forward in his seat; in which case both he and his passenger—their machine being uncontrolled—would fall to earth. But there was a fact that nerved the aviator and made him struggle heroically against his weakness, and this was the knowledge that he had obtained news during his flight which was of extreme importance, and that this information must at all costs be communicated to the French headquarters. So, causing the aeroplane to climb rapidly, he rose out of range of the fire from the ground, and then steered back towards his starting-point, which was 10 miles away. Each moment, watched anxiously by his companion, who knew that his life as well as that of the pilot was at stake, he grew fainter from loss of blood; but still, by an exercise of will-power, he managed to retain his faculties and keep his machine in hand. For a quarter of an hour he remained in his driving-seat, suffering acute pain and on the verge of fainting; then, having arrived within sight of his landing-ground, he shut off his engine and planed to earth, alighting neatly and without mishap. But when


he had done so, and almost before his craft had come to rest, he fell forward in utter collapse.

Two aviators, in a naval sea-plane, were scouting one day above the North Sea. Their motor, when the sea-plane was an hour's flight from land, gave trouble suddenly, and they were obliged to land on the water. The waves ran high, and the sea-plane, not having the strength to resist this buffeting, began to break up rapidly. Its two occupants, after a fruitless effort to re-start the motor, placed themselves on the floats of the machine, hoping that in this way, by bringing the load nearer the surface of the water, they might check the craft's rolling. Time passed, a sea-mist enveloped them, and the aviators saw that it would not be long before their machine, battered to pieces, would sink under them. The outlook was as black as it could be, and they were steeling themselves for the worst, when they heard through the mist the sound of a ship's engines, and a torpedo-boat destroyer, which was on patrol duty, and whose crew knew nothing of the airmen's predicament, appeared suddenly right in front of them, and came alongside. It was amazing good fortune for the aviators, lying low in the water, and with no ship in search of them, that this vessel should have steered through the mist, entirely by accident, just across their path. In a very short time, had not Providence sent them aid, their machine would have been destroyed by the waves, and they would have been drowned.

A grim story is told of an air duel

between a British biplane and one of the German monoplanes. The British pilot, while scouting, came suddenly upon his antagonist as he emerged from a cloud. The German was at a disadvantage, the biplane being just

craft planed down as though under perfect control, and landed without injury in a field. Whereupon some of the soldiers, hoping to make its pilot captive, ran towards the machine. The aviator, when they came up to



Perils of the Sea-plane Service: Descending through engine failure in the North Sea

The British naval sea-plane shown above was so battered by heavy waves that she began to break up; and the pilot and passenger, who placed themselves on the floats to check her rolling, would in all probability have been drowned had not a torpedo-boat destroyer—appearing providentially out of a mist—rescued them in the nick of time.

above him. The British pilot, quick to take advantage of his position, drew a revolver and emptied it at his opponent, who dived suddenly and disappeared in a low-lying cloud. This was the last the British airman saw of his foe; but some of our troops, occupying trenches beneath the scene of the conflict, caught sight of the German monoplane as it descended. The

him, was still seated in his driving-seat, being held in position by straps. But his head had fallen forward, and he was found to be dead. A bullet from the British pilot's revolver had, indeed, entered his brain. It appeared remarkable that the dead man's aeroplane should, when left completely to its own resources, plane down correctly, as though there was a hand at its

levers. But many modern-type machines, as a matter of fact, are so inherently stable—owing to their wing-shape and the adjustment of their load—that they will assume automatically a proper angle, and will then glide down quite steadily, following a smooth and accurate path, without any manipulation of their controls. It is probable in this case that, just after he had been struck, and by a movement that was instinctive, the pilot had switched off his motor, and afterwards—while he hung dead in his seat—the monoplane had tilted its bow downward and begun its glide. It is a question of luck, of course, what landing may follow such an uncontrolled descent. If a machine alights in a smooth grass field, then all is well; but it may strike a hedge, or a tree, or the side of a house, and in such a case it will be wrecked.

There is a story of an officer who, while he had an eye for a country and was skilled in reconnaissance, knew nothing of the technique of flying. Ascending one day with an aviator, so that he might make an observation from above of a German position, he directed the pilot to pass over a section of the enemy's lines. Unfortunately, just as they were above the Germans, a shot struck the air-craft and so damaged it that it was only with great difficulty that the aviator, returning gingerly the way he had come, and expecting each moment that his craft would collapse, was able to make a landing without accident. The officer, who had not sufficient knowledge of aircraft to see how damaged the machine had been, could not understand why the pilot had

turned and made homeward instead of continuing his flight. Being a man who was quick to jump to conclusions, he imagined the aviator had, when subjected to gun-fire, lost his nerve suddenly and turned tail out of fear. Greatly angered, and with this idea firmly in mind, the officer sprang from the aeroplane as soon as it had alighted, and drove to head-quarters without a word to his pilot. Arrived there, and speaking in tones of indignation, he reported the aviator for cowardice in face of the enemy. Such a charge, naturally, was investigated at once; and then it was found that, far from showing lack of courage, the pilot had acted with the greatest coolness and judgment. His machine had been so badly hit that, had he betrayed the slightest clumsiness or lack of skill, it would have collapsed in the air and killed both himself and his passenger. Nothing, indeed, but the pilot's dexterity, when confronted by the gravest danger, had brought them safely to earth. Whereupon those who understood matters explained to the officer that, instead of blaming the pilot for any lack of a proper spirit, he should in reality thank him for having saved his life. Whereupon this officer, at heart a fair-minded man, apologized earnestly for his hastiness, and the incident closed, as it should, with smiles on all sides.

A feature of the employment of air-craft, and one that has enabled them to do consistently useful work, has been their power to fly in high winds. It is on record that our British aviators, when an aerial reconnais-



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH

BY BASSANO

Lord Kitchener

sance was needed urgently, ascended in a wind which, at an altitude of 3000 feet, was blowing at the rate of nearly 90 miles an hour. Flights have been made, frequently, in winds of 60 miles an hour, and it must be remembered,



Deceiving German Airmen: French dummy cannon at the front made of a tree trunk

to appreciate the progress which such feats indicate, that a year or so ago it was an achievement if a pilot could weather a wind blowing at the rate of 25 miles an hour. One incident of the war, reported in regard to our French allies, goes to prove the value of wind flying. On a very gusty day,

during the fighting on the Aisne, French and German batteries were engaged heavily with each other. On both sides there had been airmen at work, obtaining the range for their guns; but as the wind increased in strength, until it blew a gale, one aviator after another had to descend. Soon, to all appearances, no aeroplanes remained aloft; whereupon the Germans, putting in operation a scheme they had been considering all day, but had been obliged to postpone owing to the presence of the French airmen, sent a battery to the top of a hill near their lines, so that its guns might rake the French positions. These German guns, shielded by the crest of the hill, were invisible to the French artillery officers a mile or so away; but to an aviator, looking down on the hill from his bird's-eye view, there would have been no difficulty in observing the location of the battery; and it was for this reason that, so long as there were aeroplanes in the sky, the Germans had hesitated to make use of the hill. Now, however, the wind blowing in heavy gusts, and no hostile air-craft to be seen, they sent a battery at full speed to the hill-top. But they reckoned without the personal skill and courage of the French airmen. One pilot, rising in a high-powered monoplane during a temporary lull, fought his way to a high altitude, his machine beaten occasionally to a standstill by the gusts. At a height of 8000 feet, in a cloudy sky, his craft was almost invisible; yet he himself, looking down upon the German lines, was able to observe and signal back to the French

batteries the moving to the hill-top of the German guns. The range of this hill had been obtained already by the French artillery officers, so they were ready, without delay, to direct their fire upon it. The enemy's guns were brought up to a slope, just behind the crest of the hill, and were being unlimbered, ready for action, when one of the German artillery officers, watching the French with his glasses, managed to catch sight of the monoplane, high against the sky and appearing no larger than a bird. But his warning came too late. The French batteries, having the range of the hill to a yard, directed upon it, before their enemy was able to reply, such a withering and continuous fire that the German battery was almost annihilated—officers, men, and horses being mown down where they stood, and the guns dismounted and overturned.

We had in Britain, when the war came, a German-built biplane that had been bought by the Admiralty. This machine was flown one day by its pilot, a naval officer, from an aerodrome in the south of England to one of the air-stations on the north-east coast. Half-way through his journey, needing some lunch, the aviator descended on a race-course which lay near a large inland town. Troops were in training near this spot, and some of them, when they saw the biplane descend, ran towards it. On the hull of the machine was the name of the German firm which had built it. This the soldiers saw, with the result that the pilot was arrested promptly, it being reckoned that he was a Ger-

man aviator who had been spying over England and had been forced by engine-failure to descend. The airman protested that he was a British naval officer, but without avail. Even when he was recognized, and publicly identified, by a civilian aviator who happened to arrive on the scene, this did not prevent him from being marched to the nearest police-station, and locked in a cell. His friend, the civilian flyer, going to the commanding officer of the troops, endeavoured to persuade him that the biplane pilot was really what he claimed to be; while this unfortunate individual, turning out his pockets in the cells, was able to produce a mess-bill from one of the naval air-stations, which helped to prove his case. Eventually he was released, and went to lunch with the aviator who had helped to extricate him from his trouble.

Afterwards they returned in company to the race-course, the naval aviator intending to resume his flight. But, here an unpleasant surprise awaited them. The troops who had first seen the aeroplane descend had, when its pilot's credentials were accepted, marched away from the spot, leaving the machine untended. But soon after their departure a body of Territorials had passed near by. Observing the biplane, they had examined it, and had seen the German name it bore. Whereupon they came to the conclusion that its pilot, who must, they decided, be a German spy, was lurking somewhere in the neighbourhood. So they hid themselves and waited, springing on the pilot and his friend as soon as they appeared, and

holding loaded rifles within an inch or so of their chests. The civilian aviator could not help his friend in this new predicament. He himself, indeed, was placed under arrest, no pleadings or protests being regarded. The naval pilot's pockets were searched and his revolver taken from

luctance—and allow the biplane to continue its flight.

Sea-planes, in their present stage of development, cannot ride upon rough water without risk of destruction. The sea-plane raid on Cuxhaven, made soon after dawn on Christmas Day, 1914, was only possible because of an



Photo. Cribb, Southsea

Heroes of the Royal Naval Flying Corps: Commander Samson, D.S.O., and some of his officers


Left to right: Flight-Lieutenant Draper, Squadron-Commander Briggs, D.S.O. (afterwards captured), Flight-Commander Osmond, Commander Samson, D.S.O., Flight-Commander Marix, D.S.O. (one of the Düsseldorf raiders), Captain Courtney, R.M.L.I. (leader of the first Ostend raid), the late Flight-Lieutenant Beevor (killed with Lord Annesley), and Flight-Lieutenant Young. Flight-Commander Dalrymple Clark is sitting behind Commander Samson. (The machine is the one flown by Commander Samson.)

him; then the suspected spies were placed with their backs to the aeroplane, while men with loaded rifles, fingers ready on the triggers, confronted them fiercely. Presently, however, there arrived from the town the officer of the regular troops who had dealt already with the case, and as he vouched for the naval pilot, and also for his friend the civilian, the Territorials had to lower their rifles—though they did so with obvious re-

exceptional calm which prevailed over the North Sea. The smoothness of the water permitted the sea-planes, which had been carried in transports to a point off the Cuxhaven roads, to be lowered upon the surface without injury, and ride there safely while their pilots started the motors, and then moved forward to gain flying speed. Nine sea-planes had been transported to the German coast, but two developed engine trouble after they had

been placed in the water, and seven only made their way towards the land. The success of the raid was prejudiced owing to a heavy mist that lay over the mouth of the Elbe. This made accurate bomb-dropping impossible, and though the pilots released their missiles over war-ships in the roads and positions inland, they were unable to gauge what results they had obtained. So thick was the mist, in fact, that one of the airmen, Flight-Commander Hewlett, lost his way completely. He descended, eventually, out at sea, owing to engine-failure, and was rescued by a fishing-boat.

The mist rendered inconclusive also the combat that developed between the cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers of the British squadron and several German sea-planes and two Zeppelins,



Sketch Map to illustrate the Air Raid on Cuxhaven, Christmas Day, 1914


which set out from Cuxhaven to engage them. The German sea-planes, flying above the British vessels, discharged a number of bombs; but their missiles flew wide. This was not to be wondered at. It is sufficiently difficult to drop a bomb from an aeroplane upon a stationary target, but in this case the vessels aimed at were in motion. Picture yourself standing on the roof of a high building. Far below you, on the pavement, lies a pail, and into this you are asked to drop a billiard-ball; imagine also that the pail, and the building on which you stand, are moving rapidly and at different speeds.

The cruisers, when menaced by the sea-planes, opened fire on them with high-angle guns. But the light was bad, the machines were flying fast and high, and they escaped being hit. The Zeppelins, though they maintained a high altitude, offered naturally a better



Flight-Commander Hewlett (son of the novelist, Mr. Maurice Hewlett), who was rescued at sea after the Cuxhaven Raid

(From a photograph by Swaine.)



Our Newest Arms in Naval Warfare: Submarines picking up sea-planes after the Cuxhaven Raid

target; but they refused to come within range. A number of shells, discharged against them, all burst short of their mark. Conditions were unfavourable for Zeppelins. In daylight, and when pitted against ships which are steaming fast, they cannot—without exposing themselves to almost certain destruction—descend sufficiently near the water to drop bombs with accuracy. Their rôle, therefore, on this occasion, was that of scouts rather than combatants, the attack falling to the sea-planes. But in any case the affair was spasmodic, and tells us little, as regards strategy, that we did not know before. Bombs were dropped; high-angle guns were fired; there was a brisk expenditure of ammunition.

Then the raiding airmen, having flown back seaward and alighted near the British ships, were picked up by destroyers and submarines, and the squadron steamed towards Britain.

The aviators might, had conditions permitted, have done considerable damage both to German ships and to buildings on shore.

Our only loss in this operation was four sea-planes. Three of these, whose pilots were picked up by submarines, had to be abandoned and sunk, because the submarines could not take them aboard; while Commander Hewlett's machine was also lost in the adventure we have described.

C. G.-W.
H. H.

CHAPTER XI

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN IN HOME WATERS

(December, 1914-January, 1915)

The Naval Side of the Cuxhaven Raid—The Loss of the *Formidable*—The Mines again—The Action on the Dogger Bank—Sir David Beatty's Dispatch—German *v.* British Guns and Gunnery—Other Lessons of the Victory.

THE last days of 1914 and the first of 1915 were made memorable by episodes in the naval war. On Christmas Day a combined force of light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and air-craft carried out a raid on the German coast. The operations of the air-craft are dealt with elsewhere. The movements of the vessels employed can be recorded only with strict limitations. For reasons which do not need to be stated at length, the Admiralty at the time of writing forbids the publication of details which, while they would satisfy the curiosity and much worthier sentiments of the country, might also be of use to the enemy. The main facts and the result alone are known.

The object of the attack was the German naval force lying in the Schillig Road. This anchorage, which is between the mouths of the Weser and the Jahde, lies to the south-west of Cuxhaven. It contains the measured mile for the trial of the speeds of the German ships built at Wilhelms-haven, the principal German naval station, which lies 19 miles up the Jahde. The naval share in the work was naturally confined to convoying the air-craft to a starting-point, and

remaining to help them on their return. It is somewhat difficult to keep the doings of the on-water and the above-water fighters apart. While the British air-craft were delivering their attack, a counter-attack was made on the British cruisers, destroyers, and submarines by German Zeppelins and sea-planes. Two of the first and three or four of the second, aided by submarines, formed the attacking force. As the official report tells:—

"It was necessary for the British ships to remain in the neighbourhood in order to pick up the returning airmen, and a novel combat ensued between the most modern cruisers on the one hand and the enemy's air-craft and submarines on the other. By swift manœuvring the enemy's submarines were avoided, and the two Zeppelins were easily put to flight by the guns of the *Undaunted* and the *Arethusa*. The enemy's sea-planes succeeded in dropping bombs near to our ships, though without hitting any. The British ships remained for three hours off the enemy's coast without being molested by any surface vessel, and safely re-embarked three out of the seven airmen with their machines. Three other pilots who returned later were picked up, according to arrangement, by the British submarines which were standing by, their machines being sunk."

It is clear that the German ships ir



Drawn by E. S. Hodgson from the description of an eye-witness

The British Air Raid on Cuxhaven, Christmas Day, 1914: the Zeppelin Attack on the Escorting Force of Light Cruisers

the Schillig Road were not able or not willing to take the offensive against the supporting British ships. It is no less clear that the attacks of the submarines were baffled, and that on this as on other occasions where the vessel assailed was on the alert the under-water enemy could be avoided. As has been pointed out above, the details of the actions were not given. It is therefore not possible to say whether the fact that while three air-craft were rescued with their crews by light cruisers and destroyers, three others were sunk by British submarines and their crews rescued out of them, must be taken to indicate that our surface craft had drawn off before the risk of German submarine attack.


On the afternoon of New Year's Day the Admiralty had to announce a loss which had no exact precedent in the war:—

"The battleship *Formidable* was sunk this morning in the Channel, whether by mine or submarine is not yet certain".

Other vessels had been lost, and the loss confessed, but none of them of which the public had heard was of the importance of the *Formidable*. She was a sister ship of the *Irresistible* and *Implacable*; had a displacement of 15,000 tons, length of 400 ft., beam of 75 ft., and a speed of 18 knots. Her armament was made up of four 12-in., twelve 6-in., sixteen 12-pounder, and two 3-pounder guns, with four torpedo tubes. The *Formidable* was commanded by Captain A. Noel Loxley, of Norcott Manor, Herts, an officer who had seen as much service as could well fall to his lot in the long peace

which ended in August, 1914. He had among other things, and when he was a lieutenant in the *Phæbe*, taken part in clearing off the face of the earth the cruelty and the filth of the African city Benin. He had served in the punitive expedition organized and led by the late Admiral Rawson. His second in command, Commander C. F. Ballard, had seen service in China. Both officers perished in the ship.

The *Formidable* formed part of the Second Fleet, and as Lord Charles Beresford afterwards said, when speaking on the subject in the House of Commons, the work on which she was




The Deck of a British War-ship as seen from Aloft



Captain A. Noel Loxley, in command of the lost
Formidable
(From a photograph by Dinham, Torquay.)

engaged was matter of common knowledge. Common sense if not common knowledge would be enough to show that while the pick of the fleet was employed under Sir John Jellicoe in dominating the North Sea, the second rank of battleships would naturally be employed in guarding the Channel and in protecting the passage of the troops to France. On the night of January 1, 1915, the *Formidable* was going down channel in company with other vessels, battleships and cruisers. The order in which they were going, and the exact constitution of the squadron, were rigidly kept official secrets. They were steering to the west, when about two o'clock a.m. a violent explosion shook the *Formidable* with such dreadful force that no one in her could have any doubt as to the

fate of the ship. The explosion had taken place on the starboard side abreast of the foremost funnel. It produced an inrush of water. The engine-room was flooded, and both electric light and steam power failed. The ship took a great list to starboard. Though Captain Loxley is credibly reported to have shown a degree of confidence which he cannot well have felt, it was obvious that nothing could be done except inform other ships in the vicinity of the disaster, warn them of the presence of a danger, and then take measures to save as large a proportion as might be of the crew before the war-ship went down. While he still could Captain Loxley communicated by wireless with the vessels within reach, warning them of the presence of a German submarine, and of the blow given to the *Formidable*. It will be remembered that after the Cressys were sunk in the earliest stage of the war, the Admiralty had issued instructions that when one vessel in a squadron was injured by a torpedo fired from a submarine, she was to be left to the help of the destroyers and small craft, whose function it is to guard the bigger vessels. This was the first time in the history of the British navy when officers were told to disregard the standing obligation to aid "a known friend" injured and in danger. The innovation was made necessary by the altered conditions of modern warfare in which peril comes from below. It happened that in the middle watch of January 1, the light craft to which the function of giving protection against, and aid after, submarine attacks were



Germany's Submarine Fleet: Vessels of the 1910-12 class in dock at Wilhelmshaven

The photograph shows, in the two middle craft, the stern tubes through which the torpedoes are discharged

not in attendance on the *Formidable*. This fact, like a good many others which were officially ignored, was a matter of common knowledge. But no explanation was given even to requests for information in Parliament. When, therefore, Captain Loxley informed the other vessels that his ship had been attacked by a submarine, he made it as certain as might be that the *Formidable* would be left to her own resources. Certain it is that she was so left, and that the agony of the ship lasted for fully two hours, or even a little more.

About 4 a.m. Captain Loxley, who had hitherto remained on the bridge, came down on the boat-deck and ordered everybody into the water as their last chance of saving themselves. Just before the *Formidable* went down

by the head at about twenty minutes past four in the morning, a cruiser unnamed had approached, but not in time nor in conditions which allowed her to do more than rescue sixty of the two hundred survivors of the whole crew. Captain Loxley, who would in any case have been the last man to leave the deck of his ship, went down with her. Of the four boats launched one, a barge, capsized, but another reached the cruiser, to which several of the survivors succeeded in swimming. Two others had a longer struggle, and the crews endured more suffering before they could reach safety. The pinnace, which carried some sixty men, was brought to land at Lyme Regis about eleven o'clock at night. The launch carrying seventy men owed

more to fortune. She had been injured while she was being launched from the sloping deck of the *Formidable*, and numbers of her oars had been broken while she was being fended off from the side of the sinking ship. It was only by constant bailing that she was kept afloat, and the crew could do no more than keep her head to wind by pulling oars on one side. In the end a sea anchor was made—that is to say, empty water casks and pieces of timber were tied together and thrown out ahead, and the boat was attached to them by its anchor and cable. The sea anchor kept her head to wind, and in this state she drifted till she was sighted about 15 miles off Berry Head by the 50-ton smack *Provident*, of Brixham, whose owner and skipper was William Pillar. There are no smarter boatmen nor seamen round the coast than the

Brixham men, or rather, to give them their familiar title, the “Brixham Lords”. The skipper of the *Provident* brought his smack into position to rescue the half-frozen men in the launch, and took them out. There is a curiously familiar ring of the adventures of the old sea life in the story of the *Formidable's* launch.

From the 1st to the 24th January the naval war in the North Sea was again covered as by a mist from the eyes of the public. These intervals of obscurity come from the very nature of war at sea, and it was not to be supposed that because nothing was heard of, nothing was being done. The loss of the armed steamer *Viknor*, formerly known as the *Viking* when she was a tourist cruiser yacht, was in its way a typical incident. That she was lost we know by her non-appearance when she was due to report, and



"A Neutral" in the midst of War: war-ships passing a lighthouse—a building safe from attack so long as it did not signal information to passing ships

by the throwing up of fragments of wreckage. But how she perished with all hands, or even exactly where she met her end, are points which have never been cleared up, and probably never will be. She went down somewhere off the north coast of Ireland, carrying some five hundred men with her. That is a far greater loss than has often sufficed to gain a vitally important victory at sea. But it is, and it always has been, one of the features of naval warfare that its perils must be added to the ordinary dangers of the sea. There have been several instances in the history of the British navy of the loss of many hundreds by wreck. The loss of Sir Cloudesley Shovell's flagship on the Bishop and Clerk near the Scilly Isles, of Sir J. Balchen's flagship on the Caskets near the Channel Islands, the unrecorded disappearance of the ships of the elder Hyde Parker, and of Sir Thomas Troubridge in the Indian Ocean, were all more costly in human life than the great majority of naval battles. There remains, it is true, a certain doubt whether the *Viknor* was sunk by the common perils of the sea or by a mine. It is impossible to find a solution for that doubt, and it is quite idle to indulge in mere speculations.

We heard in those days much of mines, and were given to understand from Germany that they were to have at least a considerable share in the blockade of these islands. It was therefore somewhat of a relief to see that the old spirit which nerved the British seaman to take risks, was as lively as ever. Mr. George Lam-

ming, Grimsby skipper, who was fined three pounds on January 6, 1915, for disregarding Admiralty regulations, was of course in the wrong. When he was told by a qualified authority that he was to take a pilot, it is obvious that he ought to have obeyed. None the less there was something which deserved very lenient treatment in the action of Mr. Lamming. When he wanted to come in there was no pilot at hand to show him how to avoid the mine defences laid down by ourselves. So rather than lose the early market Mr. Lamming came in without the pilot, trusting to his own skill and to luck. That was very like the adventurous behaviour of traders in the old wars, who gave an immense amount of trouble to naval authorities. But after all if British sea-borne commerce had not been adventurous even to the extent of being unruly at times, it would probably not have been so successful. The spirit which nerved Mr. Lamming to take risks rather than lose his market was at any rate one of which there was to be considerable need in this war.

Mines, as has been said, were much to the fore as matters of speculation, and pegs for discussion during the first weeks in January. A good deal was said touching some supposed devices of the Germans for making use of them in fleet operations. What was to be done with them was indeed very far from clear, but it was to be something surprising. Rumours more or less well founded went about that the effective ships of the German navy had all been drawn out of the

Baltic and were concentrated for service in the North Sea. The outcome of these preparations and prophecies fell much short of expectation, but before the month came to an end the calm or seeming calm of the North Sea was broken by a vigorous passage of arms.

Here as almost always the antecedents of the action were obscure. We

under his command, namely, the flagship *Lion* (Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O.), the *Princess Royal* (Captain Osmond de B. Brock, A.D.C.), *Tiger* (Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.), *New Zealand* (Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., A.D.C.), flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O., and




The German Armoured Cruiser *Blücher*, sunk in the North Sea Battle of January 24, 1915

did not really know for what purpose the German squadron found at sea on Sunday, January 24, had left port. More or less plausible guessing was easy enough, but was of no value.

For the action itself we possess the telegraphic dispatch of Sir David Beatty sent immediately after the engagement, and his second narrative dated February 2, and published on March 3.

At daybreak on January 24, Admiral Beatty was patrolling with the battle-cruiser squadron of five ships

Indomitable (Captain Francis W. Kennedy). The battle cruisers were served and guarded by the light cruisers *Southampton*, flying the broad pennant of Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., *Nottingham* (Captain B. Miller), *Birmingham* (Captain Arthur A. M. Duff), and *Lowestoft* (Captain Theobald W. B. Kennedy), which were placed on the port beam—ahead were the light cruisers of Commodore Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in the *Arethusa*, the *Aurora* (Captain Wilmot S. Nichol-



Plan showing the approximate positions of the British and German Fleets during the battle of January 24, 1915

son), *Undaunted* (Captain Francis G. St. John, M.V.O.), and the destroyer flotilla. Sir David Beatty does not state the exact position of his squadron, but as the action took the form of a pursuit of some five hours at a high rate of speed from west to east and ended about 70 miles from Heligoland, it is to be presumed that he was about 200 miles off the German coast to the west.

At 7.25 a.m. the flash of guns was observed to the S.S.E. The advanced squadron of light cruisers and destroyers under Commodore Tyrwhitt had met a German force of four large cruisers, six light ones, and destroyers steering a course to the N.W. The course of the British squadron was laid to the S.S.E., and the pursuit began in a speed of 22 knots. The enemy reversed his course, and at 7.30 a.m. was seen on the port bow (to left and ahead) of the British battle cruisers, making off to the S.E. They were 14 miles off, and were manifestly heading for German waters. The course of the British squadron was at once altered to one parallel with the enemy's, and a chase began. By the strenuous exertions of the engine-room staffs, the speed of the British cruisers was raised to 28 knots—the *New Zealand* and the *Indomitable* exceeded their official rate of steaming considerably.

"At 8.52 a.m.," so Sir David Beatty tells us in his second dispatch, "as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear ship [of the enemy], the battle cruisers manœuvred to keep on a line of bearing so that the guns would bear, and the *Lion* fired a single shot which fell short."

When ships are in a "line of bearing" they do not follow one another, but are arranged like the half-closed laths of a Venetian blind, so that the bow guns can be fired without fear of hitting friends.

the *Blücher*, and engaged the vessel ahead of her. The *Tiger*, which followed the *Lion*, now engaged the *Blücher*, and this process was repeated as the *Lion* and *Tiger* drew ahead, and the *Princess Royal* and *New*



The *Blücher's* End in the North Sea Battle of January 24, 1915: the German armored cruiser on fire and about to turn over

This remarkable photograph was taken just before the *Blücher*, with her foremast shattered, her guns out of action, and her crew gallantly lined up and singing patriotic songs on her deck aft, turned over on her side and disappeared.

"The enemy in this time were in single line ahead, with light cruisers ahead and a large number of destroyers on their star-board beam. Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9.9 a.m. the *Lion* made her first hit on the *Blücher*, No. 4 in the [enemy's] line."


Owing to their better speed the British ships drew up on the Germans. The *Lion*, which was leading, passed beyond the German rear ship,

Zealand came up. The enemy began to return our fire at 9.14 a.m., and it naturally happened that the *Lion* and *Tiger* got the most of the blows, they being the first to come within range of the enemy. The *Blücher*, the slowest and weakest of the Germans, was, in fact, a half-ruined ship when the *Princess Royal* and *New Zealand* came up. The light cruisers, which had been stationed on the beam

of the battle cruisers, fell back so as not to hamper their fire. But when the German destroyers made a move to execute a torpedo attack on the British battle cruisers, our destroyers, gallantly handled by Captain the Hon. H. Meade, D.S.O., passed ahead to beat them off.

"About 9.45 a.m.", to quote Sir David Beatty once more, "the situation was as follows: The *Blücher*, the fourth in their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gun-fire; their leading ship and No. 3 (the *Moltke* and *Seydlitz*) were also on fire. The *Lion* was engaging No. 1, the *Princess Royal* No. 3, *New Zealand* No. 4, while the *Tiger*, which was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when interfered with by smoke at their No. 4."

The smoke was belched out in vast columns deliberately by the German destroyers, which now endeavoured to hide their big cruisers. Under cover of this screen the enemy altered course from S.E. to N.E., or E. by N. This would bring them also into a line of bearing, and those on the left bore away to increase their distance. The British squadron had naturally to alter course, and pursued in a N.N.W. line of bearing. They headed to the north of east, but a line drawn from the bow of one to the others would have been a line from N.N.W. to S.S.E. The German destroyers covered their cruisers gallantly but were beaten off, and the British light cruisers kept well on the enemy's port quarter.



The *Blücher* going to her Doom: an instantaneous photograph from one of the British warships showing the German cruiser turning over with her guns pointing skywards and her crew crowding on her side and sliding into the water

"At 10.48 a.m."—it is again Sir David Beatty who speaks—"the *Blücher*, which had dropped considerably astern of the enemy's line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list, on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition."

The *Indomitable* was ordered to make an end of her, and the other ships pursued the fleeing Germans. The German submarines began to come into action, and Sir David Beatty had to alter course to port to avoid one whose periscope was seen on his starboard bow. At 11.3 a.m. the *Lion's* feed tank was damaged by a shot, and she fell out of the line and was headed to the N.W. Sir David Beatty transferred his flag first to the destroyer *Attack* and then to the *Princess Royal* at about 12.20 p.m. In this last stage the movements of both sides are not so easy to follow. Flight and pursuit had brought both sides into a zone swarming with German submarines and mines. The pursuit was given up and the three German cruisers escaped, though two of them went off on fire and badly mauled.

The *Blücher* went down with most of her men, and it is recorded that a German Zeppelin and sea-plane dropped bombs near the British boats engaged in endeavouring to rescue the survivors. From the report of the men saved from the *Blücher* it appears that the German light cruiser *Kolberg* was sunk by the fire of our ships over the larger of the enemy's ships. The Germans made unfounded claims to have sunk two at least of the British light cruisers. The damage suffered by the British squadron was in fact

slight, for though it was found necessary to tow the *Lion* into the Firth of Forth, neither she nor the *Tiger* was badly hurt.

These being the main lines of the action, we have next to see what were the forces actually engaged—number, tonnage, armament, and speed.

BRITISH

Lion.—26,350 tons; eight 13.5 guns, sixteen 4-inch, four 3-pounders, and five machine-guns; two torpedo tubes. Speed, 28.5 knots.

Tiger.—28,000 tons; eight 13.5-inch and twelve 6-inch guns. Speed, 28 knots.

Princess Royal.—26,350 tons; eight 13.5-inch, sixteen 4-inch, four 3-pounders, five machine-guns. Speed, 28.5 knots.

Indomitable.—17,250 tons; eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch, five machine-guns; five torpedo tubes. Speed, 26 knots.

New Zealand.—18,800 tons; eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch, four 3-pounders, five machine-guns, and two torpedo tubes. Speed, 25 knots.

GERMAN

Derfflinger.—28,000 tons; eight 12-inch, twelve 5.9, twelve 3.4-inch guns; four torpedo tubes. Speed, 27 knots.


Seydlitz.—24,640 tons; sixteen 11-inch, twelve 5.9-inch, twelve 3.4-inch guns; four torpedo tubes. Speed, 26 knots.

Moltke.—22,640 tons; ten 11-inch, twelve 5.9-inch, two 3.4-inch, and four torpedo tubes. Speed, 28.4 knots.

Blücher.—15,550 tons; twelve 8.2-inch, eight 5.9-inch, sixteen 3.4-inch guns; four torpedo tubes. Speed, 25.3 knots.

The number and quality of the smaller craft employed on both sides have been sufficiently stated. The encounter, in fact, was one between big ships and big guns, in which the victory fell to the greater number. We can make that concession all the more readily because we are well authorized to go on to point out

that "greater numbers" in themselves, and apart from other elements of strength, rarely give the victory. There is no lack of testimony to the effect that Providence is apt to be on the side of the big battalions. But neither have men of experience ever doubted that numbers are the deciding element only when they are combined with skill. The big battalions win, not the big mob of men. The superiority of Sir David Beatty's squadron in number and weight of guns was sufficient to have turned the scale in his favour if all other things had been equal. It would not have been sufficient to avert defeat if the German squadron had shown a marked superiority in skill, or if the instruments, ships and guns, handled by the



The German Battle Cruiser *Seydlitz*, reported to have been seriously damaged in the North Sea Battle of January 24, 1915

German officers had been of superior quality. If there had been equality in all other respects but number of ships and size of guns, the action would only have gone to show that the more numerous British fleet would maintain a superiority in the war, and although that was not a point on which there could well be any serious doubt, still the demonstration would have been welcome. But the action went

further than this. It went on the whole to show that the superiority of the British squadron in material things was made available to the fullest extent by a superiority in skill. The German gunners made, it is allowed, good practice, and nobody denies that on this as on other occasions in the war they stuck manfully



Keeping her Fit: cleaning up the bow-anchor cables on a British war-ship

to their guns. The injury they inflicted on the *Lion* was enough to "beat her out of the line", and if the arrival of reinforcements had caused the advantage to pass to them, then the crippled flagship would have hampered the rest of the squadron, whether for action or retreat, very seriously. It would hardly have been possible to save the ship herself. An attempt to save her might only have compromised the safety of the whole squadron. Yet on the whole the German gunnery did less harm by a good deal than had been expected. The reputation of the Germans for gunnery stood high, and had been justified by the action off Coronel. In the affair of January 24, though it was good, it was by no means eminent. The moral of the whole story was stated for the Admiralty by Mr. Churchill on February 15:—

"The range of the British guns was found to exceed that of the German. Although the German shell is a most formidable instrument of destruction, the bursting, smashing power of the heavier British projectile is decidedly greater, and—this is the great thing—our shooting is at least as good as theirs. The navy, while always working very hard—no one except themselves knows how hard they have worked in these years—have credited the Germans with a sort of super-efficiency in gunnery, and we have always been prepared for some surprises in their system

of control and accuracy of fire. But there is a feeling after the combat of January 24 that perhaps our naval officers were too diffident in regard to their own professional skill in gunnery. Then the guns. While the Germans were building 11-inch guns we built 12-inch and 13½-inch guns. Before they advanced to the 12-inch gun we had large numbers of ships armed with the 13.5. It was said by the opposite school of naval force that a smaller gun fires faster and has a higher velocity, and therefore the greater destructive power. Krupp is the master gunmaker in the world, and it is very right and proper to take such a possibility into consideration. Everything that we have learnt, however, so far shows that we need not at all doubt the wisdom of our policy or the excellence of our material. The 13.5-inch gun is unequalled by any gun yet brought on the scene. Now we have the 15-inch gun with which the five Queen Elizabeths and the five Royal Sovereigns are all armed coming into line, and this gun in quality equals the 13.5-inch gun and is vastly more powerful and destructive. There is another remarkable feature of this action to which I should like to draw the attention of the House. I mean the steaming of our ships. All the



Drawn by Charles Pears

With the Grand Fleet at Sea: coaling a super-Dreadnought



Photo. Gale & Polden

Heavy Units of the British Navy: super-Dreadnoughts in line ahead (bow view)

vessels engaged in this action exceeded all their previous records without exception. I wonder if the House and the public appreciate what that means? Here is a squadron of the fleet which does not live in harbour, but is far away from its dockyards, and which during six months of war has been constantly at sea. All of a sudden the greatest trial is demanded of their engines, and they all excel all previous peacetime records. Can you conceive a more remarkable proof of the excellence of British machinery, of the glorious industry of the engine-room branch, or of the admirable system of repairs and refits by which the Grand Fleet is maintained from month to month, and can, if need be, be maintained from year to year in a state of ceaseless vigilance without exhaustion."

In short, the action of January 24 was a test of quality, and the test was admirably borne by the fleet. The rule in modern naval war is apparently to be that the loss is always

in extremes. The defeated side is destroyed; the victor loses few. Eleven wounded in the *Lion*, Engineer-Captain Taylor and nine men killed in the *Tiger*, were nearly all our losses. The German Government did not state its own loss, but it is enough to point out that only about 120 out of the 880 men of the *Blücher's* crew were rescued. It is obvious that the balance was enormously weighted

on the side of the enemy. When we look at this action as part of the whole body of operations, it cannot be said to justify some of the comment made on either side. It was, for instance, absurd in the Germans to claim, as some of them did, that the withdrawal of the British ships from the pursuit, and the continued activity of their submarines, showed that they had the command of the North Sea. But in view of the fact that the three British ships, which remained after the *Lion* fell out and the *Indomitable* took her in tow, did not care to pursue three weaker opponents, of whom two were badly damaged, to a point nearer the enemy's coast than seventy miles—owing to his mines and submarines—we must allow that the British command of the sea was not then unlimited.

D. H.

CHAPTER XII

THE DOMINIONS' SHARE IN THE WAR

(September, 1914—February, 1915)

Secret Mustering of the Empire's Armies—Arrival of the Canadians—"Pat's Own" at the Front—Canada's stream of Reinforcements—Her War as much as the Motherland's—Germans and Austrians in the Dominion—Dynamite Outrage on the Frontier—Canada's Debt to the British Navy—Red Cross Contributions—Feeding the Mother Country—Colonel Seely's Appointment—Newfoundland and her Naval Losses—Australia's Share—Value of her New Fighting Machine—Part played by Australian Navy—Japan's Tactful Act—The First Australian Contingent—Arrival in Egypt—New Zealand and the Naval War—Her New Citizen Army—Sir Ian Hamilton's Opinion—Loyal Maoris—New Zealanders' Advance Guard in England—Rejoins Main Force in Egypt—Training at the Foot of the Pyramids—Review of Combined Dominion Forces—The Spirit of Sacrifice—How the Fiji Contingent Arrived.

A VEIL of secrecy was thrown not only over the mighty deeds of Sir John French's army at the front, but also over the coming and going of all those myriad sons of the Empire who, in the Motherland's hour of need, flocked to her shores from the four corners of the earth. Great fleets of transports,

guarded by British warships cleared for action, stole across the ocean with contingent after contingent of men whose loyalty and devotion filled our hearts with pride, but who had perforce to be landed and hurried away to complete their training with wholly inadequate demonstrations of the Mother Country's admiration. It was



Bringing the "Lion's Whelps" to Britain: part of the line of transports conveying the Canadian contingent, as seen from one of their escorting warships in Mid-Atlantic

no time for pageantry and display. Secrecy was the very essence of success in this grim struggle for life and death; and every hour was needed for the serious business of training for the front.

mishap in thirty-two transports, all steaming across the Atlantic in regular lines which extended eighteen miles from front to rear, and never altered their course or position from the St. Lawrence to the British coast—a



Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, the First of the Canadian Contingent to reach the Fighting Line:
Colour party with the colours worked and presented by Princess Patricia herself

For the Canadians, whose first Expeditionary Force numbered, all told, upwards of 30,000 men—complete in every detail down to its own airmen, chaplains, and field hospitals—this final course of preparation took place on Salisbury Plain. Under the safeguard of the British fleet the whole army had been brought over without

wonderful demonstration of Britain's sovereignty of the seas. It was fortunate that most of the newcomers had been hardened by the outdoor life of Canada, for the autumn rains transformed Salisbury Plain into a sea of mud which put their physical fitness to the severest test. The experience was trying, but it must have

stood them in good stead when their time came to share the hardships of the trenches in Flanders. The first Canadians to leave for the fighting line—if we except the 750 French-Canadians who were reservists of France, and left Montreal to join the colours on the outbreak of war—were the 1100 odd men of Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, who completed their training in time to eat their Christmas dinner within hearing of the guns in Flanders. "A fine regiment", in the words of Lord Kitchener—from whom such praise was praise indeed—or "Pat's Own" as it was popularly known in the Dominion, its ranks were chiefly filled by men who had already seen active service. Princess Patricia of Connaught had herself worked the colours of the regiment; and one of its officers was Captain Denzil Newton, M.V.O—son of the late Mr. G. D. Newton, of Croxton Park, Cambridgeshire, and Lady Alice Cochrane, daughter of the eleventh Earl of Dundonald—who was acting as military secretary to the Duke of Connaught when the regiment was formed. Captain Newton, unhappily, was the first officer of the Canadian contingent to be killed in action. The "Pat's Own" went into the firing line during the first week in January, 1915, filling the post of honour in front of a German fortified position on the extreme left of the British front, thus extending the British line and relieving exhausted French troops in the trenches. It was during this baptism of fire, which lasted four days and nights, that Captain Newton fell, and his regiment earned the praise of

General Snow, commanding the British division to which it was attached, for its steadiness and courage. In later engagements in this same month of January, two other officers of the regiment were killed—Captain Gerald Fitzgerald and Lieutenant Price—both shot by German snipers in brave endeavours to bring in wounded. Nearly forty of the men were lost in killed and wounded in the same actions. Sir John French paid the regiment a handsome tribute in his dispatch of February 2, 1915. "They are a magnificent set of men", he wrote, "and have done excellent work in the trenches." A month later he again had occasion to acknowledge their gallantry and efficiency when a party of them captured a German trench with great dash. "After killing eleven of the occupants and driving off the remainder", reported the Field Marshal, "they succeeded in blowing up the trench. Our loss was trifling."

Canada, like the rest of the Empire, set no limit to the sacrifices she was ready and eager to make for the common cause. "The preservation of the Empire is worth fighting for," declared Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister, "and Canada is prepared to send all that is necessary." She had already increased her forces for active service until, instead of keeping 30,000 men continuously in training, to be drawn upon in units of 10,000 so long as the war lasted, as stated in an earlier chapter (Vol. I, p. 103), she now kept 50,000 men, from whom a continual stream of reinforcements could be sent to the Motherland, in addition to the 8000

men engaged in garrison and outpost duty. The Canadian forces thus organized for active service by the end of December, 1914, were as follows:—

Forces already dispatched (including regiment garrisoning Bermuda), nearly	...	33,000
Forces engaged in garrison and outpost duty in Canada, about	8,000
Forces under training in Canada	50,000
Total	91,000

It was arranged that as soon as the second contingent left a further enlistment of 17,000 men to take its place should be made, bringing the total up to 108,000. The Second Expeditionary Force was organized, in accordance with the requirements of the War Office, as follows: Officers and men, about 17,000; horses, 4765; field and heavy guns, 58; machine guns, 16. This force included infantry, artillery, engineers, signal and cyclist companies, army service corps, and field ambulances, with ammunition park, supply column, reserve park, and other line-of-communication units. There was no difficulty in getting the men. In many parts of the country they offered themselves in greater numbers than could be dealt with at the moment. In the first contingent the percentage of Canadian-born recruits was estimated at not more than 30 per cent. To the young Briton—in many cases a newcomer—who rushed to the colours at once, and crowded the ranks of the first contingent, the call from the land of his birth was naturally more urgent and

insistent; but it did not take long to rouse all Canada to a true consciousness of the Empire's needs. One of the unpremeditated outcomes of the war, as the Canadian Prime Minister bore witness, was the quickening of the national spirit throughout Canada. Canadians now recognized to the full the existence of something greater than material prosperity, or family ties, or even life itself. Cowboys and miners, farmers and trappers, combined with the townsmen in bombarding the recruiting offices with eager offers of personal service. The disproportionate number of French-Canadians in the first contingent, commented on at the time by those who overlooked the 750 French-Canadian reservists who had already gone, was made up by the 22nd Regiment of St. John's, Quebec—recruited solely from French-Canadians—forming part of the second contingent. At first the recruits assembled from all parts of the Dominion at the monster camp at Valcartier, which had sprung up with mushroom rapidity out of what in times of peace had been a farming centre; but with the approach of winter this open camp gave place to more suitable accommodation in permanent buildings in Toronto, Winnipeg, St. John's, Quebec, and other centres. Each succeeding contingent, as a result of experience, and more stringent tests, was an improvement upon its predecessor, more volunteers continuing to offer themselves than could be accepted. Canada, in short, regarded this war as their war, as much as the Mother Country's, and were prepared to make

any sacrifices to bring it to a successful conclusion. "We want everyone to feel", as one of her public men declared, "that we will not stop until we have seen this war through."

"Every noble Canadian life bravely offered up on the altar of the Empire's

British Dominions should have a say in the issues of peace and war in the present conflict raised constitutional problems which were highly controversial, as Sir Wilfred Laurier pointed out at the opening of the Canadian Parliament on February 7, 1915.



Photo. "Trio", Victoria

A Canadian Contingent's Farewell: Scene at Victoria, British Columbia, on the departure of 500 volunteers for the front—30,000 people attending to see them off

sacrifices, deeply regretted and mourned though it be," said Sir Rodmond Roblin, Premier of Manitoba, in his Christmas Day message to the Canadian Press, "shall be and remain a testimony that here on this Western continent has risen a new Britain whose voice joined with that of the Motherland must hereafter be heard in the family circle, and heeded in the disposal of the world's affairs."

The question, however, whether the

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There would be time enough to settle this, he added, as well as many other Imperial matters, when peace was restored. Canada must not forget, said the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, on the same occasion, that but for the British navy the men and women of Canada might have been mangled by bombardment from German warships. The possibility of

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what the British Blue-books had been referring to for years as a "war in defence of the Empire" had been suddenly converted into a fact, as Principal Peterson, of McGill University, pointed out in his paper on "The War Through Canadian Eyes" in the Canadian *University Magazine* in December, 1914.

"I hope", added Dr. Peterson, "that the type of person will disappear from our midst who used to spend all his energies in calculating what Canada would do in the (very remote) contingency of 'England embarking on a war of which the Canadian Parliament could not approve'. He could not get it out of his head that the question he had to consider was whether he would 'help the old country' instead of whether he would or would not fight for his life! For all the time the foe was at our gates."

Nothing brought the true inwardness of the situation home to all the overseas Dominions more clearly than the revelation of Germany's despicable attempt to bargain for Britain's neutrality with the promise not to rob France of any more of her own soil, but to rest content with the French colonies. "If the French colonies now," asked Dr. Peterson pertinently, "why not the British next?"

It was significant that the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the Canadian Parliament in February, 1915, was moved by Mr. W. G. Weichel, a German-Canadian, who stanchly upheld the justice of the British cause, and seconded by Mr. H. Achim, a French-Canadian. Another eloquent commentary on the Potsdam conception of the British Empire was the



The Canadians' Pet: a snapshot in camp at Salisbury

attitude of Berlin, Ontario, 12,000 of whose 18,000 inhabitants were Germans, or of German extraction. These settlers not only raised £15,000 for the National (Canadian) Patriotic Fund within a few months of the declaration of war, but also sent a cable to Lord Kitchener himself expressing their confidence that Britain had chosen the right man in appointing him, with Mr. Churchill, "to boss the job", adding that they wanted "to see militarism in Germany smashed for good, and the people free to shape a greater and better Germany".

For all this display of loyalty, however, Canada had to look to her own defence, as well as to help the

Imperial forces. A well-informed writer in the *Round Table* for March, 1915 noted that sentiment was less favourable among the German and Austrian communities in the west; he added, however, that the Mounted Police were vigilant, and that no treason was manifested. In all it was estimated that there were 521,000 Germans and Austrians in Canada, and of these 248,000 were established in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Hence the 8000 men engaged in garrison and outpost duty. The only danger of a raid by land was from the United States border, where there was the possibility of some desperate German raid, like those of the Fenians in 1866 and 1877, in order to do as much damage as pos-

sible before scuttling back. That the danger was not unreal was proved by the attempt made by a German officer at the beginning of February, 1915, to blow up with dynamite the frontier bridge over the Croix River, near Vanceboro, the joint property of the Canadian Pacific and Maine Central Railways. Fortunately the bridge was only slightly damaged, and the passenger service resumed after a trifling delay.

The British fleet kept both the Pacific and the Atlantic shores of the Dominion inviolate, bringing home to all its sons, as it had never been brought home before, a consciousness of the protection afforded by that "sure shield" in the Empire's hour of danger. Although Canada could not, like Australia and New Zealand, help the navy with battleships of her own, she purchased two submarines shortly after the outbreak of war, and, as already stated, presented them to the Admiralty. Eight other submarines were put in hand for construction in Canada. The Canadian cruisers *Niobe* and *Rainbow* were also handed over for the protection of commerce on the Pacific Ocean, and the fine liners of the Canadian Pacific Railway converted into cruisers for similar purposes.

Nor must we forget the splendid services rendered by Canada to the wounded in the war, both in the Mother Country and in France. By the beginning of 1915 as many as seventeen hospitals were at work, all organized and for the most part maintained by Canadians. At that period 160 Canadian doctors were engaged



"Boys of the Bull-dog Breed": Australians and their pets in Egypt



Brigadier-General J. E. B. Seely, D.S.O., M.P., commanding the Cavalry Brigade composed of the 2nd King Edward's Horse and two regiments of Canadian Mounted Troops

(From a photograph by Hughes & Mullins, Ryde)

in war service, with Colonel Charles Hodgetts as Canadian Red Cross Commissioner, Colonel Carleton Jones in command of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, and Nursing Sister Margaret Macdonald, matron-in-chief of the Canadian Army Nurses, who then had 103 Canadian nursing sisters under her, with 70 more on their way. Sir William Osler, one of Canada's most distinguished sons, and Regius Professor of Medicine at Oxford, took over the charge, with Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Armour, of the Queen's Canadian Hospital in the building generously provided by Sir Arthur and Lady Markham at Shorncliffe,

and maintained by the Canadian War Contingent Association, which equipped it. The Duchess of Connaught's Canadian Red Cross Hospital was equipped by the Canadian Red Cross Society at Cliveden, Taplow—lent for the purpose by Mr. and Mrs. Astor—and was under the charge of Major Gorell, C.A.M.C. The Canadian Army Medical Corps also took over the Mount Vernon Hospital at Hampstead, with Colonel Lorne Drum in charge, and equipped and maintained twelve hospitals—all, however, forming part of the Contingent organization—on Salisbury Plain, with headquarters at Bulford, under the command of Colonel Murray MacLaren, of St. John. These were in addition to the military hospital at Le Touquet, in Northern France, entirely officered by Canadian doctors and nurses, with Lieutenant-Colonel Shillington, of the Canadian No. 1 Field Hospital, in charge; the military hospital at Dinard organized and equipped by the French War Office as a result of the Canadian Government's gift of 100,000 dollars for the purpose; and countless contributions to the British Red Cross Society and kindred associations. Well might Sir Robert Borden declare in the Dominion House of Commons on February 9 that the strength of our Empire, bound by the ties of liberty and autonomous self-government, had been tested, and had held firm and true:

"In no respect have the expectations of the Prussian autocracy been more utterly disappointed and falsified than in this. From these great Dominions have gone forth, and will still go forth, the free manhood of a great Empire to fight for the

cause which involves, not alone our institutions of freedom and destiny, but those of the world. Fighting in such a cause, we do not dare to doubt the issue."

The great difficulty in Canada, as well as in Great Britain and all the Dominions, in organizing the immense

least important precaution was that Canada undertook to increase her normal food-stuff crops by fifty per cent in 1915 in order to make good the deficiencies of some of the Allies. It was estimated that this meant, with the average yield, that Canada alone



Part of Australia's First Contingent: the Victorian troops marching through the streets of Melbourne

forces needed for the Great War, was the provision of arms and equipment on so vast a scale. These difficulties, however, were gradually overcome, the government of Canada co-operating effectively with the Imperial Government in order that the resources of the British Isles and of the Dominion, and all other available resources, might be utilized in the most efficient manner for the common purpose. Not the

could supply the Mother Country with enough wheat to keep every inhabitant for eight or nine months.

An interesting appointment in February, 1915, and one subject to some partisan criticism at the time, was that of Colonel Seely, M.P., the former Secretary of State for War, to the command of the Cavalry Brigade composed of the 2nd King Edward's Horse and two regiments of Canadian



In the Land of the Pharaohs: Australians in Egypt finishing their training for the fighting line

Mounted Troops with Brigade Artillery. Colonel Seely—or Brigadier-General Seely, to give him his new temporary rank—was an army man long before he became a Cabinet Minister. He served in command of mounted troops in South Africa, and had commanded a Yeomanry regiment, of which he had been an officer for twenty-two years. In the Great War he had already been on Sir John French's Staff for six months, thus gaining invaluable knowledge of the conditions in which the campaign was being fought. His appointment, which Sir John himself had recommended, was confirmed by Lord Kitchener.

Newfoundland, which had pledged a contingent of 500 men for land service upon the declaration of war, as well as 1000 men for naval service abroad, had the tragic side of the struggle brought home to her in the early part of 1915, when 25 of these

reservists went down in the armed steamer *Viknor*, formerly well known as a tourist cruising yacht under the name of *Viking*, which foundered off the north-east coast of Ireland with all hands at the beginning of 1915. Further grievous losses were incurred among the ranks of the same gallant men when 24 others foundered with the crew of the armed merchant cruiser *Clan McNaughton* in February. Both vessels disappeared mysteriously, whether by mine, torpedo, or one of the common dangers of the sea remained unknown, there being no survivors in either case.

But while the colony mourned the loss of these gallant sons others were readier than ever to join the colours. Meantime the promised contingent of 500 men had already arrived in the Motherland, and was undergoing its final course of training before proceeding to the front.

So noble was the response to the call to arms throughout the Empire that Sir Robert Borden, in December, 1914, predicted that before she was finally crushed Germany would find in the British ranks facing her troops no fewer than 250,000 men from those Overseas Dominions whose loyalty she had so blindly discredited. Australia's share in the war, like that of Canada, increased with each succeeding month. There was no limit to the number of men she was prepared to send to the front. It was not a question, as the Minister of Defence explained, whether the number was 50,000 or 100,000; the only limitation was the number that could be properly equipped and trained for the purpose. Figures published to-

wards the end of November, 1914, showed that nearly 42,000 Australians had already been raised for active service abroad, including nearly 1800 naval reserves and infantry who had taken part in the operations in the Pacific. Approximately 2000 men monthly were being provided to increase the Australian force in the field. In addition to these, upwards of 56,000 men had been armed and equipped for the Citizen Defence Force, the majority of whom had also been mobilized under active service conditions for the defence of the Commonwealth. Besides these again there were some 51,000 members of rifle clubs, and 16,000 recruits who had passed from the senior cadets, making a grand total of some 162,000 under arms.



New Zealand's War Trophy: Members of the Expeditionary Force with the German flag which they hauled down in Samoa

The cadets referred to, it should be explained, formed part of Australia's new system of compulsory service on Militia lines, under which every able-bodied male in the Commonwealth is now compelled to undergo military training. This was part of the elaborate defence scheme recommended by Lord Kitchener and inaugurated in 1911. Although the system, which begins with the training of cadets from twelve to eighteen, and thence passes to their enlistment in the Citizen Defence Force, was too new to be tested as a whole, the lessons already learned, and the training already undergone, proved of very real service.

The Commonwealth had reason to be proud also of the part played by the Royal Australian Navy, the early achievements of which were recorded in Vol. I, pp. 101-2. Its association with the Japanese Navy in the Pacific had also been of the happiest augury, thanks largely to Japan's inflexible loyalty to her British ally, and the very favourable impression created by the action of the Mikado's Government in handing over the administration of the Marshall Islands to Australia after capturing them from the Germans. The fine record of the Royal Australian Navy down to the end of 1914 was succinctly stated by Mr. Fisher, the Australian Prime Minister, in his Budget speech:

"The coasts of Australia have been guarded from attack by the enemy's cruisers; all the trade routes to Colombo, Singapore, the Pacific Islands, and America have been kept open, and not a single merchant vessel has been captured in our waters. The ships of the R.A.N., together with mili-

tary expeditions, have taken all the German possessions in the Pacific, and the Royal Australian naval reserves, reinforced by crews from the destroyers, successfully attacked the wireless station at Rabaul. Our ships have assisted in the convoy of the Australian Expeditionary Force to Europe. The first page of our sea history has been inscribed with the well-fought action of the *Sydney* and the *Emden*."

How the *Sydney* found and destroyed the *Emden* has already been told in these pages. The Australian cruiser was helping to escort the first contingent when news was received of the *Emden's* proximity off the Keeling or Cocos Islands, 10 miles to leeward, and, as may well be imagined, the conquering cruiser received a remarkable reception after dealing with the enemy as she steamed down the lines of transports. It was remarkable, however, in a wholly unexpected manner—unexpected, at least, by the captured Germans on board the *Sydney*, who looked at each other uneasily as they watched the sides of the transports, all swarming with Australians, hats in hand, but uttering no sound. They could not understand why no cheer was raised to greet the victors. "Why this silence?" at length asked one of the captured German officers of one of the officers of the *Sydney*.

"He was told, very simply," writes Mr E. C. Buley in his *Glorious Deeds of Australians*, "that as there were prisoners on the cruiser, suffering from serious wounds gallantly sustained, the *Sydney* had sent a message asking that no noisy demonstration should mark her return to the fleet. This reply unmanned him completely. With tears in his eyes he said: 'You have been

kind, but this crowns all; we cannot speak to thank you for it.' For Australians not the least proud of the memories of the first engagement fought by their navy will ever be that silent greeting of the returning conqueror. The restraint imposed on that army of Australasians, going out for the first time to make war in Europe, was hardly natural, when the thrilling nature of the incident is considered."

Victoria	7,430
New South Wales ...	6,420
Queensland	2,380
South Australia ...	1,770
Tasmania	1,070
Western Australia ...	840
	<hr/>
	19,910

Thenceforward the voyage was without noteworthy incident until the arrival at Suez, where it was learned for the first time that instead of continuing the journey to England, as originally planned, the troops would disembark to complete their training in Egypt, and meantime be ready for any eventuality in that threatened land. The command of the Australian Expeditionary Force was given on its formation to Brigadier-General Bridges, who was appointed a Major-General in the British army. On the arrival of the troops in Egypt the command of the united Australian and New Zealand Force—the New Zealanders having also landed to complete their training in Egypt, as well as the Planters' Corps from Ceylon—was given to General William Riddell Birdwood, C.B., who saw much fighting on the North-West Frontier of India, and served through the South African War as military secretary to Lord Kitchener. The different States of the Commonwealth—true to their promise before the war-cloud had burst upon Europe—contributed to the Expeditionary Force in proportion to their population. Thus the first contingent was originally constituted, with Tasmania, as follows:—

Additions here and there brought the actual number of troops dispatched as Australia's first contingent to 20,338, besides 1200 of the Army Reserve. There were, in addition, 7477 horses and 70 guns. "The crushing of mad militarism will take long," declared the Australian Minister of Defence, "but we shall continue to send men till the end of the war is in sight."

Mr. Pearce, the same Minister, sent the troops on their departure a message which braced them for their great adventure. "The people of Australia," he said, "look to you to prove in battle that you are capable of upholding the traditions of British arms. I have no fear that you will worthily represent the Commonwealth's military forces." Six months later the Empire was ringing with the news of their magnificent feat of arms with the New Zealanders at Anzac Cove in far-off Gallipoli.

New Zealand, who had offered her all at the very beginning of the crisis, had also played an active part at once both by land and sea. Her smart capture of German Samoa has already been recorded (Vol. I, p. 101); and her battle-cruiser *New Zealand*, sharing the perils of the British fleet in its ceaseless vigil of the North Sea, shared also in the glory of the only actions on a considerable scale which took place in those waters during the



The Rally of the Empire: part of New Zealand's army in training

first six months of the war—the battle in the Bight of Heligoland on August 28, 1914, and the action of January 24, 1915, when the innocent victims of the East Coast raiders were avenged. This fresh chapter in our naval history sent a new thrill of pride not only through the Mother Country, but through every son of the Dominions oversea. The “Well done, Halsey!” of the High Commissioner’s message to the captain of the *New Zealand* after her second engagement, was echoed throughout the Empire. New Zealand had her own craft even in the aerial war, the *Britannia*, an aeroplane presented to her in the first place by the British Imperial Fleet Committee some time previously to the war, being sent to the front by the New Zealand Defence Department.

In the main Expeditionary Force came the flower of her young manhood. Like Australia, her military

system was in a period of transition, but her “Defence Amendment Act”, passed as a result of Lord Kitchener’s visit in 1910, and including compulsory training, had already yielded excellent results. Her main Expeditionary Force, numbering nearly 100,000 men, consequently contained a large proportion of trained troops, close connection being preserved in their organization with the new Territorial or Citizen Army. Only a few months before the war the whole of the citizen forces of New Zealand had been inspected by Sir Ian Hamilton, then Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces, and received the hall-mark of his unstinted approval. Of the Cadet system in particular, with its compulsory training, he spoke with enthusiasm:—

“If the working men and women of Scotland could have participated in my Cadet inspection through Otago Province (verily a smaller Scotland), if the fathers

and mothers of the poorer children of London, Birmingham, Manchester, and Liverpool could only have been present at my Cadet parades in Canterbury Province and in the North Island, could they have done this, and have shared with me the joy of seeing so many keen, happy faces, so many bodies in the pink of physical condition, I know they would not permit their rulers to deny to their own sons one day longer, the same privileges as the boys of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are now enjoying."

The only regret in New Zealand was that the compulsory military training scheme had not been in force longer, and one of the outstanding features of the wave of patriotism which swept over the Dominion upon the outbreak of the war was the ardent

desire of the older men to drill themselves into a state of military preparedness. This resulted in the formation of Citizen Defence Corps in the leading centres, with the object of taking the place as far as possible of the younger men on active service. Besides the 8200 men of the first Imperial Expeditionary Force 1800 were then garrisoning Samoa. Like the other Dominions New Zealand had largely increased her original offer of help with her full realization of the fact that her own fate, no less than that of the Mother Country, was involved in the Great World War. By December, 1914, she had 3000 reinforcements in camp near Wellington waiting to sail as soon as transports could be provided



With the Australasian Army in Egypt: an inspection during the visit of Sir George Reid, High Commissioner for Australia

Sir George Reid—with the silk hat in the picture—afterwards declared that the Australians had "excelled every other display of manhood" he had ever seen.

for them; to be followed by 3000 more. Arrangements were made to send further reinforcements every two months; so that New Zealand seemed likely to be represented at the front in due course by an army of something like 20,000 men. The Maoris were represented both in the first Imperial Expeditionary Force and in the expedition to Samoa, 250 being allotted to each. Twice as many came forward—magnificent specimens of warriors most of them—and there was intense disappointment when the official limit was reached. A number of strapping Maori women also volunteered, loudly urging their claims to share in the defence of the Empire. "I can shoot as well as any man who ever stepped," one Maori maid is said to have protested, adding scornfully, when at length convinced that all appeals were in vain, that the ways of the "pakeha"—white men—were incomprehensible in thus sending their men to war without their women to look after them.

The first of the New Zealanders to arrive in the Motherland, where they produced a first-rate impression in the military camp prepared for them on Salisbury Plain, and roused London's enthusiasm by their soldierly bearing in the historic Lord Mayor's Show, was only the advance guard of the contingent. When it had made itself very much at home on Salisbury Plain, and prepared the way for its comrades, this detachment suddenly discovered that its main force, which it had been expecting for weeks, had landed instead in Egypt, for the same reason as that which had detained the first Australian contingent. There was no-

thing for it, therefore, but to re-embark from Home—for Britain meant Home to all these New Zealanders, as well as to every other colonist, though many of them had never set foot on her shores before—and rejoin the Expeditionary Force on the banks of the Nile, where the forces of half the Empire were gathering for battle. Not even Macaulay's familiar vision of some future New Zealander, "in the midst of a vast solitude, taking his stand on a broken arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's" could stir the imagination more than the reality of this most modern army of the desert—ardent young soldiers of the newest countries in the world, with all their history still to be made, camping, tramping, and training among the immemorial monuments of ancient Egypt. To see these Australians and New Zealanders encamped at the foot of the Pyramids on the way to fight for the Empire in Europe, as Sir George Reid, the High Commissioner for Australia, declared after his visit to them towards the close of 1914, "was one of the most impressive spectacles of Imperial glamour and romance". During this visit of Sir George Reid, who was accompanied by the Hon. Thomas Mackenzie, the High Commissioner for New Zealand—both sparing no pains to secure the comfort of the troops, and to inspire all ranks with an added sense of the righteousness of the cause upon which they were engaged—the entire Australian army was inspected by Sir John Maxwell, Commander of the Forces in Egypt, who subsequently asked that his congratulations might



Photo. Bassett Digby

At the Foot of the Sphinx: Young Australia—with one of the contingent's regimental pets—amongst the Monuments of Ancient Egypt

be conveyed to the governments concerned on the splendid qualities of their contingents. In his farewell letter to the Australians on returning to London Sir George Reid declared that they had "excelled every other display of manhood I have ever seen"; while Sir John Maxwell, in praising the New Zealanders to Mr. Mackenzie, said it would be impossible to find better material anywhere. General Birdwood, in command of the combined Dominion Forces, was equally enthusiastic.

The Ceylon contingent—or Planters' Corps, for it was chiefly composed of young planters—had been in Egypt

since October, and also proved extremely smart and efficient. Many of its members were well-to-do, and all were of good extraction. The corps was attached to the New Zealanders on the arrival of that contingent in Egypt.

All the colonial troops settled down to strenuous training. Their one idea was to fit themselves for the European front at the earliest possible moment; for as the weeks slipped by, and Turkey's threatened invasion seemed farther off than ever, their prospects of seeing active service in Egypt became depressingly remote, until fresh hopes were raised by the enemy's

futile attempts upon the Suez Canal at the beginning of 1915. But even though no fighting had hitherto taken place, their presence undoubtedly produced, in Sir George Reid's words, "a very soothing impression upon the young Egyptian Party . . . an effect of more value than would be possible even if they were in the actual fighting line". And all the time, as the High Commissioner added, they were undergoing training which would make them "worthy to fight side by side with the finest troops in the Empire".

Every rank, and every profession and trade were represented in these armies of the Dominions, as in the ranks of the new armies at home. Many of the privates, as well as officers, had sacrificed big incomes for the privilege of serving. A correspondent of the *Daily Chronicle* describes how he met an Australian private one morning in the streets of Cairo:—

"'I am going to buy carpets to send home,' he said. 'Let us get a dragoman and go into the bazaar.' The dragoman was found, and he took us to a large shop. Carpets were spread out. This one cost £50; so did another; a third was valued at £100. 'But,' said the dragoman to the dealer, 'this man is only a private soldier; he can only buy very cheap carpets.' Imagine the astonishment of the dragoman when the 'private soldier' decided to take all three carpets and paid for them on the spot. 'Truly,' he muttered, 'the English are a marvellous people.' The soldier was an Australian barrister who had given up a practice worth £5000 a year to shoulder a rifle."

Among the medical men associated with Australia's five field hospitals for

the front were many of the leading practitioners of the Commonwealth, and it was roughly estimated that the twenty-six officers of the highest rank among them made an aggregate sacrifice of £34,000 a year in thus volunteering. That the same spirit animated the smaller colonies as well as the great Dominions was shown in a dozen different ways, but nowhere better, perhaps, than in the scattered Fiji Islands in the South Pacific. Here the British colonists mustered a contingent of fifty-eight volunteers, all of whom were well-to-do government servants, or farmers earning from £1000 to £2500 a year. It was all part of the great conspiracy of silence that these last gallant sons of the empire arrived at Liverpool unannounced on the 1st of February, 1915, emerged in London from the Tube at Charing Cross the same afternoon as though in the habit of doing this every day of their lives, and swung through Trafalgar Square towards the War Office, unnoticed save by those who happened to be in the neighbourhood at the time, and unrecorded save by two lines in the press which probably escaped the eyes of the censor. But the memory of those fine, upstanding men, with their look of grim determination, and the touch of colour which they gave to the grey London background with their bronzed skin and their picturesque shirts—for they wore no coats—will not soon be forgotten by those who were privileged to watch them pass.

F. A. M.

CHAPTER XIII

THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

The Movements of Von Spee's Squadron—The Counter-measures—The Falkland Islands, their Position and Importance—The Action of December 8 and its Moral—The *Dresden* sunk.

WHEN Admiral von Spee had won the action off Coronel—described in Vol. I, pp. 301–5—he was still in a position calling for great wariness and activity on his part. It is highly probable, so probable in fact as to be practically a certainty, that no display of capacity and energy could in the end have averted the destruction of his squadron. Nothing could have saved him except such a degree of sloth and ineptitude in the operations of his enemies as would have covered them with ridicule—which was not to be thought possible. In what manner, and when, and where ruin would overtake him were details which of necessity remained obscure. And yet we ought not to overestimate that obscurity. Conditions physical and political dictated the course of events with a measure of precision which would have almost justified prophecy.

When the German officer had destroyed the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* he broke through the circle which was being drawn round him in the Pacific. He did not make it possible for himself to remain in that ocean. The overwhelming superiority of British, Australian, and Japanese forces had deprived Germany of every possible base of operation in the whole expanse of water lying east of Africa

and west of America. Mobile forces were concentrating on him. His only chance, not of final escape and return home—for that he and his officers do not appear to have considered attainable—but to win other successes and prolong the active existence of his squadron, was to escape into the South Atlantic, and he had a particular reason for taking that course. It was just conceivable, though most improbable, that he might there provide himself with a harbour under his own control, an anchorage where he could repair or clean his ships, which he could use as a storehouse, and to which he could take prizes. The Falkland Islands presented a tempting object for a bold venture.

This archipelago is valuable to a naval force for two reasons—its geographical position and the good anchorages it contains. As a scene of industry and a place of human habitation the Falklands are just a little better than worthless. They are barren, treeless, and swept by the killing winds which blow up from the South Pole. But there are good harbours in the two main islands, East and West Falkland, which are separated by Falkland Sound, and the fritter of small rocky islets about them affords some cover. A little pasture, a whaling-station, and guano give some profit.

Buccaneers, Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Spaniards, the South American Republic of La Plata, the United States, and Great Britain have been interested in them sporadically as the bases of piracy, or smuggling, or whale-fisheries; and they have remained in the possession of this country as the prize of its naval superiority and after a curious story of war and diplomacy with which we are not for the moment concerned. They have been held by the fleet only, not by garrisons or forts. Therefore it did appear, in December, 1914, that if Admiral von Spee could only strike quick enough, and if the British Government were sufficiently slow and negligent, the Germans might seize a harbour of their own among them and retain hold of it at least during a period of some length. With such a base, lying 300 miles or so to the east of the Straits of Magellan, an active cruiser squadron would have been fairly well placed to harass British commerce in the South Atlantic. Their exact position is between $51^{\circ} 15'$ and 53° south latitude, and $57^{\circ} 40'$ and 62° west longitude. It will be obvious that all the reasons which invited the Germans to attempt to seize the Falkland Islands were equally valid to stimulate the British Admiralty to take measures for their protection. Common sense dictated that course, and neglect would have been a proof of sheer stupidity. When the news of Admiral Cradock's disaster reached home there was obviously not a moment to lose. The measures taken were, of course, not announced to all the world, but it was not an absolute mystery that the chief

of the Naval War Staff, Sir F. C. Doveton Sturdee, had been dispatched, on receipt of the news of the battle of Coronel on November 1, with an adequate force and on a mission to forestall the probable, or even the all but certain, irruption of Admiral von Spee into the South Atlantic. We do not, so far, know the details of the movements on either side, the dates and precise course of the British ships entrusted with the defence, nor the previous arrangements, activity of private agents, connivances of South American officials, or liberties taken with Chilian neutrality, as the case may be, by which Admiral von Spee was able to carry out his attack. We do know that, until December 8, the forces were converging. The *Canopus*, which was unable to reach the scene



Sketch-map showing the Scenes of the Naval Battles off the South American Coast



Photo. Crit-b, Southsea

On a British Dreadnought: two 12-inch guns trained for firing

of the action off Coronel in time, and the *Glasgow*, which escaped from the disaster, fell back on the Falklands. There they were joined by Admiral Sturdee, and there the combined forces were found by Admiral von Spee on December 8.

The only British settlement of any importance in the Archipelago, Port Stanley, lies on the east side of East Falkland. The small town (the whole population of the islands is but little over 3000) is built on the inner or north side of a narrow and low peninsula running from west to east. This peninsula on the south, and the mainland of the island on the north, embrace a fiord of which the more open or eastern half is known as Port William, while the narrower and western end is Stanley Harbour. Admiral Sturdee had arrived on the morning of Monday, December 7, and began at once to coal. The strength and disposition of his force on the 8th, the day of the action, is stated in his dispatch dated December 19, 1914, and first published on March 3, 1915.

Vol. II

The *Macedonia*, an armed merchant-ship, was at anchor as look-out ship, presumably at the entrance to Port William.

The following were in Port William:—

The *Invincible* (flagship), Captain Percy T. H. Beamish (1909), of 17,250 tons, eight 12-inch guns, sixteen 4-inch, five machine, and five torpedo-tubes—and of 26 knots.

The *Inflexible*, Captain

R. F. Phillimore, sister ship to the *Invincible*.

The *Kent*, Captain John D. Allen (1903), 9800 tons, fourteen 6-inch, eight 12-pounders, one 3-pounder, eight machine-guns, and two torpedo-tubes—21.7 knots.

The *Cornwall*, Captain W. M. Ellerton, sister ship.

The *Carnarvon* (flagship of Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart), Captain H. L. d'E. Skipwith (1905), 10,850 tons, four 7.5-inch guns, six 6-inch, twenty 3-pounders, two machine, two torpedo-tubes—23.3 knots.

The following were in Port Stanley:—

The *Canopus*, Captain H. S. Grant (1899), 12,950 tons, four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch guns, ten 12-pounders, six 3-pounders, four torpedo-tubes—18.5 knots.

The *Glasgow*, Captain J. Luce (1910), 4800 tons, two 6-inch, ten 4-inch, one 12-pounder, four 3-pounders, two torpedo-tubes—25.8 knots.

The *Bristol*, Captain B. H. Fanshawe, sister ship to the *Glasgow*.

The strength of the German ships—five in all—has been given in the account of the action off Coronel. A comparison will show that the superiority in number and weight of guns was overwhelmingly on the side of the British squadron. It was several

times greater than the superiority of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* over the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*. And then, two of the British ships, the *Invincible* and the *Inflexible*, had an immense advantage in passive strength over the German cruisers. The 7½-inch armour of their belts, the 3-inch armour of the sides above the belts, and the 7-inch armour of the guns gave them a far greater protection than was enjoyed by their opponents. Either of these vessels could have fought the whole of Admiral von Spee's squadron single-handed. Their greater speed would have enabled them to fix the distance at which they would engage, and their armour could not have been pierced by the enemy's guns at ranges at which their own could have told with ruinous effect—and indeed did tell in the action. When we look at the disproportion between the two squadrons, the ques-

tion how Admiral von Spee came to put his weak force within striking distance of Admiral Sturdee's nearly two-to-one superiority in mere numbers, and far more than two-to-one superiority in effective force, imposes itself. Much has been said in praise of the masterly dispositions of the British Admiralty, and the skill it had shown in maintaining a strict secrecy as to the movements of ships; yet a moment's reflection ought to have shown Admiral von Spee that some measures to protect a base and coaling-station of the importance of the Falkland Islands would in all probability have been taken between the beginning of August and the first days of December. German officers make mistakes like other men, and Von Spee may simply have blundered; but it is reasonable to suppose that he had very little choice. At the vast distance at which he was from



On Examination Duty: British submarine, with boarding-boat on her forecastle, stopping a neutral



Sir F. C. Doveton Sturdee, in command of the British Fleet at the Battle of the Falkland Islands
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

home, and in his great need of an anchorage of his own, he may have felt constrained to stake everything on one great hazard.

His route of approach had naturally been round the Horn, for he could not well have risked his small squadron in the narrow waters of the Straits of Magellan, nor could he have escaped detection if he had taken that route. One of his smaller and quicker vessels, the *Dresden* or the *Leipzig*, might have been sent in advance to reconnoitre, or he might have timed his approach so as to near Port Stanley in the afternoon, when the shades of night would have been near to cover him in case he found a superior British force waiting. But it was in the early hours of a very clear morning when

he was signalled coming on with his vessels together from the south and heading to the north. Sir F. D. Sturdee states in his dispatch that at 8 a.m. on Tuesday, December 8, the signal station on Sapper Hill reported a four-funnel and a two-funnel man-of-war in sight. At 8.20 the signal station reported another column of smoke in sight to the south. At 8.47 the *Canopus*, at anchor in Stanley Harbour, with a clear view over the low land between her and the open sea, reported two vessels at a distance of 8 miles, and the smoke of others, showing 12 miles farther out. Yet another column of smoke was soon seen, from the signal station, still farther out, at ten minutes to nine. The German admiral was, in fact, coming on with his five cruisers and two colliers, the *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*, in three detachments. The most distant of them was so near that it would certainly be overtaken in the course of a long day of bright light.

The enemy found the British crews grimy from hard work at coaling, and hungry for breakfast, but alert and ready. At 9.20 the two leading German ships, the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg*, approached the low land on the south of the fiord as if to fire on the wireless signal station. They were clearly visible to the *Canopus*, which was at anchor inside, and she must have been visible to them. They could also be seen across the same land from the *Invincible* and the *Inflexible*, which were in Port William, and these two powerful ships might therefore have been seen from the tops of the *Gneisenau* and the

Nürnberg. The *Canopus* opened fire at a range of 11,000 yards, firing over the land. The two Germans went on to the eastward and then turned north, as if to close the entry to Port William. Meanwhile the British squadron had prepared to sally forth and meet the attack. The *Macedonia* was ordered to weigh "on the inside", that is to the north of the other vessels. The *Kent* was sent to the entrance "and a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed". All the squadron, except the *Macedonia* and the *Bristol*, which were seemingly told off as a reserve, stood out together. As the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* neared the entry to Port William they apparently realized for the first time the presence of the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, and at once turned south to join the ships farther out. The *Glasgow* had already gone to join the *Kent*. It was at a quarter to ten that Admiral Sturdee's squadron stood out of Port William, passing Cape Pembroke, the southern entry to the fiord, on which there is a light. The order of the big ships was: the *Carnarvon*, *Inflexible*, *Invincible*, and *Cornwall*. The slow speed of the *Canopus* gave her no chance of taking part in this action.

When the British ships cleared Cape Pembroke the enemy had concentrated and were seen hull down to

the south-east. At 10.20 the signal was made for "a general chase". A general chase is a pursuit of the enemy in which every vessel is allowed to go at her best speed, so that the swifter ships leave the slower behind them. It is a method of attack which might, if executed in a rash manner, result in bringing the vessels of the pursuing force under the



The German Light Cruiser *Nürnberg*, sunk in the Battle of the Falkland Islands


enemies' fire in succession, when they might be crushed in detail. The advantage of it is that the quickest of one force will almost certainly be able to overtake the slowest of another, so that the pursued fleet must either sacrifice some of its members or be drawn into an action which it wishes to avoid, if it supports the menaced vessel. The *Invincible* and *Inflexible* pressed on, leaving the slower *Carnarvon* behind, and by a quarter-past eleven had so far reduced the distance between them and the enemy that his bridges and funnels were visible above the horizon. Speed was slackened to allow of a concentration of force. In-

formation by wireless from the *Bristol* told the Admiral at 11.47 that some of the enemy had been detached and were apparently heading for Port Pleasant, to the south of Port Stanley. She and the *Macedonia* were ordered round to take care of them, and did in fact capture and sink them after taking out their crews. This was a subsidiary part of the general action. The main action with the five cruisers was itself soon subdivided.

A little after midday, or 12.20, the enemy still keeping his distance, and when, as from the context of Admiral Sturdee's dispatch would appear to be the case, only the *Glasgow* was close to the *Invincible*—at a distance of 2 miles—and the *Inflexible* was on her starboard quarter, i.e. on the right side but not in a line, the British Admiral decided to attack with these three. The formation of the enemy is not exactly stated, but it would seem to have been "a line abreast"; or with the ships side by side. They were right ahead of the British squadron, heading to south-east. Fire was opened at ranges of 16,500, to 15,000, at 12.47, with the bow-guns, and was directed at the enemy's right-hand ship. When the shells from the *Invincible* and *Inflexible* began to fall near them, the three light German cruisers—the *Leipzig*, *Dresden*, and *Nürnberg*—separated from the two more powerful, the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and fled to the south-west. They were pursued by the *Glasgow*, *Cornwall*, and *Kent*.

While these six went off, pursued and pursuers, to the south-west, the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, with the

slower *Carnarvon* coming on behind, followed the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, firing at them. As the pursuing British ships began to draw up, and it was clear that they would be overtaken, the Germans turned to port, i.e. to the left, so as to place themselves one ahead of the other, the *Scharnhorst* leading, and bring their broadsides to bear. In the days of Nelson two ships, of any nationality, so over-matched as the Germans were would have made some fight "for the honour of the flag", and would then have surrendered. No thought of surrender appears to have occurred to the Germans. The British ships followed the enemy's movement, but drew farther off to diminish the chance that the German fire would produce any effect on them. The broadside action lasted from 1.30 to 2.10, during which time the range increased from 13,500 to 16,450 yards. The Germans then turned and tried to make off again. But the superior speed which enabled the British ships to draw away made it possible for them to pursue. If the determination never to submit nor yield deserves honour, then the German ships went down covered with honour—the *Scharnhorst* at 4.17 and the *Gneisenau* at 5.30. Their last moments were spent in firing till their ammunition was exhausted. Their practice was good, but at the long ranges which the British ships were able to maintain it was of no effect. Admiral Sturdee made full use of his superiority, and if his cautious adherence to the long range prolonged the action, his victory was practically bloodless on his side.



The German Armoured Cruiser *Scharnhorst*, sunk in the Falkland Islands Battle

Towards the close of this part of the action the *Carnarvon*, which was not of sufficient speed to follow the light cruisers, had joined the *Invincible*. The *Kent*, *Glasgow*, and *Cornwall* followed the *Leipzig*, *Nürnberg*, and *Dresden* when they turned to the south-west. The chase was long. The *Glasgow* outsteamed the *Cornwall* and *Kent*, and began engaging the *Leipzig* at 3 p.m. In this case also the British ship kept her distance, and strove to cripple the enemy by the greater range of her guns. She held her till the *Cornwall* could come into action, and the two destroyed the *Leipzig* by 7.17 p.m., when she was plunging and sinking, though she did not actually go down till about 9 p.m. The *Kent* followed the *Nürnberg*, and by the strenuous efforts of her engine-room staff she excelled her accepted speed and forced an action at 5 p.m. The German ship sank at 6.35 after lowering her flag, but only twelve of her crew were picked up, and of them five died. The *Dresden* escaped by speed and in the dark. Seven killed and four wounded, mostly on the *Kent*, was the total British loss. The loss

might have been infinitely greater but for the heroic resource of Sergeant Charles Mayes, of the *Kent*, who received the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal for the deed which is officially described as follows:—


“A shell burst and ignited some cordite charges in the casemate; a flash of flame went down the hoist into the ammunition passage. Sergeant Mayes picked up a charge of cordite and threw it away. He then got hold of a fire-hose and flooded the compartment, extinguishing the fire in some empty shell-bags which were burning. The extinction of this fire saved a disaster which might have led to the loss of the ship.”



Sergeant Charles Mayes, awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal for heroism which saved H.M.S. *Kent* in the Falkland Islands Battle

(From a photograph by Cribb, Southsea)


Map to illustrate the BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND IS.



Sketch-map illustrating approximately—from Admiral Sturdee's Dispatch—the Battle of the Falkland Islands from start to finish. The map is not to be regarded as showing the proper scale of distances, etc.

The German loss was counted by the hundred. Of the *Scharnhorst's* crew none survived. Of the *Gneisenau* somewhat more than a hundred. Eighteen officers and men of the *Leipzig* and seven of the *Nürnberg* were saved.

The action off the Falkland Islands practically annihilated the German commerce-destroying ships in the Atlantic, and proved once again that this method of conducting naval war is never of any real effect when it is properly met. The *Dresden* was not accounted for until March 14, 1915, when she was caught near Juan Fernandez Island, off the coast of Chile, by the *Glasgow*, the *Kent*, and the auxiliary cruiser *Orama*. The fight-



Homeward Bound from Northern Seas: British war-ship forcing her way through ice 5 feet thick

ing which ensued only lasted five minutes, the *Dresden* hauling down her colours and her crew seeking safety ashore, to be interned in Chile until the end of the war. The cruiser herself sank, her magazine exploding after she had been set on fire during the action. There were no British casualties.

D. H.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ADMIRALTY

A Worthy Record—The Admiralty's Beginnings—Development and Present-day Composition—Functions of the First Lord—His Professional Advisers—The War Staff—Prince Louis of Battenberg's Resignation—Mr. Churchill's Letter of Acceptance—Lord Fisher's Return—The Navy Discipline Acts.

THE great administrative department which we name "for short" the Admiralty can claim one most honourable distinction. It has been on the whole the most efficient and the most uniformly successful part of the executive government of this country all through

its history. To say that it has never erred by blundering or through corruption would be to claim for it that it has been more than human. We advance no such absurd claim, but only state as a matter of historic fact that in all the changes through which it has passed it has blundered less,

and has been less corrupt at its worst, than other departments.

What for convenience sake we call by the name of the Admiralty is technically the body or board of Commissioners for discharging the office of the Lord High Admiral. Mere historical or archæological detail would be out of place here, but there is an actual contemporary interest in the facts of the origin of the constitution, functions, and powers of the department. The Lord High Admiral was originally a great officer of state whose powers were both judicial and military. Nothing need be said here of the judicial side of his functions; they have long been transferred to lawyers. But a trace of the connection remains in the title of Vice-Admiral, which still belongs to the President of the Admiralty Division of the High Court of Judicature. There are Vice-Admirals of counties who are justices—at least in theory

—for Admiralty cases. Since the Revolution of 1688 the office of Lord High Admiral has been, save for a very few brief intervals, when a single person held it in ways rather formal than effective, “in Commission”. The Commissioners have been known as “The Lords of the Admiralty”, and commonly as “My Lords”. Until the year 1832 the Board of Admiralty exercised the superior political and military government of the navy. The civil government, that is to say the administration of the dockyards, the victualling, supply of stores and so forth, was carried out by other boards and offices of varying number under the supervision of the Admiralty. The most important and permanent was the Navy Board, or Navy Office, first organized by King Henry VIII at the close of his reign. For reasons which would make a long story, this separation of functions was finally condemned, and by a reform, or at least

a change, carried out by the distinguished Whig statesman Sir James Graham, the Admiralty and the Navy Boards were, so to speak, combined. During the eighty years or so which have elapsed since his reorganization there have been not a few modifications in detail, but no alteration in the essential character of his work. To-day the Admiralty is composed of the



The German Light Cruiser *Leipzig*, sunk in the Falkland Islands Battle

following nine officers, First Lord, First Sea Lord, Second Sea Lord, Third Sea Lord, Fourth Sea Lord, Civil Lord, Additional Civil Lord, Parliamentary Secretary, and Permanent Secretary, whose particular duties will be dealt with presently. When the war broke out, these offices were held, respectively, by Mr. Winston Churchill, Prince Louis of Battenberg, Vice-Admiral Sir F. T. Hamilton, Rear-Admiral F. C. T. Tudor, Captain Cecil F. Lambert, Mr. George Lambert, M.P., Sir F. J. S. Hopwood, Mr. T. J. Macnamara, M.P., and Sir W. G. Greene.

This concentration of functions formerly divided between the Admiralty and the Navy Boards has been

criticized on the ground that it tended to overwhelm the first by calling upon it to perform both its own duties and those of the second. The Admiralty, it has been contended, ran the risk of being smothered by administrative detail, and would be tempted, if not absolutely forced, to give its whole thoughts to mere material matters—building, stores, and the like. The better course, in the opinion of these critics, would have been to leave the merely “civil” work to a body of officers who had nothing else to do, while the Admiralty would see to it that they did their duty, and would have been free to give its main attention to the training of the navy and the conduct of war. But if the Admi-



Photo. Stephen Cribb

The Vigil of the North Sea: H.M.S. *New Zealand* washed from end to end in a rough sea



Photo. Cribb. Southsea

With the Naval Brigade: How Bluejackets effect a landing

rality was to maintain a really effective supervision over the civil government, it must both understand the work and attend to every step of the execution. The result must necessarily have been a duplication of function. There must have been one man to do, and another to see that he did it, instead of one man who was responsible for the execution of the work. The change was made after long enquiries by a series of commissions, and was justified by very strong arguments.

The functions of the various members of the board were officially defined in the memorandum of 1912. It is necessary to bear in mind that such a document as this must necessarily ignore certain facts which yet have a very real influence. It states a theory which is not always, nor even commonly, in exact harmony with practice in the political and administrative worlds. The theory concerning

the Admiralty is that it is a species of corporate body or legal person of which all the individuals composing it are parts. Its decisions are not those of the chief, but the whole board—of “My Lords”. It is not a department with a minister at its head who gives orders to his subordinates by his own authority. Now, experience has shown that no corporate body or quasi-legal person will ever work harmoniously unless there is, in fact, subordination to a superior.

The Admiralty, in practice, is just a Government office with a minister at its head who is called First Lord and who speaks in the name of the board. The amount of power he exercises depends, as it does in all cases, partly on his personal capacity and partly on the strength of the ministry of which he is a member. But because he is the member of Parliament, and of the Cabinet, who speaks for the navy in

Parliament, and who, therefore, represents the supreme authority of the State, he is by necessity in a wholly different position from his fellow "Commissioners". We will, therefore, leave the theory on one side and speak of the First Lord as the minister at the head of the government of the navy. As the direct representative of the State he exercises a general supervision over all the work of the Admiralty. There is a reference to him, and he decides in the last resort. He controls all promotion, distributes honours, and rewards and appoints the senior officers. If he is a wise man he will not multiply interferences with the functions of other members of the board. Any of them, or all of them at once, can resign if they think fit. A weak minister belonging to a feeble Cabinet may be overawed, but when he is a man of strong character, and the Cabinet is vigorous, the only necessary consequence of a threat of resignation from the other members would be their retirement.

In other European nations, and as a rule, the ministerial heads of the navy and army are admirals or generals. In Great Britain the practice has been to give the office to a statesman and to leave the executive work of administration to professional men. This practice has been justified by the results. No First Lord ever showed more party spirit or was more acrimoniously attacked for reducing the strength of the navy than Earl St. Vincent (Sir John Jervis), who was in office at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The ideal First Lord is one who exercises the authority of

the State at the Admiralty, takes the advice of the most competent professional men, and puts the needs of the service effectively before Parliament.

The chief of the minister's professional advisers is the First Sea Lord. The memorandum of 1912 defines his functions as being the director of the "Fighting and sea-going efficiency of the Fleet, its organization and mobilization, including complements of ships as affecting total numbers; system of gunnery and torpedo exercises of the Fleet, and tactical employment of air-craft, and all military questions connected with the foregoing; distribution and movements of all ships in Commission and Reserve".

Next to him is the Second Sea Lord, to whom belongs the supervision of the manning of the navy and training of the crews, including, as a matter of course, the Royal Marines, hospitals, signals, discipline, and the appointment of all officers except those reserved to the First Lord.

The Third Sea Lord deals with the ships, armour, guns, and, in short, the material of the navy, and is the immediate Chief of the Director of Naval Construction, Engineer-in-Chief, Director of Naval Ordnance, Director of Naval Equipment, Director of Air Department, and Superintendent of Compasses.

The Fourth Sea Lord has under his charge the pay, victualling, and stores, uniforms, medals, detention, barracks, deserters, collisions, and salvage.

The Civil Lord looks to "works and buildings, including purchases of

land, coastguard buildings, sites and leases, and so forth". An additional Civil Lord has been recently created, whose duty it is to attend to contracts and also "the general organization of the dockyards".

The Parliamentary Secretary is, in fact, an "Under Secretary of State"

The Board, being a governing body—a quasi-legal person—must work by advisers and through sub-departments of officials. The chief adviser of the Board is the Admiralty War Staff. In its present form the staff, at the outbreak of war, had been in existence for only two years or so



Bluejackets and their "Long Tom": Naval Brigade hauling a 4.7 gun over a hill for siege operations

with another title, and his name explains his position, which is that of lieutenant to the First Lord in Parliament.

The Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty is what Permanent Secretaries are in all departments—the official who is head of the "secretariat", that is of the daily work of the whole office. In all kinds of business the man who exercises this function, and does not come and go, may possess a practical power out of all proportion to his theoretic authority.

—to be exact, since 1912. Before that date there was an "Intelligence Department" which itself was not of ancient standing. The duty of an Intelligence Department is sufficiently described by its very name. So much cannot be said of a "War Staff". On the face of it the title would seem to belong to the body by which wars are conducted, but this is not the function of the Admiralty War Staff. It is an advisory body. At the head is an admiral, and it is subdivided into three sections, each of

which is directed by a rear-admiral—the Intelligence Division, the Operations Division, and the Mobilization Division. The first collects information from all quarters, home and foreign. The second draws the morals and makes the applications. The third advises as to the best ways of making available the labours of the other two. The subordinate officials of the War Staff are naval officers, of the rank of lieutenant and upwards, who pass through a course of study at the War College at Portsmouth. All the labours of the War Staff are laid before the board, and the board accepts or rejects on the advice of the First Sea Lord. The members of the staff are officers on the active list who pass from sea service to the Admiralty and back again. The chief of the War Staff in August, 1914, was Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. Doveton Sturdee.

A phrase which was much in use while the War Staff was in process of being formed defined it as the brains of the navy. Like many other rhetorical terms so popular in current controversies this is neither description nor definition. The brains of the navy must, by the very nature of things, dwell in the head of the authority by whom the labours of the War Staff are judged, and by whose will they are accepted or rejected. In a multitude of counsellors there is wisdom, as we know, but it is no less true that Wisdom herself can cry aloud in the streets, and that no man may mark her. The poor wise man too often fails to save the city, because nobody will listen. There is a danger inherent in the nature of such bodies



Prince Louis of Battenberg
(From a photograph by Bassano)

as a War Staff. It is that it will become a mere debating society, and that it will either confuse or dominate the authority which it is supposed only to instruct and advise. It may lose itself in mere discussion and references, in red tape,* or in what the French term *paperasserie*. And yet, because of its supposed function, which is to serve as "brains", it may reduce the very person whom it is supposed only to serve to the position of puppet. The model was manifestly the famous German General Staff of 1870-1; but it ought not to be forgotten that the General Staff was kept in its place by two men of very exceptional strength of mind and will—the war minister Von Roon and Moltke—its own chief. In short, Wisdom may never act beyond crying

aloud in the streets, unless there is an enlightened will to make her lessons effective. The will belongs to the First Sea Lord, who again requires the confidence and support of the First Lord and the ministry. So far the War Staff of the Admiralty has been confined to investigation and the giving of counsel. Perhaps the best feature of it is, that its members, being officers on the active list, pass to actual service at sea when war comes.

During the actual progress of war only the results of Admiralty measures could be, or ought to be, known, not the exact steps by which they were reached. But there was one event very intimately connected with the inner history of the Admiralty which inevitably became public at once. On October 28, 1914, the First Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, informed the First Lord of his desire to resign his office in the following letter:—

“DEAR MR. CHURCHILL,

I have lately been driven to the painful conclusion that at this juncture my birth and parentage have the effect of impairing in some respects my usefulness on the Board of Admiralty. In these circumstances I feel it to be my duty as a loyal subject of His Majesty to resign the office of First Sea Lord, hoping thereby to facilitate the task of the administration of the great service to which I have devoted my life, and to ease the burden laid on H.M. Ministers.—I am, yours very truly,

“LOUIS BATTENBERG, Admiral.”

Prince Louis's “birth and parentage”, which connected him with the royal family of this country, were no disqualification in the opinion of his brother officers. No man in the navy enjoyed a higher reputation, nor possessed more fully the confidence of the whole service. The hearty expression of regret with which the news of his retirement was received by Sir John Jellicoe and the navy was proof sufficient that the reasons why he should resign were not to be found in their lack of confidence in his zeal and capacity. The fact that his two sons were both serving in the British navy, as well as the gallant



A Snapshot of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, who succeeded Prince Louis of Battenberg as First Sea Lord

(From a photograph by Cribb, Southsea)

death of his nephew, Prince Maurice of Battenberg, in action ashore at the very time when he felt himself constrained to withdraw, ought to have covered all doubt of the loyalty of his family with shame. Prince Louis had entered the navy as a midshipman in the *Ariadne* in 1869, had served in the Egyptian War, and had risen by steady work and by degrees. It was the universal opinion of all who were competent to judge, that whatever his birth had been he would have risen by force of his character and merits to the highest rank in the service.

It was, however, notorious that the legislative measures taken to protect ministers, and other gentlemen holding high positions, from forms of criticism which tended to discredit them, and through them the effective discharge of the duties of the King's servants, had not been used to protect Prince Louis. "In these circumstances" His Majesty's ministers could not well decline to accept his resignation. Their acceptance was worded by the First Lord, Mr. Winston Churchill, in his reply of October 29, 1914:—

"MY DEAR PRINCE LOUIS,

"This is no ordinary war, but a struggle between nations for life or death. It raises passions between races of the most terrible kind. It effaces the old landmarks and frontiers of our civilization. I cannot further oppose the wish you have during the last few weeks expressed to me to be released from the burden of responsibility which you have borne thus far with so much honour and success. The anxieties and toils which rest upon the naval administration of our country are in themselves enough to try a man's spirit, and when to



Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick T. Hamilton, Second
Sea Lord

(From a photograph by Heath, Plymouth)

them are added the ineradicable difficulties of which you speak, I could not at this juncture in fairness ask you to support them.

"The navy of to-day, and still more the navy of to-morrow, bears the imprint of your work. The enormous impending influx of capital ships, the score of 30-knot cruisers, the destroyers and submarines unequalled in modern construction, which are coming now to hand, are the results of labours which we have had in common, and in which the Board of Admiralty owe so much to your aid.

"The first step which secured the timely concentration of the Fleet was taken by you. I must express publicly my deep indebtedness to you and the pain I feel at the severance of our three years' official association. In all the circumstances you are right in your decision. The spirit in which you have acted is the same in which Prince Maurice of Battenberg has given his life to our cause, and in which your

gallant son is now serving in the Fleet. I beg you to accept my profound respect and that of our colleagues on the Board.

"I remain,

"Yours very sincerely,

"WINSTON S. CHURCHILL."

Lord Fisher succeeded Prince Louis, and resumed his former place as First Sea Lord, but no other change was made in the constitution of the Board.

It is, of course, not necessary to do more than note that a department which deals with an immense amount and variety of material and a very large number of men must be greatly subdivided. But a mere list of its sub-departments would be only a string of names unless it were accompanied by an exhaustive account of their functions and method of working.



Rear-Admiral Frederick C. T. Tudor, Third Sea Lord
(From a photograph by Russell & Sons)
VOL. II.

What has been said above is enough to show, first, how numerous and varied are the kinds of work done by the Admiralty, and then how completely the harmonious working of the whole must depend on the consistency and intelligence of the direction from above given by the First Lord, who represents the supreme authority of the State, and the First Sea Lord, who directs the application of the policy. There must be harmony between them, and there must be in both a certain power of self-effacement which will enable them to abstain from fretful intervention in the work of subordinates.

It has already been stated that the jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral in maritime cases has passed to the King's courts. But this, of course, means only such cases as arise within the navy itself, and out of acts of its members. The Admiralty naturally retains jurisdiction when it has to deal with offences against discipline. Actions which would be felonies when committed by any of the King's subjects—say, for instance, the murder of one member of a crew by another, may or may not be tried by the courts of the navy itself, or courts martial. When the felony is committed while the ship is within the jurisdiction of a home county it would be left to be tried at assizes. In foreign waters the proper tribunal is, of course, a court martial. The jurisdiction of the Admiralty is, in fact, co-ordinate with that of other courts. But it is the only authority authorized to try and punish offences against discipline, or misconduct, such as careless navigation, wherever com-

mitted. The law administered by the courts martial is contained in the Navy Discipline Acts. In ancient times each Lord High Admiral, or admirals appointed to command fleets under him, made his own law for the period of his command. But a code, or body, of "ordinances" was drawn up by the Long Parliament which was intended to be permanent. It was replaced by an Act for the government of the navy passed in the first Parliament of King Charles II after his restoration. This Act embodied the ordinances of the Long Parliament. It was supplemented by other Acts, and a consolidating Act

was passed in the twenty-ninth year of the reign of King George II (1749). This still continues to be the basis of the law of the navy, though it has been supplemented. The Admiralty has necessarily the power to frame the "King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions for the government of His Majesty's Naval Service". An infringement of these regulations and instructions is a disobedience of authority, and therefore an offence under the Navy Discipline Acts, and as such triable by court martial. These acts apply only to members of the navy who are in full pay and on active service. D. H.

CHAPTER XV

THE WAR OFFICE, PAST AND PRESENT

Lord Kitchener's Task—The Empire's Existence staked on the Navy—Britain's Inadequate Army—The War Department in Bygone Days—A Hotbed of Political Jobbery—National Prejudice against the Army—Some Neglected Lessons—The Era of Reform—Chaos at the War Office—Dual Control abolished—Creation of the Army Council—Its Composition—The Committee of Imperial Defence—Scientific Preparation for War—Sir John French and his Successor on the Army Council—Achievements in Army Organization during the War—Wolsey and Kitchener—How the New War Minister set to Work—An American Hope—Shattered German Illusions.

THE task which faced Lord Kitchener when he became Secretary of State for War in August, 1914, was vastly different from that which confronted the heads of the Admiralty. In the case of the Royal Navy everything was ready for all eventualities, down to the smallest detail that could be foreseen, as Mr. Churchill afterwards informed the House of Commons. Lord Kitchener, on the other hand, had not only to master the problem of Home Defence,

send immediate support to our allies on the Continent, and organize half a dozen smaller expeditions in various parts of the world, but also had to create an army eight or ten times as great as any hitherto even contemplated in this country. An island race, we had staked our Empire and our national existence on our navy grudging no money, sparing no effort, to make that navy supreme. Our frontiers were on the seas and we had made no attempt to raise an army in

the modern sense of the word. We only possessed, as Lord Esher said in one of his essays written before the war, an "Expeditionary Force", highly trained and extremely mobile, it was true, but merely intended as an adjunct to sea power, and for the little war which were always liable to break out in one part of the Empire

were learned in bygone struggles for life and death only to be lost sight of by a people expert in the art of forgetting. The War Department for ages remained the recognized prey of the politician, and the army the object of popular jealousy, save when the anti-military cry of the mob—ever ready to regard any strengthening of



Soldiers in the Making: 10th Battalion of the "Fighting Fifth" (Northumberland Fusiliers) on the march at Pirbright

or another. For Home Defence we relied chiefly upon some 300,000 Territorials. With these forces, together with 70,000 Special Reserve and 200,000 National Reserve, we suddenly found ourselves at war with a nation in arms of 70,000,000 people.

Seeley declares that we conquered and colonized half the world in a fit of absence of mind, never allowing it to stir our imaginations or alter our ways of thinking. The story of the British army, at least until recent years, tends to confirm this. Lessons

that force as an encroachment upon its own liberties—was temporarily silenced by some splendid achievement abroad. Even to-day—or at least until the beginning of the Great War, which swept away so many prejudices of the kind—the King's uniform on a common soldier was not permitted in public-houses which considered themselves the hall-mark of respectability among their class. That antipathy was a link with the days when want of pay, a brutal system of discipline, and a corrupt and vicious

policy of administration not only lowered the type of recruit, but also rendered the service obnoxious to the civilian population throughout the country. The popular prejudice had its roots in the army of the Commonwealth. The people who had fretted under Cromwell's major-generals bequeathed to their descendants, and especially to the political life of the country, what Professor C. H. Firth has described as "a rooted aversion to standing armies and an abiding dread of military rule". It was easy to test the truth of this in the difference between the position which the army had always occupied in the popular imagination and that of the navy:

"The instinct", wrote Lord Esher, "was a valuable one that induced our forefathers to resist the organization of a standing army. Their reasons, no doubt, were very different from ours. They feared a standing army on account of the use which might be made of it by autocracy or oligarchy to curtail or destroy their liberties. The reason to-day is different, but the instinct is there as of yore. Its basis is an ineradicable belief in the sea, and in sea power, as the only weapon that Great Britain can safely and effectively employ for the purposes of defence."¹

Even after Waterloo, with its glorious chapter in the history of the nation, the Commons refused to spend the necessary money on essential army reforms, and in so doing reflected the people's sentiments. Long after that exhausting campaign, when questions of economy were less urgent, Wellington confided to a correspondent:

"The state of our military force is very distressing. The Government will not—they dare not—look our difficulties in the face and provide for them. I don't believe that any Government that could be formed in these days would have the power."

With the Crimean campaign, however, which revealed so many grave defects in our whole military system, came a radical change both in the organization of the War Office and in the popular attitude towards the army itself. If the results remained unsatisfactory for another half-century, a move had at length been made in the right direction. The crying need then existing for reform was obvious from the appalling confusion prevailing at the War Department upon the outbreak of the Crimean struggle in 1854. A general but vague control was exercised by a Cabinet Minister who was Secretary of State both for War and the Colonies, and sat at the Colonial Office. This control was limited to times of war, but, while it then empowered him practically to direct operations and select the more important executive officers, it involved no responsibility for the details of army management. The civilian element was emphasized by another official, the Secretary-at-War, who sat at the Horse Guards, holding an office which had been in existence for some two hundred years and was associated with some of the worst grievances and most shameful jobberies in the history of the army. This Secretary-at-War acted as the parliamentary representative of the army and Commander-in-Chief, superintended practically all the financial

¹ *The Influence of King Edward, and Other Essays*, 1915.

operations of the army as regarded its *personnel*, and included among his other responsibilities the control of the militia, which, until 1852, as the



The Secretary of State for War: a snapshot of Lord Kitchener leaving the War Office

Constitutional force of the country, had been under the Home Secretary. The Commander-in-Chief himself, under the Sovereign, was supposed to have absolute control over the army,

and administered its patronage, but, since he could only adopt measures involving financial support with the consent of the Secretary-at-War, a dangerous source of friction was always present, though at the period under review the relations between Sidney Herbert, as Secretary-at-War, and Lord Hardinge, as Commander-in-Chief, were exceptionally cordial. The fact remained, however, that this clogging system of dual control, and the absence of any defined relationship between the civil and military responsibilities, together with such anomalies as the liability of the Treasury for the supply of provisions and forage of troops on foreign stations, and a general mixture of authorities in all departments, caused a condition of affairs which Sir James Graham, after the Select Committee of 1860 had finished its work, aptly summed up in the word "chaos". With all these numerous departments communicating with one another by letters, the amount of circumlocution can be better imagined than described. The official historical sketch published in *The War Office List* admits that it was inevitable that delay and confusion should arise by the action of so many almost independent powers, each with a province of ill-defined limits.

"And in practice, indeed," continues the same authority, "it was found that different departments competed in the market for the same thing; that disputes arose between them on trifling points which there was no central authority with power sufficient to decide; and that the result was unquestionably detrimental to the public service".

The Crimean campaign soon proved

the impossibility of any one Secretary of State efficiently acting both for War and the Colonies, as well as the urgent need for administrative reform in every department. A good beginning was made when War and the Colonies were made separate departments four months after the outbreak of hostilities, the Duke of Newcastle, unfortunately for the conduct of that campaign, choosing the War Department. Not long afterwards the ancient office of Secretary-at-War was amalgamated with that of the Secretary of State for War, and eight years later was abolished altogether. These were the beginnings of many sweeping changes, including the transference of the Commissariat Office from the Treasury to the War Department and the abolition of the Board of Ordnance, after an independence of between three and four centuries—an independence which it had always made a point of emphasizing. Thenceforward, having assumed control over all the scattered branches except that of the Commander-in-Chief, the War Department became known as the War Office, into which was finally welded in 1870 all the civil administrative responsibilities of the Secretary of State and the military administrative functions hitherto exercised at the Horse Guards.

It would be tedious to enter into all the rearrangements and reconstructions, the alternate progress and retrogression, which have since filled the history of army organization. The dual system of the Horse Guards and the War Office, each jealous of the other, and putting a spoke into the wheel of every effective reform, gradu-



Lieutenant-General Sir J. Wolfe Murray, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (First Military Member of the Army Council)

(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

ally disappeared, though it was not until the final lessons of the last South African War that the fundamental principles of sound administration were firmly grasped, and a military policy adopted which placed the whole machinery of the army on a basis which, if not ideal, was accepted as the one best suited to our constitution.

The revolutionary recommendations of Lord Esher's Committee in 1904, refashioning the War Office on the lines of the Board of Admiralty, led to the constitution of an Army Council of experts, under the presidency of the Secretary of State for War, who was made wholly responsible to His Majesty and Parliament for the business and efficiency of the army. Thus

the office of Commander-in-Chief of the British army disappeared after an existence of nearly two and a half centuries. In the words of the Esher Committee Report:

“Attempts to combine the administrative and executive functions of the army have led to confusion, to reduplication of work, to expense, to dual control, to divided responsibility, and ultimately to the conditions revealed in the evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the South African War. As an executive commander of an army scattered over Great Britain and Ireland, over Europe and Africa, such an officer is an anomaly, and by the light of experience a mistake.”

With the Commander-in-Chief in these sweeping changes went other great staff officers and civil officials. The new Council consisted of seven

members, four military and three civil, with a secretary. The military members were classified numerically, the First Military Member being the Chief of the Staff—a title changed in 1909 to that of Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to mark the increasing closeness of the relations between the British army and the oversea forces; the Second Military Member being the Adjutant-General; the Third the Quartermaster-General; and the Fourth the Master-General of Ordnance. Their duties and those of the civil members were briefly apportioned as follows:—

The First Military Member was allotted the duties of the former Director-General of Military Intelligence and Mobilization (whose office was abolished), and also matters connected with military education and training, previously dealt with by the Adjutant-General. A thinking department was thus created, and given its due place as one of the most essential elements in our military system. The Second Military Member retained the work hitherto done by the Adjutant-General's Department, with the exception of the portion transferred to the First Member or Chief of the General Staff, and in addition was made responsible for medical and sanitary matters, the Director-General of Army Medical Services being placed under him. The Third Military Member retained the work formerly done by the Quartermaster-General's Department, with the exception of the administration of the Army Pay Department; and was also made responsible for the provision of clothes and



Lieutenant-General Sir H. C. Selater, Adjutant-General to the Forces (Second Military Member)
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

equipment, which previously fell to the Director-General of Ordnance. The Fourth Military Member took the place of the Director-General of Ordnance and the duties pertaining to that office, save the portion transferred to the Quartermaster-General, taking over in addition a considerable part of the duties of the former Inspector-General of Fortifications, whose office was abolished.

The Civil Member, or Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, became responsible for that portion of the duties of the former Inspector-General of Fortifications not transferred to the Master-General of the Ordnance, as well as for the work of a newly created civil sub-department, that of the Director of Barrack Construction. In addition, he took over the Chaplains' Department. The Finance Member replaced the former Financial Secretary, and exercised through the Director-General of Finance functions similar, generally speaking, to those hitherto performed by the Financial Secretary through the Accountant-General. He also controlled the administration of the Army Accounts Department. The Secretary of the Council—otherwise the Permanent Under-Secretary of State—was also Secretary of the War Office, and was assisted by the Assistant-Secretary, the office of Assistant Under-Secretary of State being abolished. The Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief was also done away with, his place being taken by the Military Secretary to the Secretary of State.

It was Mr. Balfour, with an Administration which, as Lord Esher

says, must always be memorable in the history of national defence, who created this General Staff for the Army, and at the same time made a living reality of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Finality, however, is impossible in any system of national administration, and Mr. Balfour's successors widened the scope of both these reforms. Mr. Asquith, especially, brought the Committee of Imperial Defence to bear upon every Department of State, with a view of co-ordinating the whole of the material forces of the country—naval, military, and civil—as far as possible, for war. Thus, such questions as the Press censorship, the treatment of aliens, trading with the enemy, the oversea transport of reinforcements, and the



Major-General Sir J. S. Cowans, Quartermaster-General to the Forces (Third Military Member)
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)



Major-General Sir S. B. von Donop, Master-General of the Ordnance (Fourth Military Member)
(From a photograph by Russell & Sons, London)

In the main, however, our army administration, up to the beginning of the Great War, remained according to the recommendations of Lord Esher's Report, and the wonderful proof immediately forthcoming of the soundness of the new machinery, as well as the thoroughness of the work put into it, was a revelation and a relief to a nation too long accustomed to the old military policy of "muddling through". At the outbreak of the war the Army Council, under Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister and Secretary of State for War, was constituted as follows:—

Chief of the Imperial General Staff (First Military Member)—General Sir C. W. H. Douglas.

Adjutant-General (Second Military Member)—Lieut.-General Sir H. C. Sclater.

organization and distribution of food supplies were all dealt with, though not of course finally settled, long before the war. Later developments also involved other reforms at the War Office, especially in the extension of the principle of decentralization. Other new departments were rendered necessary by the creation of the Territorial Force in 1908—and added to the administration of the Civil Member, from whom meantime the barrack-construction directorate had been transferred to the Master-General of the Ordnance—as well as by the growth of the Army Air Service, for which a special branch was created in 1913, under a Director-General of Military Aeronautics, who was made directly responsible to the Secretary of State.



The late Sir C. W. H. Douglas, who succeeded Sir John French as Chief of the Imperial General Staff and died in office

(From a photograph by Russell & Sons, Southsea)

Quartermaster-General (Third Military Member)—Major-General Sir J. S. Cowans.

Master-General of the Ordnance (Fourth Military Member)—Colonel (local and temp. Major-General) Sir S. B. von Donop.

Civil Member (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State)—Mr. H. J. Tennant, M.P.

Finance Member (Financial Secretary)—Mr. H. T. Baker, M.P.

Secretary of the Army Council and of the War Office (Permanent Under-Secretary of State)—Sir R. H. Brade.



Mr. H. J. Tennant, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War (Civil Member of the Army Council)
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

General Sir Charles W. H. Douglas, Colonel of the Gordons, had succeeded Sir John French as Chief of the Imperial General Staff some four months before the outbreak of war, and afterwards proved a tower of strength to Lord Kitchener in the brief time that was spared to him. Unfortunately he sacrificed his health in the stupen-

dous labours of those first few momentous months of the war, dying on October 25, 1914—giving his life for his country as surely as any of his comrades on the field of battle. He was succeeded by Sir James Wolfe Murray, late General Officer Commanding in Chief in South Africa, a post to which he had been appointed from the Scottish Command in 1913.

When we remember the costly mistakes that were made at the beginning of the South African War, and the fact that even so severe a critic as the late Mr. Arnold Forster could then acknowledge the raising in six months of a force of 146,000 from all parts of the Empire as a highly creditable performance, the achievements of the War Office and the army during the weeks immediately succeeding the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 seem scarcely believable. Within a fortnight of the declaration of war we had sent 150,000 men fully equipped to the battle front on the Franco-Belgian frontier, and by the end of December, in filling up gaps and increasing the strength of the Expeditionary Force, had dispatched to the same Theatre not fewer than 300,000. By the end of six months, thanks to the superlative work of the Royal Navy, as well as to the efficient organization of the War Office, armies had been safely moved up and down the Empire, and campaigns begun—and sometimes finished—in half a dozen colonies, as well as on the vital battle-fields of Europe.

When Henry VIII planned his expedition to France some four centuries previously there was no War Office to



"Kitchener's Army" in Training: Drilling on the sands at Llandudno

attend to all the multifarious duties of mobilization, &c., there was no paymaster-general freely supplied with public funds, all the controlling offices being combined in the King's own person, and the army paid for out of His Majesty's privy purse. But just as Henry VIII was fortunate in discovering in Wolsey a man who could master every detail of organization, so was Britain happy in her hour of need in 1914 in finding ready to hand another master mind in Lord Kitchener. Though the duties of the two War Ministers had been revolutionized since the days of Wolsey—who, among other things, provided for the whole victualling of the fleet, down even to the number of beer barrels—the two men were alike in their marvellous grasp of detail, their thoroughness, their judgment of men, and their inflexible will. There, however, the likeness ends, for Wolsey's arrogance and ostentation were as foreign to

Lord Kitchener's nature as the Cardinal's political leanings differed from the Field-Marshal's essentially military bent. "I have no politics", he declared in the House of Lords in making his first statement after his appointment as Secretary of State for War. Most fortunate it was for the Empire that Lord Kitchener happened to be home from Egypt when all Europe sprang to arms in 1914. Mr. Asquith, having recently taken over the post from Colonel Seely during the Irish crisis, resigned in consequence of the pressure of other duties, and to the relief of the whole Empire Lord Kitchener, at the Prime Minister's request, stepped into the breach—"for the time being", in the words of the official announcement on August 6, "in view of the emergency created by the war". His post as Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, it was added, would be kept open for him.

The appointment was without a precedent. The War Minister had hitherto been chosen from the front rank of party politicians, and was a member of the Cabinet. But the situation was unprecedented, and called for exceptional measures. The closest unity between policy and military management was essential. "The best master of the principles of war ought always to be a member of the Cabinet," according to Professor Spenser Wilkinson in his Oxford pamphlet on *The Coming of the War*, "because the Cabinet determines the policy, and how can the policy square with the conditions of war unless those conditions are explained by a competent judge of war, and unless the Cabinet explains to him the nature of the policy?" Lord Kitchener was not without valuable experience of Cabinet work, having had years of office while

in India in a position tantamount to that of a Cabinet Minister in this country. His association with the Government as a Cabinet Minister in this national crisis, as Mr. Asquith was careful to make clear at the time, must not be taken as identifying him with any set of political opinions. His quick grasp of the situation was at once felt in the Government measures for increasing the strength of the Army, and in countless swift, far-seeing moves of which the public at the time knew nothing. On the very day of his acceptance of office (August 6, 1914) Mr. Asquith asked in the Commons on his behalf for power to increase the army by no fewer than 500,000 men of all ranks. And, these men having been raised, another estimate was brought forward on September 9 for the second half-million, a third estimate following on No-



The Making of Kitchener's Army: Officers taking advantage of the floods to instruct the men in bridge-building



Teaching Kitchener's Army how to Shoot: Firing-exercises at Winton, Bournemouth

vember 16 for 1,000,000 more, the Prime Minister announcing on that day that all but 100,000 of the first million of "Kitchener's Army" had already been formed. It was an object-lesson for more countries than one.

"We are looking to Great Britain now", said Dr. Eliot, of Harvard University, to the "Pilgrims" in New York early in the New Year, "for something only Britain can give. That is a complete demonstration that national efficiency can be developed to a higher expression under free institutions than it can under autocratic institutions."

Continental armies cannot be created in a day, but the astounding growth of the fighting strength of the whole Empire gave every promise that our American cousins would not be disappointed.

By the end of 1914 the establishment of the regular army had been raised, since the declaration of war, from some 330,000 to 2,186,400.

These figures were exclusive of the Territorial Force, which had also grown amazingly in the same stirring period; and the overwhelming majority of the Territorials, be it remembered, had taken upon themselves the obligation of foreign service. They were exclusive, too, of the inexhaustible ranks of the Colonial and Indian armies. In six months it was estimated that all told we had something like three million men under arms quite apart from the Volunteer Training Corps which had sprung up all over the kingdom. Without giving any of these figures, however, Mr. H. J. Tennant, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, in presenting the Army Estimates in the Commons in February, 1915, made some striking comparisons with the estimates of a hundred years previously:—

"In 1815, Waterloo year, the number of forces voted, including Militia, was 246,988,

and the total of the Estimates was £6,721,880. The men were less in numbers than our Territorial Force in peace-time, and the money was less than we spend in a week."

The raising of this vast British host upset many of the most cherished calculations of the German military leaders. The utmost that Britain could do, according to Bernhardt, was to place in the field an Expeditionary Force of 150,000 men; and that "so long only as all is quiet in the Colonies", where Germany so confidently anticipated a general snapping of the bonds with what she so arrogantly regarded as the degenerate old Motherland. As for any troops from the self-governing colonies, wrote Bernhardt, in *Germany and the Next War*, "they

can be completely ignored so far as concerns any European theatre of war"; while the Territorial army, for any use it might be in the same field, might also, according to the same authority, be left out of account. The deeds of French's gallant troops shattered the fondest illusions of the German General Staff, and not only revived the ancient glory of our arms upon the Continent, but also proved that whatever might be said for or against our traditional military policy the nation at length possessed a War Office which, by systematic preparation and scientific study, could make the best use of the available material, and strike both hard and at once.

F. A. M.

CHAPTER XVI

THE TURKISH OFFENSIVE

(December, 1914—February, 1915)

The Cockpit of Asia Minor—Enver Pasha's Grandiose Plan—The Advance from Erzerum—Historic Memories—Russian Territory Invaded—Crushing Defeat of Turkish Army—Failure of Plot to rouse Revolt among Russian Mohammedans—The Invasion of Persia—Tabriz seized by Turks and reoccupied by Russians—Egypt as the Forlorn Hope—Turkey's Advance from Syria—A Creditable Feat—The Futile Attack on the Suez Canal—How the Turks entered Egypt—German Officer's White Flag—British Losses.

AS stated in an earlier chapter, the main efforts of the Turks, when they threw in their lot with Germany, were at first concentrated against Russia in the Caucasus. Here, among the high mountain ridges forming the Russo-Turkish frontier, lay what from time immemorial had been the chief battleground of Asia Minor, just as Belgium for centuries

past had been the cockpit of Europe. When last referred to, Russia was driving her hereditary enemy back towards Erzerum with an army which the Turkish Armenians welcomed as the long-looked-for Army of Liberation. Winter, however, decided the Russians to rest content with their possession of Köprükeui, about half-way to Erzerum—won after a three

days' battle in November—and to remain on the defensive until the spring. Time was no object to the Russians. But it was all-important to Turkey and her allies. It was imperative in their case to strike a sledgehammer blow at once or not at all. A fresh counter-attack against the Russian invaders was confidently expected, but few people imagined that, instead of delivering her blow in their direction, she would court disaster by marching her troops across the Russian frontier in the depth of a winter of unusual severity. Such, however, proved to be the case. Urged no doubt by Germany, to whom every day was priceless, plans were prepared by Enver Pasha for the invasion

of Russia simultaneously at several points. The main attack was to be delivered across the snow-bound Caucasus by the passes to the north-east of Erzerum, while a part of the 1st Army Corps was to be landed at Trebizond and advance to link up with the left wing of the Erzerum army. Meantime, far away to the south, another army was to advance from Mosul and invade Russian territory at Julfa by marching across the Azerbaidjan province of neutral Persia via Tabriz.

It was a grandiose scheme, and its separate movements were but dimly understood at the time, but there is no doubt that the Turco-German General Staff aimed at dealing a crushing blow at Russia in Trans-



The Fetwa of the Sheikh-ul-Islam: How the Holy War was proclaimed in Constantinople
(see Vol. I, pp. 217-8)



The Call to Arms in Constantinople: Reserves marching in to join the colours, while the finished drilled soldier leaves for the Front

caucasia as a preliminary to the advance against Egypt. Had it succeeded, the effect on that part of the campaign, and, indeed, upon all the operations in the Near East, would have been incalculable. But, like the dash for Paris at the very beginning of the war, it was a gambler's throw, staking everything upon success, and it failed even more disastrously than that first Teutonic rush.

German inspiration in the plan of attack which developed towards the end of 1914 was revealed in the familiar enveloping movement which spread out on the Turkish left and endeavoured to surround the Russian troops advancing to meet the danger from Kars along the road to Erzerum. Roughly, the plan was to hold the

Russians at Köprükeui with the 11th Corps, strike with the 9th Corps in the centre, and dispatch the 10th Corps to the left in two columns, one marching towards Id, through the valley of the Olti Chai, and the other towards Ardost, through the valley of the Servy Chai. While these were advancing, the 1st Army Corps, reinforced by irregulars and rebel Muslims in Russian territory, was to concentrate at Ardahan and act in conjunction with the Erzerum troops in the enveloping movement round the Russian right flank. Kars and Ardahan are names reviving many memories of Russo-Turkish wars in the past—Kars especially, for its vain but glorious defence by General Fenwick Williams some sixty years pre-



Photo Underwood & Underwood

The Kaiser's Allies in the Caucasus: Some of the Irregular Kurdish Cavalry operating against the Russians

vously, when Britain was the ally of Turkey and the enemy of Russia. The recapture of the fortress of Kars—formerly one of the bulwarks of the Ottoman Empire in Asia—was one of Enver Pasha's ambitions.

Against the unexpected avalanche of Turks the weaker Russian forces were compelled to fall back at all points, though the defenders in the region of Olty inflicted heavy losses on the invaders, and hindered their advance on Kars by repeated counter-attacks. Meantime the Ottoman forces from the coast crossed the Panjouretsk and Yalanuz-Djamsk passes towards Ardahan, the garrison

of which, greatly inferior in strength, retired only after seventeen days' hard fighting. While thus arresting the Turkish advance, the Russians had time to gather reinforcements in great numbers. Attacking the enemy on their own ground, they were able to take full advantage of local conditions and transformed the temporary triumph of the Turks into an overwhelming defeat. The first object of the Russians was the recapture of the town of Ardahan. This they succeeded in doing on January 3, 1915, after completely routing the invaders concentrated there and ruining the prospects of the great enveloping

project. This was finally crushed in their crowning victories over the 9th and 10th Army Corps, which at this time were operating against Sarykamysh, a town of great strategical importance as the terminus of the railway from Tiflis, the capital of Russian Caucasia, to Kars. The defence of Sarykamysh by its heroic Russian garrison was one of the finest acts in this grim Caucasian drama. Like the defence of Liége, it held up the invading host until the enemy's plans were entirely upset, and cost him immense sacrifices in life and limb. In spite of the rigorous winter weather, and the necessity of fighting in mountainous passes 10,000 feet high, the Russians were thus enabled to bring up reinforcements in sufficient

strength to annihilate the bulk of the invading army. Instead of enveloping the Russians, the Turks were themselves enveloped. They fought, as the official *communiqué* of the Russian Head-quarters Staff declared, with the fury of despair, but were outmatched both by the stamina of their opponents and the superior military skill of the Russian commanders. Victory was finally won at the point of the bayonet after ten days' fighting, in which, as already stated, both Turkish army corps were almost entirely destroyed. A Turkish general was among the killed, and the prisoners included the Commander-in-Chief of the 9th Corps, Iskhan Pasha, three divisional commanders, all their staffs, and over a



Turkey's Army in Campaigning Kit: an Arabian infantry regiment from Bagdad in khaki uniform

hundred other officers, together with thousands of men. Many guns and immense quantities of war material also fell into the victor's hands.

As soon as the danger of the new situation was realized in the Turco-German war councils, the 11th Army Corps was dispatched to the rescue.

crushing defeat of the Turks, whole regiments of whom were destroyed. The shattered fragments at length took headlong flight towards their last stronghold at Erzerum.

The battle of Kara Urgan was fought in the middle of January, and was not the last of the blows that



Photo. Underwood & Underwood

The Invasion of Persia: View of Tabriz, the city seized and afterwards evacuated by the Turks

It was too late to save the 9th Corps, but it succeeded in stopping the remorseless blows which were falling upon the hapless head of the 10th Corps, the remnants of which succeeded in joining the broken ranks of the 1st Corps in the Olty region. Thus attracting the attention of the pursuing Russians, the 11th Army Corps had to fight for its life at Kara Urgan. The battle lasted three days, in the midst of a blinding and continuous snowstorm, and ended in another

were to fall on the Turks who took part in that luckless scheme of invasion. The battered troops of the 1st Corps had in the meantime been pursued from Ardahan and cleared out of the Chorak valley, but made a valiant effort on January 20 to attempt a fresh offensive in conjunction with the remnants of the 10th Corps, with which, as already stated, it had joined forces in the Olty region. The new attack, however, was hopeless from the first, and was repulsed with heavy losses.

This overwhelming defeat of the Turco-German plan was a brilliant achievement, accomplished at a time when Russian arms were playing so potent a part in the main theatre of war. If the invaders had counted upon Russian preoccupations in that direction they were bitterly disappointed, the Caucasian Army proving once and for all that it was capable of

representations were for the most part nipped in the bud at the declaration of war by the heads of both the Mohammedan communities in the Caucasus, the Sunni and the Shia, who called upon their followers for unswerving loyalty to the Tsar, and revealed the true nature of the Turco-Germanic plot. "There is no power that can shake our loyalty", declared one of



Photo. Chusseau-Flaviens, Paris

Turkey's Germanized Army: Artillery ready for the Desert Campaign

beating off any attack that might be made on its own familiar battleground. It had indeed been chafing in inactivity since the war began, hearing of the great deeds of its brethren on the European front, and longing for just such an opportunity as the Turks had now provided it with. The attempt to raise rebellion among the Russian Mohammedans in the Caucasus had also failed, apart from some irregular bands of tribesmen among the mountains, whose influence on the operations was entirely negligible. Whatever hopes of the kind may have been raised by persistent intrigues and mis-

the leaders of the Moslem world in Russia. "Russia is our Motherland, and having given us food and drink in abundance for generations, nothing will make us desert her now."

While the vanquished invaders from Erzerum were being hurled back by the Caucasian Cossacks, the right wing of the Turkish army in Armenia had advanced from Mosul, and, besides operating in the Van region, sent two forces across the Persian frontier in the direction of Russian Julfa on the opposite border. Both forces were largely composed of Kurdish tribesmen who, living up to the reputation

acquired in generations of Armenian massacres, left a trail of blood and outrage behind them on their march. One force advanced to Urmia, on the lake of the same name. The other force, marching south of the lake, reached Tabriz by way of Suj Bulak and Maragha. The

sudden appearance of this Turkish detachment at the second city in the kingdom, in defiance of Persian neutrality, was to most people one of the unexpected developments of the Great War.

But it was not so unexpected to the official mind of Britain and Russia as to the world at large. The Secretary of State for India afterwards announced that documentary evidence had reached His Majesty's Government proving conclusively that German consular officers and other German agents in Persia had long been engaged in intrigues with the object of facilitating the Turkish invasion of Persia, and of raising the tribes against Great Britain, thus flagrantly violating Persian neutrality. The same underhand campaign was directed against Russia, thanks to whose intervention in the Turco-Persian quarrel before the war the disputed region afterwards invaded by Turkey had been preserved for Persia. These intrigues, as M. Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, pointed out in the Duma on February 9,



The Eyes of Britain's Defending Army in Egypt: one of the Aeroplanes employed in reconnaissance work over the Sinai Peninsula

1915, had been especially intense in Azerbaijan, the province in question, where the Turks succeeded in winning the support of some of the wild Kurdish tribes, who were only too willing to share the spoils of the expedition referred to.

Tabriz, as the capital of the Azerbaijan province, was included in the Russian sphere of influence under the Anglo-Russian agreement, and had been occupied by the Tsar's troops since the spring of 1909, their object being to maintain order in their frontier territory, and prevent its invasion by the Turks, who were anxious to establish there an advantageous base of operations against the Caucasus. Persia, herself, was incapable of preventing Turkey's aggressive designs in that direction. At the beginning of the Great War, however, Russia withdrew her troops in accordance with her general plan of campaign.

The Turks, therefore, met with no effective resistance to their occupation of Tabriz. The whole Armenian population—for the Christians of Armenia had fled for safety to north-

western Persia in great numbers in recent times—had taken flight to the Russian frontier at the first warning of their approach, many of them dying from hunger and cold before reaching the border. If, however, Turkey now fondly imagined that Tabriz, and the rich province to which it belonged, would compensate her for her costly failure against the Russian front among the mountains, she was swiftly disillusioned. The Russians, who in the earliest operations of the war had occupied the historic town of Bayazid, in the angle of the Russo-Turco-Persian frontiers, and thrown out columns both to the west and the south-east, effected a swift movement in the region of Khoi. Then, while the Turks were marching from Tabriz against a threatened Russian attack from Marand, they cut them off with an unexpected force advancing from the direction of Sufian. A glance at the map will make this clear. In the fighting which ensued round Tabriz the Turks lost four field-guns, provisions, ammunition, and many prisoners. The remainder, seeing their position

helpless, fled in disorder towards Maragha, and on January 30 Tabriz was reoccupied by the Russians.

Humiliated and defeated by the Russians at every turn, there remained for Turkey only the forlorn hope of Egypt. Her need to strike quickly in that direction was urgent. It was urgent on her own side, not only because of her broken prestige, but also because, with the operations of the Allied fleet in the Dardanelles, and the threat against the very heart of the Ottoman Empire, it would soon be necessary to concentrate her whole attention on the vital problem of defence. To Germany, of course, it was also increasingly necessary to divert Great Britain from her supreme purpose in France and Belgium. The attack on Egypt had, indeed, already been launched while the Turks were still in Tabriz. It had been threatened so long that the waiting troops in Egypt had depressing doubts as to whether it would take place at all; but the British authorities in Cairo knew perfectly well that the threat was to be taken seriously, and made no secret

either of its knowledge or of its confidence in being able to deal with the attack whenever it should be delivered. The only doubt was as to the route or routes that would be taken from Syria across the wilderness of almost waterless desert which constitutes the Sinai Peninsula. It is to



After the Attack that Failed: one of the Pontoons, made in Germany, employed by the Turks in their abortive attempt to invade Egypt



Map showing approximately the direction of the Turkish Attack on the Suez Canal, January 25–February 3, 1915

A, Route of small force demonstrating against El Kantara to occupy Ismailia garrison. B, Route of main Turkish advance from Beersheba, the troops concentrating near Kataib-el-Kheil for the chief attack on the canal. C, Route of small force along the pilgrim road from Akaba to demonstrate on the Suez Canal. D, Flooded area.

the credit of the Turks, or their German organizers, that they surmounted this formidable obstacle far better than most people anticipated. The first stretch of the canal, from Port Said to El Kantara, had been rendered inaccessible to them by the flooding of the whole area as part of the Egyptian defence-works.

Marching from Beersheba, the main body of the Turkish expeditionary force chose the least-expected because more difficult route, by way of Hafr-el-Auja. This route crosses Wadi-el-Arish, and continues its desert march until it reaches Kataib-el-Kheil, a group of hills some 10 miles from the canal at the point where it enters

Lake Timsah. It was no mean feat to cover this formidable journey in ten days, with heavy guns to drag across the desert, as well as a score or so of galvanized-iron pontoon boats, carried on carts, dragged by oxen and buffaloes, and all the other impedimenta of an army on the march, forced to carry the whole of its provisions, &c.; and faced all the way with the inevitable obstacles offered by the shifting sands to all wheeled transport. While this main force was advancing towards Toussoum and Serapeum, and concentrating near Kataib-el-Kheil, a smaller body marched along the northern caravan route towards El Kantara from El Arish, via Katieh, to mask the

major operations and engage the attention of the Egyptian garrison at Ismailia; while another body to the south followed the pilgrim road from Akaba to Suez. This last is the most-used way between Africa and Syria, connecting Egypt with many other places than Mecca. The northern column, marching along the barren sea-coast route, was sighted by British aeroplanes long before it came within striking distance of El Kantara. One section of a mountain battery advanced to meet it some 6 miles from that town on January 25, and drove it back. Attacks were made by this force on the British advanced posts, both on that night and the night following, but they were easily beaten off. Meantime the southern column, consisting of Eshref Bey's irregulars, had also

been discovered by aeroplane reconnaissance over the pilgrim road, and the half-hearted attack which it delivered at Kubri, near Suez, was similarly disposed of.

The Flying Corps rendered gallant and invaluable service throughout these operations. One officer had a narrow escape through engine trouble, which brought him down within reach of the enemy's cavalry. Luckily he succeeded in restarting the engine in the nick of time, and though the enemy blazed away at him as he passed over, at a distance of less than 70 yards, they only succeeded in piercing the planes and puncturing one of the tires. Two other airmen, unhappily, fell victims to a tragic accident after safely descending through an accident to their machine. Returning in the dark



Waiting for the Invaders: Military posts guarding the banks of the Suez Canal

towards the British outposts, they made the fatal mistake—neither of them being trained soldiers—of blowing their whistles. Our troops, expecting an attack, and unable to distinguish between friend and foe in the night, took this as the signal to charge, and at once opened fire. Both airmen were killed in this lamentable accident.

Djemal Pasha was discovered, but at midnight on February 2 the long-anticipated battle of the Suez Canal began. Apparently the enemy had decided that the most vulnerable point of the defence was the west bank of the canal between the posts at Toussoum and Serapeum. To dash through what the Turks believed to be a gap



How the Turks entered Egypt: Prisoners (wearing their "Enver Pasha" helmets) marching through Cairo after their futile attack on the canal

Before the Turkish feint attacks were finally disposed of it became known that the enemy's centre column was concentrating in the valleys to the east of Kataib-el-Kheil. This main force was made up of troops from the 4th and 8th Army Corps, the whole operations being commanded by Djemal Pasha—not the commander of the Syrian Army, it should be explained, but a namesake. Days passed after the first demonstrations before the principal objective of

in our line would bring them within reach of Cairo and in touch with the Egyptian sympathizers whom they fondly hoped would rise in their thousands to support them. That, at least, seemed the only possible explanation of this daring, if hopeless, attack. All told, Djemal Pasha's army probably amounted to 25,000 men—a ridiculously inadequate force for a serious invasion against the British, Indian, and Egyptian troops at the disposal of General Wilson. If, on

the other hand, the attack was merely intended as a reconnaissance in force, the elaborate preparations and the sacrifices involved were out of all proportion to the object in view. Djemal and his advisers were undoubtedly ill-informed both as regards the local ferment aroused by their approach among the native Mohammedans, and the strength of the defence-works on the west side of the canal. Before the battle proper began, on the night of February 2, the right wing of the Kataib-el-Kheil army delivered a feint attack during the day towards Ismailia Ferry, being met by a reconnoitring force of Indian troops. The desultory fighting which ensued ended indecisively in a blinding sand-storm. With nightfall came the march of the main Turkish advance-guard from Kataib-el-Kheil to the canal in the direction of Toussoum and Serapeum, a distance of some 10 miles in each case. The invaders were divided up into separate contingents, each ordered to attack a portion of the canal in the neighbourhood of those two posts. The certainty that the real attempt was about to be made came as a positive relief to the defending troops, who had been waiting for days and nights on the opposite side of the canal for something to happen. More than once it was feared that the whole affair would fizzle out without a fight, but the Flying Corps and the look-out men observing from the mastheads of the war-ships on Lake Timsah sent encouraging reports of the enemy's activities. "This has cheered us up," wrote one British officer in a letter home during these

anxious days of waiting, "as there seems quite a good chance of something happening at last to relieve the monotony." The first warning that this something had begun in earnest came across the water of the canal after midnight on February 2, in the shape of earnest exhortations to the Turkish troops by the Imams of their regiments to fight for the Faith and remember that victory or Paradise awaited them on the other side of the canal. The Turks had crept up in force in the dark, cloudy night, and were now hauling their pontoons towards the water by hand. Both banks of the canal in this district are steep, and the only useful cover lies behind the east bank, where the invaders were gathering. Here, among the hollows and brushwood, the advanced guard had silently entrenched themselves before the attempt was made to cross the canal. When at last the pontoon section moved down to the water, and began to build its bridge of boats, discovery was inevitable; yet no sign was made on the opposite side until the enemy had crowded in force under the steep bank, which left him largely at the mercy of the defenders' fire. Then, however, the Maxims of the defending troops opened at point-blank range, decimating the ranks on the opposite shore. This was about 3 a.m., and the canal was soon swept by a violent fire from both sides. The result of the attack on Toussoum may be given in the words of one of the Shawishes of the 75th Turkish Regiment after his capture:—

"Our party, composed of half a *tabur* (500 to 600 men), was ordered to attack



German Armaments in the Turkish Army: Field Artillery armed with Krupp quick-firing guns

Toussoum. We came as far as the canal bank, but met with a hot and well-aimed fire, which caused a great many casualties among us, and then we were surrounded by troops from behind, and so were hemmed in and taken prisoners. Arif Bey, our commandant, was wounded and carried off the field. Our next officer was wounded and made prisoner."

Meantime the attempt to cross the canal by means of pontoons—several rafts were also employed—was equally disastrous, though the Turks fought bravely, under cover of heavy Maxim-fire, and returned to the attack as reinforcements arrived with the break of day. The enemy now brought six batteries of field-guns into play; the war-ships on the lake and canal joined in, and the action became general. The fate of the invaders who succeeded in reaching the water during the engagement is illustrated in the statement afterwards made by another of the prisoners, an officer of the 74th Regiment:—

"The rifle-fire was very fierce as we approached the canal, but we managed to get a boat launched with our half-company. After sustaining heavy casualties, on nearing the west bank the boat was riddled and sank. At this point I was wounded. I landed with two boatmen and a third man. It was all that was left of my half-company. Finally I and one boatman alone survived, and I thereupon surrendered to some Indian troops."


Another boatload of some twenty Turks had meantime succeeded in crossing in the dark, and began sniping the defending artillerymen in the rear; but this trifling success was short-lived, the Indian cavalry rounding up and capturing the whole party. Four

others managed to slip across and to evade capture with the rest, but they were glad enough to give themselves up a day or so later. While the main attack was being delivered between Toussoum and Serapeum another Turkish detachment was again advancing towards Ismailia Ferry under cover of its 6-inch gun, which opened fire at daybreak, and succeeded during the morning in scoring two hits off H.M.S. *Hardinge*, one of the armed troopships of the Royal Indian Marine, which joined in the fray from Lake Timsah. The pilot and nine men were wounded, but no lives were lost. A gunboat was also hit, without adding to the casualty list, in the course of the battle, though a torpedo-boat, which patrolled the canal in the thick of the fighting and played havoc with the enemy's pontoons as they lay unlaunched on the east bank, lost in wounded four officers and men.

At the Ismailia Ferry the threatened infantry attack failed to develop, though two battalions, well covered by a Turkish battery, entrenched themselves some 800 yards from the Indian outposts. Yet another Turkish detachment advanced against El Kantara, the scene of the fighting a week previously, attacking our outposts there between 5 and 6 a.m. After losing fifty of their men in killed and wounded the enemy was driven off, leaving in addition to his other casualties in our hands thirty-six unwounded prisoners.

All danger from the main attack between Toussoum and Serapeum was removed in the afternoon of February 3, when the Indian troops took the counter-offensive from those garrisons,

and swept most of the discomfited enemy back. Supports were hurriedly sent up from Kataib-el-Kheil, only to provide a running target for the guns of the war-ships and the land batteries. Not long after 3 p.m., having lost heavily at all points, the Turks were in full retreat, save for their advanced troops entrenched among the hollows



The White Flag, found on the body of a German officer after the attack on the Suez Canal

and brushwood of the east bank of the canal. Here these isolated survivors—several hundred strong in one position—were rounded up the next day and overpowered, while the bulk of the army of invaders retreated precipitately eastward. Soon there were no enemy forces within 20 miles of the canal. Nothing more was heard of them until March 22, when a party, estimated at 1000 strong, was discovered near El Kuri port, opposite Suez. On the following day a force under General Sir G. Younghusband attacked and routed

them completely, killing a good many and putting the rest to flight.

Thus ended the long-threatened invasion of Egypt, an invasion which, as the Egyptian official *communiqué* expressed it, had merely taken the form of Turkish prisoners being brought to Cairo. There were between 600 and 700 of these prisoners all told—a wretched-looking, thinly-clad lot for the most part, though many of them had fought bravely enough. About 100 were wounded. The total Turkish losses in the so-called Battle of the Canal probably amounted to some 3000, including over 500 killed who were buried by our patrols, and deserters.

The German officers, who were credited with the chief control of the operations, did their best with the mixed forces at their disposal. They probably realized that the whole affair, like the futile invasion of Russia's Caucasian borderland, was a gambler's throw, and only likely to succeed with gross incompetence on the British part, and rare luck and skill on their own. That they were prepared for the worst was obvious from the white flag in a specially designed khaki wallet, with rings and halyard complete, found on the body of a German major who fell in the fighting near Serapeum. Our own losses did not amount to much more than 100 killed and wounded, chiefly among the Indian troops, to whom fell the brunt of the fighting. Invaluable services were also rendered by the Egyptian troops as well as by the British and French war-ships—for the Allies shared the naval honours here as in so many widely-scattered waters.

F. A. M.

CHAPTER XVII

GERMANY'S THIRD ATTEMPT ON WARSAW

(January–February, 1915)


Description of Russian Lines in Central Poland and North of Vistula—The Bzura-Rawka Position—Harassing East Prussia—The February Attack on the Russians from Bolimow over the Rawka—The German Strategic Offensive North of the Vistula from the Masurian Lakes—The Niemen and Narew Lines of the Russians—Retirement of the Russian Forces from East Prussia—The Mistake in the Retreat—The German Attack on General Bulgakov's Corps—Rout of the Russian 20th Corps—New German Formation—A Triple Attack—The Battle of Przasnysz—End of the Third Thrust at Warsaw—The Southern or Carpathian Russian Lines—The Carpathian Passes—Przemysl—Bukovina—Russian Occupation and Retirement from Bukovina—The Austro-German Attack on the Russian Left Wing—Fight for the Tukholka Pass.

FIRST PHASE

AFTER the heavy work of December, 1914, a lull fell on the forces in the eastern theatre of war. The German thrust at Warsaw by the attempt to pierce the Russian centre had faded out through exhaustion; the weather, abominably bad even for a Galician winter, had made further progress in the Carpathians difficult, and the Russians were disposed to husband their resources there, though making headway in the passes when they could. On the north of the Vistula the Russians were not strong enough to embark on the adventure of carrying an attack through the Masurian Lakes, and contented themselves, as in the Carpathians, with pushing forward whenever they could over the frontiers of East Prussia. The German counter-stroke in this region had not yet matured. They contented themselves with various feelers at Vischegrad, on the Vistula. They made several attempts to cross the Vistula here, so as to seize the roads

and to secure a base of operations on the right-hand or Warsaw bank of the Vistula.

These movements the Russians held in check, and from Vischegrad, through Central and South Poland to the River Nida and to where the River Dunajec falls into the north-eastward-flowing upper Vistula, their main position stretched along river frontages in a convex curve, the slight bulge of which was towards the west. The River Vistula, flowing north-eastwards where the Nida and Dunajec fall into it, presently turns north, and, curving more and more, flows north-west through Warsaw and west through Vischegrad (or Wyszogrod), so that it forms the curved part of a **D**, if the upright of the **D** be taken as the main line of the Russian position. Warsaw is near the top of the **D**. This image may be amplified by regarding the main Russian position as the broad chest of a strong man whose right shoulder is at the Vischegrad stronghold on the lower Vistula, and whose left shoulder is where the Nida joins the upper Vistula. His right



Germany's Third Thrust at Warsaw: Sketch Map illustrating Marshal von Hindenburg's direct attack on the Russian lines on the Bzura and Rawka rivers, February, 1915

Farther south the line ran on the Warsaw side of Petrokow to the Lotsosina, which is a tributary of the Nida, and so on to the Nida and the upper Vistula. The Russians made no attempt to advance beyond this line. The Austrian and German forces made continual attempts to pierce it, and fighting was incessant. But these efforts were not made with very large forces, and were directed to threatening the line

arm, which is the weaker, is flung from Visczegrod towards East Prussia and the Baltic, and is from time to time pressed back by the German wrestler. His left arm, longer and stronger, is still farther thrust back along the Carpathians, but is always trying to sweep southwards and westwards. His chest is immovable.

The more northerly part of this immovable Russian centre was established on the Bzura, which falls into the Vistula at Visczegrod; on the Rawka, farther south, though receding from this narrow stream in front of Bolimow, and coming back to it where the brooks Bialka and Rylka fall into it, south of Skierniewice. The fiercest German attacks were directed to piercing this Bzura-Rawka line.

and to the prevention of the withdrawal of any Russian forces from it while heavier attacks were made elsewhere.

Till nearly the end of January the only movements of importance—apart from the continued give and take along the entrenched centre of the Russian and German forces, and the unending fighting to maintain positions won in the Carpathians—were a tentative advance of the Russian northerly or right wing towards the fortress of Thorn in East Prussia. There were numerous rather indistinguishable skirmishes in the triangle of country formed by the Vistula River line from Warsaw to Thorn and the railway line from Warsaw to Mlawa on the East Prussian frontier. Contact between troops took place at Sierpce, at

Konopki, south of Mława, on the Skrawa River, and at Skempe and Lipno in the Masurian Lake region. No great successes were claimed by either side, but more and more names in this region came into the reports and telegrams, till Lotzen and Pillkallen

The Russians were testing, in their way, the German strategic offensive, in order to ascertain as accurately as possible where the concentration of German forces—which must strike soon, if they were to strike at all—was being effected.



A Great Railway after Bombardment: how the Germans wrecked the main Russian line between Kalisz Lodz and Warsaw

were mentioned, and critics several thousands of miles away were in doubt whether this was the presage to that Russian advance in force on East Prussia which had so long been hoped for, or whether it was still another reconnaissance, designed for no further end than to harass the Germans and to disperse their forces.

It was the second of these things.

Then at the beginning of February the German war-machine, with its admirable provision for locomotion by means of strategic railways at its back, began to move. The opening attack was ordered by Marshal von Hindenburg on the lines of the Bzura and its tributary the Rawka, where the Russians had maintained themselves without giving or gaining for two months.



Russian Reinforcements Entraining for the Front

The Russian trenches were on the Warsaw side of both rivers except at two points on the Bzura—the most northerly where the Bzura falls into the Vistula. Here they were on the western or German side of the river. They crossed it also at a point just north of where the Rawka joins the Bzura. The Russian Bzura trenches were on the river. Their Rawka trenches were on heights eastward of the river, and the German trenches were on the same side; but this did not imply any thrust back of the Russian line, because they were on low hills looking down towards the stream. It was these Russian positions that the German commander selected for attack. His attack was

made along a six or seven mile front, from a little north of Bolimow to Skierniewice, both of which are west of the Rawka. The Russian trenches which were assaulted were on the low hills or roll of ground which lies between the Rawka and the parallel stream the Sucha. This position covered the villages of Borzymow, Gumin, and Wola Szydlowska. From Skierniewice a railway runs to Warsaw, about 40 miles distant.

On the night of February 2 the Germans massed some 600 guns on the ridge west of Rawa. That works out at about 100 guns to a mile. It was a snowy night: their movements could not be detected by aeroplane, and they concentrated on the Rawka front, from the Bzura to the railway, four corps—from 100,000 to 120,000 men. On the same night as their artillery preparation they attacked the Russian positions at Borzymow, Gumin, Wola Szydlowska. That was an extent of position which was only part of the Russian line here; but the idea was to break through at one point by concentrating the attack, while making a big enough hole or gap in the defences to give room to turn round when they were broken. The Russian position which bore the fiercest brunt of the attack was perhaps only 2 miles in length. All Wednesday this fierce German attack made ground. The position or château at Wola Szydlowska was captured; so was Gumin, north of it, while southwards, behind the woods through which the railway runs, the Germans got as far as the station of Bednary, say 6 miles. On Thursday, February 4, the issue still

hung in the balance: the Russians had been pushed off their crest. But on Friday the Russian infantryman came again. He recovered the whole of the crest, and by Saturday morning the Germans were back again at the foot of the hills, and had lost the railway station. Their massed attack flickered out on the Sunday; it was dead on the Monday; and after six days of effort the Germans were back again at their starting-point—less a very great cost in dead, wounded, and prisoners. The blow at the centre had failed.

SECOND PHASE

Even while the new attempt to hack a way to Warsaw through the Russian centre, and so to take the shortest road, was in progress, the Germans were maturing a great counter-offensive north of the Vistula,

and the Austro-German forces, while not ceasing to attack the passes in the Carpathians, were thrusting eastwards to Bukovina and to where Bukovina joins Roumania. Thus it seemed that while they were holding the centre they were making two great outflanking manœuvres, one on either extremity of the thousand-mile Russian line. That is not the precise military interpretation of the Austro-German plan, because the movement south and east of the Carpathians was largely influenced by political considerations. The movement from East Prussia, north of the Vistula, was, on the other hand, a military movement which aimed at reaching Warsaw by a longer route, after the attack on the centre had been made. If this movement had succeeded it would have cut the railway between Warsaw and Petrograd as its preliminary achievement.



The Tsar and his Head-quarters Staff

The Tsar is seen in the centre, with the Grand Duke Nicholas on the extreme right and General Rennenkampf the second from the extreme left.

The railway from Warsaw to Petrograd runs roughly parallel to the East Prussian frontier till it reaches the Niemen River not far from the fortress of Grodno (to which there is a branch line). At Grodno the Niemen River turns north, and so runs to the fortress of Kovno, where it makes a right angle with itself and flows eastwards through Jurburg to Tilsit in East Prussia. The Niemen from Grodno to Kovno was one sector of the Russian defence, though till well into February their advance troops were far to the east of it and were ensconced in East Prussian villages. From Grodno, south-west to the Vistula, their defences were of another description. There was first a narrow gap; then the great forest of Augustowo, with the stronghold of Osowiec in the middle of a number of marshes. A little river, Bobr, leads from Osowiec to the River Narew; and the River Narew, winding a good deal on its way through to Lomza, Ostrolenka, Roshan, Pultusk, and Sierok, falls into the Vistula at the very strong fortress of Novo Georgievsk. If these details are grasped with the aid of a map it will be seen that the main defences of the Russians against any movement towards Warsaw and the railway are the river lines of the Niemen and the Narew.

But before the Germans reached these some very important things had occurred. On February 7, just after the fierce attack on the Bzura-Rawka defences of Warsaw had failed, the new concentration of German troops in East Prussia was completed. It was said to consist of some new for-

mations, as well as a corps from the western front to add to those corps of the eastern front rapidly assembled by the railways. The total strength may have been anything from 300,000 to 500,000 men.

The Grand-Duke Nicholas was aware of the concentration; and as the number of Russians in East Prussia could scarcely have been more than 130,000, he ordered an immediate withdrawal, signifying the gravity of the situation in Head-quarters Staff report only by the observation that "we are on the eve of a great and long operation which ought definitely to decide the struggle in Eastern Prussia. . . . This circumstance will render necessary some brevity in the *communiqués* of future fighting." The veil then fell on a situation which developed more seriously, because more swiftly, than the Russian Head-quarters Staff anticipated.

The Russian forces, now obliged to assume the defensive, began to retire without disorder in four units, which for convenience may be called army corps, though this designation bears no reference to their numbers.

If the four corps could have fallen back as one unbroken line of soldiers, the first or most southerly corps would have backed to the east through Lyck in East Prussia towards the marshes south of the forest of Augustowo, and so to Grodno on the Niemen or Osowiec (joined to Lyck by rail). The second corps would have retreated in line, north of Lyck through Suwalki to the Niemen. The third corps through Gumbinnen and Mariampol also to the Niemen; and the fourth

or most northerly corps through Wilkowsi to the same river.

But the ideal retirement did not take place, and the failure was due to the German swiftness to seize a weakness. The most northerly Russian corps deflected a little to the north, being struck on its southern flank by

was nothing else for it to do. It was all but surrounded, and as a unit never got back at all. Its men fought magnificently. Isolated units turned up days afterwards, having fought their way back to the shelter of the forest of Augustowo; but as an army corps the 20th was splintered. The German



The Campaign among the Masurian Lakes: German Staff Officers reconnoitring the Outskirts

the German onslaught. This left a gap between it and the next southerly corps, the third unit, which was the 20th Army Corps under General Bulgakov. Bulgakov's corps neither retreated with the same rapidity nor in the same direction. Thus it suffered the whole brunt of the German chief attack, was outflanked through the gap on its northern side, and could neither retreat nor hold on against overwhelming numbers. It cannot be said to have held on too long, for there

account of the numbers of the prisoners they took was grossly exaggerated; but one can hardly put the Russian loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners at less than 30,000 men and sixty guns.

Meanwhile the other units—Corps I and II—farther south had fought well and retreated in sound order, fighting hard in the narrows of the Masurian Lake district, and exacting as great a toll as they suffered. By the 12th they were all out of German territory.

The fourth or northerly corps was safe at Kovno; the third had disappeared; the second and first were on the line of the Niemen, and lay there in front of Grodno, Osowiec, and Lomza. On Sunday the 14th the Germans, having re-ordered their line and having a great initial success to their credit, began the serious part of their operations—which were designed not to the freeing of East Prussia, but to the cutting off of Warsaw. They proceeded to two tasks: the more northerly advance of a smaller body from Wilkowski and Mariampol to the lower Niemen; and the advance of their main strength on the Grodno-Osowiec-Lomza. Osowiec may be taken as the central point at which the Germans were aiming; and the line of the Narew from Osowiec to Novo Georgievsk was the defence which they had to pierce.


The attack became divisible into three sectors. An attack just to the north of Grodno on the Niemen, which was pursued with great enterprise if not with large forces. The Niemen was crossed, and this movement, beginning about February 15 or 16, did not appear to have been abandoned till the end of the first week in March.

The second sector of attack was on the fortress of Osowiec. The Germans brought up a siege-train of considerable magnitude, though there is no reason for supposing that the famous 42-cm. howitzers were included in the equipment. These pieces weigh 100 tons, and are not lightly to be risked. If they were brought up, it is probable that the Russian

assertion that they never left the railway was correct. In any case, a week's siege-work did not produce appreciable result on the fortress.

The third sector was from the direction of Mlawa to the River Narew, and included within its perimeter the decisive struggle at Przasnysz. As early as February 16 to 18, when the 20th Russian Army Corps was being battered by the Germans, another German advance was noted from East Prussia along a 30-mile line through Plonsk and Rachiaz, at right angles to the Vistula and towards the Narew. About February 18 the Russians spoke of checking this advance; but it may only have been halting for the advance of another German body. This second German advance was strung along another 30-mile line from Mlawa to Chorzele. These two advances converged and met in the neighbourhood of Przasnysz. Przasnysz stands at the focus of highways in a marshy land and the struggle for it was bitter and prolonged.

On Saturday, February 20, the rapid German convergence forced a Russian brigade acting as an outpost back into Przasnysz and flowed past it in three bodies towards the Niemen. The two German bodies which were farthest south passed on either side of a flat plateau called the Ridge of Volyaverslorska, which lies half-way between Przasnysz and the railway from Mlawa to the Vistula. The Russians seized this ridge and held on to it from Saturday, February 20, till Wednesday, 24, and, though they were violently attacked on all sides, held their own. The Germans got



Sketch Map to illustrate the German Attack north of Warsaw in February, 1915



The Winter Campaign in Poland: Russian Infantry leaving for the Front

into Przasnysz on that day, taking prisoners and guns from the brigade still there; but the ridge held. It held till the Russian reinforcements came up from the south.

This Russian advance stretched from a point south-east of the Volyaverslorska ridge to the town of Kraznosielce (north-west) on the little river Orzec. It began by pressing the Germans back over this river. On the next day, Thursday, 25th, it thrust the Germans back into Przasnysz, and this day witnessed the fiercest stage of the struggle. Towards the end of it the Russians were advancing on their left to the succour of their comrades on the ridge, and by Friday morning, 26th, the German line was wavering and the Russians were thrusting for the town. It was not, however, till Saturday night that the Russians, after a fierce and hand-to-hand struggle, won Przasnysz and

were beyond it and had the Germans in full retreat. The retreat was not a rout, but even the most grandiloquent German *communiqué* could call it nothing better than a retirement. The Russians claimed 10,000 prisoners, twelve guns, twenty-nine machine-guns, 122 ammunition-wagons, and a number of trains. It was compensation for their own broken army corps, but it was more than that, for it marked the beginning of the end of the third great German thrust at Warsaw. It was a costly attempt—since the severe losses on the Bzura and Rawka must be reckoned with it—and cannot have put fewer than 100,000 men out of action.

THIRD PHASE

The left wing of the Russian Grand Army, its left arm, was curved back in a long line which extended from

the main body in Central and Western Poland till it almost reached Roumania on the east. Defensively regarded, this great left wing was a protection of the flanks of the main body, the Western Poland armies under General Russki and General Ivanov. It also was a line of defence for the railway which, coming from Kieff and passing through Lemberg and Przemyśl, and then through Jaroslav and Tarnow, and so on to Cracow, was the secondary line of supplies for all the Russian armies. But, regarded as a weapon of offence, it had other functions. Its earliest function was to threaten Cracow. The strong German-Austrian advance relieved that pressure and removed the threat on the manufacturing districts of Silesia. But even as the Russians fell back towards Tarnow their wing began to develop the second of its

functions, which was to seize the passes of the Carpathians. Though this movement, as a movement in force, was second in point of time, it was strategically first in importance as part of the plan of campaign of the Grand-Duke Nicholas. The passes had been seized by Russian advance-guards in December, and some of the inflated "unofficial" telegrams which have been, with the newspaper placards founded thereon, one of the minor curses of the war, declared that the Russians were already scouring the plains of Hungary.

That, of course, was nonsense. As soon as it was evident that the Russians were not prepared to drive home an advance by way of Cracow and Silesia, the Austrians, stiffened by Germans, began to take steps to dispute the passes of the Carpathians. How important their possession was



With the Russians in Poland: Artillery on the road to the Battle Front

may be gathered from the fact that throughout all the advances, assaults, retirements, and pauses at other points in the line where the German and Austrian forces faced the Russians, from the Baltic to Bukovina, the fight for the Carpathians had been ceaseless. What number of men



General Brussilov, thrice decorated by the Tsar for his victories over the Austrians

General Brussilov had for his threefold task of threatening the gateway or gap of the Carpathians towards Cracow, of holding the passes or advancing in them, and of maintaining the investment of Przemyśl was not known. But his numbers, even if as great as half a million, were not equal to those of the combined Austrians and Germans.

This left Russian wing, if the comparison to an arm be pursued, may be

said to have its triceps at Tarnow and at the Neu Sandec opening; a swelling biceps at the Dukla, Lupkow, and Uszok Passes on the Carpathian ridge, the Dukla being the westernmost of these three; a strong elbow-joint at the Tukholka Pass; and a forearm passing behind the Delatyn (or Jablonitza) Pass and tapering to fingers which had a light hold on Bukovina. The fingers were bent back, the forearm had to incline with them, but the elbow joint, though hard twisted, held firm, while the muscles of the upper arm still pressed unrelaxing against the Austrian defences in the more Westerly Carpathians.

The first movement towards the establishment of the Russian left arm hug came from General Brussilov late in December. The Austro-German forces making their way through the western Carpathians had deployed in a line stretching from in front of Cracow to the Dukla Pass. Brussilov's divisions withdrew before them till this section of his army rested with its right on the Dunajec River at Tarnow, and was thence strung out till its left was in touch with the other Russian forces investing Przemyśl. Having effected what the Russians described as the levelling out of their line, Brussilov took the offensive on December 21, and turned again on the advancing Austrians. The Austrian line was then based on the villages Tuchow (on the railway line south of Tarnow) Olpiny (south-east), Biecz (on the railway line running from Przemyśl through Jaroslav to Neu Sandec), and finally on Dukla, which was on the Russian side of the Dukla Pass.

It was a position roughly aligned to the south-east, and based on roads and railways. Brussilov, in a series of fierce engagements, broke through it, and the Austrians were forced back on the passes.

The chief Carpathian passes in this section of the fighting area are the

a railway runs joining Marmaros Sziget in Hungary with Stanislaw in Galicia and with Kolomea and Czernewitz in Bukovina. The importance of the railways running through the passes must be kept in mind. It will help to a comprehension of the reasons for the great concentration of the German-



Russia's Snow-bound Battlefields: Infantry working their way forward against the enemy

Jordanow, due south of Neu Sandec, the Tarnow Pass (through which a railway runs), the broad Dukla Pass (the easiest of them all but having no railway), the Mezo Laborcz Pass, the Lupkow Pass (railway from Przemyśl), the Uszok Pass (railway to Lemberg).

The Uszok Pass is perhaps to be regarded as the middle pass between east and west. Farther east are the Tukholka Pass and the Beskid Pass, with a railway leading also to Przemyśl; and the Delatyn Pass, through which

Austrian forces on the Tukholka Pass at a subsequent stage of the fighting.

While Brussilov was engaged in thrusting back the Austrian advance, a sortie was made from Przemyśl, which was in wireless communication with the enemy. This was repelled, and during the last days of 1914 and the first days of January the Russians continued to advance towards the mouths of the passes. The advance was fiercely fought, as may be gathered from the conflicting Austrian and

Russian *communiqués*, which at various parts announced captures from one another. While throughout the campaign the Russian *communiqués* always proved to be as frank and trustworthy as they were terse, they were naturally silent for strategical reasons about the extent of their losses on occasions. The Austrian reports differed from theirs in including deliberately misleading statements. When both sides claimed captures it usually meant that the ground over which fighting had taken place had been alternately lost and won, and the wounded left in possession of the enemy. But the net result of the fighting on the Carpathian front during the first half of January was that the Russians re-occupied the line of the Dunajec River in the west, and pushed into the mouths of the chief passes, beginning with the Dukla. They claimed 18,000 men and 200 Austrian officers as prisoners, and a number of guns. The Austrians officially reported their own withdrawal "before numerical superiority". Meanwhile a subsidiary Russian force advanced far to the extreme left into the Bukovina.

Bukovina is at the eastern extremity of the Carpathian ridge which Hungary carries like a knapsack on its back. It is a country which, like Transylvania, is geographically a part of Roumania, and, if Roumanian ideals were realized, would be politically, as it is racially, joined to both. It occupies an area of about 6000 to 7000 square miles, and is partly good forest and partly bad agricultural land. The forests of beech cover half the area, and are valuable; at any rate they are



Russia's Oldest Volunteer: Ivan Truvanoff, a Cossack veteran who, after distinguishing himself in three campaigns, served in the fighting line in the Great War

the chief wealth of the land, and give to it its name. It is a region very much broken up into ridges and valleys, which fall away on the east towards the plain of Bessarabia, and towards the west, that is to say, as the Carpathians are approached, become mountainous in character. On the Hungarian frontier the hills or mountains rise to heights of over 5000 feet, and the whole of this wooded chaos of hills is cut by two roads only, leading to Transylvania. Both start from Kimpolung, the one going to Marmaros Sziget, the other inclining to Klausenbourg. Kimpolung is therefore a point of considerable strategic importance.

From its northern frontier to its southern boundary Bukovina is laced with valleys and ridges which run roughly in an east-west direction. Beginning with the valley of the Dniester, which is the most northerly one, the next of these valleys is the valley of the River Pruth, on which the capital Czernowitz stands. Czernowitz is a railway junction, and for that reason is important. It must be held by any force which meditates an excursion southwards. Next in order come the valleys of the Great and the Little Sereth; then the Suczawa, near to which is Radautz; then the Moldawa, with Wama standing at the junction

of the Moldawa's tributary, the Moldawitza; and, lastly, the Golden Bistritza. All these rivers rise in the Carpathians, and flow towards Roumania. When the Russians, having overrun Bukovina in January, fell back under pressure of the German-Austrian advance in February, they used the rivers as successive lines of defences.

The Russian previous movements were in conformity with those tactics of enterprising reconnaissance which they had ceaselessly pursued throughout their eastern campaign, and which on the whole had paid them very well. After having occupied the plain of Czernowitza without difficulty during their first march through Galicia, they quitted it, and then, when their raiding operations began, re-occupied it, and used it as a base for their advance towards Galicia. This advance was never made in any great force. The Russian Head-quarter's Staff, in rebutting the Austrian claims to have taken impossibly vast numbers of prisoners, asserted that the Russian forces in Bukovina were no more than a division. It was most likely true; because, owing to the friendly reception given to the Russians by the Ruthenian and Roumanian population, the Russian communications need not have been very solidly held. The Russians stated that their losses in officers and men were only 1077.

By the end of December the Russians had methodically occupied all the valleys. They took Radautz, then by way of Koczika passed into the valley of the Moldawa. On January 4 they took Gura-Humora, and Bouksoia. Then, going on to




Russia's Youngest Volunteer: Constantine Malafeeff, aged fifteen years, decorated and promoted for bravery in the Polish campaign

Wama, they marched on January 6 for Kimpolung. From Kimpolung the two roads leading into Hungary pass over passes about 3600 feet high. Twelve days later it was officially announced that the Russians had stormed the pass of Kirlibaba on the road to Marmaros Sziget. Hungary was therefore threatened, and the threat was rendered graver by the possibility that Roumania might join in the attack, and that two Russian army corps at the gates of the eastern passes of the Carpathians might complete the junction.

The Russian operations in Bukovina may have been intended as what another of our allies calls a *ballon d'essai*, and, politically, was an encouragement to Roumania. Roumania, which had raised a loan with

the assistance of the Allies, was regarded by the Germans and Austrians, at any rate as a likely enemy, and had given colour to the suspicion by mobilizing her forces, which were said to approximate to 700,000 men. This is not the place in which to discuss the ramifications of Balkan politics or the reasons influencing the Baltic States for maintaining their neutrality or for taking sides in the war. It is sufficient to remark that the German-Austrian combination replied to the possibility of Roumanian intervention by two measures, one political, one strategical. The political measure was that of lending money to Bulgaria, a State which, since the beginning of the war, had been very carefully poised between neutrality and intervention, with a slight list towards the Austro-



The Campaign in the Carpathians: Sketch Map of the Russian Positions in February, 1915

Germans. The strategical measure was that of throwing new German reinforcements into Austria. These reinforcements were loudly proclaimed as being part of a new expedition against Serbia, which would have been an absurdity. They were really designed for the double purpose of over-awing Roumania and of preparing for the great outflanking movement on the Russian left wing which was to coincide with another and similar movement on the Russian right wing in the distant north.

This Austro-German movement in the Carpathians, which was of great military importance, was again subdivided. On the extreme right strongish Austrian forces undertook in early February the task of driving the Russians out of Bukovina. From the River Bistritza the Russians fell back to the Moldawitza, from the Moldawitza to the Sereth, from the Sereth to the River Pruth on which Czernowitza stood. They fought well and carried out their retirement in good order. But they had to abandon Czernowitza, which is a railway junction and therefore valuable, and their general offensive line in this part of the field had to retire as far north-west as Stanislau. It is a considerable sector on even a moderate-sized map, but the retirement could not be evaded, for the Austrians, stiffened with Germans, were striking hard at a far more vital spot.

The Uzsok Pass is the middle one of the gaps through the Carpathians, and became and continued to be a focus of the fiercest attacks and counter-attacks for possession. But the pass

next to the eastward of the Uzsok is the Tukholka Pass. Here the Austro-Germans concentrated their efforts, knowing that if they could break through at this point they would have the most valuable fulcrum for cutting the Russian extreme left wing off from its main supports, and would, furthermore, be in a strong position for pushing right on north to Lemberg, and so getting astride the main railway line of the Russian supplies. A railway line runs from Hungary past the Tukholka and Beskid Passes almost due north to Lemberg, and they could advance along this. Thus Tukholka became in some measure the key to the Carpathian fighting; it was a key which, if turned, would unlock the Russian resistance.

First of all, however, the passes farther west were attacked. On January 25 the Austrians, surging through the Dukla, attacked the Russian positions at its northern mouth. The Russians counter-attacked, and after three days' hard fighting were in possession of the head of the pass, having taken guns and about 5000 prisoners. By the end of the month they were through the pass and were entrenching themselves at the southern opening on to Hungary. They had meanwhile repelled an attack on the Uzsok.

While these attacks and counter-attacks were being made, a more important German force, masked by them, was pushing to the south-east on the favourite German outflanking manœuvre. On February 3 this movement, the principal one, opened out. Strong reinforcements appeared on the Uzsok ridges; still stronger ones at the

Tukholka Pass. At the same time the engagements at the Dukla and Lupkow Passes were still going on, and in these the Russians steadily gained. They were well over the main ridge at two of the three western passes by February 7. Further sorties of the Przemyśl garrison had been driven in; Austria's demonstration on the Dunajec River had not relieved the pressure.

But the full force of the storm was meanwhile beginning to fall on the Russian positions at the Tukholka Pass, where a German-Austrian success would have driven a wedge between the two parts of the Russian wing, and would have opened up a way for turning the Russian positions at the passes farther west. On February 7 the German stiffening battalions concentrated here, and on the next day began an attack which for sustained violence was unprecedented even in a region where most of the fighting has ended with the bayonet. The Russian main position, or the key to it, was on the heights of Koziowa,

north of the village of Tukholka, and west of the station of Tuchla on the pass railway. Russian accounts of the fighting describe the massed masses of the Germans moving forward at daybreak. No losses in the foremost ranks could stop the succeeding ranks; the avalanche came on, the German heavy guns in support.

They captured a dominating height in the Russian position. They were driven out by a succession of furious bayonet charges. They came back again in attack after attack. Twenty-two German assaults were launched in all, and towards the evening of the bloody day they again captured the Koziowa heights. Once more in the gathering dusk the Russians sent forward their bayonets; the Germans resisted with a tenacity which won the admiration of their opponents, but the long strain had been too great, their strength was exhausted. Night found the Russian steel triumphant, the positions retained.

E. S. G.



Cave-dwellers at the Front: German Troops in their Bomb-proof Shelters

CHAPTER XVIII

THE WAR OF TRENCHES IN FLANDERS

(January–February, 1915)

The Winter Deadlock—Campaigning in Flanders Past and Present—The Orient at the Front—Comforts for the British Army—How the Troops were fed—Work of the Army Service Corps—Hardships of the Winter Campaign—“A Brilliant Little Affair”—Sir John French and the Indian Cavalry—German Attack of January 25, 1915—Desperate Fight for the Cuinchy Triangle—Battle of the Brick-stacks—The Struggle at Givenchy—A Day of Heroic Deeds—The Military Cross—Celebrating the Kaiser's Birthday—Another German Assault at Cuinchy—Counter Attack of the Irish Guards and Coldstreams—Corporal O'Leary's V.C.—Other Decorations won at Cuinchy—A Crowning Victory.

ABNORMAL weather conditions continued to control the campaign in Flanders for several weeks after the turn of the year. The largest British army which had ever taken the field on the Continent was forced, like its opponents, to remain buried in a battle-field of excavations, yet working night and day in what amounted to siege operations on a gigantic scale. It was monotonous and deadly work—one ceaseless struggle against mud, snow, rain, and floods, as well as against the ever-present danger from shell-fire and sniper's bullet. The capture of an enemy trench, so frequently reported in a single line, was no mere piece of haphazard luck. It usually meant long, patient planning, digging, and mining, and the highest qualities of heroism and self-sacrifice at the supreme moment when the infantry leapt to the assault against the murderous fire of machine-guns and rifles. Yet in spite of this grim, cramped, and perilous existence the spirit of cheerful endurance was stronger than ever among the British troops at the beginning of 1915. They were quite confi-

dent that, though neither side could claim a decisive victory, the offensive was gradually, but unmistakably, passing to the Allies. The Germans had remained on the defensive against the British front since the great battle before Ypres in November; for the formidable assaults of December had been in the nature of counter-attacks, like the repeated onslaughts which succeeded every capture by the Allies of a German position, however trifling. The war, as one of the British officers at the front wrote at the time, had become like a game of draughts. “We take two trenches, the Germans take one; we move and take three, they move and take two, and so on. So it is slow, but sure.”

It was only by counting all these losses and gains on both sides, and balancing the results one against the other, with a clear perception of the motives inspiring each, that it was possible to appreciate the nature of the progress made, or the extent to which the initiative had passed, or was passing, to the Allies. The German defensive is almost always an active one. “It is founded”, to quote from

"Eye-Witness's" account from General Head-quarters on January 4, 1915, "on the axiom of war that the weaker a force is, and the more hardly it is pressed, the more persistently should it attack; but it remains true that such action is none the less defensive, even though here and there one of their counter-attacks may succeed in regaining possession of a trench, or in driving back a small section of our front." The firm conviction that they were now gaining this ascendancy over the enemy, as well as the measures taken to mitigate the hardships in the field, played no small part in keeping the British army cheerful enough throughout these trying winter months.

Remnants of ancient ramparts here and there along the extended battle-front recalled the campaigns of bygone days, but the great Condé and Turenne, who fought there hundreds of years before, when war was a more picturesque affair, full of glamour and romance, and operations were entirely suspended in the winter, would have stood amazed at the sight of these muddy regiments digging and living in a perfect labyrinth of trenches, as well as at the startling sound of the more or less continuous artillery and mortar duel. Winter, though it heavily handicaps a Continental campaign, brings no respite to modern warfare. How appallingly slow was the progress now made in Flanders, however, was demonstrated in a ghastly manner in the work of excavation, where the spade would often turn up dreadful relics of earlier fights for the same debatable ground. In this desolate region of death and destruction, where

roads and fields alike were ploughed and furrowed by shells and bombs, where buildings were battered beyond recognition, and practically no sign of human life was visible above ground, there was nothing of the pomp and panoply of the ancient wars of Flanders. Beyond the trenches, on the narrow strip of territory through which each side was burrowing towards the other, was the No Man's Land strewn with the dead bodies of soldiers who had fallen in recent attacks and lay there still unburied. It was more than any man's life was worth to take even a hurried glance at this fatal zone in daylight. Even in the rear, away from the firing-line, where a war-worn regiment of French Cuirassiers on the march, with their cuirasses red with rust, would give an occasional touch of colour and something of an old-world air to the scene, the effect could scarcely be described as picturesque. The drab reality was more often a snorting convoy of motor lorries, lumbering alongside Indian ammunition carts drawn by mules, whose native drivers, uncomplaining but bitterly cold, would be huddled practically out of sight in their heavy coats. Whatever there was of picturesqueness in the winter campaign was to be found in the odd assortment of Oriental races from the French and British colonies, as the official "Eye-Witness" testified in one of his messages at this period:

"Many of the roads leading up, and parallel to, the allied front present a kaleidoscope of the strangest contrasts. Several types of humanity can be seen, from the wild Arab horseman of the North African deserts, clothed in flowing robes of blue and



Drawn by H. W. Koekkoek from a sketch by the special war artist Frederic Villiers

In the First Line of British Trenches: Flinging Ammunition in Belts from Hand to Hand

To avoid unnecessary casualties in the dangerous work of getting ammunition to the deadly advanced trenches, the extra rounds needed by the men were placed in belts of canvas, which were passed into the trenches and thrown to one another by the men when anyone was running short of cartridges.

scarlet, to the tribesman from the mountains of the North-West Frontier of India. And there is something grotesquely incongruous in the appearance of the dusky faces and Oriental garments—such as those worn by the Algerian cavalry—amidst the surroundings of driving sleet, seas of mud, and long squalid rows of brick cottages, such as those in the small industrial towns where many of these troops are billeted."

The finest sight of all was to see the columns of British soldiers threading their way through the throng as they marched back from the trenches, men covered with mud, and probably wet to the skin, but as cheerful as ever. These were the men whose turn had come for warm billets and hot meals again; and above all, for a warm bath and dry clothes; for one advantage of the deadlock at the front was that excellent arrangement could be completed for making the soldier's lot as comfortable as possible.

At General Head-quarters a newly built jute factory was turned into a convalescent home for men suffering from the minor ailments and exhaustion due to the hardships of trench life in winter. A thousand men could be comfortably accommodated here at a time; and the effect of a hot bath, a few days' complete change and rest, and a new outfit worked wonders, the majority then being again fit for duty. After recuperation, however, these men were not sent back to the trenches at once, but given light work for a few days longer at the head-quarters of their units. At another place certain works were handed over by the proprietor to the British army as a sort of wholesale bath-house, capable of

dealing with 1500 men every day. The vats in these works, large enough to take several soldiers at a time, were transformed into hot baths, and they answered the purpose splendidly. Men who had not had their clothes off for weeks, and who had trooped in from the trenches, weary, unshorn, encrusted in mud, and often splashed with blood, emerged different beings, refreshed, reclothed, and ready for anything again.

As for the food, it was universally admitted that no army in the history of the world had ever been so well fed as was the British army in France and Flanders. No grumbling was heard in any part of the scattered theatre of operations, either as to the quantity or the quality of the food. With bacon for his breakfast, bread and cheese for his luncheon, bread and jam with his tea, and a hot dinner of meat, vegetables, and bread, many a British soldier fared far better at the front than at home, and undoubtedly fought all the harder for it afterwards. In emergencies he carried what was known as an "Iron Ration", consisting of preserved meat, biscuit, tea, sugar, and a couple of concentrated-meat cubes. For the troops in the trenches pea soup was provided twice a week, and an extra allowance of tea and sugar. Little luxuries also flowed in from friends and relations at home, from knitted socks and mufflers to tinned salmon and toffee; so that altogether Mr. Thomas Atkins had little to complain about in the way of supplies. He was better clad, too, than the Germans, according to prisoners captured from their ranks, whose evidence, as

well as personal appearance, went to prove that the British clothing was both better and warmer than theirs. The whole of the French commissariat department, with no fewer than 2,500,000 men at the front, was, of course, more complex and formidable

Lord Kitchener bore witness in the House of Lords, remained remarkably good, their freedom from enteric fever and the usual diseases incidental to field operations furnishing a striking testimony to the value of inoculation and to the advice and skill of the



A Rest from the Trenches: the Cheerful British Officer off Duty in Flanders

than the British, but was also most efficiently carried out. The daily campaign ration for every French soldier consisted of $1\frac{1}{2}$ pounds of bread and 1 pound of meat, together with bacon, sugar, coffee, tea, and a third of a litre of wine.

All this helped to account for the high state of physical fitness maintained by both armies in the field. The health of the British troops, as

Royal Army Medical Corps and its auxiliary organizations, as well as to the excellence of the commissariat.

Well for the British army that it was so, for in spite of the accounts that were circulated at the time of starving and bedraggled German prisoners—sometimes true enough in such isolated cases as are incidental to trench warfare on an extended battle front—the enemy's organization in



Drawn by Christopher Clark from a sketch by an officer at the front

With the "Fighting Carters": the Army Service Corps carrying Supplies from the Wagons to the Trenches on a Moonlight Night

these respects, if the clothing was not so good as in the British army, was as thorough and as scientific as every other detail of their mighty war machine. "Though most of us agree that one of our men is worth three of the Germans," as a British infantry officer wrote at the time from the trenches, in a letter printed in the *Times*, "what their Staff doesn't know about war and its devices isn't worth knowing. Their trench equipment is magnificent." The writer then described how the Germans had lately blown up and captured a trench in the dark from some British troops whom he had been sent up to reinforce, and how he offered to retake it at once, but was told to wait till daylight:

"So I watched the Germans with my periscope and saw them rush in. No sooner had they got in than they had every sand-bag off the parapet and blocked up the trench against us, and they brought in their portable iron loopholes, which are extremely good. They had all this rigged up in under half an hour. When I retook the trench, I found they had everything ready for a long occupation. Their trench mortars are a wonderful piece of scientific work; they make no report when fired, as the bomb is propelled by compressed air. Ours makes a row like a thunderclap. The prisoners I took were very well dressed (smart and clean); plenty of good rations, bread, bully beef, chocolate, coffee, biscuits, good boots to prevent frost-bite. In their trenches they oil their feet, then bandage them and oil the bandage, wear two pairs of socks, then a pair of carpet slippers, and then gum boots over the top of that. They are equipped with any number of hand grenades and bombs, which I don't think are as good as ours, but they have plenty of them, and in the trenches they have fixed rifles, which is an advantage."

Full credit for the way in which the British troops were supplied must be given to the Army Service Corps, as well as to the French railway authorities, who, in spite of the complicated duties of supplying the French army over an infinitely longer front, never once failed to render the necessary assistance to the British commissariat. The smooth working of the Army Service Corps from the very beginning of the Great World War demands something more than a passing reference. As soon as mobilization became imminent in the critical days before the outbreak of hostilities all the reserve supplies for the whole of the army were at once transferred to what is known as the Home Base Port—the port at which supplies were accumulated for shipment overseas. Contracts were then made for the regular supply of rations, and shiploads sent to the Oversea Bases, where supply depots and field bakeries were established. The course taken by the operations in August necessitated the removal of all these accumulations of stores, but it is recorded by the official "Eye-Witness", in his account of the working of the Army Service Corps, that, notwithstanding the tremendous task involved in their shipment from one port to another, the whole machinery of supply continued to work smoothly through all the early vicissitudes of the war.

From the supply depots thus established food was sent up by rail to a "Regulating Station", where it was sorted out and dispatched by train in its correct proportions to the "Rail-heads" nearest to the troops for whom

it was intended. On arrival at the railheads it was loaded on convoys of motor-lorries, known as "Supply Columns", and conveyed to a rendez-vous—varied each day when troops were on the move—where it was met by representatives of the force for which it was intended, and conducted,

the system work that throughout the first six months of the war, save during the critical period of the retirement from Mons, not a single day passed upon which food did not reach our men. The last and most dangerous stage of the long journey to the firing-line is illustrated on p. 230 in



With the Army Service Corps at the Front: a Break-down on the Road

in the case of infantry, to what are called "Refilling Points". Here it was again subdivided and taken over by the "Supply Sections of the Train" belonging to each division, who conveyed it to its destination by horsed wagons. In the case of the cavalry there would be no refilling points, the food being carried by the supply columns direct to the units for whom it was intended. So splendidly did

the picture showing the "Fighting Carters" carrying supplies on a moonlight night from the wagons to the trenches. Some idea is also conveyed by it of the slough of mud in which most of this winter campaign in Flanders had to be fought. Moonlight, of course, added enormously to the perils of such Army Service Corps work within range of the enemy's guns, but no dangers were allowed



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH

Field-Marshal Viscount French

to interfere with the regular delivery of the vital necessities to the men in the firing-line. A well-deserved tribute was paid by "Eye-Witness" to the plucky drivers of the Army Service Corps—not a few of whom won the Distinguished Conduct Medal for gallantry under fire—in relating some of their experiences in the campaign:—

"These included early in the war many narrow escapes from hostile cavalry patrols, long night journeys without lights over bad roads between the hostile lines, daily drives over the open stretch of a plateau swept by howitzer shell, and generally exhausting days and sleepless nights spent in taking up food and carrying back wounded . . . It will then be realized that there is as much romance and excitement and as much opportunity for heroism in driving a lorry as there is in seemingly more adventurous duties."

In the fighting-line little happened of outstanding importance along the British front during the first three weeks of 1915. It was a duel of artillery for the most part, in which the guns of the Allies were gradually assuming a marked superiority over the German; but always there was ceaseless sapping, sniping, and laborious struggle to gain another step forward in the process of attrition which was to bring the war to an end. The floods so overflowed the banks of the River Lys that both sides were forced to abandon their trenches in places. Everywhere it was as much as the men could do to keep the trenches dry and prevent the earth from falling in. Such conditions were naturally ruinous to the stoutest leather. Many soldiers chose to save theirs as much

as possible by walking barefoot down the long communication trenches, and waiting until they reached the better-drained fire trenches before putting on their boots and socks. In one of his dispatches Sir John French bestowed high praise upon the troops for the magnificent spirit in which they had responded to the call to face these rigours and hardships of a winter campaign after the most desperate fighting hitherto recorded in the history of the British army:

"Frost and snow have alternated with periods of continuous rain. The men have been called upon to stand for many hours together almost up to their waists in bitterly cold water, only separated by one or two hundred yards from a most vigilant enemy. Although every measure which science and medical knowledge could suggest to mitigate these hardships was employed, the sufferings of the men have been very great. In spite of all this they present a most soldier-like, splendid, though somewhat war-worn appearance. Their spirit remains high and confident; their general health is excellent, and their condition most satisfactory."

One or two minor successes ushered in the new year; in particular a brilliant little affair on the British right centre on the evening of January 3, when an officer with twenty-five men stormed an isolated trench held by some twenty-five Germans in advance of their main line, and bayoneted a score of them without firing a shot. It was all over in a few minutes once the party had crept across the 200 yards of intervening open ground. Heavy rain and total darkness favoured the enterprise, enabling the attackers to account for every German in the

trench with a loss of only three of their own number, and without firing a shot. Then they rendered the position untenable by digging a channel to a neighbouring ditch, which at once filled the trench with water; afterwards withdrawing in the same grim silence to their own lines. The veil of secrecy which lay over the whole operations at the time hid the names of the officer and regiment in "Eye-Witness's" account of this affair, but in due course the Honours List announced that Lieutenant Frank Crowther Roberts, of the 1st Battalion Worcestershires, had been awarded the D.S.O. for attacking with twenty-five men of his battalion on January 3, "and capturing by surprise, with complete success, a German saphead situated about 60 yards in front of our lines near Neuve Chapelle".

On January 18 Sir John French, who had taken the opportunity afforded by the winter deadlock to inspect all the various units of his army, reviewed the cavalry, including the Indian Corps under Lieutenant-General Rimington. These last, in the words of the Commander-in-Chief at the time, formed "a magnificent body of cavalry, and will, I am sure, give the best possible account of themselves when called upon. In the meantime, at their own particular request, they have taken their turn in the trenches and performed most useful and valuable service." Just a week later—at 7.30 a.m. on January 25—a certain liveliness on the German front proclaimed the beginning of a fresh attempt to obtain possession of Givenchy as a stepping-stone to the capture of the ancient


town of Béthune, between 5 and 6 miles beyond the British line—once the capital of a barony, and one of the fortresses of Artois. Givenchy itself, hitherto an obscure and peaceful village, has been cruelly immortalized by the war from its unfortunate position on rising ground in the midst of a wide, marshy plain, assuming military importance from its command of the high road from Béthune to La Bassée. In the desperate fighting of December, 1914, and January, 1915, it was practically razed to the ground, scarcely one of its 268 houses remaining intact, and its little Gothic church, dating back to 1513, being reduced to a heap of ruins.

The attack in force on January 25 was hurled against the allied front, right from Givenchy to the main La Bassée-Béthune road, after half an hour's bombardment of Bethune. It made most progress against the British line south of the canal, held only by half a battalion of the Scots Guards and half a battalion of the Coldstreams, of the 1st Infantry Brigade. The British line at this point was described as forming a pronounced salient from the canal on the left, thence running forward towards the well-known railway triangle at Guinchy, and back to the main La-Bassée-Béthune road, where it linked up with the French. The attack developed both against the British and the French, and was driven home with a force and impetuosity which for a time carried everything before it. This was especially the case in the British salient, the trenches of which were blown in almost at once, and an infantry struggle began

which lasted throughout the day. Succeeding in penetrating the line where they had blown in the trenches, the enemy advanced along the main road, but was held up at the partially prepared second line—strengthened by

as well as in some communication trenches extending even beyond and west of the keep on either side of it.

Meantime the London Scottish had been sent up in support, and a counter-attack organized with the 1st Royal



Map showing approximately the British and French positions before Béthune at the time of the German attacks on Givenchy and Cuinchy, January 25, 1915

a "keep" among the brick-stacks, half-way between the canal and the road—to which the Scots Guards and Coldstreams retired. Here were also the other two half-battalions of their regiments. Though stopped at this point, the enemy managed to establish himself in a part of the brickfields,

Highlanders, part of the Cameron Highlanders, and the 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps. One of the London Scottish present described the engagement in a letter quoted in the *Times* as follows:—

"The 'Huns' made a mass attack. There must have been thousands, and they abso-



A Storm-centre at the British Front: Gurkhas entering Givenchy

lutely swamped our fellows out, after undermining, sapping, and blowing the trenches up; then they poured in. It was a marvellous escape for our regiment, as these trenches we had been holding a day previous. Then came the counter-attack, in which we figured as supports, but were not required. We were successful in the counter-attack, and, although we lost heavily, the 'Huns' lost thousands. Our guns were wiping them out in batches of 30, and it is said one battery got rid of over a thousand rounds."

Pushed forward at 1 p.m., this counter-attack made good progress near the road and the canal, but was fiercely contested among the brick-fields, where desperate hand-to-hand fights took place without decisive ad-

vantage on either side. Late in the afternoon, therefore, the 2nd Royal Sussex Regiment was sent forward to reinforce; with the result—to quote from Sir John French's dispatch—"that the Germans were driven back far enough to enable a somewhat broken line to be taken up, running from the culvert on the railway almost due south to the keep, and thence south-east to the main road". Thus, though the original line was not wholly recovered, the British troops were able to establish themselves in a fresh line close behind it. On both sides the casualties had been heavy. Among the British the gallant 1st Guards Brigade especially had suffered severely,

and was temporarily withdrawn with reserve, having been replaced during the night following the engagement by the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

Elsewhere along the Allies' line the enemy paid dearly for this trifling gain of ground. The French to the south of the British, though driven back slightly, eventually repulsed the Germans with slaughter, and a simultaneous attack which developed against Givenchy, north of the canal, met with a similar fate. Here the struggle was again of the most sanguinary nature, and at close quarters. In many cases our men fought with bayonets in their hands, and even

knocked out a number of Germans with their fists. The story was told of one soldier in the thick of this fight, who, enlisting the help of two other men, broke into a house held by eight Germans, bayoneted four, and captured the rest, while he continued to suck at a clay pipe. It sounds an improbable story, but since it was vouched for by the official "Eye-Witness" it is more trustworthy than some of the amazing tales from the front solemnly recorded at the time in the daily press. As in the counter-attacks at Givenchy in December, the enemy, pressing on in swarms, had at first smashed a way through our front



How Trenches were blown up in Flanders: an Instantaneous Photograph


trenches and gained a temporary foothold in the village; but by noon our men had flung him back again at the point of the bayonet and regained possession of the original line round

each time in vain, the enemy at length retiring in confusion with a total loss of not less than 1000 officers and men, including 53 prisoners. The successful counter-attack which cleared the Germans out of the village and re-established the line was delivered by the reserves of the 2nd Welsh Regiment and 1st South Wales Borderers, together with a company of the 1st Black Watch (Royal Highlanders), which had been lent by the 1st Brigade as a working-party.

It was a day of heroic deeds, as the Honours Lists attested in due course. Among the officers' awards were the D.S.O. for Major and Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel E. B. Macnaghten, 30th Battery Royal Field Artillery, for conspicuous gallantry and ability during the German attack. "While exposed to very heavy fire", runs the official record, "he obtained valuable information as to the enemy's position, which resulted in the prevention of supports reaching them." Another D.S.O. for the same engagement was awarded to Captain (temporary) Hugh M. B. Salmon, of the 1st Battalion South Wales Borderers:

"Although wounded, he brought up men from the local Reserves under heavy fire on two occasions, and remained throughout the day with his company in action."

Two officers of the Gloucester Regiment won the Military Cross¹—the



The Military Cross, the new British Decoration for Gallantry, created by the Great World War

the place. No fewer than five German assaults were made on the salient at the north-east of the village, but

¹ The new decoration was struck at the Royal Mint from the design of Mr. H. Farnham Burke, C.V.O., C.B., Norroy King of Arms. It is of silver, 1½ inches square, with a bar 1½ inches wide. According to the Royal Warrant: "No person shall be eligible for this decoration unless he is a captain, a commissioned officer of a lower grade, or warrant officer in the British Army or Indian or Colonial Military Forces, and the Cross shall be awarded only to officers of the above ranks on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for War. Foreign officers of an equivalent rank to those mentioned above, who have been associated in military operations with the British, Indian, or Colonial Forces shall be eligible for the honorary award of the Cross. The Military Cross shall not confer any individual precedence, and shall not entitle the recipient to any addition after his name as part of his description or title."

new decoration which came into being with the Great World War, just as the Victoria Cross had its origin in the Crimean campaign. The two officers of the Gloucesters were Second-Lieutenant W. H. Hodges, of the 1st Battalion, "for gallantry and coolness at Givenchy on January 25, 1915, when he succeeded in holding a position after his senior officers had been killed"; and Second-Lieutenant H. G. de Bush, of the 3rd Battalion, attached to the 1st Battalion, for the following deed:—

"When one of his machine-guns with its complement of men had been buried by a shell, he succeeded under heavy fire in digging out the men and gun and brought them into action again."

For equally gallant conduct on the same occasion the Military Cross was also awarded to Lieutenant W. H. C. Edwards, 1st Battalion Black Watch, and Second-Lieutenant C. H. Carrigan, 2nd Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers. Nor were all the honours of the day with the British. So many charges of barbarity, some of them only too well-founded, were brought against the Germans that it is but just to place on record the following supreme act of humanity recorded at the time by our official "Eye-Witness":

"During the engagement at Givenchy one of our officers had been partially buried by the parapet of a trench which had been blown in on top of him. A German officer who saw him, regardless of the fact that he himself was out in the open under a hail of bullets, stopped to dig him out and give him brandy from his flask. To the great regret of those of our men who witnessed this deed of gallantry and self-sacrifice and

deeply appreciated it, the German was killed by a chance bullet."

Possibly the German onslaught of January 25 was intended to snatch a victory as a small birthday offering to lay at the feet of the Kaiser, whose fifty-sixth anniversary was due two days later; but it seemed unlikely in view of another fruitless attack delivered on the same day against the French near Zonnebeke, east of Ypres—nearly 30 miles away from the scene of the fighting just described, and obviously unconnected with it in any tactical sense. In any case no further attempt of the kind was ventured on the Allies' front in Flanders until after the 27th. The only celebration recorded in this theatre on the birthday itself was a British salute of several rounds of lyddite against a house near Messines much used by the enemy.

"The whole building blew up", writes "Eye-Witness", "and there followed a *feu de joie* of smaller explosions, the house apparently having been used as a magazine for bombs and grenades. It was felt by the troops that this display of fireworks was a fitting celebration of the day. On the right our troops gained a little ground. In the same quarter our snipers were very successful, and our guns caused the evacuation of a saphead by the enemy. Otherwise there was no action of note."

A foot-note to this must be added from the *London Gazette* of March 10 1915, in which Lieutenant Malcolm Royal Wingate, of the 26th Field Company, Royal Engineers, figures as the recipient of the Distinguished Service Order "for conspicuous gallantry on numerous occasions under

dangerous conditions, especially at Givenchy on January 27, 1915, when he led a small party and blew in the head of the enemy's sap at White House". Thus the Kaiser's birthday was not allowed to pass unadorned.

The lull in the heavier fighting which succeeded the costly attacks of the enemy on January 25 was broken on the morning of the 29th, when further violent assaults were launched by the Germans on the right of the 1st Corps, south of the canal in the neighbourhood of La Bassée. This was in answer to the progress made by us in regaining some further ground near the railway triangle, between the La Bassée Canal and the Béthune Road, where our troops were now more firmly established in the brick-

fields. The enemy, consisting of part of the 14th German Corps, after a severe shelling, made two determined attacks between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m., advancing with scaling-ladders on the keep which figured in the fighting of the 25th, and storming the positions to the north and south of it. At the keep, and on the north side, the Sussex Regiment gave the enemy a particularly hot reception, first holding him off and then hurling him back with serious losses. On the south side the Germans succeeded in reaching the Northamptonshire Regiment's trenches, but though they gained a small portion of these they were immediately counter-attacked with the bayonet, and every man in the captured trench was killed. Close to the Béthune road a similar fate awaited the Germans who had seized another of our trenches there; the trench was regained and the enemy bayoneted to a man. Our casualties were inconsiderable in this action, but the enemy lost heavily, more than 200 of his killed alone being left in front of our position when he was at length forced to beat a retreat.

Reluctant to accept defeat on this scene of so many hard-fought fights, the enemy delivered yet another assault in the small, dark hours of Monday morning, February 1. Taken by surprise, some of the 2nd Coldstreams were driven from their trenches, but with dogged courage hung on to a fresh position not more than some 20 yards east of it. The recapture of the trenches later in the morning was a piece of work which will live in the history of the war and especially in the



Fighting the Floods: Pumping out the British Trenches in Flanders



More Artillery for the Fighting-line: British Guns arriving at one of the Head-quarters at the Front

annals of the Guards. Undaunted by the failure of a plucky counter-attack launched at 3.15 a.m. by half a company of the 2nd Coldstreams and one company of the Irish Guards—unsuccessful owing to a murderous rifle-fire from the east and south—the Guards returned to the attack with a brilliant bayonet charge at 10.15 a.m., after a heavy bombardment had been opened on the lost ground for ten minutes. This assault was made by about fifty men of the 2nd Coldstreams, led by Captain A. Leigh-Bennett, followed by thirty men of the Irish Guards, led by Second-Lieutenant F. F. Graham, who were followed in their turn by a party of Royal Engineers with sand-bags and wire. Not only was all the lost ground recovered, but the 2nd Coldstreams, forging ahead, captured another German trench and took a couple of machine-guns. Thirty-two prisoners also fell into our hands.

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It was on this occasion that Lance Corporal Michael O'Leary, of the 1st Battalion Irish Guards, won the Victoria Cross for one of the outstanding deeds of the war. The story is thus officially recorded in the *Gazette*:—

"When forming one of the storming-parties which advanced against the enemy's barricades, he rushed to the front and himself killed five Germans who were holding the first barricade; after which he attacked a second barricade, about 60 yards farther on, which he captured, after killing three of the enemy and making prisoners of two more. Lance-Corporal O'Leary thus practically captured the enemy's position by himself, and prevented the rest of the attacking-party from being fired upon."

All Britain and Ireland rang with the story of Michael O'Leary's wonderful deed; but the record in the *Gazette* hardly does justice to the heroism of all ranks in that gallant piece of work at Cuinchy.

In forwarding his report on this en-

gement, General Sir Douglas Haig, commanding the First Army, wrote as follows:—

“Special credit is due—

“(i) To Major-General Haking, Commanding 1st Division, for the prompt manner in which he arranged this counter-attack and for the general plan of action, which was crowned with success.

“(ii) To the General Officer Commanding the 4th Brigade (Lord Cavan) for the thorough manner in which he carried out the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Division.

“(iii) To the regimental officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the 2nd Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards, who, with indomitable pluck, stormed two sets of barricades, captured three German trenches, two machine-guns, and killed or made prisoners many of the enemy.”

The Victoria Cross was not the only distinction awarded for this engagement. For “conspicuous gallantry and ability” in leading his men Captain Leigh-Bennett, of the 2nd Coldstreams, won the D.S.O., and Second-Lieutenant A. C. W. Innes, 1st Battalion Irish Guards (Special Reserve), the Military Cross. Second-Lieutenant Innes had been sent forward to take command when all the officers of the attacking company had been put out of action, and distinguished himself by his dash and courage. A number of Distinguished Conduct Medals were also won by the rank and file of the Irish Guards and Coldstreams on the same stricken field. There was one dramatic moment at the beginning of the final attack when the whole plan was threatened with disaster by an accident which “Eye-Witness” records as follows:—

“As the storming-party was on the point of dashing forward, just at the moment when delay might have been fatal, for it might just have given the enemy, who were much shaken by our artillery-fire, time to recover, a man dropped a box of hand-grenades, some of which detonated. For one instant there was bewilderment and some hesitation, no one quite knowing what had happened. Fortunately the officer who was leading the storming-party rushed ahead, and his men followed him, and carried the enemy's position at the point of the bayonet with very slight loss. After this the Germans were kept on the run.”

The now famous brick-stacks remained for some days the storm-centre of the British front, both sides stubbornly contesting every inch of ground. Our infantry, however, had gained an ascendancy over the enemy in this series of encounters of which they did not fail to take advantage, recovering bit by bit the ground lost on January 25. On February 6 our heavy howitzers joined with the French artillery in a concentrated fire upon the remaining German positions in the brick-fields and beyond. The effect of the lyddite shells was described as terrific, one house being blown bodily into the air; while among the enemy's brick-stacks the shells spread death and destruction all round. This bombardment was immediately followed by an infantry assault upon the enemy's strongest position, or “keep”, among the stacks, and proved completely successful. “Our storming columns”, wrote “Eye-Witness”, “rushed the work from three sides at once, and captured it with very little loss, for—as the prisoners afterwards stated—the noise of bursting shells was so

great and the clouds of dust with which the defenders were surrounded were so thick that they did not observe our men advancing until too late." Sir John French's subsequent dispatch revealed the fact that the storming-columns were supplied by the Irish Guards and the 3rd Coldstreams, who had prepared the way during the previous night by seizing ground whence converging fire could be directed on the flanks and rear of

the chief German strongholds. This triumph, and the capture of other German positions in the same neighbourhood, enabled the British army to establish its line north and south through a point about forty yards east of the brick-stacks. The measure of the British success was the significant fact that the victors were able to fix barbed-wire entanglements in front of their new positions, in broad daylight, without being fired on. F. A. M.

CHAPTER XIX

BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE

(August, 1914–February, 1915)

How the Invaders failed to govern—A Triumph of Passive Resistance—General von Bissing's Illuminating Statement in the *Nord-Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*—Cardinal Mercier and M. Max—The Resourceful Burgomaster teaches a German Officer Manners—Vain Efforts to win Belgian Sympathy—American Organization rescues nearly 7,000,000 from Starvation—Silence and Desolation in the Blood-stained Country—Mines, Railways, and Factories—A Nation patiently awaiting the Day of Reparation.

THE fanatical belief of the Germans in the doctrine of their might and their culture suffered one of its severest blows in their failure to govern the Belgians. They pushed the gallant Belgian army back to the line between Nieuport and Dixmude. They drove its Government in turn from Brussels to Antwerp, to Ostend, and finally out of Belgium to Havre. They burned towns, bombarded cathedrals, massacred defenceless citizens. They pillaged and occupied fourteen-fifteenths of the country. But that was the summit of their achievement at the end of six months. They never drove the

King and his soldiers from Belgium. They did not conquer the nation whose cry of "Halt!" to the Kaiser's hordes at the outset of their criminal adventure will live imperishable in history. And in the matter of the civil administration of the occupied territory the invaders found they had to deal with a people who met all advances with sublime passive resistance, against which governors and functionaries from Berlin were powerless.

This experience may well have come as a surprise to the brilliant tools of the Prussian military system. Plans had been laid by rule and measure.

For a generation the ground had been prepared by a systematic invasion of Belgian trade, shipping, manufactures, finance, and society. Germany held the threads, and some leaders of the Flemish party in Antwerp had encouraged dreams of the annexation of Belgium by Germany. Yet—everything went wrong. General von Bissing, though not the first Governor of Belgium, was the author of the best explanation of failure. He did not, of course, intend it to be so described, but we could see in every line of his statement to a German newspaper in February, 1915, that inability to be receptive to the point of view of any other people which is the besetting weakness of the German intellectual equipment.

"From the moment I was placed in this responsible post", he declared, "I realized that my task was to see that German character, German force, and German work were respected. I hoped to restore order and calmness to Belgium. If one wants to rule a people, and to make them acknowledge the authority of an undesired Government, one has to take measure of their peculiarities. In my efforts to reach them I have found that the Belgians have both good and bad traits. One good quality is that they love their country and have a deep-seated patriotism, and will gladly work for it, even though not with the same energy as we Germans work. They are light-hearted, which astonishes us. They so often appear to us like badly trained children, who become obstinate if they are forbidden to do a thing they want to do, and if they are threatened with punishment for things they have not done they become rebellious. I have threatened as little as possible, and only inflicted punishment when I have thought it necessary, though I have had to take sharp measures some-

times, and here and there my hand has been felt heavily."

The Governor had tried with all his might to put the economic life on its legs again, and claimed successes, especially with agriculture. To make Belgium less dependent on imports in future, he had changed the methods of agriculture, reducing the amount of sugar beet grown in favour of corn and potatoes; and in the neighbourhood of Malines particularly he had given the small holders "much help" to get the crop of early potatoes necessary "both here and in Germany". But it was not his assertion of successes, unconvincing as that was, which formed the most striking feature of the General's pronouncement. It was the air of confidence undermined. He only spoke of an "occupation" period. "I have always tried to keep Belgium in a state of peace and calm, which shall last during the probably fairly long occupation period."

Then followed the richest revelation of all.

"Everything that we undertake here", said this ingenuous soldier, "would be very much easier if the Belgians knew what was going to be the fate of their country. In this too they are like children. On the days that we heard cannonading from the neighbourhood of Nieuport and Ypres they listened attentively, and said that their release by the Allies was close at hand. Arising out of the measures of inoculation taken, there was a story current that the Germans wanted to inject poison into the Belgian children, and at the bidding of their parents and teachers the children all left the schools. Someone remarked on this in fun: 'Do you think the Germans will be so stupid as to poison their future recruits?'"

We have given so much attention to General von Bissing's utterance from the conviction that it is a human document of some significance. It bears between the lines a palpable admission that the jackboot of a merciless enemy could not crush the spirit of an independent people. Truly



M. Adolphe Max, the gallant Burgomaster of Brussels

us not take bravado for courage nor tumult for bravery", was part of the counsel of his Eminence in the celebrated pastoral for which he was immured. The authority of the Power that had invaded the soil was no lawful authority; in soul and conscience they owed it neither respect, nor attachment, nor obedience; occupied provinces were not conquered provinces; but "the greater part of our towns, having surrendered to the enemy on conditions, are bound to observe those conditions; towards the persons of those who are holding dominion among us by military force, let us conduct ourselves with all needful forbearance". Long before that sustaining Letter of the Cardinal Archbishop of Malines was read the Burgomaster of Brussels had been consigned to a German fortress; but not until he had set to his countrymen an example of the nation's undying fortitude. A journalist and a barrister, M. Adolphe Max entered the Municipal Council of Brussels in 1908, and was appointed Burgomaster the following year. He had therefore wielded the very large responsibilities of the post barely five years when General Sixtus von Arnim and his stolid troops in dusty helmets entered the capital on August 20, 1914. An eloquent little man, of distinguished bearing, M. Max proved himself a resourceful leader of the people. He remained at the head of the municipal administration. A touch of brilliant humour in his negotiations with Marshal von der Goltz captivated Europe. A German officer who clattered into his room at the Hotel de Ville, re-

and grimly the Belgian could say with Henley's Stoic:

"Under the bludgeonings of chance
My head is bloody, but unbowed".

Apart from the King and the army, and the sagacious leadership of Baron de Broqueville, the people gained much of the inspiration that supported them in their long trial from two notable personalities, Cardinal Mercier and Burgomaster Max. "Let

volver in hand, found that the Burgomaster of Brussels was not amenable to a line of conduct that had succeeded too well in small towns. M. Max neither listened to him nor looked at him, but rang for the porter, ordered him to show the intruder to the door, and requested the Governor to send a more worthy emissary. The officer was forced to apologize. M. Max had a little camp-bed brought into his office, and never left the Town Hall day or night. The citizens of Brussels had furtively hidden away their national flags at sight of the invader; but M. Max sent out bills enjoining them to display the colours. When the German Governor signified disapproval of this, M. Max tactfully submitted, and advised the citizens to obey, but as skilfully added, "until the hour of reparation come". Learning that the Governor of Liège had posted in the town a proclamation stating that the Burgomaster of Brussels had been assured by France that she was powerless to help Belgium, having to defend her own land, M. Max placarded the walls of Brussels with an indignant denial. Marshal von der Goltz, the Governor, was terribly annoyed, and caused the manifesto of M. Max to be covered up with white paper. On the following day it was discovered that this paper had been soaked in oil, and the Burgomaster's denial of the Liège canard shone through. M. Max was forbidden to put up any proclamation in future without the consent of the German authorities. But when the Germans placarded the walls with false news of victory, he walked about

the streets and told groups of people the truth. The story of how he came to be arrested is told by Germans. Towards the end of September the greater part of the levy which the Germans had imposed on entering Brussels was unpaid. The Germans got to know that M. Max expected the Allies to liberate Brussels at an early date, and they therefore exacted the immediate payment of the balance. M. Max refused. The Germans decided to force his hand by no longer paying their requisitions of supplies, and presented themselves for repayment of their notes of requisitions by the Burgomaster through the bank. M. Max refused to open the town safes, and the Germans arrested him at 4 p.m. on September 26. After spending some time in the prisons of Namur and Cologne, he was placed in the central dungeon of the fortress of Glatz on October 12. That this treatment did not break the serenity of the heroic Burgomaster was seen from a letter he wrote three months later, in which he explained why he could not then discuss the causes of his arrest. "I was warned to-day that the too free tone of my correspondence has given offence."

The military occupation of Belgium was, above all, soulless. The Germans took charge of all the functions of the national government. The banks could send no money out of the country. The Belgian judiciary remained; the schools also went on as usual. Belgian policemen controlled the street traffic. At night in Brussels a policeman and a German soldier walked together, not so much for the

sake of the Belgian as for the sake of the German. It prevented friction and preserved order. In the small towns the Germans remained arrogant longer than in the larger places, where in course of time they became almost humble. They tried to win the sympathy of the people, but failure attended

The Germans published a Flemish newspaper in Antwerp and a French one in Brussels, and posted on the walls bulletins on the war, which were instinctively scoffed at by the people. There were no theatres. People went out as little as possible. The streets were in darkness at eight o'clock in



Devastated Belgium: Among the Ruins of Termonde

all such efforts. In cafés, or wherever they met, a Belgian man or woman would draw away from the German. One tried to get into conversation with a mother by taking notice of her children and talking of his own; but the mother only remarked: "Wouldn't they be glad to see you home again?" If a German was being buried, the people at sight of the funeral ran into their houses to avoid saluting the hearse. All the normal enjoyments of Belgian life were suspended in this atmosphere.

the majority of cases. In Ostend the residents were not allowed to go farther than two or three streets from their dwellings. In one village the Germans taxed the peasants 25 centimes for keeping a chicken (which in due course they commandeered), 5 francs for a cow, 10 francs for a horse. Even the household copper kettles were seized and sent to Germany. A people celebrated for habits of industry were in large part condemned by the necessities of their condition to the torture

of enforced idleness. They would not work for Germans, but only for the relief committees which came into existence as soon as the Germans had appropriated every form of supply, and thereby left the civil population, numbering nearly 7,000,000, to look to the mercy of neutral nations.

After the fall of Antwerp prominent Belgians appealed to Mr. Brand Whitlock, the American Minister in Belgium, telling him that famine was certain by mid-winter unless relief came. This was the origin of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, which had its head-quarters in London, although its composition was fifty-two Americans, four Spanish, and one Italian. An arrangement was made by neutral diplomatists with the belligerents whereby imports were facilitated and protected in their transmission to the civil population. The German Government, at the end of December, 1914, undertook to make no further food requisitions in the occupation zone of Belgium. With the Commission was associated the Comité National de Secours et d'Alimentation, of whose thirty-seven members twenty-two represented the commercial and banking community of Brussels, and fifteen the various provincial sub-committees. Many Belgians in the middle and upper classes were able to pay for their food, but the care of the destitute, numbering 1,500,000, cost about £700,000 per month, which was made up from four sources: (1) profits from the provisioning department; (2) contributions by local charity or sale of ration tickets; (3) a percentage contribution imposed

upon the Communes in order to guarantee economy in working the can-
teens; and (4) the charity of the world. Up to February 20, 1915, the United Kingdom had given cash donations and food to the extent of £186,000; Belgium, £151,000; the United States about £1,300,000; Australia, cash, £100,000; Canada, foodstuffs, £157,000. Shipments from Rotterdam, the port of discharge for the relief ships, to Belgium in the sixteen weeks from October 31 to February 17 totalled 177,349 tons (of which 1982 were clothing, &c.), of the approximate value of £2,300,000. This scheme of relief work was splendidly administered. "We would have starved if it had not been for you," was Cardinal Mercier's message to America; and thousands of pathetic little letters of gratitude went out to the children of the United States from the children of unhappy Belgium. Compulsory attendance at school was preserved, since it was in school the children were fed. That was characteristic of the Commission's excellent scheme of operations. In every town were representatives of the Commission, many of them young students from American or even from English universities, who worked in conjunction with Belgian authorities. Towns were divided into wards, and country districts into communes. Then a roll was prepared of every inhabitant having no means to purchase food. Each person received a card, which he or she took to the distributing centre, and on presentation received food, generally in the form of bread, of which the allowance was about half a pound a day per

person. In the province of Liège, containing Louvain, Visé, and other burned towns, 225,000 people regularly received free food. In the long queues were men and women of all classes—for hunger had broken down class distinctions. "They wait in silence like dumb animals," said one who saw them. "They do not talk to each other, and there is never a smile on their lips. There was something so pathetic about this passiveness and silence that every time I saw a bread line, tears came to my eyes." It will ever be a cause of wonder to those who knew Belgium at this period how General von Bissing could describe the people as "light-hearted". Some of the women continued the lace industry for export, and thus obtained relief from the Commission without charity. The Commission also encouraged the people to make their own clothes. In Louvain several ex-merchants opened little wooden shops on the sites of their former premises. What had been a large men's outfitter's was now a little one-roomed shanty. The streets were cleared of debris, and a certain amount of reconstruction on a very small scale went forward.

To envisage the once-thriving industrial areas is to continue the catalogue of desolation. Ninety per cent of the workpeople were unemployed. A picket of German soldiers was on every street-corner, at every cross-road, and in every village. "What struck me most", says someone, "was the complete silence. We drove for miles and miles and did not see even a dog, though we went through the remains of many villages which evidently had

once been prosperous." There had been German reports that the Germans were running the ammunition works at Liège in full blast and had given the old mechanics double wages—in Liège, where the hatred of Germans was consuming!—but a traveller, in November, 1914, who expected to see another Pittsburg, found instead a forest of tall chimneys utterly smokeless. None of the arms and ammunition factories was working in February, 1915; nor had any been working since the beginning of the war. None of the beet-sugar factories continued working, though at one stage they did make a little sugar from the beet crop then got in. At the great iron and steel works started in 1816 by John Cockerill, a native of Lancashire, they were managing a day or two per week at the beginning of the new year, filling orders received before the war. There was no new work, and it was with very great difficulty that the firm could keep its employees going, all receiving half-pay on a scale of six days' work per week. Before the war, nail and wire mills flourished at Liège, Charleroi, and Brussels; boilers were made at Dinant; tin-plate at Huy; and Termonde had flax and linen mills. Six months later a few nails were being manufactured, and apparently some were exported to Germany and possibly to Holland; the wire factories were making a little wire which was used by the farmers for fencing; the boiler factory and indeed all factories at Dinant were demolished; the tin-plate works at Huy were lifeless on account of entire lack of raw material;

the gold and silversmiths of Brussels, Liège, and Antwerp, whose beautiful wares are famous, were idle; and Termonde was a ruin. At Verviers and Ghent, where there are wool, cotton, and linen industries, the Germans took all the raw material, but in order to give employment to a few people they "allowed" the factories to work about two days a week on raw material which they supplied, and for the manufacture of goods which were shipped into Germany or used for the army. Not far from Brussels there were large plants for the manufacture of artificial silk, all of which were shut down. There was no raw material, and no market for the manufactured product if it existed. Since the beginning of September most of the coal-mines had been going about two days a week. As a result there were enormous piles of coal at the pit-mouths. Practically all transportation was employed by the German army, except a few local tramways and the canals of the country. The Germans took Belgian coal for running the railways in Belgium, but little, if any, had been taken into Germany. A porcelain factory near Mons was doing a little; but no tannery was working, all raw materials having been seized by the Germans. The enormous glass industry of Charleroi, Namur, and Liège was entirely stopped. Most of the sand used in the manufacture of glass comes from the extreme north-eastern corner of Belgium. With no transport facilities there could be no raw material from this quarter, and even if there were it would be

useless to create large stocks of glass at the factories, seeing that it was practically all made for export. Telephone or telegraph services did not exist for the Belgian. Some trains ran which carried passengers, but no journey was made easy for a Belgian. If he were going, say, from Brussels to Liège, he had to satisfy the German military authorities before a pass would be issued; then pay an excessive fare, and take whatever train was specified by the passport bureau. The railways and the post office were for the time being staffed by Germans. Latterly a sort of postal service was established between Belgium and Holland via Germany. There had been one between Germany and Belgium for a considerable time. There was also a local mail service in Belgium—a man in Brussels, for example, could communicate by open letter or postcard with his mother or other friend or relation in Liège. The names of only a few places had been Germanized—Liège, Louvain, and a few others. A Dutchman who wrote to Liège had his letter returned with a German inscription: "Liège not known. Presumably Lüttich, Prussia, Germany"!

Such was unconquered Belgium under the German yoke. It is the picture of citizens crushed under the severest alien rule, who nevertheless kept their sang-froid, their energy, and even that native humour which so exasperated the enemy. Patiently awaiting deliverance, they preserved unshakeable confidence in the future.

G. T.

CHAPTER XX

SURVEY OF THE FIRST SIX MONTHS

(August 4, 1914—February 4, 1915)

Magnitude of the Task—Lord Kitchener's Anxiety—Britain's Proud Record—The German Point of View—Something to be learned from her National Spirit—Britain only at the Beginning of her Task—Our Naval Supremacy—Achievements of the Admiralty—Transport Department—Six Months' Losses on the Battle Fronts—How British Trade was affected—Imports and Exports—Effect of the War upon Food Prices—The Rise in Coal—Wages in War Time—Soundness of British Banking System—How the Government handled the Financial Situation—Railways under State Control—War and the Cotton Trade—Spending Power of the Working-classes—War and Emigration—The Prince of Wales's Fund—Other National Funds—The Cost of the War—Comparisons with Earlier Campaigns—Allies' Financial Agreement.

HAVING brought our record to the end of the first six months of the Great World War, it is not out of place to attempt a general survey of the situation at the beginning of February, 1915. The British race had no reason to be dis-

satisfied with the results achieved by its arms in all parts of the world since the declaration of war. Yet it was only the first act of the drama, and a very real danger existed in the apparent inability of a vast number of people to realize the magnitude of the



On the Belgian Frontier: French troops crossing a village street under German fire



With the British Army in Flanders: Cavalry on the march during the Winter Campaign of 1914-15

task which still confronted the Allies in general, and Britain—chief object of Germany's implacable hatred—in particular. How real was this danger was revealed by Lord Kitchener in the following words, when he first warned the House of Lords that he had heard of workmen in some factories who had an idea that the war was going on so well that there was no need for them to work their hardest:

"I can only say," added the Minister of War, "that the supply of war material at the present moment and for the next two or three months is causing me very serious anxiety, and I wish all those engaged in the manufacture and supply of these stores to realize that it is absolutely essential, not only that the arrears in the deliveries of our munitions of war should be wiped off, but that the output of every round of ammunition is of the utmost importance, and has a large influence on our operations in the field."

There was some excuse for the man in the street who failed to realize the real gravity of the situation, and the need of increasingly heavy sacrifices, at the end of the six months of such tremendous happenings. "Business as usual" was still going on in most trades; everyone connected with the supply of war material was overwhelmed with work; the British navy had asserted its supremacy in all parts of the world; the British army had covered itself with glory in France and Flanders; and the remnants of Germany's colonial empire were fighting for their lives in Africa. A proud record, indeed, when we remember that in the Crimea just sixty years before nearly six months elapsed before military operations began.

Yet it was easy to lose a true sense of proportion by omitting to look at the position of affairs from the German

standpoint. Germany, it is true, was losing her colonies, but from the beginning it was inevitable that the ultimate fate of these would be decided on the battle-fields of Europe. She had suffered heavily at sea; but her main battle fleet was still intact. And though she had failed to reach either Paris or the English Channel coast, she had retained her grip on north-east France, tightened her hold on Belgium, seized a considerable slice of Russian Poland, and was soon to boast—for the time being at all events—that not an enemy in arms could be found on German soil. Had the war ceased at the end of six months, on the understanding that each nation should keep what it held, Germany could have claimed the victory—and have thereupon proceeded at her leisure on the Belgian coast to prepare for the final settlement of accounts with her enemy of enemies, Britain. The plain man, relying for his news upon a censored press—and wilfully misled in its least creditable organs by exaggerations of minor successes—too readily believed what he wished to believe, namely, that Germany, nearly bankrupt and approaching starvation, was shooting her last bolt. The truth was that Germany, now more than ever a nation in arms, still outnumbered, with the Austro-Hungarian forces, the allied armies available on her eastern and western fronts; and though obviously under the necessity of safe-guarding her resources, was in no imminent peril of failing for lack of funds or food. It was time that every Briton realized this truth, and learnt something from the national spirit of an

enemy who was prepared to devote every atom of his strength upon the vital task in view, and bend his will with inflexible devotion and discipline, even to his daily allowance of bread. At a time when certain cheap jibes were being made at Germany's expense, in this matter of her citizens' bread allowance, and when the posters of certain evening papers were annihilating the enemy's armies every hour, a timely glimpse of the other side of the shield was offered by the official "Eye-Witness" at the front:

"The plain truth is, that although the enemy's effectives in the west are much reduced in comparison with those possessed by him some months ago, and although ours are increased, he is still holding an enormous extent of front here, whilst carrying out operations on a huge scale in the east, and in spite of these gigantic efforts no signs of weakening are yet visible in the *moral* of the German troops taken as a whole. Nor, if we put ourselves in their place, can we fail to see that there is as yet no reason why an intensely brave, determined, and well-organized army like that of the Germans should feel discouraged. The Kaiser can choose at will a Russian, a Belgian, or a French town in which to make a triumphant appearance in the presence of his troops. They are fighting in an enemy's country, ruined and devastated by the passage of their armies. The falsehoods told them by their superiors, the tales of victories in the Press, have all produced an atmosphere of complete illusion. . . . It is difficult for British people to realize what a national war means to a Continental nation. Every man, woman, and child is doing his or her part. When the men go to fight, the women and children carry on their work at home. Thousands of them can be seen any day in the fields. They are ploughing and sowing and herding sheep and cattle. All their thoughts and

energies are directed to one end. All are living under a great cloud in the shadow of which it would seem utterly incredible to them that any individual should cease working for the common good in order to gain any personal advantage or increase of leisure, and still more that anyone should give a thought to the ordinary pleasures and enjoyments of peace. Such is the spirit in which Germany is facing this struggle."

Whatever excesses the Prussians had committed or inspired on sea or land—and for each and all of these a proportionately heavy price would have to be paid—this was a foe whom it would be fatal to underestimate. Lord Kitchener did not underestimate him when he stepped into the breach in August, 1914, and laid the foundations of the most powerful voluntary army the world had ever known. Heroic and immortal as were the deeds of Sir John French's Expeditionary Force since the mighty onrush of the German invaders in August, it could but help to stem the tide, and roll it back to its fortified positions on French and Belgian soil. Man for man the British soldier had proved himself more than a match for the enemy; but, in spite of all their appalling casualties in the six months' fighting, the German army, as already pointed out, was still in superior strength on the vital battle-fronts, and held a reserve, estimated at not less than 2,000,000 men, ready to throw into the field as soon as spring brought the siege warfare of the winter months to a close. Lord Kitchener, therefore, needed every man of the new army on which so much now depended. Not a regiment of this force had gone to the

front by February 4, 1915, though a host of Territorials, and some of the Canadians, had won their spurs with French's veterans and the gallant Indians. Britain, indeed, at the end of six months, was only at the beginning of her task, caught unprepared as she had been by an enemy who, with an army which considered itself invincible, had been stealthily organizing himself until, when "The Day" arrived, he was the only combatant completely equipped for the conflict on land.

With her navy, however, Britain was as fully prepared for national defence at the beginning of August, 1914, as were the Germans themselves for an offensive war of unparalleled proportions. Mr. Churchill had just cause for pride when referring to this happy condition of preparedness in his statement in the House of Commons on the naval situation six months later:—

"On the declaration of war we were able to count upon a Fleet of sufficient superiority for all our needs, with a good margin for safety in vital matters, fully mobilized, placed in its war stations, supplied and equipped with every requirement, down to the smallest detail that could be foreseen, with reserves of ammunition and torpedoes up to and above the regular standard, with ample supplies of fuel and oil, with adequate reserves of stores of all kinds, with complete systems of transport and supply, with full numbers of trained officers and men of all ratings, with a large surplus of reserved and trained men, with adequate establishments for training new men, with an immense programme of new construction, rapidly maturing, to reinforce the Fleet and replace casualties, and with a pre-arranged system for accelerating that new construction which has been found to yield satisfactory and even surprising results."

Though we had not yet defeated the main German fleet we had reduced it to immobility, and taught its raiding cruisers some wholesome lessons in the North Sea. With the Falkland Islands victory, too, the first phase of

back from the front, including Belgian and French troops, moved here and there as circumstances required, often at the shortest possible notice, with constant changes of plan, across oceans threatened by the enemy's cruisers, and across channels haunted by submarines, to and fro from India and Egypt, from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, China, South Africa, from every fortress and possession under the Crown, approximately 1,000,000 men without up to the present any accident or loss of life". Credit for this remarkable record was very largely due to the head of the Admiralty Transport Department, Mr. Graeme Thomson, described by Mr. Churchill as one of the discoveries of the war, "a man who stepped into the place when the emergency came, and formed and organized and presided over performances and transactions the like of which were never contemplated by any State in history".

Our losses had been heavy, but they were light in comparison with those suffered by the Germans. On February 8, 1915, Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons gave the total of the British losses in the western theatre as approximately 104,000 of all ranks up to February 4; and earlier in the same month he stated that 60 per cent of the wounded had then recovered and were fit for service again. The German total for the first six months on both battle fronts, according to the French official estimate, based on the lists of losses published by the German General Staff, and other trustworthy documents, was no less than 1,560,000 men, or at the rate




Mr. Graeme Thomson, head of the Admiralty Transport Department

the naval war had terminated by effecting a practical clearance of the German flag from the oceans of the world. Not the least wonderful achievement of the Royal Navy during this period was due to the Admiralty Transport Department, which, to quote the First Lord's eulogy in the House on February 15, 1915, had "moved by sea at home and abroad, including wounded brought

of 260,000 a month. The French and Russian totals for the same period were not published, though it was announced in the French official review that the wastage in the German army had been in all respects greater than that of the French army.

How had British trade been affected during the same critical period? The answer is clearly stated by Dr. A. L. Bowley, Reader in Statistics in the University of London, in a book which shows that though the effect of the war was immediate, far-reaching, and considerable, British trade adapted itself extraordinarily well to the new conditions, as soon as the first shock had spent itself. This will be seen at a glance in the accompanying diagrams, which we are permitted to reproduce from the book. Professor Bowley shows that the value of the aggregate imports from the Empire in the third quarter of 1914, thanks to the protection afforded by the Royal Navy, was only 1 per cent below normal, an excess from Canada of £1,100,000 balancing defects from New Zealand and Australia. A trifling increase from India also balanced a fall from South Africa. With regard to exports the position was not quite so favourable, but, in all, the fall in August and September only amounted to two weeks' trade. The check in the cotton trade with India accounts for two-thirds of the fall with that country. Exports to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were nearly normal, but those to South Africa showed a decrease, while the drop in exports to the Crown Colonies was nearly universal.



How British Imports were Affected during the First Months of the War

The sudden drop will be noticed in August, 1914, followed by the rapid recovery. The dots represent the twelve months in each year. (Our diagram is from Professor A. L. Bowley's *Effect of the War on the External Trade of the United Kingdom*, Cambridge University Press.)


"Both with imports and exports", writes Professor Bowley, "the fourth quarter repeated the phenomena of the third. Imports came as usual, except that India and Australia fell away from their amounts of the previous autumn, and Canada, New Zealand, and other countries (Ceylon, the Straits, West Indies, Guiana) filled up the deficit. But the very slight increase in the total was not enough to pay the war insurance, and quantities had decreased. In exports there was a falling off all round,

the equivalent of four weeks' trade being lost. In the half-year, exports to non-belligerent foreign countries lost the equivalent of three weeks' more trade than exports to the Empire. As to imports, values were nearly normal in both groups."

Thus from the beginning of August, 1914, until the end of that year, less than two weeks' imports was lost to Britain from the Empire and from non-belligerent foreign countries. Even of these, much was simply delayed by congestion at the docks. The enemy's efforts to check our supplies from countries not actually at war, as Professor Bowley points out, thus had less effect than a minor trade crisis, and about as much as a moderately serious strike of transport workers. With exports, with which

the enemy had not directly concerned himself, the position was different, trade dropping back to a definitely lower scale, though the aggregate to all countries was still well above that of, say, 1902, the date of the beginning of the fiscal controversy. Part of this fall was due to the special conditions of the cotton trade, part to the disorganization of the foreign exchanges in the early months of the war, and part to the closing of the important markets of Germany and Austria, the hindrance of trade with Russia, the destruction of Belgium, and the pre-occupation of France in affairs of war. Judging from the trade of December, 1914, and January, 1915, Professor Bowley estimated that the scale of our exports of home produce had shrunk so as to cause a diminution at the rate of about £230,000,000 per annum, of which £100,000,000 was due to loss of trade with Germany, Austria, Turkey, Belgium, and Russia. This shrinkage was ultimately connected with the withdrawal of vast numbers of men from production, and the diversion of another great number to providing the munitions and other necessities of war.¹

Board of Trade and other statistics also enable us to give an approximate idea of the effect of the war upon food and other vital commodities in the Motherland, as well as of the earnings of the people, during the period under review. Many of the most confident prophecies on these matters before the conflict were quickly



How British Exports were Affected during the First Months of the War

(From Professor A. L. Bowley's *Effect of the War on the External Trade of the United Kingdom*, Cambridge University Press)
VOL. II.

¹ *The Effect of the War on the External Trade of the United Kingdom*. Cambridge University Press, 1915.

falsified. Fears of famine were at once checked by the maintenance of Britain's supremacy at sea, by State insurance of British merchant-ships, and by Government supervision of food prices at home; but, even if this had all been anticipated, few people would have believed it possible that at the end of six months' war our imports would be so considerable that the only difficulty would be in handling them at the docks. It is true that much of this difficulty was due to the reserving of certain ports for military purposes, and a widespread shortage of dock labour; but, even so, the continual and plentiful supply of food was beyond all expectation. The most serious increase to the working-classes was in the price of bread, rising from $5\frac{1}{2}d.$ for the quartern loaf, before the outbreak of war, to $6d.$ by August 12, to $6\frac{1}{2}d.$ in December, $7\frac{1}{4}d.$ at the end of January, and $7\frac{1}{2}d.$ on February 8; the first price corresponding to wheat at 33s. $6d.$ a quartern, and the last-named to 53s. $6d.$ These, it must be borne in mind, are average prices, and consequently do not apply to all districts. Scotland, especially, seems to have been fortunately situated in this respect, Professor Bowley pointing out that while the quartern loaf reached its extreme cost in south-east London, by increasing $2\frac{1}{2}d.$, it only rose $1d.$ in Scotland in the twelve months ending February 1, 1915. Professor Bowley, who—this time in his Oxford pamphlet on *Prices and Earnings in Time of War*—is again our authority for some striking facts on the subject, shows that this increase did not cor-

respond to any diminution of supply during the first six months of the war. On the contrary, the total wheat and flour available (including the home harvest, imports, and Canada's gifts) had proved greater than the quantity for the same period a year before. Nor was any evidence forthcoming as to the failure of the world's harvest as a whole over the first half-year of the war. There had been a serious failure in Australia's yield, but, as Professor Bowley points out, Australia only produced 2 or 3 per cent of the world's supply, and the production of all countries was variable. Apparently the high price of bread and flour was due to nervousness as to the availability of the Russian supply before other sources became exhausted, and to the doubts entertained regarding the extent to which Europe could rely upon her harvest in 1915.

Meat varied in price in an odd manner. Great quantities of foreign meat were turned into rations for the Expeditionary Force, and this, with the delay of foreign shipments through difficulties of transport, sent up the price of frozen meat until it was nearly the same as that of home-killed. It varied, of course, in different parts of the kingdom, affected one way or the other by local circumstances, but practically everywhere the price of mutton rose less than that of beef. As extreme cases it was found that a leg of home-killed mutton was only $\frac{1}{2}d.$ or $\frac{3}{4}d.$ a pound dearer in February, 1915, than in July, 1914, while coarse imported beef had risen $3d.$ a pound. Pork was very little affected in price,

though bacon was up a penny or two a pound.

Although the Government supervised the people's food at the beginning of the war by fixing maximum prices, the only commodity which it took under its actual control was sugar. This was due to the high prices to which available sugar immediately rose at the outbreak of hostilities, the Government policy being dictated by fear thus raised of a serious shortage of supplies. A Royal Commission on the question was appointed, of which Mr. McKenna acted as chairman. The Government dealt with the situation by buying something like 900,000 to 1,000,000 tons of sugar and reselling first at 30s., and afterwards at 27s. 6d. a hundredweight. This action was widely discussed, and in certain sections, especially among manufacturers, who opposed it throughout, was severely criticized. On the one hand the supporters of the Government policy maintained that the price of sugar had thereby been kept lower than it would otherwise have been; on the other hand the manufacturers asserted that they could have bought all the sugar they wanted much cheaper without the Government's help and without aiding the enemy. A good deal of sugar, indeed, was still sold under Government prices, and there were not wanting those who hinted that this underselling had something to do with the total prohibition of sugar imports which came into force in October, 1914. The Government's explanation, however, was that the prohibition was intended to prevent Germany from converting her surplus sugar into money.

Fish supplies were naturally heavily handicapped by Germany's barbarous methods of warfare round the coast, which ruined the regular harvest of the sea. The fishing fleets were further reduced by the large numbers of trawlers and other craft which were turned mine-sweepers or were volunteered for other Admiralty work, the men doffing their fishermen's clothes for the uniform of the Royal Naval Reserve. Nevertheless a restricted amount of fishing was continued without interruption in certain areas, and nothing in the nature of an alarming shortage was experienced, though prices necessarily, for the greater part, remained above normal.

Eggs, as every housekeeper learnt to her cost, soon became a matter for serious consideration, the shortage of supplies, from Siberia and elsewhere, sending up the price nearly 20 per cent above the average. Milk in most districts remained normal, but butter rose slightly—1d. or 2d. a pound in places—forcing many people to look with increasing favour on margarine, which changed very little, if at all. Cheese, like butter, cost slightly more than usual; oatmeal, rice, haricot beans, cocoa, and coffee, like tobacco and spirits, remained untouched during the same period. Tea was feeling the full effect of the new duty by February, 1915, costing 3d. a pound more, beer at the same time rising 6d. a gallon, $\frac{1}{2}$ d. a glass. Fruit and vegetables of or all kinds were not only plentiful but cheap.

Coal, on the other hand—which, with a diminishing export and a falling off of so much general manufacture,

might reasonably have been expected to drop in price—rose in cost to an abnormal extent. The increase varied greatly in different districts and in the different qualities of coal. It rose extravagantly in certain parts even close to the pit's mouth, but was especially high in London and the south of England, where transport difficulties resulted in serious shortage. In February, 1915, kitchen coal in London was 7s. 6d. a ton higher than in July, 1914, and 5s. a ton higher than in February, 1914. The most expensive coal was least affected, because its consumers, having more storage-room, were not as a rule bound to buy at winter rates. It was among the poorest classes that the increase brought the greatest hardships. Forced to buy by the hundredweight they were charged at a rate—sometimes 6d. a hundredweight above normal prices, though this was exceptional—which made cruel inroads upon their scanty income.

It was fortunate for a vast number of the poorer classes that with the increasing cost of living came increasing earnings. Everyone connected with the manufacture of war supplies was working at high pressure, and often at a higher rate of wages. The rush of men to the colours provided vacancies for countless out-of-works, so that by the end of January unemployment was lower than ever recorded before. Women were not so favourably situated in this respect as men, being some 5 per cent worse off at the end of six months than immediately before the war. By far the most serious consequences were felt in Lancashire, owing to the disastrous blow dealt by the

war to the cotton trade; but cotton, like many other branches of the business world, gradually adapted itself to war conditions. This was one of many proofs that our highly complex economic system was far more adaptable than most people imagined. The sound basis upon which British banking was established was also completely vindicated. A firm lead was taken by the Bank of England in all the measures adopted by the Government for dealing with the situation in the first crisis of the war, as well as in its later developments, including the 3½ per cent War Loan for £350,000,000 announced in the House of Commons on November 17, 1914, and handsomely subscribed for. It was for services rendered in connection with the Government financial measures that the King bestowed a peerage upon Mr. Walter Cunliffe, the Governor. The Bank rate, which had jumped from 3 per cent on July 29 to 4 per cent on July 30, 8 per cent on July 31, and 10 per cent on August 1, dropped to 6 per cent on August 6, two days after Britain's declaration of war, and fell to 5 per cent on August 8, at which rate it remained for the rest of the year, all danger of a scarcity of gold having then ceased. Other measures which will be remembered in connection with the financial crisis upon the outbreak of war was the extension of the customary August Bank Holiday by three extra days, the immediate proclamation of a moratorium—finally ended, after several extensions and modifications, on November 4—the establishment of an enlarged paper currency, and the closing

of the London Stock Exchange until January 4, 1915, when the "House" reopened under severe restrictions, imposed by the Treasury as a safeguard against sales of securities by the enemy. This strong handling of the problems immediately raised by the war included the control by the Government of the entire railway system of Great Britain. Power to do this was conferred by the Regulation of Forces Act, 1871. It was the first time in our history that the railways had come under the direct control of the State. Administered by a highly efficient executive committee of railway managers presided over by Sir H. A. Walker, general manager of the South-Western Railway, with the President of the Board of Trade as chairman *ex officio*, the whole system worked extraordinarily well under its new auspices. In spite of the fact that no fewer than 72,000 railway workers—10 per cent of the whole number—had enlisted in the services during the first six months, Mr. Asquith was able to announce in the Commons on February 11, 1915, that the railways had been in a position at all times to provide for whatever military movements were required. The man in the street had reason to marvel, when he understood how urgent and tremendous these movements were, that his own particular service was so little interfered with.

With the cotton trade in the British Isles, the most stupendous in the whole world, the collapse of August, 1914, as already mentioned, did not last long enough to spell widespread disaster, and by the beginning of the

new year trade took a decided turn for the better. In his Oxford pamphlet on *The War and the Cotton Trade*, Professor S. J. Chapman, of Manchester University, shows that while much of the recovery was due to the fulfilment of large orders for our army and our allies, it was chiefly due to an increased demand in overseas markets, where, in addition, a certain amount of replacement of German goods by British substitutes had already taken place:

"Of an increase in the exports of piece-goods of 76.5 million yards," writes Professor Chapman, "France took only 4.5 million yards, which meant, however, an advance of 110 per cent on December, and of more than 500 per cent on what had been normal. Increase was biggest in bulk in the supply of the Indian, China, and Australian markets. India took 34.5 million yards, or 29 per cent, more in January than in December; China 12.8 million yards, or 59 per cent more; British South and West Africa 6.7 million yards, or 56 per cent more; and Australia 3.2 million yards, or 27 per cent more. It is also notable that the Egyptian market, which had been gravely affected, absorbed 3.7 million yards of the extra shipments, thereby raising her buying over December by 45 per cent; and that Central and South American markets, which had long been in an unsatisfactory state, began to show a certain liveliness. The passing of depression would seem to have begun."

Taking the country as a whole, it was estimated that the average earnings of all persons employed at the beginning of February, 1915, were slightly greater than those prevailing at the beginning of August, 1914. In a large number of families the principal earner who joined the forces left his home better off than before, with

regular money flowing in, and the chief food-consumer absent. This was especially the case among agricultural, unskilled, and casual labourers. In the case of partly-skilled labour there was little to choose. The chief sacrifices were made among the families of skilled workmen, and of those who

3s. 6d. further was given. Placing the average wages of men for all occupations at 28s. to 30s. Professor Bowley showed that a wife with three children, receiving the allowance of 20s. a week, without having to provide for her husband, was about as well off as before, assuming that he

	A.		B.		C.	
	London Poor.		Labourer in Provincial Towns.		Artisan in Provincial Towns.	
	Normal Ex- penditure before the War	Increase in Cost six months later.	Normal Ex- penditure before the War.	Increase in Cost six months later.	Normal Ex- penditure before the War.	Increase in Cost six months later.
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
Rent	7 0	—	5 0	—	6 6	—
Coal, gas, coke, wood ¹ ...	2 4	0 7 ¹	1 6	0 5	2 0	0 6
Other expenditure	2 9	—	1 6	—	7 6	—
	12 1	0 7	8 0	0 5	16 0	0 6
Bread and flour	3 1	1 2	3 3	1 2	4 0	1 3
Meat and bacon	2 2	0 6	4 3	0 8	7 0	2 4
Butter, milk, eggs, cheese ...	1 1	0 1 ²	3 0	0 2	5 6	0 10
Tea	0 6	0 1	0 9	0 1	1 3	0 2
Sugar	0 5	0 3	0 9	0 6	1 1	0 8
Vegetables	1 1	—	1 1	—	2 2	—
Other food	0 7	—	2 3	0 2	4 0	0 6
	8 11	2 1	15 4	2 9	25 0	5 9
Total	21 0	2 8	23 4	3 2	41 0	6 3

The War and Working-class Expenses: how they were affected during the first six months

(From Professor Bowley's pamphlet on *Prices and Earnings in Time of War*, Oxford University Press.)

joined the ranks from the middle classes. For the wife of a private or corporal the army separation allowance in February, 1915, was 12s. 6d. weekly, with an addition of 2s. 6d. for each girl under sixteen years or boy under fourteen years, up to three children, and 2s. for each further child under the same ages. In London

¹ The coal expenditure is as in the winter and the increase as compared with February, 1914.

² Margarine had not risen in price; very little fresh milk, eggs, or cheese were used.

kept an ordinary sum for his private expenditure. From March 1, 1915, the scale was raised so that a wife with three children received 23s. a week. The same authority has drawn up an instructive table, which, by the courtesy of the author and the Oxford University Press, we are permitted to reprint, demonstrating at a glance how the spending power of the working-classes in February, 1915, compared with that of the summer of

1914. It shows how difficult it became for those whose earnings did not increase to make both ends meet. Fortunately, as already stated, a large proportion of workers earned considerably more money than before; and those whose incomes remained stationary, if they were prudent, evaded much of the increase by a rearrangement of purchases; and, if they were reasonable, were thankful that six months of the greatest war the world had ever known had not made matters infinitely worse. Mr. Asquith ably summarized the situation in his speech on the subject in the House of Commons on February 11, 1915, when he said that while agreeing that the rise in prices of some of the necessities of life had imposed a severe burden and substantial hardships on the consuming classes of the country, yet it must not be forgotten that Britain was in a state of war, that the safety of the country and the prosecution of our cause demanded sacrifices on the part of the working-classes, who had not been behind or the least to recognize that fact.

The drop in emigration throughout this period was not without a certain significance. The total for 1914 was less than half that for 1913. A White Paper showed that the number of emigrants from the United Kingdom during February, 1915, was 5287, as against 12,854 of the previous February. British subjects returning home during the same month of 1915, on the other hand, numbered 10,581—practically twice as many as the emigrants, a large proportion of whom were women and children.

Much distress at home was miti-

gated by the National Relief Fund, which, in response to the appeal issued by the Prince of Wales at the beginning of the war, soon rose to a colossal sum. More than £3,000,000 were raised in the first six weeks, and at the end of six months the grand total was announced of £4,547,000. The fund was largely used in relieving distress due to unemployment through the war, and in supplementing the separation allowances to wives and the dependants of men serving with the colours. Invaluable help was also rendered by the Queen's "Work for Women" Fund, founded by Queen Mary with the object of relieving distress among unemployed women, and establishing training-schools for them in new forms of work—such as toy-making—to take the place of industries affected by the war. By February 4, 1915, the "Work for Women" Fund had reached a total of £131,563. At the beginning of the crisis, committees were also formed by the municipal authorities throughout the kingdom both for the prevention and the relief of local distress, but happily, as already stated, the fears at first entertained of commercial collapse and widespread unemployment were not realized. Monetary subscriptions and gifts in kind flowed into the national funds from all parts of the Empire with prodigal liberality. The Belgian Relief Fund and the Indian Soldiers' Fund were also generously supported, while the Red Cross Fund was raised with the help of the *Times* to nearly £1,000,000 before the end of six months, exceeding that magnificent sum shortly afterwards.

All these unprecedented totals, however, fade into trifles when we compare them with the colossal figures relating to the cost of the war itself. The sum of £100,000,000 which the House of Commons on August 6, 1914, agreed to as the first Vote of Credit was supplemented on November 15 of the same year by a further Vote of £225,000,000, making a total of £325,000,000 for the remainder of the financial year expiring on March 31, 1915. Even this total proved insufficient to meet the growing needs of the military situation in the new year, another £37,000,000 being called for in order to carry on the public service to that date. This made a total of £362,000,000, and meant an average daily expenditure, during the period provided for, of £1,500,000—that sum representing the excess due to the war over the expenditure in peace time. Vast as was this daily expenditure, it was destined greatly to increase in the following financial year, as Mr. Asquith pointed out at the beginning of March, 1915, in introducing the new Vote of Credit for £250,000,000 for that purpose—a vote unique and without precedent in the annals of the House of Commons, constituting the largest single Vote on record, and also providing for the ordinary as well as for the emergency expenditure of the Army and the Navy. It was then estimated by the War Office that from the beginning of April, 1915, the total expenditure on army services alone would be at the rate of £1,500,000 a day, with a tendency to increase. The total expenditure on the navy

during the same period would, it was calculated, amount to about £400,000 a day. The aggregate daily cost of both services, therefore, would be £1,900,000, with a tendency to increase; so that for the purpose of the Estimates the Government based the figure at a round £2,000,000 a day—as against £220,000, the normal daily expenditure upon the army and the navy on a peace footing.

The magnitude of the task is seen when we compare these figures with our expenditure upon some of the great campaigns of the past. The whole cost of the South African War, from 1899 to March 31, 1903, did not exceed £211,000,000; the Crimean War was put down at £70,000,000; and the Great Napoleonic War, which lasted over twenty years, from 1793 to 1815, at something like £831,000,000. The Great World War was to prove the most costly that had ever been waged, alike in men, material, and in money; but no nation could bear the financial strain better than Britain. "The first hundred millions our enemies can stand just as well as we can," said the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his historic speech of September 8, 1914, "but the last they cannot. . . . We have won with the silver bullets before, and we shall win again." In the spring of 1915 Mr. Lloyd George reckoned that the aggregate expenditure of the Allies for the current year would not be far short of £2,000,000,000. Of this large sum the British would be spending considerably more than either of her great allies—probably from £100,000,000 to £150,000,000

more than the highest figure to be spent by France and Russia. We had to maintain an enormous navy as well as to create and maintain a new army, to bring troops from the ends of the earth, and to wage war simultaneously in three continents. It was the measure of the complete soli-

relative position of the three leading allies six months after the war, at the time of this historic conference in Paris. Britain undoubtedly was still the best market in the world, just as Britain and France together—the two great bankers of the world—were the richest countries.



Photo. Henri Manuel. Paris

Mobilizing the Financial Resources of the Allies: the Historic Conference at Paris, February, 1915

M. Ribot, French Minister of Finance, is sitting with Mr. Lloyd George, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, on his left, and M. Bark, Russian Minister of Finance, on his right.

ilarity of aim and purpose between the three great allied Powers that at the conference held in Paris in February, 1915, between Mr. Lloyd George, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, M. Ribot, French Minister of Finance, and M. Bark, Russian Minister of Finance, it was agreed to put their capital resources and national credit into the common stock. The advantage of the new financial agreement is appreciated when we realize the

"We could pay for our huge expenditure on the war for five years, allowing a substantial sum for depreciation," declared Mr. Lloyd George in February, 1915, "out of the proceeds of our investments abroad. France could carry on the war for two or three years at least out of the proceeds of her investments abroad, and both countries would still have something to spare to advance to their allies. This is a most important consideration, for at the present moment the allies are fighting the whole of the mobilized strength of Germany, with perhaps less than one-third of their own

strength. The problem of the war to the Allies is to bring the remaining two-thirds of their resources and strength into the fighting line at the earliest possible moment. This is largely, though by no means entirely, a question of finance."

Russia, though probably the richest country in the world in natural resources, was differently situated from her allies in several respects. In spite of her vast resources she had not yet obtained command of sufficient capital within her borders to develop them; and a great deal of what she depended upon for raising capital abroad was absorbed by the exigencies of the war in her own country. The amount of her borrowing depended both upon what she could spare of her products to sell in open markets and also on the access to those markets—which, for the time being, was restricted. Hence the special need to help her in the matter of financing outside purchases for the war. An alliance in modern warfare could not, as Mr. Lloyd George explained, be conducted on limited liability principles:

"If one country in the alliance has more trained and armed men ready with guns, rifles, and ammunition than another, she must bring them all up against the common enemy, without regard to the fact that the others cannot for the moment make a similar contribution. But it is equally true that the same principle applies to the country with the larger navy, or the

country with the greater resources in capital and credit. They must be made available to the utmost for the purposes of the alliance, whether the other countries make a similar contribution or not. That is the principle upon which the conference determined to recommend to their respective Governments a mobilization of our financial resources for the war."

A joint loan of £1,000,000,000 was discussed at the Paris Conference, but wisely rejected as the very worst way of utilizing the Allies' resources. The only joint loan then agreed to in principle was in the case of borrowings by the smaller States associated with them. It was decided that each of the great allies should contribute a portion of every loan made to the minor countries which were with them then or prepared to join them later on, that the responsibility should be divided between the three countries, and that at an opportune moment a joint loan should be floated to cover the whole of these advances. As for the needs of the three great allies, it was agreed that each should raise money for these within its own markets in so far as their conditions allowed, but that if help were needed by any one of them for outside purchases, then those who could best afford to render assistance for the time being should do so.

F. A. M.

CHAPTER XXI

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN WITH THE FRENCH
AND BELGIANS.

(December, 1914–February, 1915)

Joffre's Barrier—Germany's Isolated Gain—The French Reverse near Soissons—With the Belgians on the Coast—Their Reconstituted Army—Forcing the Germans Back—How St. Georges was recaptured—The War on the Sand-dunes—Along the Battle-front from the North Sea to the Swiss Frontier—Where the French Lines are linked to the British—The Position at Ypres—Main Object of French Strategy—The Line through the Black Country of Northern France—Arras and its Battered Hôtel de Ville—German Defeat at La Boisselle—The "Incomparable 75"—Modern Guns and Primitive Warfare—From Albert to Rheims—The Nearest Point to Paris—Through the Champagne Country—The Fighting round Perthes—In the Argonne Forest—The Crown Prince's Precipitous Flight—Lord Kitchener's and Lord Curzon's Tributes to the French Army—Heroic Work of the Garibaldians—The Great German Salient at St. Mihiel—Forcing it Back—The Capture of Les Éperges—President Poincaré's House bombarded—Along the Franco-German Frontier—German Calculations upset—Ebb and Flow—Devastated French Towns—Prussian "Frightfulness" at Lunéville and Gerbéviller—A Deserted District—In Alsace and Lorraine—Fighting on Sacred Soil—Foot by Foot among the Vosges Mountains—With the Alpine Battalions—Germans' Formidable Defence-works—Joffre's Visit to Alsace—The French Occupation of Thann—The Germans at Mulhouse—Steady French Progress—Capture of Steinbach—Germans forced out of Cernay—The Fight for Hartmannsweilerkopf—Belfort and its Associations—Alsace and Lorraine remain French to the Core—The Spirit of the French Army—Its Certainty of Final Success.

IN the frank official review of the first six months of fighting, issued by the French authorities in March, 1915, the whole of the western theatre of war was revealed for the first time in something like true perspective. This military retrospect was a calm, clear statement of a great achievement, which made no attempt to gloss over the early mistakes of the campaign on the French side. Its very confessions inspired confidence, not only among Frenchmen themselves, but also among their allies; for they furnished proof that these early mistakes had not been made in vain, and were not likely to be repeated. The whole statement also helped us to realize, whose minds were not unnaturally centred on the heroic deeds of the British troops, how much

had been done by the French in erecting the barrier, nearly 600 miles in length, against which the Germans had repeatedly hurled themselves in vain through the long winter months of 1914–15. Though the heaviest blows of all had been dealt against the British positions, the French army, two and a half millions strong, had resisted the enemy's ceaseless pressure against an infinitely longer battle-front, and had itself made steady progress at many points. The length of front on which the Allies were fighting during most of these winter months was estimated at 592 miles, of which the British held some 31 miles, the Belgians 18 miles, and the French no fewer than 543 miles.

Along the French front, as along that of the British army, operations

on a decisive scale were rendered impossible throughout by the weather conditions. The Germans, forced to continue on the offensive, faced these conditions to their cost, maintaining their disproportionate rate of casualties with little appreciable result. "From November 15, 1914, to February 1,

offensive of the enemy. The Germans were not slow to take full advantage of the floods on that occasion. They had been forced back by the brilliantly executed advance of the French on January 8 against the plateau of Hill 132, one of the wooded heights which dominate the whole valley in this dis-



The Battlefields of the Aisne District: Wire Entanglements and other Defences at Craonne


1915", declared the French official review referred to above, "the enemy, notwithstanding numerous assaults, succeeded in seizing nothing from us save a few hundred metres of ground to the north of Soissons". This isolated gain was Germany's lucky reply to the dashing advance of the French in that direction in January, an advance of no great strategic importance, and checked as much by the flooding of the Aisne as by the counter-

trict. Advancing up this spur, over which the main road to Chauny passes from Soissons by way of the village of St. Paul, the salient of the German line was broken by the sudden onrush of the French infantry, and trenches were captured for which a desperate fight raged for several days. Not only did the French succeed in holding these trenches, but they also carried the German position to the east of Hill 132, at the Dent du Crouy, where

guns and prisoners were taken, and scores of the enemy's dead littered the ground. This was on January 11. What had originally started as a purely local offensive now developed, as a result of this success, into a pitched battle. Bringing up first a whole division, and then a whole army corps, the Germans counter-attacked on the evening of the 11th in such force as to recapture the eastern slopes. Throughout the following day the struggle grew in violence. All would have been well for the French had it been possible to send sufficient supports in time to their captured positions on the heights, but unfortunately the River Aisne, swollen into a raging torrent by the ceaseless downpour of rain in which all this fighting had taken place, now destroyed the temporary bridges over which reinforcements and ammunition had hitherto been forwarded. Thus the position of the three French brigades engaged in the operations became critical. Overwhelmed by the counter-attack on the plateau, after the defence-works had been wrecked by the Germans with concentrated artillery-fire, and the colonel commanding that sector killed and buried under the débris, the French troops held their own for a time on the saddle of the hill, but the impossibility of reinforcing them rendered their retreat inevitable. Harried on every hand, they fought their way with heavy losses but indomitable courage towards the left bank of the Aisne, saving most of their guns and rendering useless the few pieces which they found impossible to move.

The full story of this reverse con-

stitutes a thrilling page in the military history of France. Nothing, according to French eye-witnesses, could stop the flood of German reinforcements. They seemed to be as thick as sands in the desert, massing themselves on the heights above the retiring troops, whose only shelters were such ruined villages as Bucy, Moncel, and Sainte Marguerite, through which they passed along the only lines of



Scene of the Battle near Soissons, January 11-14, 1915

retreat that remained, towards the pontoon bridges of Vénizel and Missy. Meantime the river continued to rise, until at last even these two bridges were swept away, and it seemed as though nothing could prevent the retiring force from falling into German hands. All that night the French engineers worked heroically to build another bridge at Missy. Many of them were drowned; others were nearly frozen to death; but when daylight broke on the morning of the 13th the retreating troops found another bridge completed for them. First, however, reinforce-

ments of men and ammunition were hurried over; and long before these could cross in sufficient numbers the new bridge was swept away. Other pontoon bridges were hurriedly built, only to share the same fate, but happily the heavy French artillery



Photo. Tiranty, Paris

A Volont  r with the Belgians

One of the French heroines of the war was Mlle Leroy, fifteen years of age, who joined the Belgian Cyclist Volunteers, and fought at their side.

now came to the rescue on the opposite side of the Aisne and helped to keep the enemy at bay while fresh preparations were made to bridge the river. Further masses of Germans were pouring up all the time from Laon, Vervins, and M  zi  res; the French positions on the heights of Vregny were overwhelmed; and the


troops found themselves no longer able to hold the villages of Bucy, Moncel, and Sainte Marguerite, the last of which was already burning under the devastating storm of German shells. With the dawn of the 14th, however, a way over the river had been found, and the last detachments of the retreating force succeeded in crossing just as the advance-guard of yet another Prussian army corps appeared on the scene in the vain hope of completing what had promised to be a crushing French defeat. It was loudly proclaimed as such throughout the world by the German official wireless, in which comparisons were calmly drawn with the historic defeat of Marshal Bazaine at Gravelotte on August 18, 1870. Most of the fighting was said to have taken place in the presence of the Kaiser himself, who, on the battle-field, it was reported, decorated General von Lochow with the Prussian Order Pour le M  rite, and Lieutenant-General Wichura with the Commandership of the Order of the House of Hohenzollern. Had the Germans followed up their adventurous success they might have justified their grandiloquent claims, but when they ventured, the next day, as far as St. Paul—a village just to the north of Soissons, on the other side of the river—they were immediately driven out, and for the next three months the French artillery compelled them to remain at a respectful distance. This significant fact entirely discounted the value of the victory, and seemed clearly to justify the French claim that the real offensive was passing from the Germans to the Allies.

As against the few hundred metres of ground thus won by the enemy to the north of Soissons the French could point to numerous gains on their side, which, if seemingly slight in themselves, were in the aggregate substantial advantages. These began at the very end of the Allies' line on the North Sea coast, in the south-west corner of King Albert's land, where his army, with its head-quarters at Furnes and its battle-front behind the Yser between Nieuport and Dixmude, was holding the last strip of his stricken country with unconquerable spirit. Supported at first by the gallant French marines under Admiral Ronarc'h, and subsequently strengthened by the French division which linked it up with the British army at Ypres, it had gathered strength and confidence, until by the beginning of February, 1915, King Albert found himself head of an army raised to the equivalent of five army corps, and well equipped. "The Belgian army", declared a French official account towards the end of January, "has been reconstituted with remarkable speed, and has given us valuable support with its artillery."

When the official "Eye-Witness" with the British General Head-quarters visited this part of the line in the spring of 1915 he described the scene as strangely impressive:

"Here, in its entrenchments looking out over the country, once the richest soil in Flanders but now willingly surrendered to the sea, is the Belgian army, still unvanquished after eight months of war. Behind it stretches only a narrow strip, some 10 miles in extent, of Belgian soil left to defend, and even in that strip there are few

villages or towns which have escaped the enemy's fire. Of the more important, Nieuport lies in ruins—latterly 42-cm. shells have been raining upon it; Furnes has been battered; historic Ypres has been partially destroyed. As for the villages immediately



The German Line facing the French and Belgians between the Coast and Dixmude, February, 1915

in rear of the line, they are almost razed to the ground. War has added desolation and horror to the natural melancholy of the country-side, which at all times is of the most dreary character. A dead, wind-swept flat, its only features are the villages, with their tall church steeples, and a few trees, chiefly willows, all bent and twisted by the prevailing winds from the sea."

Ramscape, the only point on the railway line between Nieuport and Dixmude which the Belgians had lost, had been recovered long before the end of 1914; and they had also re-occupied the Dixmude district commanding the river crossing, with the result that the Germans, although they had succeeded in capturing the town, were unable to debouch from it. A more striking success was gained on December 28, 1914, by the Allies' capture of St. Georges, a hamlet which, with the adjacent ferryman's house, suddenly leapt into fame through its strategical importance in the midst of the floods which overwhelmed the German invaders when the Belgians opened the sluices at Nieuport and let in the sea. Thanks to these floods and the defenders' indomitable courage, as well as to the guns of the British and French warships, which continually threatened the German right wing, the enemy had long since abandoned his original idea of outflanking the Allies and advancing towards Calais by this coastal route. The inundation of the country surrounding Nieuport, and the arrival of Allied reinforcements along the Belgians' front, rendered the further presence of the war-ships unnecessary, the rush of the enemy having obviously been checked. The navy's share in this phase of the operations has been dealt with in an earlier chapter of the present work. In his dispatch reporting the proceedings Rear-Admiral Hood added the interesting fact that after five French torpedo-boats had been placed under his orders by Admiral Favereau, "I had the honour of hoisting my flag in

the *Intrépide*, and leading the French flotilla into action off Lombartzyde. The greatest harmony and enthusiasm", continued the Admiral, "existed between the Allied flotillas". Undoubtedly they played no small part in the operations which so completely upset the enemy's plans, and led to the first Battle of Ypres, with the loss of from 150,000 to 200,000 Germans in their disastrous attempt to hack a way through the British army. Now the Belgian troops, with their French comrades, were wintering in thousands of little huts between banks of earth—trenches for the most part being impossible in this flooded region of mud and water—or amid the havoc of what were once peaceful villages, keeping watch and ward over the waste of waters, while the artillery did most of the fighting. The struggle for St. Georges in this district was a dramatic interlude at close quarters. The hamlet is merely a small cluster of houses between the Yser Canal and the road, but standing on a strip of rising ground it had escaped the inundations, and commanded both the railway and the canal from Nieuport to Dixmude, as well as the main road to Bruges. It was the key to Nieuport for the enemy, and a vantage point for the Allies in forcing him back. The heavy sacrifices made by the Germans in capturing it, and in holding it against persistent attacks, proved the importance which they attached to the place. They had transformed it into a veritable fortress, loopholing the walls of the houses, erecting barricades of sacks filled with earth, and commanding the approach



Photo. Tiranty, East.

The Fight for the Belgian Coast: Lombartzyde during the Defence of the Village

with machine-guns, the embankment being also occupied and protected with barbed wire. They lost the position on December 28 through a daring Franco-Belgian attack by road and canal, both of which were swept by German fire. The attackers, who had captured the ferryman's house the day previously, succeeded in landing a 75-millimetre gun brought to their aid in a small boat by a gallant band of marines, all of whom were killed or wounded on the journey, and turning this on the houses which formed the Germans' last stronghold completely destroyed them. Belgian troops, who had been working their way gradually nearer and nearer by a zigzag sap along the road itself, now advanced through the mud, while French marines

dashed forward from the direction of Rams cappelle, and the few Germans who escaped their combined attack fled down the road towards Mannekenvere. Some hundreds of them were killed, wounded, captured, or drowned. A violent counter-attack delivered two days later was repulsed by the Allies at point-blank range.

Nearer the sea, among the dunes, where both sides had dug themselves into rows of trenches—the sand-hills rising above the flooded region of dykes and fields—close conflict was more or less continuous. It was in this district, between Lombartzyde and Westende—known to Continental holiday-makers as the fashionable little bathing-resort on the south-western outskirts of Ostend—that the first

"Battle of the Dunes" was fought in the summer of 1600, when the Dutch, under Maurice of Orange, defeated the Spaniards. There was no hope of a glorious battle and a decisive issue on this occasion. But the national sentiment and hope of revenge were ample to keep the Belgian troops in heart and courage through the bitter winter of 1914-5. Their spirit was expressed at the time by M. Roland de Marts, editor of the *Indépendance Belge*, in a passage quoted by Capitaine Gabriel de Flemelle:

"Our men are down there fighting on the last corner of free ground which symbolizes the bruised Fatherland. On the inundated plain, in the trenches covered with snow, in the desert of our dunes, they remain upright, rifle in hand, unconquerably wild, sustained only by the flame of Holy Hate. Our French and British friends have behind them, in the country they left, homes where mothers, wives, sisters, seek to soften the task. Our men know that their homes are destroyed, that the mothers, the wives, the sisters, wander in tears amid the domestic ruins, or on the road of exile, and yet they fight as though they had a world to save, for the Fatherland fills all their soul and sums up all the affections of their hearts."¹

Probably it was of set purpose that the French troops operating with the Belgians in this territory included a force of Zouaves and Algerian cavalry, who were more at home on the rolling sand-dunes of the coast—reminding them of their native Sahara—than in the mud-swamps of the interior. These Algerians played a picturesque part in helping gradually to force the enemy back, especially in gaining a

footing on the Grande Dune, between the road to Ostend and the sea, where the Germans had established themselves in positions which seemed well-nigh impregnable. Following the capture of St. Georges, every effort was made to render the German position on the coast between Lombartzyde and Westende untenable. Progress was made at the beginning of 1915, when the Zouaves advanced from Nieuport towards Lombartzyde and captured a small spur to the west of that village, firmly establishing themselves there, and beating off a counter-attack on the following day. That was on January 7, by which date the success at St. Georges had been consolidated, and more than 5 kilometres secured along the right bank of the Yser. Previously the Allies were holding in front of Nieuport only a very narrow bridge-head. Now they had elbow-room extending from the sea to St. Georges, and secured their communications by the construction of a strong bridge, which the soldiers at once named General Joffre. The enemy apparently abandoned the idea of disputing the Allies' position surrounding the bridge-head, establishing himself still further on the Grande Dune. A week later the French artillery compelled the Germans to evacuate some 200 metres of trenches on this position, and destroyed a redan to the north of it. Progress, however, was slow owing to the impossibility of digging deep trenches on sandy soil close to the sea, as well as by reason of the wind, which often blew a gale, adding to the hardships of the winter campaign

¹ *Fighting with King Albert* (Hodder & Stoughton), 1915.

with stinging clouds of sand. In one of the attacks on the Grande Dune, foothold is said to have been gained by the Algerian Cavalry by a ruse worthy of the pages of romance. Half a dozen splendid Arab horses were allowed to wander one morning within reach of the enemy's lines, and the delighted Germans, allowing them to approach without firing, promptly bagged them. Next day, in the gathering dusk, not six but two dozen Arab horses strayed in the same direction, looking as innocent as the others, and apparently unmounted. The Germans were more delighted than ever. But just when they seemed to have the animals within their grasp, the horses kicked up their heels and bolted back to the French lines, while two dozen swarthy cavalymen, who had hidden themselves in Oriental fashion beneath the bodies of their mounts, flung themselves upon the astonished Germans and captured the post.

The combined attack on the Grande Dune towards the end of January was a brilliant if not completely successful affair. It began at 9 a.m., after the usual artillery-fire; but though the centre column passed the first line of German trenches, which were full of water and unoccupied, and forced a way at bayonet-point through masses of the enemy established behind cover, it was then decimated by enfilading fires and forced to beat a retreat. In parts some rough cover was thrown up and the ground held until nightfall, while more to the left two sections of the tirailleurs succeeded in securing a temporary foothold on the very top of the Grande Dune.

"One section", to quote from the "French Eye-Witness's" account of this affair, "actually started to pursue the enemy down the opposite slope, but suffered heavily from the furious fire directed upon them from the farther crest. One non-commissioned officer




The War among the Sand Dunes: Zouaves called up for an Advance from their Defence-works

and five men who survived seized a little redoubt on the south-western slope, but, one by one, they were all killed. Their comrades, vigorously supported by the artillery, made a gallant effort to save them by digging a communication-trench from their own position, and managed to reach the redoubt by 1 p.m. A few minutes later, however, the Germans, strongly reinforced, delivered a counter-attack and forced the Allies back. Thus we held only the outer edge of the Grande Dune, but nevertheless we secured exact knowledge of the enemy's defences. The Germans also lost heavily, more than 300 bodies being counted near the redoubt. We took fifty prisoners, including two officers."

If, therefore, progress was slow on the coastal wing, as elsewhere along General Joffre's far-flung ramparts, it was sure; though the stubborn nature of the struggle along the sand dunes from day to day, and for weeks together, pointed to the sternness of the task which faced the Allies all along the line. A counter-attack was attempted near Westende in the early days of February, but the enemy failed signally to drive the Belgians from their positions.

It gives us a clearer conception of the war on the western front to follow Joffre's ramparts as they stretched at this period from the sand-dunes of the North Sea to the Vosges Mountains and the Swiss frontier, noting the topography of the different districts, and obtaining a general view of the military situation. The sector between Dixmude and Ypres need not detain us long. The landscape is agricultural and flat, and being at the time under review largely inundated, effective action was precluded. In the

next sector, between Dixmude and the famous battleground of Ypres, where the French lines were linked to the British army, the country is more undulating, though Ypres itself lies on very low ground, with the flat plain of the Yser valley extending north and north-west to the sea. To the north-east, east, and south-east there are rolling and fairly well-wooded ridges sloping gradually towards the hollow in which the ancient



The Southern Battlefields of Ypres, showing approximately the Franco-British line at the beginning of February, 1915


capital of West Flanders is situated. In the course of the long-drawn-out battle of October–November, 1914, the avalanche of Germans gradually forced the British back along the salient running round the town, while farther south the same overwhelming masses pressed back our thin line from the Château of Hollebeke, from Wytchaete and Messines. Thus when the struggle was over, and the Germans

retired beaten, the British line ran slightly to the west or north-west of all those points. Our worn-out troops in the trenches, east and south-east of Ypres, were relieved towards the end of November by French reinforcements, who had already taken over part of the line south of the Ypres-Comines Canal. Subsequently, the French gained some ground here, but at the period with which we are dealing the line was substantially as it was in November, when the fighting ended. Broadly speaking, as “Eye-Witness” pointed out, the result was to leave the enemy in possession of the higher slopes of the ridges in the area south and south-east of Ypres, but beyond that all his attempts at further progress had been frustrated. His nearest approach to Ypres was in the re-entrant south-east of the town along the canal bank, where the German lines reached within a couple of miles of the ancient ramparts. Between the hostile lines in the woods round Ypres was the narrow strip in which all the bloodiest horrors of war lay in unburied and unspeakable heaps. This was the dreadful zone of the dead which, as “Eye-Witness” wrote four months after the great battle, almost defies description:

“If the reader can imagine what a wood would look like with most of the trees either felled altogether or half sawn through and lying with their tops on the ground; if he can further imagine this wood standing in soft muddy clay in which every few yards there is a pit several feet deep; and if he can further picture to himself the whole of this tangle of dead vegetation, mud, and deep pits, heaped from end to end with thousands of German corpses, the majority

of whom have lain there since November, he will then gain some idea of the appearance of this awful zone of the dead that lies between us and the enemy.”

Patches of wooded country extend from Ypres and St. Eloi to Armentières over the Belgian frontier into northern France, where the British line extended as far as the La Bassée area. Here, on the extreme right of the British positions, bordering the scenes of so many sanguinary fights for the brick-stacks and railway triangle at Guinchy, began the main battle-front of the French army, stretching, with endless projections and indentations, but, practically speaking, in one unbroken line, over the remaining 450 miles to the Swiss frontier. It was like the Roman wall built by Hadrian between the Tyne and the Solway Firth, right across the northern boundary of his British dominions nearly eighteen hundred years before, or rather like the earthen rampart erected by Antoninus between the Firths of Forth and Clyde, some twenty years later, to resist the encroachments of the northern tribes. It was much longer, but for months was almost as stationary as those ancient defences; and it needed a broad view of the general situation, and some knowledge of the strategy of the French Supreme Command, to appreciate the advantages gained by the French army during the long spell of inactivity which followed the first Battle of Ypres. If measured by the amount of territory recovered from the enemy the results were negligible. But in this stupendous life-and-death war of attrition Germany was fighting against time as well as



"Joffre's Wall": the Allies' line in France and Belgium at the beginning of February, 1915—six months after the declaration of war

against men; while the Allies, with time on their side, were gradually accumulating the force of reserves without which it was impossible to embark upon decisive offensive operations. The main object of French strategy from the Battle of Ypres in November, 1914, to the beginning of February, 1915—that is to say, to the end of the

first six months of the war—was to keep the enemy fully occupied without attempting any operations on a considerable scale. It was necessary to keep him busy, because the swing of the Prussian pendulum had carried the enemy's offensive to the Russian front, where Hindenburg badly needed reinforcements in order to deal a crushing


blow at the Tsar's inexhaustible army. This object the French tactics appear to have achieved, Germany having dared to send to Marshal von Hindenburg only four and a half corps of the fifty-two army corps facing the Allies on the western front. This helped in no small degree to check the German offensive in Poland at that time. Climatic conditions also handicapped the operations along the whole of the western front, rain, mud, snow, and mist furnishing adequate reasons in themselves for postponing offensive operations on a large scale.

At the period now dealt with the French line, leaving the British army on its left, passed through the village of Vermelles, which stands on the ridge south of the Béthune-La Bassée canal. The French had taken Vermelles early in December, 1914, after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, and clung to it through all the furious fighting in this area during the first month of the following year. At the beginning of 1915 they also captured from the Germans the neighbouring position of Rutoire, which, like Vermelles, stands on rising ground above the land of marshes which the people call "Le Pays Bas"—hence the name of La Bassée—and leads towards the mining town of Lens, in the midst of the Black Country of northern France. The coal-fields have an area of nearly 200 square miles, and in normal times yield upwards of 5,000,000 tons of coal a year. Here, among the countless collieries and industrial mills of various kinds, the rival armies had faced each other for months without making much headway on either side.


The French artillery, however, gradually dominated the German fire, and occasional local attacks, in accordance with General Joffre's deliberate policy of "nibbling", resulted in the capture of a number of German trenches at the turn of the year between Aix-Noulette and Carency. At this point the flat country and the ugly mining villages give place to sloping woodlands leading along the Béthune road to the fortified town of Arras, lost and captured many times in the earlier wars of France, and with lace and other industries dating back in certain cases to Roman times. It was at Arras that the French and English signed their treaty of peace, just 500 years before (1415), after the battle of Agincourt.

Arras itself lies in a cup of low hills, and had already suffered much in the Great World War by the beginning of 1915. Its heart had been pulverized by the successive German bombardments, and many of its ancient buildings shattered, including the handsome Hôtel de Ville, dating from the sixteenth century, with its noble Gothic façade, rising upon seven arches of different sizes, its Renaissance lateral façades, and its handsome belfry, 240 feet high, terminating in a crown. The belfry was destroyed for ever in the early bombardments, the cruel effects of which on the rest of the building will be seen in the views on the following page better than in columns of description. The French had gradually improved their positions round Arras before the end of 1914, and in the following January again pushed the enemy back by the partial reoccu-

pation of St. Laurent and Blangy, two of the villages on the eastern outskirts of the town. Blangy had been recovered by the French in the middle of December, but a few weeks later changed hands once more, the French on that occasion falling back before a violent bombardment, followed by an infantry attack in force.



A Shattered Masterpiece: the ancient Hôtel de Ville at Arras before and after the Second German Bombardment



As a result of the fresh counter-attack the French not only reoccupied all their old positions, but strengthened them by capturing some further trenches at Écurie and Roclincourt on the north-east. The Germans lost severely in unsuccessful attempts to recover these trenches, leaving several hundred of their dead on the battlefield, including a number of officers.

It was unspeakably wet all along the western battle-front at this period, but in the region of Arras the rain did not cease falling for weeks, and the condition of the fighting-line may

be better imagined than described. In some of the trenches the water was many inches deep; but in this respect the enemy was in the same plight as our allies. South of Arras the next sector of the firing-line passes within a few miles of the battle-field of Bapaume, where one of the hardest-fought fights in the north of France took place in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, both sides claiming the victory, though it was the Prussians who fell back after the battle, behind the Somme. At the end of 1914 and beginning of 1915 it was nearer to the little industrial town of Albert, in the region of La Boisselle, that the chief struggle took place, and, though here as elsewhere the atrocious weather interfered with the operations, the combat was continuous and contested foot by foot. "We gave the enemy no peace", wrote the "French Eye-Witness", in dealing with the war at this point towards the middle of January; and a later official dispatch describes how they foiled an attempted coup in that direction, designed as a fitting celebration of the anniversary of the foundation of the modern German Empire, when the Emperor William I was proclaimed at Versailles on January 13, 1871.

"The Imperial hopes", states the official account published in Paris on January 30, 1915, "were dashed at La Boisselle, whence it had been decreed that we were to be driven to celebrate the anniversary of January 18, 1871. The Kaiser had promised a reward of 700 marks to any German soldier who captured a French machine-gun on that occasion; but the only result was the crushing defeat of no fewer than nine German assaults. This

was largely due to the great and continuous success of our artillery, German prisoners admitting that they had been mastered both in regard to numbers and in the efficacy of our shells."

The artillery was the main factor of the gradual French progress all along the line. The "Incomparable 75", the field-gun which, with Joffre, was the first article in the faith of France in ultimate victory, justified all the hopes that were centred in it. It enabled the infantry to charge to within 50 yards of a German trench, while that position was shelled with a precision and rapidity which annihilated or completely demoralized the enemy, the infantry thereupon completing the work as the curtain of devastating fire was carried beyond, to prevent a counter-attack while the French troops were consolidating their captured position. Outwardly the "75" looks the simplest of guns, but its very simplicity is the outcome of many years of scientific experiment. It is not the work of one man, though the first realization of the finished design was due to Colonel Deport some thirty years previously. General Sainte-Claire Deville and other officers afterwards improved on this in various ways. Thanks to its distinctive breech operation, worked on the eccentric principle with a single movement of the hand, and its wonderful recoil mechanism, one "75" can fire from twenty to twenty-five shells a minute with astonishing accuracy. A battery can concentrate a hail of shells through which no troops can hope to pass alive. The German 77-cm., though modelled



The "Incomparable 75": a Battery of the famous Field-guns of the French army

on the same lines, cannot be fired with the rapidity and precision of the French gun, and in the Great War it failed to earn the fame achieved by the mighty siege-artillery of the German and Austrian armies. While the superiority of the French field-gun was admitted from the first, the need of heavier metal was sorely felt in the closing months of 1914, when the operations had to be conducted against an enemy strongly entrenched and supported by long-ranging heavy batteries. This heavier metal was provided by February, 1915, when it was authoritatively announced that the co-operation between the French artillery and infantry was becoming perfect.

One of the extraordinary features of the war was to see these latest triumphs of military science acting in conjunction with, or in opposition to,

some of the primitive methods of by-gone warfare revived in the trenches—the bomb-slinging and the throwing of hand-grenades, for example. It was in the Albert district, through which we have just passed, that the Germans, at the beginning of February, 1915, adopted another ancient device by sending fire-boats down the Ancre River in the direction of Aveluy, 2 miles north of Albert, and not far from La Boisselle. The French, however, succeeded in stopping these contrivances before they exploded. This singular attack was part of the enemy's incessant struggle to clear the French from the plateau on which they had established themselves above the valley of the Ancre as far back as November, thus maintaining a constant threat against the German front between Cambrai and Péronne. Péronne had fallen into Prussian hands in 1870, and

now served as their supply centre, with one of their head-quarters some 17 miles away at St. Quentin, near which the French *Armée du Nord*, under Faidherbe, was defeated by General Goeben on January 19, 1871, and through which the heroic British army fought its way against desperate odds during the retreat from Mons in August, 1914.

Coming to the next sector of the battle-front, from Albert to Rheims, we cross the line of this historic retreat and follow the main bend of the western defences, where Joffre's Wall guarded the nearest approach of the Germans to Paris after they had been hurled back over the Aisne. Here the trenches were practically speaking continuous, rival combatants facing each other rarely more than 300 yards apart, often within a stone's-throw. The popular notion that the line was broken when a trench was captured on either side was far from the truth. In reality, as a British observer with the French forces in the field explained at the time, the trench would be only the front face of a work resembling a small fort, a regular nest of bomb-proof shelters, machine-gun emplacements, and deep communicating trenches. It was this system of forts, with the trenches connecting them, which constituted the enemy's front line of defence, succeeded by others of similar construction, though generally less highly developed. Hence the slowness of the progress made in the face of the rain and mud, which rendered any rapid advance impossible during the winter, and the costly nature of the fighting under the more

favourable weather conditions of the early spring. Although the French made little headway, the German attack was also brought to a standstill, the forward thrust in the direction of Paris—only some fifty odd miles away at the nearest point—being checkmated by the lateral pressure brought to bear by Joffre's far-sighted strategy. The enemy's inability to resume a real offensive at this stage was shown by his failure to follow up the local advantage gained at Soissons, as already described. Between Soissons and Rheims the French artillery gradually dominated the situation, searching every part of the German positions with heavy and field guns. Rheims herself suffered still further under occasional shells from the enemy's fire in return. Considerable German activity was also displayed at the beginning of 1915 at other points in the same sector, especially at Paissy and Berry-au-Bac. Only local actions, however, were fought here, and though they did honour to the French army they had no appreciable result.

From Rheims the battle-front passes through the famous wine province of Champagne—the cellars of which proved too tempting to so many of the invaders—to the line Perthes-les-Hurlus, Mesnil-les-Hurlus, and Beau-séjour, the scene of the heavy fighting which brought 1914 to a close and opened 1915 auspiciously for the Allies with a series of small but pronounced successes on the part of the French army. Our allies had made themselves masters of this line during Christmas week—for the spirit of *revanche* would brook no such truce



The Track of the Army of the German Crown Prince: Ruins of Clermont, in the Argonne, after its Evacuation by the Germans

as was arranged in the British lines—and they swept back as many as five fierce counter-attacks in force against their new positions. The fighting raged over a district entirely different from that in which the British army was entrenched. One vast undulating plain, dotted with copses of pine trees—planted by Napoleon III—it was almost an ideal country from the military point of view, with its possibilities of concealment and its splendid opportunities for cavalry work. In peace time, indeed, it served as the training-ground of the great military centre of Chalons:

“What commander training his men over this ground”, wrote a British observer with the French forces, in a dispatch issued by the Press Bureau, “could have imagined that the area from Perthes-les-Hurlus to Beauséjour Farm would become two fortress lines, developed and improved for four months; or that he would have to carry out an attack modelled on the same system as that employed in the last great siege undertaken

by French troops, that of Sebastopol in 1855? Yet this is what is being done. Every day an attack is made on a trench, on the edge of one of the little woods, or to gain ground in one of them; every day the ground gained has to be transformed so as to give protection to its new occupants and means of access to their supports; every night, and on many days, the enemy's counter-attacks have to be repulsed. Each attack has to be prepared by a violent and accurate artillery-fire; it may be said that a trench has to be morally captured by gun-fire before it can be actually seized by the infantry. Once in the new trench, the men have to work with their entrenching-tools, without exposing themselves, and wait for a counter-attack, doing what damage they can to the enemy with hand-grenades and machine-guns. Thus the amount of rifle-fire is very small; it is a war of explosives and bayonets.”

The net result of the fighting, which continued daily for weeks, with the French gaining ground foot by foot, was that by the beginning of February they had captured Point 200, a forti-

fied slope near Perthes, and carried their lines 2 kilometres to the north. These gains they held against repeated counter-attacks and consolidated in preparation for the further advance which followed later in the month.

Meantime equally continuous fighting was proceeding in the grim silence of the Argonne Forest, to which the battle-line now continued in its upward slope to the Meuse above Verdun. Here for months the war was carried on under the most deadly and arduous conditions. In the heart of the forest, where it was never safe to move even from tree to tree, cavalry and artillery work was for the most part impracticable, though there was little slackening of the artillery duel on the outskirts. The French were bent on pushing the enemy farther and farther back from all possibility of investing their fortified town of Verdun; the Germans were struggling to recover the ground too readily yielded by the Crown Prince after the Battle of the Marne. The precipitous flight of the Crown Prince on that occasion partly explains the curious formation of the fighting-line at this vital point. Had he bolted, as it appears he might well have done, at Clermont-en-Argonne, 10 miles farther south, the German lines would have held the pass of Les Islettes—through which runs the railway line from Chalons to Verdun by way of St. Menehould and Clermont—and in due course have completely invested Verdun and its formidable chain of forts. Verdun fell to the Germans in the war of 1870, after a gallant resistance during three weeks' bombardment, but the demonstration against

it by the Crown Prince's army at the beginning of the Great War, after capturing the obsolete fort at Longwy, was merely futile; and the place stood in less danger than ever after the advances made by the defenders towards the end of 1914 and the beginning of




The German Crown Prince (on the left) talking to one of the Imperial Staff Officers

1915 in the direction of Varennes and Montfaucon, to which the invaders had retired.

In the House of Lords at the beginning of 1915 Lord Kitchener paid a just tribute to our allies for their work during this period:

"During all this time", said the War Minister, "the long line from Lille to Verdun was maintained intact by our French allies against constant attacks from the



From the Argonne Forest to the Frontier of Lorraine: the German Line round Verdun and the St. Mihiel Salient, February, 1915

German forces. The French army have shown the greatest tenacity and endurance, and have displayed the highest fighting qualities in thus defending their position against any advance of the Germans. For although they have made notable advances at various points, they have never yielded up a yard of their country since I last addressed your lordships."

Lord Curzon of Kedleston endorsed these words, adding:

"We are rather apt in this country—it is a pardonable fault, concentrating our attention as we do on the fifteen or twenty miles¹ where our troops are fighting—to think this is the centre and focus of the war. Do not let us forget that it is not more than one-tenth of the line held by our allies, and it is due to their patience and the strategy of the French commander, and to their endurance, that France, who is fighting our battle just as much as her own,

¹ Lord Curzon rather underestimated the length, which, as stated on p. 267, extended at that time over some 31 miles.

has so gallantly held her own all the way from Switzerland to the sea."

In the Argonne, to return to that fiercely contested region, constant fighting went on at such places as Le Four-de-Paris, St. Hubert, Fontaine Madame, Bagatelle, and the wood of La Grurie. One specially dashing advance, on December 22, 1914, gave the French temporary possession of the village of Boureuilles. They were forced out again by a series of furious counter-attacks, but succeeded in retaining their hold on the ground won between Boureuilles and the village of Vauquois, quite close to Varennes.

It was in this winter campaign in the forest that the Italian Legion covered itself with glory. In response to their special request to be given a post of danger, the Garibaldians, 3000 strong, under Colonel Peppino Garibaldi—son of General Ricciotti Gari-

baldi, himself the son of the famous Liberator—were sent to share the task of driving the enemy from the Argonne. Day by day in the ceaseless fighting they gave abundant proofs of their valour and resource, earning frequent mention in Joffre's dispatches, and many decorations for individual heroism. Colonel Garibaldi himself

the regiment, the second, a few weeks later. Both officers fell in victorious attacks on German positions. In Constante Garibaldi's last fight—on January 5, 1915, near the ravine of Courte Chaussée—the Italians, after some of the enemy's trenches had been blown up, captured a whole German company, with three officers and twelve



The Campaign in the Argonne Forest: First-line Trenches of the French army

received the cross of the Legion of Honour for "brilliant valour". The losses of the Italians, unfortunately, were proportionately heavy. In a few months a third of their number had fallen from wounds or the hardships of the winter campaign. Of General Garibaldi's six sons serving with the Legion two were killed in action during this period, Lieutenant Bruno Garibaldi being the first to fall, and Constante Garibaldi, chief adjutant of

non-commissioned officers, together with machine-guns and ammunition-wagons.

The whole of this complicated forest campaign in the Argonne was closely related to the struggle round the great German salient which curved to the east of Verdun, and stretched like a tongue that had its tip licking the Meuse at St. Mihiel. Its western edge was thrust along the range of hills known as the Heights of the



The French "75" in the Argonne: how improvised floors of young trees were made during the Forest Campaign of the winter of 1914-15

Meuse, which fall abruptly to the well-known plain called the Woëvre, a region of wide, open fields interspersed with roads, woods, meres, and streams. The Woëvre itself extends as far as the Moselle and to the eastern edge of the tongue, and includes a single-line railway to Metz which the Germans found of vital importance to their operations in the district. It was reported that one of the first things they did after consolidating their position there was to extend this line by a new field railway from Thiaucourt to St. Mihiel. The tongue spread itself out nearer to Verdun when the Germans captured Fort Troyon, between that stronghold and St. Mihiel, at the begin-

ning of October, 1914, but the French recovered possession of the fort, and gradually extended their positions to the east. Strongly entrenched on the heights, the enemy held on to St. Mihiel throughout the winter, either with the object of completing the long-threatened investment of Verdun, or as a convenient point through which to advance in force against the French armies in Champagne. This projection was in some respects the most remarkable feature of the whole front, and was a much more formidable position than appears on the map, the Germans having fortified the wooded heights above the valley of the Meuse until these fairly bristled with guns.

It was because of this constant menace round Verdun that the French were presently to launch their repeated attacks, ending in the capture of Les Éparges, which the invaders had transformed into a veritable fortress. With this success the French regained command of the Heights of the Meuse, dominating the plain of the Woëvre, and were able to increase their efforts towards cutting off this threatening tongue or forcing it to contract towards the frontier and Metz. Not far from St. Mihiel stands President Poincaré's estate at Sampigny, which the enemy doubtless took particular pleasure in shelling. One of the accompanying photographs shows the result of forty-eight German shells on the house itself—Le Clos. It was fitting that

when the Great War broke out which was to decide the fate of Alsace-Lorraine the president of the French Republic should himself be a Lorrainer.

From St. Mihiel the eastern edge of the German salient stretched back to the Moselle above Pont-à-Mousson, only a few miles from the German frontier in Lorraine, and less than twenty from Metz. Pont-à-Mousson had so far suffered little damage, though constantly shelled by the Germans. From here to the Vosges Mountains in Alsace the French, after checking the German offensive, had for the most part been marking time for months, and consolidating their positions until the full strength of the Allies could be brought to bear



President Poincaré's Home in French Lorraine: his house at Sampigny, wrecked by German shells

upon the whole battle-front. In this policy, it must be remembered, they were acting conformably with the operations in Belgium and the eastern theatre, preventing the enemy from releasing his troops by holding them under the constant threat of a surprise. How completely the Germans had failed in their attack across the frontier of the annexed provinces is seen when we follow the French line along the border of Lorraine and over the Vosges into Alsace itself, and recall the fact that the Germans regarded the capture of the frontier strongholds of Belfort, Épinal, Toul, and Verdun at the very beginning of the war as a foregone conclusion. The spring of 1915 found all these fortresses intact, and protected by a network of entrenchments which made them more formidable than ever.

The French line may here be conveniently divided into three parts, the first extending from the beautiful valley of the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson to the Marne-Rhine Canal, north of Lunéville. Along this barrier the French were still holding the famous range of hills known as the "Grand Couronné" of Nancy, with advanced posts along what to all intents and purposes were the outer defences of Metz, the outworks of this mighty fortress forming a girdle some 15 miles in circumference round the town. It was expected that the French would strain every nerve to avenge the betrayal of Metz on October 27, 1870—the first time in its eventful history that it had succumbed to attack—by recapturing it at the first opportunity. After Castelnau's magnificent army




Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, in Command of the Bavarian Army
(From a photograph by Bieber)

had held the impregnable "Grand Couronné", and beaten the Bavarians under their own Crown Prince, in the critical days of August and September, 1914—thus saving Nancy, Verdun, and Toul, and making possible the greater victory of the Marne—the invaders were in turn driven back at that point towards the frontier. Here both sides, fought to a standstill, watched each other with ceaseless vigilance through the winter months the while they strengthened their positions for the spring campaign. In the same sector such devastated towns as Lunéville and Gerbéviller had once more fallen into French hands. Lunéville, like many other towns in the district, had suffered both under French and German bombard-

ments. When the invaders were forced out they blew up all the bridges over the Meurthe both above and below the town. Railway communication was thus cut off with Nancy on the one side and Épinal on the other. M. Keller, the Mayor, was warmly congratulated by President Poincaré, who subsequently visited the town, for the way in which he had stuck to his post throughout. He was held as hostage by the Germans, and was fortunate to escape with his life. Elsewhere in this district the enemy had ruthlessly shot his hostages when compelled to evacuate the French towns which he had captured. M. Keller's private house, in which his wife during this ordeal was forced to act as hostess to the Bavarian general and his staff, is historically interesting as the building in which was signed the famous treaty of Lunéville in 1801, by which France received the left bank of the Rhine as her frontier.

Though its mayor was spared, Lunéville, as the official report of the French Commission of Enquiry showed, was the scene of many barbarities during the enemy's occupation, but the full measure of German brutality appears to have been reserved for Gerbéviller, some 5 miles away. Before the war this was a picturesque industrial town on the River Mortagne, with a castle rather famous for its artistic gardens. After the brief German occupation it looked, as one visitor expressed it, "much as Pompeii must have looked after the Vesuvius eruption". Of the original 2000 inhabitants only 500 remained.

"The others, men, women, and children," wrote a British officer with the French troops, in a message issued by the Press Bureau at the time, "were massacred in cold blood, while every house was burned to the ground by the Germans when they were forced to retreat. Much has been written on the horrors perpetrated at Ger-



Spoils of War at Nancy: some of the thirty German Guns, captured by the French in Alsace, exhibited in the Place Royale



After a French Victory in Alsace: the captured Flag of the 49th Regiment of German Infantry

béville, but one must have seen it and have talked with the original inhabitants to realize to the full the definition of German 'frightfulness'."

The Prince of Wales visited the devastated regions of French Lorraine round about Lunéville and Gerbéville in January, 1915, when he made his tour of the eastern battle-front.

The second sector of the frontier line led past the Fort of Manonville, or rather the remains of that fort, for the Germans blew it up when they retreated. This was the fort which, with its garrison of 900 men, surrendered on August 28, 1914, after two days' bombardment. Apparently the Germans had prepared the way for

this by destroying the French guns with heavy artillery inside their own frontier, fired from the concrete platforms built there in peace time. Eastward still the French line in the same sector extended some 10 miles south of the frontier to St. Dié, on the crest of the Vosges. The intervening space between the rival lines had been evacuated by the inhabitants, and all supplies removed, so that the whole of this district was practically deserted. Save for reconnaissances and other cavalry work the two armies were nowhere in close contact.

The third sector of the frontier line, from St. Dié to the Swiss frontier, was in many ways the most interesting of all. Not only were the opposing troops at grips again, but the French,

as described in an earlier chapter, had carried their line to the plain of Alsace, and were fighting on sacred soil—soil reconquered from the Germans after more than forty years of waiting. They had still the hardest part of their task before them; but their hold was firm, and their confidence restored after the set-back so frankly summarized in the French Official Review. Describing how the first month of the campaign had begun with successes in Alsace and finished with defeats, the report shows that the French plan of concentration had not sufficiently allowed for the possibility of the German invasion of Belgium. As soon as the enemy's unscrupulous advance in that direction was begun it was realized that the principal action, instead of taking place either between the Vosges and the Moselle, or to the north of the Verdun-Toul line, as had been anticipated, would develop in the north. Awaiting the moment when the operations in the north could begin, and preparing for it by retaining in Alsace the greatest possible number of German forces, Joffre ordered the French troops in the east to occupy Mulhouse—or Mülhausen, as it is printed in German on the map—to cut the bridges of the Rhine at Huningue and below, and then to flank the attack of the French troops operating in Lorraine:

"This operation was badly carried out by a leader who was at once relieved of his command. Our troops, after having carried Mulhouse, lost it and were thrown back on Belfort. The work had therefore to be recommenced afresh, and this was

done from August 14 under a new command."¹

The new leader, as stated in the first chapter of Vol. I of the present work, in which these operations are briefly touched upon, was General Pau, who retook Mulhouse on the 19th, after a brilliant fight at Dornach. Twenty-four guns were captured from the enemy on that occasion. But though the enemy had undergone enormous losses, and abandoned great stores of shells and forage, the critical situation in Lorraine and on the French left now changed the whole position in Alsace. The French army in this field was broken up, and only a small part remained to hold the region of Thann and the Vosges:

"The purpose of the operations in Alsace was to retain a large part of the enemy's forces far from the northern theatre of operations, and it was for our offensive in Lorraine to pursue this still more directly by holding before it the German Army Corps operating to the south of Metz. This offensive began brilliantly on August 14. On the 19th we had reached the region of Sarrebourg and that of the Étangs (Lakes); we held Dieuze, Morhange, Delne, and Château Salins. On the 20th our success was stopped. The cause is to be found in the strong organization of the region, in the power of the enemy's artillery, operating over ground which had been minutely surveyed, and finally in the default of certain units. On the 22nd, in spite of the splendid behaviour of several of our army corps, and notably of that from Nancy, our troops were brought back on to the Grand Couronné, while on the 23rd and 24th the Germans concentrated reinforcements—three army corps at least in the region of Luné-

¹ *The French Official Review of the First Six Months of the War.* Reuter's Agency (Constable), 1915.



The Winter Campaign in the Vosges: Alpine Chasseurs advancing to the Attack on Skis

ville—and forced us to retire to the south. This retreat, however, was only momentary. On the 25th, after two vigorous counter-attacks, one from south to north and the other from west to east, under Generals de Castelnau and Dubail, the enemy had to fall back. From that time, between the Germans and ourselves, a sort of balance was established on this terrain. Maintained for fifteen days, it was afterwards, as will be seen, modified to our advantage.”¹

By the end of six months our allies had so improved their positions that they held the heads of the valleys running beyond the frontier down between the wooded spurs of the Vosges Mountains, pushing back the enemy foot by foot until he held only the

lower spurs. In some places, such as round Cernay and south of it, the French had also seized the lower spurs, the Germans retiring to the villages and other tactical positions in the plain. For the most part the French troops engaged in this mountain campaign were the *Chasseurs Alpins* and *Chasseurs-à-pied*—“*Diables Noirs*”, as they were called by the Germans, who held these splendid fighters in wholesome awe. The men of the Alpine battalions, thoroughly trained for mountain warfare—all, like the Swiss troops, expert climbers as well as first-rate shots—gave the Germans no peace throughout the winter. When the snows covered all the heights they took to skis and alpenstocks, and continued the war relentlessly. Their night surprises kept the enemy in a

¹ *The French Official Review of the First Six Months of the War.* Reuter's Agency (Constable), 1915.

constant state of suspense. Their mountain batteries and machine-guns performed wonders from seemingly inaccessible posts. The provision of efficient artillery support to the firing-line and the victualling of the troops were the two chief difficulties of this campaign. The first difficulty, as a British officer in touch with the troops bore witness, was overcome by the construction and improvement of the mountain paths, and by the use of pack-transport above the level of the valleys. Snug, weatherproof encampments were erected on the wooded slopes, and even on the summits of the mountains, for the immediate supports and reserves of the fighting troops. The difficulty with the artillery was overcome with human, mule, and ox draught, by means of which even the heaviest guns used in the field were dragged up the heights and cunningly established there. The *Chasseurs Alpins* were ably supported by the line regiments, who quickly adapted themselves to the novel form of warfare and were veterans at the game by the beginning of 1915.

In the Southern Vosges, where the summits range from 600 to 1000 metres in height, and the pine-covered slopes are very steep, the struggle for vital points continued throughout the winter, the troops often attacking through snow up to their waists.

"The trenches", wrote the British officer just referred to, "are 40-300 yards apart, according to the lie of the land, but nearly always now the French trenches are on the higher ground, and overlook the German ones. To lessen this disadvantage the Germans put snipers up the trees, and for a

time considerably bothered the French, until the latter spotted the game and practised rook-shooting."

Where trenches could not be dug in the mountains, trees were felled and converted into barricades, or rocks would be blasted and tunnels driven through the sides of the slopes. Modern engineering science converted the whole mountain-side in places into one huge fortress. It is scarcely necessary to add that the Germans on their side had wasted little time. In many parts they constructed line upon line of cement trenches, and everywhere disputed every inch of the ground. Having driven the Russians out of Prussia, they were now eager to recover their lost strip of Alsatian territory. Nevertheless, the French continued slowly but surely to forge ahead, and infuriated the enemy by making a sort of new capital of Alsace at Thann. The French advance in this district was cemented in December by the surprise visit of General Joffre himself, who explained that, having waited forty-four years for the moment when Alsace would once more become part of French soil, and the Gaulois of the left bank of the Rhine should be freed from the Prussian yoke, he desired personally to instal the first French official in Alsace since 1870. "Permit me, gentlemen," exclaimed the Generalissimo in addressing the local committee in the Hôtel de Ville, "to embrace in the person of your president the whole of Alsace, now to be reunited for ever to France."

Failing to reconquer Thann by repeated assaults the Germans rained shells upon it, as though determined to

destroy what they could not capture, and the inhabitants who remained—though the French troops encouraged most of them to leave, sending women and children away in ambulance-wagons—were forced to spend most of their time in their cellars, feeding and sleeping there as comfortably as circum-

extraction or sympathy—vacated by them at the beginning of the war—were occupied by the German Staff, including, it was reported, the Kaiser's second son, Prince Frits¹ Friedrich. By the beginning of February the population of Mulhouse had dropped about 20,000. When the French army



"Children of Alsace, salute the Flag of France!": Scene at the presentation of a flag to the children of a village in Alsace, after its capture from the Germans by the French troops

stances permitted. In other parts of Alsace-Lorraine the Germans confiscated all the property belonging to French families, sent local recruits to fight on the eastern frontier, and, as an extreme precaution against espionage, expelled all neutrals. At Mulhouse, the most important manufacturing town in Alsace, the finest residences of the families of French

retired after its shortlived triumph several hundred of the French Alsatians and foreign residents were sent to the interior of Germany and imprisoned. So strict were the German regulations that the inhabitants of the town had to obtain passports even to go by tramcar to the suburbs.

In spite of all these precautions, and the formidable German defences,

the French made considerable progress at the turn of the year without attempting anything in the nature of a general advance. The capture of Steinbach was a particularly brilliant affair. Forcing an entry on December 30, after five days' violent fighting, the village was won street by street and house by house, and held after two determined counter-attacks, until, by January 3, the German defeat was complete, and the conquerors had begun their further advance to the north-east and south-west, also clearing the enemy, after a prolonged and ferocious struggle, from "Hill 425", the key to the German position west of Mulhouse. Ground was also won on the road from Thann to Cernay—or Sennheim, to give it its German name—a small industrial town of which Steinbach was the outpost. Both positions had been elaborately fortified and entrenched, as barriers to the French advance towards Mulhouse. Cernay was at length rendered untenable by the French artillery, and evacuated by the Germans, who in turn bombarded the place themselves to prevent its occupation by the French.

More and more the artillery became the main factor in these operations, and accounted for the prolonged fight which ensued for the summit of Hartmannsweilerkopf, one of the dominating heights along the range of hills above Cernay. The French seized this position at the beginning of 1915, only to lose it shortly afterwards to the Germans, though the hill was of little use to the enemy, seeing that the French could sweep the top with their

shells. It was due to the accurate and overwhelming artillery-fire brought against the enemy's trenches that Hartmannsweilerkopf was retaken by the French in March with trifling loss. The possession of this hill, with that of the neighbouring heights, was of the utmost value to the victors, to whom the plains of southern Alsace now lay exposed, thus enabling them to shell the railways, factories, and cantonments used by the Germans in the valley. Hence the continued struggle for the summit in the spring campaign, in which it was again to change hands more than once.

Farther south, where the French line had been extended to the two Aspachs, upper and lower, and Carspacht, the troops from Belfort supported those of the Vosges, and, though no advance of supreme importance was attempted during the winter, steady progress was made with a view of closing in on Altkirch, and pushing through to Mulhouse up the valley of the Ill and the Rhine-Rhone canal. Seven British ambulances were established at Belfort by the beginning of 1915. All through the winter months, too, a corps of airmen did excellent work thence, regularly undertaking reconnoitring duties over the frontier, dropping bombs on strategic points across the Rhine, or among the miniature fortresses along the foothills of the Vosges; sometimes making an effective raid as far as Metz. It was from the military aviation-ground at Belfort that Commander Briggs and Lieutenants Sippe and Babington, of the Royal Flying Corps, set out on November 21, 1914, upon their suc-



The Scene of some of the most stubborn fighting in Alsace: Steinbach and Cernay in flames after the German retreat at the beginning of 1915

cessful air raid on the Zeppelin Headquarters at Friedrichshafen, on Lake Constance, 120 miles away. Commander Briggs, as we have already recorded, was made prisoner on that occasion, but the other two officers, on their safe return, were decorated by General Thévenet, the Governor, before the assembled troops of Belfort, as Chevaliers of the Legion of Honour.

Belfort, a fortress of the first importance during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, had been immensely strengthened under the constant dread of a new attack from Germany. The capital of the French remnant of the old Department of Haut-Rhin—the remnant grudgingly returned by their conquerors in the preliminaries of peace at Versailles in February, 1871—its proudest monument was Bartholdi's colossal lion, the memorial of

its heroic defence in that disastrous war. The siege had lasted from November 3, 1870, to February 16, 1871, the Prussians raining shot and shell until some 400,000 projectiles had fallen on the town and its defences. Only two outlying redoubts were captured, however. The battle of January 15-17, 1871, in which Bourbaki attempted in vain to raise the siege, took place at Héricourt, some six miles to the south of Belfort. Not until Lieutenant-Colonel Denfert-Rochereau, who commanded the beleaguered stronghold, received orders from the French Government to capitulate did the siege come to an end, the garrison—13,000 all told—marching out with all the honours of war. It was over the fate of Belfort that the peace negotiations at Versailles nearly collapsed.

M. Thiers appealed for Belfort, that

this maiden fortress at least might be spared to France. Bismarck refused. "Then let it be as you will, Count!" declared Thiers, driven at last with his back to the wall. "These negotiations are nothing but a sham. . . . Make war, then. Ravage our provinces, burn our houses, slaughter our inoffensive inhabitants; complete your work. We will fight you until our last breath. We may be defeated, but at least we shall not be dishonoured." Even the Iron Chancellor was touched. He withdrew to consult the old Emperor and Moltke, and in the end it was agreed that France should retain Belfort, provided that the Germans should enter Paris in triumph. "The proud city underwent that humiliation

with quiet disdain," said Dr. Holland Rose in quoting Thiers' words in his Cambridge lecture on Alsace-Lorraine,¹ "because she saved Belfort."

The captured provinces remained essentially and enthusiastically French in sympathy throughout the interval between that war and the next, notwithstanding all Germany's efforts to infuse them with the spirit of *Deutschland über Alles*.

It is one of the anomalies of Europe that Alsace and Lorraine, though, with the exception of Metz and its district, belonging by historical right to Germany, and for the most part German both in race and speech, have been heart and soul bound up with France ever since the great Revolution. It was at Strassburg that the *Marseillaise* was first sung, after being written and composed there in a single night in 1792 by the young captain of engineers, Rouget de Lisle, who gave it its first title of *Chant de l'Armée du Rhin*. Many famous soldiers of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were sons of Alsace-Lorraine—Ney, Kléber, Kellermann, Rapp, and others. And in the Franco-Prussian campaign of 1870-1 the two provinces remained French to the core.

"Alsace and Lorraine refuse to be alienated", declared the thirty-five deputies of the two provinces when the terms of peace first came under discussion in 1871. "With one voice, the citizens at their firesides, the soldiers under arms, the former by voting, the latter by fighting, proclaim to Germany and to the world at large, the immutable will of Alsace and Lorraine to



Underground Warfare in the Winter of 1914-15:
Trench-making on the French Front

¹ *The Origins of the War*, by J. Holland Rose, LL.D. (Cambridge University Press), 1914.

remain French. France can neither consent to nor sign the cession of Lorraine and Alsace without perilling the continuity of her national existence, and dealing a death-blow to her unity with her own hands."¹

Apart from Belfort, however, France had perforce to bow the head to the harsh terms dictated by Germany. But the French people would never formally acknowledge Germany's title to the two provinces torn from her side. They, too, prepared for the "Day", but, save among the more ardent spirits, they remembered the warning words of Gambetta: "Never speak of it; think of it always". They proved their remarkable powers of recuperation by paying off the whole of the enormous war indemnity by the spring of 1873, to the mortification of Bismarck and the German Emperor, who, in a weak moment, had reduced the sum of £240,000,000 originally claimed to £200,000,000.

As for the people of Alsace and Lorraine, 60,000 of them left the country immediately after the annexation of 1871, and emigration went on continuously among the French population. Those who remained turned more than ever towards the land to which their spiritual allegiance was due. Germany's complete failure to complete the conquest by attempts to Prussianize the people was exemplified at Zabern in 1913, when certain regiments revealed to the world the supreme benefits of *Kultur* and militarism when combined under Prussian rule. That striking object-lesson



On Outpost Duty: French Troops using a Windmill for Observation Work

helped to explain why only the 300,000 German immigrants were loyal at heart, and why the remaining 1,500,000 natives—the younger as well as the older generation—longed for France and freedom. The hopelessness of this re-incorporation without another crushing war over their prostrate body warned them, however, against voicing these sentiments, and induced many of them to support a proposed compromise. The object of this was to secure for Alsace and Lorraine self-government and neutrality by mutual arrangement with both Germany and France, thus, it was hoped, securing independence for themselves and re

¹ "The Government of M. Thiers. By J. Simon (English translation), Vol. I, 1879.

moving for ever the chief source of danger to the peace of Europe.


Whatever hope of success this proposed solution might have fostered in France, its prospects were blighted in Prussia by the growth of Pan-Germanism, with its firm resolve to solve the problem once and for all by dealing France such a crushing blow that she could never again cross the conqueror's path.

When at last the Great World War broke out in 1914, the German army, living on the recollections of 1870-1, and profoundly convinced of its invincibility, aimed at dealing its crushing blow in less than a month. This fundamental plan of the German General Staff, however, was doomed to failure. The end of six months saw the French army not only undefeated, but stronger than ever, and obviously inspired with the certainty of final success. Any doubt which may have troubled it at the beginning of the campaign in again facing the might of Germany had vanished. Its confidence in itself and its leaders was superb. "It is certain," admits the French official review of the first six months of the war, "and it could not be otherwise, that at the outset our troops and the country itself remained under the impression of the defeats of 1870." To have lived that down, and created in its place a feeling of ascendancy and security, was in itself a tremendous victory.

In the meantime important changes had taken place in the higher commands of the French army. Rejuvenation was the key-note throughout:

"All the old generals who at the beginning of August were at the head of large

commands have been gradually eliminated, some as the result of the physical strain of war, others by appointment to territorial commands. This rejuvenation of the higher ranks of the army has been carried out in a far-reaching manner, and it may be said that it has embraced all the grades of the



The Hyposcope in the Trenches

The hyposcope, which is worked by an arrangement of mirrors, is much the same in principle as the periscope of the submarine. It enables a man to see what is in front of a parapet without raising his head above it.

military hierarchy from commanders of brigades to commanders of armies."¹

The result was to lower the average age of general officers by ten years, so that after six months of the war there were few French generals at the front over sixty years of age, and the few

¹ *The French Official Review of the First Six Months of the War.* Reuter's Agency (Constable), 1915.



An Observation Post along the French Front

consisted only of men in full possession of their physical and intellectual powers. Some of the army - corps commanders were from forty-six to fifty-four years old, and the majority of the brigade commanders were under fifty. Distinguished service on the field of battle was recognized at once in all ranks. Many officers who began the war as colonels were commanding brigades at the end of six months; some were even at the head of divisions or whole army corps; and among the rank and file promotions were made in the full spirit of the Napoleonic maxim that every soldier of France carried a marshal's baton in his knapsack:

"Many men", again to quote from the French Official Review, "who began the war on August 2 as privates now wear the officer's epaulettes. The elasticity of our regulations regarding promotion in war time, the absence of the spirit of caste, and the friendly welcome extended by all officers to those of their military inferiors who have shown under fire their fitness to command, have enabled us to meet all requirements."

The *moral* of the whole French army, in short, never stood higher than it did at the beginning of February, 1915. The truth of this was plain to the eyes of anyone who saw the French soldier at the front at the close of the winter campaign of 1914-5, and the same confidence was emphatically expressed in the words of the French official retrospect of the war down to that date: "The German offensive is broken. The German defensive will be broken in turn."

F. A. M.

CHAPTER XXII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AEROPLANE ATTACK

(January—March, 1915)

The Art of Bomb-dropping—Lessons of the War—Special Raiding Aeroplanes—Destructive Bombs—Work of French Aviators—Two Great Naval Air Raids—Advantages of Massed Attacks by Aircraft.

A SURPRISE of the war, and one intensified by events recorded officially during January, February, and March, 1915, was the determined use made of aeroplanes for the purposes of attack. This surprise was greater among experts than among members of the public. The latter had been led to expect, by lurid pen-pictures, that death would rain from the air. But experts, knowing the limitations of existing craft and the insufficiency of their armament, were ready to believe that very meagre results, and these moral rather than material, would result from the delivery of aerial raids. The human element, however, in offensive operations by air, triumphed over the purely mechanical. Accepting the limitations of their craft, and setting themselves to overcome them, aviators, in order that their bombs might prove effective, dived their machines deliberately into zones of gun-fire, and escaped destruction only by the speed of their craft and by their own cool judgment in the handling of them.

The earliest efforts at bomb-dropping, made in the first stages of the war, were spasmodic and generally ineffective. The aviators flew very high, out of respect for the enemy's guns; they were provided only with

small bombs, which could not be expected to cause much damage; and they had no experience in the dropping of such missiles—at any rate under the conditions of actual war.

To place a bomb accurately, when it is released from an aeroplane in flight, is unusually difficult. The bomb has imparted to it, as it falls, the velocity of the craft; it moves forward through the air, that is to say, while it descends earthwards. If, for example, a machine is 4000 feet high, and a bomb is dropped from it, this missile will—neglecting for the moment air resistance—travel forward a distance of more than 1000 feet before it touches the ground. And this factor is not the only one that needs to be considered. The aviator must, as he prepares to drop his bomb, study the influence of the wind. Gusts may be blowing, and these, as the bomb falls, will tend to deflect it from its path. It is necessary, also, as the airman approaches his target, that he should move forward through the air on a line that takes him precisely towards it. If he is a fraction to the right or left, as the bomb leaves his machine, the missile will sweep away to one side or the other, and so miss its mark.

There are bomb-releasing gears and

sighting-tubes devised to help the airman in his aim. One such apparatus contains a series of prisms through which the bomb-dropper, while seated in the hull of his machine, is given a view of the earth below. From his altimeter he gains a knowledge of the height of his craft; then, peering down through the sighting-tube, he watches the passage across his field of vision

of the aeroplane, and in each of the chambers there is a bomb. When a button within the hull is pressed, the chamber turns till it comes to a releasing position, whereupon one of the bombs is discharged earthward. But such mechanisms, at any rate in the Great War, were far from perfect.

One of the first lessons taught in dropping bombs was that the pilot



A Direct Hit: two German Field-guns wrecked by the Allied Airmen

of some landmark on the earth. The number of seconds this object takes to pass his lens, when compared with a table of calculations fixed before him, tells him approximately the speed at which his machine is moving in relation to the ground below. Then, having data as to height and speed, he determines the precise moment at which he should drop his bomb. The actual release of the missile is, as a rule, performed mechanically. One gear provided for this purpose resembles the cartridge-chamber of a revolver. It is fitted below the hull

must, if he hoped for anything like accuracy, fly low when he was releasing his missile—and this even when attacking a fortified position, and while compelled to run the gauntlet of artillery-fire. To minimize his danger as far as possible, when passing at a low altitude through a zone of heavy fire, he was provided with a light, high-powered, very speedy craft; and the tactics evolved were to approach at a considerable height the spot that was to be bombarded; then to descend at great speed, and in a single dive, till the raider was just upon his mark.

and then to discharge his bombs rapidly and dash at full speed out of range of the guns. Experience proved that it was possible, granted a pilot had a high-speed machine and handled it dexterously, to carry out a raid and escape being brought to earth, even though his aircraft became subjected to a concentration of fire. Contributing to this immunity was the fact that, even though the planes of a craft might be pierced frequently by shot, it still flew on. Not unless the machine was hit in a vital part, such as the engine, fuel-tanks, or main controls, or the pilot himself struck, could the gunners hope to bring it to the ground.

With practice in bomb-dropping, under war conditions, airmen began to improve in their aim, though the margin that must be allowed for error, when releasing a bomb, remained comparatively large. Still, if he had several bombs in his machine, and was prepared to dive low over a mark, an aviator might rely on placing, say, one of them with accuracy on a submarine base, an airship shed, a supply depot, or a railway junction.

One of the chief needs, it was soon realized, was to increase the destructive power of the bombs dropped. An aeroplane is limited strictly as regards the weight it can carry, especially on a flight over an enemy's country, which—if a long distance has to be covered—will entail a heavy load of fuel. Here, again, the experience of the war proved its value. A type of bomb was in due course provided which weighed approximately 100 pounds and was charged with an explosive which proved most destructive in its action.

There became available, also, raiding aeroplanes of a distinctive type. One of these craft, for instance, a large biplane, was fitted with a motor of 200 horse-power and had an unusually large sustaining-surface. It could carry pilot, passenger, and a considerable load of fuel, in addition to the weight of armour-plating to protect it from hostile fire, of a small machine-gun, and of two high-power bombs. An attack by air when made by such a machine, and one armed so formidably, proved far more destructive in its results than were any of the raids attempted in the early stages of the war. When these specially-prepared bombs strike the ground and explode—to use the words of an aviator who has employed them—"they simply lay everything flat". Among incidents that may be described, showing the actual power of such bombs, one is selected for description here. A French aviator, descending to within less than 1000 feet of the ground, released a bomb over some German troops who were bivouacking in a village. The atmospheric disturbance, caused by the bursting of the missile when it fell among the enemy, made the aeroplane rock; and when the aviator had steadied his machine, and looked earthward again, he estimated that thirty of the Germans lay dead or wounded.

A German cavalry officer, describing an air attack, wrote in a letter, which came afterwards into the hands of the Allies:

"Airmen flew over us and dropped bombs. Three of these were effective. We had twenty horses killed and ten wounded, and four men killed and eight wounded."



War in the Air: a Photograph of an Aerial Duel over the French Lines

The illustration is a reproduction of an untouched enlargement of the actual photograph taken by a French aviator from an aeroplane below the German biplane. The French biplane is seen above, to the left, in pursuit of the German.

An indication of the activity that was displayed, in harassing the enemy by air, was provided by one of the French official *communiqués* issued in connection with the operations between January 20 and February 6, 1915. Brief extracts from this are appended:

"On January 20 a night reconnaissance was carried out in the vicinity of La Fère and Laon. The lights in the camp were put out at the approach of the avions. One of these descended to 500 metres in order to fly along the German trenches, on which it dropped eighteen bombs.

"On January 27 we struck an artillery park and a great assemblage of the enemy to the north of Lille.

"On January 29, towards 10 p.m., an avion dropped four bombs on the quarters of staff officers at Ostend. A few days afterwards news arrived that three German officers had been killed by one of the bombs.

"On January 30 four bombs were dropped on Hombourg Castle in Alsace, a German General Head-quarters, and eight on the station at Honnenbrich.

"Six bombs were dropped on January 30 on the station at Pagny, and fourteen on the 31st.

"On January 31 one of our aviators bombarded the station at Lutterbach.

"On February 1 Lutterbach was heavily bombarded.


"On February 1 a night bombardment of Ostend, from a height of nearly 1100 metres, took place.

"On February 2 our aerial projectiles struck an important transfor-

mer for electric power which is supplied to the vicinity of Mulhouse."

In connection with the offensive of the British and French troops on the western front during March, 1915, aeroplanes were employed, and with very definite results, in making raids against our enemy's communications. In two instances in which railway junctions were attacked—those at Courtrai and Menin—very serious damage was effected. At Menin, for instance, a bomb dropped by a British aviator, which fell on the permanent way, tore up the metals and did considerable damage. At Don station, which, with Douai, was also severely bombarded, a train was struck in the centre by a bomb and a number of coaches destroyed.

Ammunition-stores and powder-magazines provide an aviator with important and vulnerable targets, which can be attacked as a rule only from the air. One successful attack—authenticated by a French official



On the Road to the Front: an Army Aeroplane in Transit



Photo. F. N. Birkett

Claude Grahame-White

report—was carried out early in the same month. A French aviator, making a non-stop flight of nearly 200 miles over hostile territory, attacked the German powder-manufactory at Rottweil, which is situated on the Neckar, near the Black Forest. Descending low over his mark, the airman dropped four bombs—one on the acid tanks attached to the works and the other on the works themselves. Then, while circling for ten minutes, so as to note the effect of his bombardment, the aviator saw smoke and flame arise from the tanks, while fires broke out at other points.

When highly destructive bombs could be employed, and experience made it possible to organize air raids on a larger scale, attacks were made which rendered trivial those attempted during the summer, autumn, and winter of 1914. In the Cuxhaven raid, which

we have described already, seven aeroplanes were used. This total the Germans improved upon early in January, when they made raids on Dunkirk with a dozen or more machines. And then our Naval Air Service, after careful organization, launched against the German submarine bases on the Belgian coast two attacks which, in their importance, eclipsed all previous raids. In the first of these massed attacks, reported by the Admiralty on February 12, thirty-four naval aeroplanes and seaplanes were employed, and they scattered their bombs in the districts of Bruges, Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe, and Ostend. Mine-sweeping vessels, railways, power-stations, and gun-positions were the chief objectives. The operations, interrupted by bad weather, were resumed a few days later, when forty British aircraft attacked the German coast positions, while eight French aeroplanes, dropping bombs on the German air-station at Ghisteltes, sought to distract the attention of the enemy and prevent hostile craft from interfering with the British raiders.

As to the results obtained by these raids, the Secretary of the Admiralty communicated on March 9 an extract from the Dutch newspaper *De Tijd*, and from this it appeared that thirteen German soldiers had been killed and thirty-five injured by the falling of a bomb at Blankenberghe; one officer killed at Knocke, as well as seven infantrymen and some artillerymen; a submarine badly damaged at Zeebrugge; several batteries along the coast damaged; and a number of coast-

defence guns totally destroyed. Great damage, also, according to an earlier Admiralty report, was inflicted on the Ostend railway station.

A significant fact in connection with these raids was that they were carried out as they had been planned, and with success, in face of a heavy fire from the German coast-defence guns. The land artillery—in this operation as in others—failed to checkmate the air attack.

These raids proved the advantage of massed attacks by aircraft. The effect of a bombardment from above, when only a few aeroplanes are employed, is not likely to be conclusive; but it is an altogether different matter when a well-organized attack can be made by fifty or a hundred craft, acting in unison and dropping bombs that have a highly destructive power.

C. G.-W.

H. H.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE END OF THE GERMAN COMMERCE-DESTROYERS

(December, 1914–April, 1915)

The Effect of the Falkland Islands Battle—Fortunes of the *Karlsruhe*—Fate of the *Dresden*—The Career of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*—The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* at Newport News—Her Prizes—The Case of the *William P. Frye*—A Transfer of Portable Property.

ADMIRAL STURDEE made an end of the German commerce-destroying squadron on December 8, 1914. But there still remained certain fragments of the enemy's cruiser force which had so far escaped, and were not wholly disposed of for some time. The *Dresden*, as we have seen, got away from her pursuers on December 8. The *Karlsruhe* was believed to be still at large, or near the West Indies. The armed merchant-ships *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm* were also at large, and there were other German steamers moving about in South American waters in the capacity of tenders, or, it may be, doing what trade they could. There was little danger that these survivors would be

able to do much harm. So many pursuers were hunting for them, the difficulties in the way of obtaining coal were so much increased, and constant cruising must inevitably produce so much wear and tear on their machinery, boilers, and hulls that their careers could not be long. Still, while they were in being they constituted a certain danger. British trade continued to be conducted under a more or less menacing cloud in waters they might be expected to frequent; absolute security was not to be felt on the ocean till they were suppressed.

The fate of the *Karlsruhe* remained obscure for months. She was known to be active before the end of 1914, and then she vanished. Guesses were made and stories were told, but evi-

dence was lacking for some time. At last residents in the Grenadines, and skippers of passing vessels, who reported their observations, told of her wreck on these islands. The string of small islands known by the name lie far down at the south-east end of the West Indies, in the Windward Islands of the Lesser Antilles, between St. Vincent and Grenada. They have seen many incidents of the naval

capitated by a meeting with British vessels to which reference is made further on. The *Rio Grande* avoided the British watch in the North Sea by making smart use of Norwegian waters. Here was a story of the sea which had a very old-world flavour about it. The *Karlsruhe* may have been blown up or beached by her own captain when her boilers or machinery were found to be in need of more re-

pairs than could be given to her at sea or by her own crew in some hidden West Indian anchorage. If the date given to the Admiralty was correct, the *Karlsruhe* was not in existence when Admiral Sturdee fought his action.

The operations of scattered vessels cruising in different seas, each on its own account, cannot be told as a consecutive story.

We must follow the fortunes of each by itself, and we can best begin with the *Dresden*, whose fate was briefly mentioned in our earlier account of Admiral Sturdee's victory.

The *Dresden* escaped on December 8, not only because of her speed but because the British cruisers told off to pursue the lesser German vessels decided, properly enough, to make sure of the *Leipzig* and *Nürnberg*. Then, too, night covered her from pursuit. After a short visit to the Argentine coast, where her crew left a very fantastic account of the Falk-



The Fate of the *Karlsruhe*: the German cruiser believed to have been sunk "in the neighbourhood of the West Indies"

wars of Rodney and other admirals, British and French, to say nothing of buccaneers and pirates. In March, 1915, the Admiralty stated that there was "every reason to believe that the *Karlsruhe* was sunk in the neighbourhood of the West Indies" (a singularly extensive and vague indication of locality) "at the beginning of November, and that those of the crew who were rescued reached Germany early in December in the steamship *Rio Grande*, which had been acting in concert with the *Karlsruhe*". The end of the cruiser was probably pre-

land Islands action, the *Dresden* put to sea, and for a time vanished over the horizon line. Vague stories went about to the effect that she was blockaded in some hiding-place in the Tierra del Fuego. Even in the height of the Southern summer this would have been a dismal refuge. To endeavour to pass the cold months in such a hiding-place would have been to condemn the crew to die of cold and starvation. The captain of the *Dresden*, without being an officer of exceptional ability, might very well have been relied on to "know a trick worth two of that". He made for the Pacific, where warmth, fuel, provisions, and British merchant-ships might be expected to be found. When she was back in her old haunts, on the west coast of South America, the *Dresden's* activity was not conspicuous. In fact, her commander must have known very well that Admiral Sturdee would dispatch cruisers in pursuit of him. Therefore he could not venture to haunt waters where the *Dresden* was likely to be seen, since her presence would be instantly reported to the British captains. Indirectly, her presence on the coast, which was known in a general way, had some injurious effect on British trade by keeping up the rate of insurance and causing anxiety to shippers. Directly, she did little harm. Her last achievement was the capture and destruction of the British barque *Conway Castle*, off the coast of Chile. The barque was on her way from Liverpool to Valparaiso. Whatever care the *Dresden's* captain showed he must certainly be run down before long. He might avoid ports,

but he must go somewhere to meet tenders with coal, and the only place he could go to were the islands off the South American coast, Juan Fernandez, or one of the others. The calculation that he would be found on one of them before long was easy and safe to make. The movements of the German steamers *Alda* and *Sierra de Córdoba*, which left Valparaiso with coal nominally for Callao, may have afforded a clue. Whether or no, the *Dresden* was caught on March 14 and promptly destroyed by the British ships *Glasgow* (Captain John Luce, C.B.), the *Kent* (Captain John D. Allen, C.B.), and the auxiliary cruiser *Orama* (Captain John R. Segrave).

The place where she met her end was in Cumberland Bay in the island of Mas-a-Tierra (Inshore Island), one of the Juan Fernandez group. The *Dresden* was anchored there on March 9, and requested leave to make certain repairs for herself. The island belongs to the Chilean Republic. The governor refused, and requested her to leave within twenty-four hours. As she did not go he declared her interned. Mas-a-Tierra is not connected with the mainland by cable, and the governor could not communicate with his superiors in time to bring a Chilean naval force on to the scene. On March 14 the British ships above named appeared, and as they found the *Dresden* still showing German colours they attacked her. She was blown up by her captain, and the crew remained in the hands of the Chileans. The action of the British officers was dictated, no doubt, by a belief that the German cruiser would herself pay

little attention to Chilian neutrality. Yet it was itself a breach of the neutrality of a friendly state, and justified the dignified protest which the Chilian Minister in London, Don Augustin Edwards, addressed to the Foreign Office on March 26. Sir Edward Grey, though not yet fully informed of the circumstances by the reports of the British officers, replied by making the frank apology for which the action certainly appeared to call.

Before the *Dresden* went to her appointed place, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was heard of on the other coast. It was a significant fact that the first accounts of her doings did not come through her own appearance in any port but through one of her tenders, or attendant ships, the s.s. *Holger*. This German steamer came into Buenos Ayres on or about February 20, to land the crews and passengers of five vessels destroyed by the auxiliary cruiser. They were: the *Highland Brae*, a Nelson liner, of 7634 tons, from Great Britain to the River Plate; the *Potaro*, Royal Mail Steam Packet, of 4419 tons, also bound to Buenos Ayres, but in ballast; the *Hemisphere*, belonging to Messrs. W. Thomas, Sons, & Co., of Liverpool, of 3486 tons, from Hull to the River Plate; the *Wilfrid M.*, a wooden three-masted schooner, of 250 tons, belonging to J. Bachman, of Riverport, bound from Newfoundland to Bahia Blanca with stock-fish; and the *Semantha*, a steel four-masted barque, of 2280 tons, of Norwegian nationality, laden with wheat for Great Britain from Astoria. These prizes were taken on the coast of Brazil. The

Hemisphere was certainly captured near the fantastic-looking island, Fernan de Noronha, which lies north-east of Cape San Roque, the shoulder of South America. The *Kronprinz Wilhelm* must obviously have been well served by tenders, a proof of the thorough organization of the Germans in these waters. It would not be difficult for her to find anchorages in which to transfer coal. Large tracts of the coast of Brazil are uninhabited and never visited except by stray Indians. There is plenty of smooth water inside the great reef which fringes the coast south of Cape Roque, and the haze which is common along the land would hide a vessel from observation by ships out at sea. Some help may have been obtained from or through the German colonists of the southern Brazilian State of Santa Catarina. The universal corruption of the officials of South American States puts their services at the disposal of anyone who can pay. The most significant of the captures of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was the Norwegian ship *Semantha*. She was sent to the bottom on the plea that she was carrying provisions to Great Britain. This was an extreme use of belligerent rights. It was not, indeed, without precedent, for, to go no further back, the Russians had done much the same thing in the war with Japan. But when the Germans did this they justified the action of the British Government in stopping provision-laden ships on their way to Germany. The destruction of the *Semantha* was part of a consistent policy of which the *Kronprinz Wilhelm's* colleague, the *Prinz*

Eitel Friedrich, was to give a still more striking example. The *Holger* was interned by the Argentine Government.

The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had cruised with Admiral von Spee, and had escaped from the disaster of his squadron. She turned up on March 12 at Newport News, in the State of Virginia, at the mouth of the James River. Her career had run a wide course, and had been lively. She was, if not worn out, at least so far damaged by wear and tear when she reached the American port as to need more repairs than could be given her in a short time. Her captain, Trierichsen, spoke airily of refitting and resuming his cruise. It is always advisable to put the best face on all things. The captain's record was in its way good, and he had given some fine examples of what commerce-destroying means.

He had to his credit—that is to say, to his recent credit, during the latter part of his cruise—the following prizes: on January 27 the Russian barque *Isabel Browne*, thirteen hands; and the French barque *Pierre Loti*, twenty-four; on the 28th, the French barque *Jacobsen*, twenty-three; on February 12, the British barque *Inveroe*, of twenty-three hands; on the 18th, the British steamer *Mary Ada Short*, twenty-

eight; on February 19, the French steamer *Florida*, with a crew of seventy-eight and eighty-six passengers; on February 20, the British steamer *Willerby*, twenty-seven. To these legitimate captures is to be added the American sailing-ship *William P. Frye*, with a crew of thirty-one. These 328 prisoners were landed by Captain Trierichsen at Newport News. In spite of his high-handed dealings with the *William P. Frye*, Captain Trierichsen was well received at Newport News. American naval officers expressed professional approval of his ways as a commerce-destroyer, and he was invited to attend the launch of the American warship *Pennsylvania* in the Norfolk yard. The German Government offered apologies and excuses for his short method with the *William P. Frye*. It represented his act as an excusable piece of excitability on his



The German Armed Merchant-ship *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* in Hampton Roads, off Newport News, Virginia, where she was interned for the remainder of the war



The American Grain Ship, *William P. Frye*, sunk by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*—for which the German Government afterwards offered apologies and excuses to the United States

part, and was of course ready to pay damages. The American Government insisted on the value of the ship only, as the cargo was British property. It does not appear that similar excuses were made for the *Semantha*—a fact which can perhaps be accounted for on the ground that the United States are very strong, and that Norway is a small power. Yet the cases were identical. The American was a full-rigged sailing-ship of 3374 tons, on her way from Seattle to Queenstown with a cargo of wheat.

The ways and hazards of commerce-destroyers were prettily exemplified by the adventures of the *Eitel Friedrich*. It is satisfactory to learn that Captain Wedgwood of the s.s. *Willerby* made a determined attempt to ram her when

he was summoned to surrender. It was fortunate for the crew and passengers of the vessels she had taken that Captain Wedgwood did not succeed.

A lively account of a commerce-destroyer at work was given by a French passenger of the *Florida*, who told the *Matin* of his experiences. The Germans when they took possession allowed the crew and passengers to keep their private property, adding that as for what belonged to the ship they would "see about that". And they did by a swift but systematic pillage. Bullion, 500 bottles of champagne, bales of cloth, new brooms, a tub full of soap, together with the carcass of an ox—which they found on board alive, killed, and cut up—and a *batterie de cuisine* of copper vessels, were swept together, arranged in perfect order on the deck, and transferred to the captor without confusion. Beyond all doubt Captain Trierichsen and his merry men knew their business. After many professions of his determination to go to sea again, the German captain had to submit to be interned.

We must go a little beyond our time limit to round up our subject. On April 11 the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* limped into Newport News, damaged, foul, and with all but empty coal bunkers. She had slipped away from Hoboken in New Jersey on August 3, and when she returned to an American port had been 255 days at sea. During her career she had sunk thirteen British, French, and Norwegian vessels in all. When she took refuge she had on board sixty-one

prisoners taken from her last prizes, the steamers *Tamar* and *Daleby*. If the statements of her commander, Captain Thierfelder, made to an American reporter, are true, she was unarmed when she left Hoboken, but supplied herself with guns from the British steamer *La Correntina*, which had some on board but had no powder. *La Correntina* was captured in the South Atlantic, and not only two 3-inch guns but 5,000,000 pounds of beef were taken from her. The

Kronprinz Wilhelm was to have received her armament from the *Karlsruhe*, and was transferring guns from that vessel when they were both attacked and forced to run in different directions by the British cruisers *Berwick*, *Suffolk*, and *Bristol*. She had, in fact, run the course of a fairly successful commerce-destroyer doomed to failure in the end because she had no ports of her own nationality in which to take refuge.

D. H.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE GERMAN SUBMARINE BLOCKADE

(February–March, 1915)

The Preliminaries—The Question of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz—German Submarines in the Channel and Irish Sea—End of January and First Days of February—The German Decree of Blockade—The Affair of the *Lusitania* and the American Flag—"Piracy"—The Case of the *Laertes*—The Failure of the "Blockade"—Story of s.s. *Cambank*—The Little Effect produced—The *Hartdale*, *Adenwen*, and some others—The Politeness of Captain Weddigen of U 29—Sinking of U 29—The Question of Reprisals—The Claim of the *Thordis*—The close of the Month of March—Sinking of the *Falaba*.

AFTER Sir David Beatty's successful action with the German cruising squadron on January 24, 1915, the naval war in home waters entered on a new phase. Before giving an account of these operations it is necessary to go back to the end of the previous year, and refer again to certain events already mentioned.

On December 22, 1914, the New York *Evening News* printed an interview with the German Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. There was no dispute as to the accuracy of this report of his words. His position, which is that of director-in-chief of the naval

operations of his country, precluded the supposition that what he said to the American journalist represented a mere private opinion or bare supposition. It was a declaration of policy, and subsequent events proved to demonstration that the Grand Admiral was indicating a carefully-thought-out plan. He said:

"America did not raise her voice in protest, and has done nothing, or very little, against the closing by England of the North Sea against neutral shipping. What would America say now if Germany were to declare a submarine war against all hostile merchant shipping?"

This was the first formal announcement from an official quarter of what was within a few weeks to become an avowed policy.

Before the Admiral's statement was repeated in the New York paper the submarine had already begun to be active as a commerce-destroyer.



The German Grand Admiral, Von Tirpitz
(From a photograph by Bieber)

Mention has been made (Vol. I, p. 251) of the capture and sinking of the Leith steamer *Glitra* on the coast of Norway by a German submarine on October 20. On this occasion the hostile craft had simply acted on the surface as a cruiser. She had done nothing which might not equally have been done by the *Emden* or the *Dresden*. As much may be said of the capture and sinking of the *Durward*, a steamer of 1301 tons, which was on

her way from Leith to Rotterdam at a later date. She was stopped, by U 19, 13 miles off the Maas lightship. Her crew were allowed to escape, and she was destroyed, on January 22. It was obvious that the Grand Admiral had something of quite another nature in his mind—an alternative, in fact, to the normal operations of a cruiser. He was thinking of the use of the submarine to enforce a blockade by destroying whatever vessel it met engaged in carrying on the enemy's commerce. The work was to be done by sending the trader to the bottom in the way most convenient at the moment to the assailant. This did not necessarily imply that the merchant-ship was always to be sunk by a blow from a torpedo. The submarine, we may note once more, carries few of these costly weapons, and cannot afford to use them wastefully or on vessels of slow speed and little value. She would in such cases prefer to follow the precedent set in the case of the *Glitra*, or to use the gun which the more fully developed vessels of her class carry. Before the German policy was formally announced to the world, several instances had occurred of both ways of using the submarine. Without going back to the earlier instances, which have been already mentioned, the attacks on the *Amiral Ganteaume*, the *Primo*, and the *Malachite* (Vol. II, p. 43), we may take as examples the events in the Channel and the Irish Sea at the end of January, 1915.

On the 30th of the month two torpedo attacks were made on British ships near Havre. The s.s. *Toko*-

maru, of Southampton, was torpedoed and sunk 7 miles west-north-west of Cape Antifer. She was a vessel of 6084 tons gross, belonging to the well-known Shaw, Savile, and Albion Company, and was bound to Havre from New Zealand with a cargo of 97,000 carcasses of mutton, and some merchandise and clothing given for the benefit of the Belgian refugees. She did not actually sink for an hour and a half, and her crew of fifty-seven men were able to escape in their boats. On the same day, and at 15 miles west of Cape Antifer, the s.s. *Ikaria*, of the Leyland Shipping Company, a vessel of 4335 tons, was struck but did not go down. She was able to reach Havre under the escort of French torpedo-boats. In these cases it will be observed that the German did all that in him lay to destroy the crews with the ships. The French Minister of Marine published a protest which denounced the barbarity of these methods in adequate terms:

"Up to the present," he said, "by a sort of self-respect, German seamen have generally not sunk Allied merchant-ships until they have taken off the crews or authorized them to escape. Almost the only departure from this rule with which they have had to reproach themselves has been the criminal attack, off Boulogne, upon the French liner *Amiral Ganteaume*, full of Belgian women and children. To-day the German navy has decided to violate international law systematically and deliberately. The officers have received orders to respect nothing in future, and to place themselves outside the pale of humanity. Thus, on January 30, German submarines torpedoed, without previous notice, two British merchant-ships in the vicinity of Havre. The whole world

will rise in horror at such an act of war, which is unworthy of a civilized nation."

A much more striking proof of this determination to violate all accepted rules was to be given in these waters within a few days, but in the meantime the German submarines had been active in other regions. In the course of the afternoon of January 29 the U 21 was reported to have been seen off Walney Island, near Barrow. Next morning she stopped the s.s. *Ben Cruachan*, a vessel of 3692 tons, at a point 15 miles north-west of the North-west Lightship, opposite the entry to the Mersey. The *Ben Cruachan* was laden with coal from Cardiff. Later in the day, and in succession, she stopped the *Linda Blanche*, a coaster of 53 tons, and the *Kilcorn*, of Belfast, 456 tons—laden with general cargoes. The submarine showed British colours, to throw the pursued vessels off their guard—an old device, but the use of it by the Germans must be noted here in view of later controversy. In all these cases warning was given, and the crews were allowed to escape. The German captain, who spoke excellent English, behaved with a certain joviality. He apologized for causing inconvenience, offered hospitality, cigars and cigarettes, and, in fact, proved himself to be as mild a mannered man as ever scuttled a ship. The *Ben Cruachan's* crew left in their boats and were picked up by the trawler *Margaret*. The crew of the *Linda Blanche* reached safety in the same way. A different course was followed with her men. The collier *Gladys* was hailed about 18 miles off Liver-



Drawn by Douglas Macpherson

Before the "Blockade": the sinking of the *Ben Cruachan* by the crew of the German submarine U 21 opposite the entrance to the Mersey, January 30, 1915

In this case the crew of the steamer were given time to escape in their boats. The skipper was taken back by one of the German naval officers, who secured various papers, and then, having placed a bomb or shell on board the doomed vessel, fired with his revolver the long fuse which had been placed over the vessel's side.

pool bar and summoned to take the prisoners. Her captain would have preferred to land them at Liverpool, but was told he must go to the Isle of Man. He obeyed, for obvious reasons, and went to Douglas. On this occasion all was done with a nice regard to the best traditions of the sea. It will be observed that the German captain did no harm to the trawlers and spared the *Gladys*. Captain Hersing of the U 21 may be a more genial man than the officer who attacked the *Tokomaru* and the *Ikaria*. But it must be observed that the unlucky three were none of them worth a torpedo, nor able to escape. Even the captain of the U 21 might have taken a harsher course if he had had a chance to launch a torpedo at a great liner of high speed.

The main object of such merely destructive operations as these is not to inflict only the loss of a few ships on an enemy. It is to produce a general sense of insecurity, and thereby to interrupt all trade by making shipowners unwilling to risk their other ships at sea. The U 21 did achieve that purpose to some extent. The Dublin Steam Packet Company, and the London and North-Western suspended the sailing of their boats for a short time. But this not unnatural nervousness passed rapidly and never ranged far. Shipowners and merchants were well aware that a submarine cannot continue to cruise for long. And, indeed, although the U 19 was reported to have received some oil from a Danish vessel on the coast of North Wales, she only used the supply to aid her to escape. The movement of the port of Liverpool was not suspended.

The next feat of the German submarines was of a kind calculated to deepen the anger aroused by the attacks on the *Tokomaru* and the *Ikaria*. On February 1, at five in the afternoon, a torpedo was launched at the hospital-ship *Asturias*, a fine 12,000-ton steamer belonging to the



Admiral von Pohl, chief of the German Marine Staff, who signed the official announcement of the German blockade

Royal Mail, and formerly used on the South American passenger service. The outrage was as ill executed as it was stupid, for the torpedo missed. There could be no question of a mistake, for the incident occurred in daylight, and the *Asturias* bore all the marks required by the Hague Convention. She was painted white with large red crosses on sides and funnels. At a later period the Germans made a clumsy attempt to explain

the incident away, but it was only too clearly an indication of the spirit of indiscriminate fury which had obviously taken possession of their minds.

An act of this nature standing by itself might be attributed to the brutality of a particular officer; but on the day after it took place an official

warlike purposes. Ships trading to the North Sea ports are recommended to take the route round Scotland."

The offensive part of this announcement was not the statement that "military means" would be used against transports carrying men or stores. That, of course, is regular warfare. It

lay in the barely veiled threat to make operations against transports an excuse for the kind of attack on neutral shipping foretold in an interrogatory form by Admiral von Tirpitz. The furious scolding of German newspapers led up to the final statement of the means by which the yoke of Great Britain, under which the nations had hitherto groaned, was to be broken. On February 4 the following announcement appeared in the *Reichsanzeiger*:—



The waters round Great Britain and Ireland declared a military area by Germany from February 18, 1915

announcement issued by the German Admiralty appeared in the *Reichsanzeiger*, or *Gazette*, which proved it to be part of a general policy.

"England", so it ran, "is about to ship to France a large number of troops and a great quantity of war material. We shall act against these transports with all the military means at our disposal. Peaceful shipping is urgently warned against approaching the north and west coasts, owing to the serious dangers it incurs by doing so, as it may be confused with ships serving

land, including the entire English Channel, are hereby declared a military area. From February 18 every hostile merchant-ship in these waters will be destroyed, even if it is not always possible to avoid the dangers which therewith threaten the crews and passengers.

"2. Neutral ships will also incur danger in the military area, because, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Government on January 31, and the accidents of naval warfare, it cannot always be avoided that attacks may involve neutral ships.


"3. Traffic northwards around the Shetland Islands in the west part of the North Sea, and a strip of at least 30 sea miles in breadth along the coast of Holland, is not endangered."

There are two parts in this statement of very different degrees of importance. The first is the assertion, in the second paragraph, that the British Admiralty had by a secret order directed merchant-ships to make a misuse of neutral flags. The second is the character of the policy announced. The first, which deals with a matter of fact and of controversy, is of comparatively small consequence, but, as it led to some diplomatic corre-

spondence with the United States, and might have aroused much ill-feeling, it cannot be ignored. The German allegation was that a secret order was issued by the British Admiralty on January 31 directing merchant-ships to hoist neutral flags and efface all marks of identity when navigating the Channel or the Irish Sea. No such order, in the peremptory form assumed by the German authorities, can have been issued. But it may well have been the case that the Admiralty, when applied to for advice, did let shipowners understand that the use of a neutral flag in a moment of danger is a pardonable ruse. This



Above-water Armaments of German Submarines: Quick-firing gun ready for action on deck



Deck of German Submarine after Quick-firing Gun has disappeared below

advice was, it seems, given to the Cunarder *Lusitania* by wireless telegraphy when off the north coast of Ireland on her way home from New York. The *Lusitania* came to Liverpool under the American flag on February 6.

The Admiralty's doctrine was sound. It has at all times been customary to use neutral flags as a blind both on war-ships and merchant-ships. The only restriction is that no hostile act can be committed while the neutral flag is flying. On February 8, and in view of the comment made in America on the subject, Sir Edward Grey issued a statement of the law of the case. He showed by a quotation of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 that Great Britain has permitted the use of her flag by foreign vessels "for the purpose of escaping capture". But it must be allowed that the device has its dangers and must be used with

discretion. There is obviously enough a wide difference between showing false colours in a moment of danger and making an habitual use of them throughout a voyage as a protection against possible perils. If the latter course were generally followed, the flag would inevitably cease to possess any value as an indication of nationality. This point was temperately but well made by the Government of the United States. The American Government was most directly concerned, not only through the case of the *Lusitania*, but because, being the most powerful of the neutrals, or rather the only one which is powerful at sea, its flag would be the one to be generally shown. The Germans, as we have seen, had had no scruple about showing British colours, and there is good evidence that some of her cruisers had flown the Spanish flag when in the neighbourhood of the Canaries. The *Emden* did the same thing at Penang.

There would be little advantage in giving a detailed account of all the reasons advanced by Germany for her decision to proclaim the blockade. Her real purpose was shown in a couple of sentences of a lengthy statement made on February 8. In this document the German Government showed its hand with some simplicity. It expressed its belief that neutrals would keep their ships and subjects away from the proclaimed area round the British coast, out of a regard for their safety, and added with an almost engaging candour that—

"This is the more to be expected as it must be to the interest of the neutral

Powers to see this destructive war end as soon as possible."

In other words, the neutrals were to suspend their trade with Great Britain in order to put pressure on her to make a peace acceptable to Germany. That this was the aim of the Germans is indeed manifest, but what is no less easily seen is that they took measures ill adapted to achieve their purpose.

The proclamation of the German Government could have been enforced only by what it did not possess, that is to say, an adequate force. Admiral Tirpitz did indeed assert that his country would possess in time fifty submarines more powerful than any in the British navy. Apart from the fact that even this number would have been utterly insufficient to blockade the whole of the British Isles, the fifty he claimed were not in existence on February 18, 1915. Blockade cannot be enforced by ships which are only going to be ready some day. The German menace therefore was a sham, except in so far as it was like to prove an excuse for an odious exaggeration of the

rights of war. A few instances of success in sinking merchant-ships was not enough to paralyse British trade. When measures of vigour fail to terrify they only serve to exasperate and bru-



Dropping a Streamer: British seaplane letting fall a message to be picked up by a patrol boat

talize. The name "piracy", which was commonly applied to the operations of the German submarines, was no doubt a mere term of "rhetorical invective", on a par with the famous old phrase, "enemy of the human race", when applied to the pirate himself. Piracy is robbery with violence, or "under

arms", at sea, by men who possess no commission from a sovereign authority. The German submarines were regularly authorized by their Government and were making war; but as the method was cruel and irregular, the employment of an inaccurate term of abuse was excusable.

It is a bad feature of the German policy that the sufferers were sure to be the smaller and weaker kind of vessels. A swift vessel could avoid submarines with ease by simply turning away when a periscope was seen, and going off at full speed. As we shall see, even the slower type of vessel can sometimes avoid this kind of attack when its position is favourable and a refuge is at hand. The *Tokamaru* was sunk and the *Ikaria* was damaged because both were going slowly as they approached Havre, when they thought themselves safe. Whether the s.s. *Oriole*, which left London on January 29 for Havre and did undoubtedly perish in the Channel, was sunk by a torpedo must remain uncertain.

Before February 18 was reached another instance of mere ruthlessness was given in the Channel, and one British steamer had an opportunity to show that a submarine attack can be baffled by a self-possessed and determined skipper. On February 15 the s.s. *Dulwich*, of 3289 tons, which was on a voyage from Hull to Rouen, was torpedoed and sunk off Cape Antifer, and in the same waters which had been so fatal to others. The Germans made this a special cruising-ground, probably because it seemed to offer them a chance of sinking

a transport. On February 17 the French steamer *Ville de Lille* was sunk by the U 16 while on a voyage from Cherbourg to Dunkirk. The crew were saved in their boats. The submarine was proceeding to stop a Norwegian vessel, but was chased off by torpedo-boats from Cherbourg. The loss of the s.s. *Wavelet*, of 1918 tons, which ran on a mine near Deal, does not come under the same head. Her cargo of timber from Pensacola for Grangemouth made it easy to raise her, and she was taken to safety. It is to be observed that in several of these cases, both in the Channel and the Irish Sea, other vessels were in sight when the submarines made victims, but were not attacked.

The story of the s.s. *Laertes* makes an agreeable change in these tales of loss. She was on her way to Amsterdam on February 10 when the periscope of a submarine was seen on the quarter. Her captain, W. H. Propert, had no intention of allowing his ship to be destroyed. He made off at once, zigzagging as he went, to baffle the submarine. The German is said to have launched a torpedo, which missed, and he undoubtedly fired his gun. The *Laertes* was hit on the funnel and small boat, but none of her crew was wounded. She got safe into Ymuiden. This timely demonstration that the merchant-vessel need not always be a helpless victim was welcome on the eve of the beginning of the "blockade". Captain Propert was thanked by the King and appointed a temporary lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve, a gold watch was given to each of his officers, and three

pounds to each of his crew. This recognition of his promptitude and decision was well judged. The incident and the reward alike served to demonstrate the spirit of the country, which refused to be daunted by threats, and took up the German challenge with spirit.

When we come to what happened on and after Thursday, February 18, it is instructive to begin by looking at the effects of the so-called blockade as a whole before speaking of details. A blockade, if it is to be more than an empty name, must suspend trade, or must at least greatly reduce it. An official statement published on March 8 by the Secretary of the Admiralty shows, with all the convincing eloquence of figures, that the policy from which the Germans expected so much had been a failure. It gives the movements of trade and the losses between January 21 and March 3. An examination of these figures tells the tale in the simplest form. Between January 21 and 27, 823 vessels of over 300 tons entered British ports and 680 sailed. One was torpedoed. Between February 23 and March 3, 805 entered and 669 cleared. None was lost. The difference between the figures is only what is normal in the movements of trade. During that period the total loss of British vessels by torpedo attack was fifteen, and that figure was reached by including the *Oriole*, whose fate is not certain. The loss of life was twenty-nine — again including the *Oriole's* crew of twenty. During the same period an all but equal number of vessels were attacked without success, and one of them, the

Thordis, claimed to have damaged the submarine which assailed her. These were not, as may be supposed, all the vessels destroyed. At a later date, but in the course of March, the s.s. *Bengrove*, of 3830 tons, was sunk off Ilfracombe on the 7th of the month, and on the 9th three were sent to the bottom, the s.s. *Tangestan*, 3738 tons, off Scarborough, with the loss of all her crew of thirty-seven, the *Blackwood*, of 1220 tons, off Hastings, and the *Princess Victoria*, 1108 tons, off Liverpool. In the second and third case no lives were lost. Far heavier losses occurred later, and some neutral ships perished, but the whole list during this period represented but a fraction of 1 per cent of the total movement of shipping of home waters, British and neutral.

We omit more than a mere mention of those few which struck mines, since disasters of that character cannot be attributed to the blockade. The destruction of the American steamer *Evelyn*, which ran on a mine near Borkum, while on her way to Emden, might have happened at any time from the beginning of the war. The loss in this case really fell on the Germans themselves, for the *Evelyn's* cargo was of cotton—a commodity of which they stood in great need. Nobody can tell whether the mine which destroyed her was British or German. One feature of the list of losses is peculiarly notable. The number of British ships accounted for between January 28 and February 3, before the blockade was fixed to begin, was only one less than the losses in the week which included its beginning, and this spasm of ac-

tivity was followed by a longish pause. When we sum up the whole, it does not much surpass the harm done in some bad years during a similar period of winter weather. When we add together tonnage, value, and lives, the total of the injury inflicted by the German submarines in the course of about three months was not much

all, did not go beyond a friendly expostulation with Great Britain on the possible abuse of her flag, and a firm intimation to Germany that the deliberate destruction of an American vessel would have serious consequences. When on March the British Government announced its intention to do what it had not hitherto done, namely, proclaim the whole German coast in a state of blockade, the United States Government accepted the position while guarding its own interests. But the diplomatic correspondence on that subject did not fully develop in the course of March. Until the last day of the month nothing had been done by the Germans to prove that their blockade so called had had any material effect.

This being the general situation, we can deal with the details of the conflict. They can be seen in their proper place and relation. It may be allowed that the necessity for reducing the risks run by seaborne commerce to a minimum did entail some increase of the restrictions already placed on its movements. For instance, on February 23, five days after the blockade began on the 18th, the Admiralty took precautions to safeguard the approach to Liverpool from the Atlantic and round the north of Ireland. This is the point which would be most vulnerable to a German raid. The Admiralty therefore gave orders that from the 23rd onwards the north channel between Rathlin Island and the Mull of Kintyre was to be closed to all ships. Vessels wishing to enter must pass to the south of Rathlin Island, between it and the coast of Antrim, and must



The North Channel between Rathlin Island and the Mull of Kintyre, closed by the Admiralty to all ships from February 23, 1915

more than the loss suffered by the wreck of the *Titanic*.

It was not by such achievements as these that Germany could hope to ruin British commerce, or convince neutrals that, in their own interest, they had better avoid the Four Seas of Britain. British commerce, in fact, went on as before, and the neutrals took the blockade calmly. The United States, which may be said to speak for them

come by daylight. No vessel was to be within 4 miles of Rathlin Island between sunset and sunrise. This was but an extension of measures taken earlier in the Channel and North Sea. They were the inevitable consequence of a state of maritime war, and though they entailed obstruction to trade and delay, which in every form of business caused some measure of loss, they fell far short of what the Germans must have hoped they would be able to inflict.

Many, or indeed a majority, of the cases of loss afford no matter for comment. They can only be recorded as having taken place. We did not see the destroyers at work, nor the fortunes of his victims. The unknown end of the *Oriole* and the disaster of the *Tangistan* must necessarily be no more to us than incidents to be named in an official list. There was no survivor to tell the tale, no eye-witness who has recorded the scene. Even when no life was, or few lives were, lost we frequently have nothing beyond the bald record of the fact. In other cases we have the testimony of witnesses which enables us to reconstruct the scenes. We may take as a typical example the loss of the s.s. *Cambank*, on February 20.

The *Cambank*, a steamer of 3112 tons, was on her way from Huelva to the Mersey with a cargo of ore. As she was approaching her destination she had shipped her pilot, and was going on from the coast of Anglesey. There were other vessels in sight, as nearly always happens on the near approaches of a great port. One of these spectators of the disaster which

was about to happen was a vessel belonging to the Furness Line. From the deck of this ship a periscope was seen, and then the trace made by a torpedo rushing through the water in the direction of the *Cambank*. It struck and exploded with such force that the Furness liner shook at a distance of 300 yards. A mass of water was hurled into the air as high as the funnels of the *Cambank*. Her back was broken, and she sank at once. Just as much time was allowed as enabled her to clear away one boat, and in that all the crew escaped except four, who perished in the explosion.

In times of peace, when such an incident as this was a mere possibility, it was always assumed that the sudden destruction of a trading-vessel would produce a panic. But we see that the loss of the *Cambank* had no terrifying influence even on her own crew, and far less on spectators. Those who made this estimate of possibility did not in fact allow for the character and training of the sea-faring man. He lives and works on his own element, with a constant sense of the possibility of collision, wreck, or explosion. Even if he has not himself gone through that experience, he has heard of it from others, and he knows what is to be done when disaster happens. Therefore he can act promptly at the time, and when he looks back on the event and talks of it, the peril and the details of the actual misfortune seem very often to have left little or no impression on his mind.

The account of the torpedoing of the *Hartdale* given by survivors to the press would probably strike an imagi-

native longshore man as jejune. The *Hartdale*, a steamer of 3800 tons, was chased and destroyed off the Mull of Galloway on March 13. She was near the South Rock Lightship between Cloughey and Ballywater, County Down, and Captain Martin, who had been on the bridge since he

off in, and that the ship was going to be sunk. Captain Martin "took no notice" of the summons—except to act with promptitude. He tried to make off, going on a zigzag course to baffle the submarine. The *Hartdale*, being an ordinary cargo-boat, had no greater speed on the surface than



The last feat of the U 29 (Captain Weddingen): Photograph taken from the British steamer *Hartdale* immediately before she was torpedoed by the German submarine

left Glasgow, had gone down for a little rest. He was soon called up again by the first mate, who reported "a submarine on the starboard bow". Captain Martin was determined that the submarine should not have him for the asking. The submarine was about a cable's length—200 yards—away. Someone on her hailed the *Hartdale*, telling her captain that he and his crew had ten minutes to get

the pursuer; but the German had to exercise some caution. If he had headed the *Hartdale*, Captain Martin might have rammed him, and would certainly have made the attempt. It was necessary to obtain a position perpendicular to the steamer's beam before a torpedo could be launched. An hour and a half of manœuvring passed before the German won his position. In the interval he peppered

the *Hartdale* with his gun, without wounding any of her crew, and hailed her three times angrily to stop. At last the submarine gained a good place and fired a torpedo. It struck the *Hartdale* on the port side just abaft of the engine-room. The wound was of course fatal, but the slipping down of the coal kept the water out to some extent, and the steamer floated for half an hour before she turned on her side and sank. Captain Martin told his crew that there would be time to get the boats away before she went down, and called on them not to make a rush. The life-boats were lowered and most of the crew got away. The captain, his chief officer, a steward, and a boy remained on the *Hartdale*, but her deck was awash. They then leapt overboard and tried to swim in their life-belts. The boy was drowned before the captain, who was wearing sea boots, and was hampered by them, could help him; and one man also lost his life. The three survivors remained in the water till they were taken into the submarine, whose crew, says Captain Martin, "acted very kindly towards us". The prisoners were revived with brandy and hot coffee, and transferred to a passing Swede, the *Heimdal*. Later on the Swede picked up the boats, and all were safely landed in a motor boat at Bangor. Here we have the tale told from the inside, and in the brief historical style proper to the man of action, who does not stop to analyse his emotions—even when he has any. Generally speaking he has few, and they are kept down while the work is going on.

Very similar are the stories of the *Adenwen*, of Cardiff, of 2386 tons, sunk 25 miles north-north-west of the Casquets, and of three other steamers, the *Headlands*, 2988 tons, of Liverpool, with fruit from the Mediterranean to Bristol; the *Andalusian*, 2349 tons, also of Liverpool, bound to the River Plate with a general cargo; and the *Indian City*, from Galveston to Havre, with a cargo of cotton. All four fell to the U 29, which was believed to be commanded by Captain Weddigen or Weddingen, the officer who sank the *Cressy*, *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Hawke*. It is pleasant to be able to record that this German officer, whose tone in reporting the destruction of the three cruisers was modest and manly, behaved with hu-



Captain Weddingen, Germany's most distinguished submarine officer, lost with the U 29 in March, 1915
(From a photograph by Bain)



An Unwelcome Neighbour: British submarine with enemy mine at her bow
(Fortunately the crew were able to cut adrift.)

manity, not only treating his prisoners with courtesy but carrying hospitality so far as to provide one of those who had fallen into the water with a dry suit of clothes. Whatever exhortations to frightfulness came from writers in Germany who were a long way off the scene of action, it could be seen that the human nature of men on the spot was too good in a creditable number of cases to allow them to do the sort of thing which the ferocity, real or assumed, of those who clamoured for more ruthlessness led them to recommend.

The German submarines were, of course, not allowed to carry on their destructive operations without check. The sinking of the *Headlands* and the other ships near the Scilly Isles was the last feat of U 29. On March 26 the Secretary of

the Admiralty issued the announcement that "The Admiralty have good reason to believe that the German submarine U 29 has been sunk with all hands". The circumstances were not reported, but the fact was placed beyond dispute by the admission of the German Admiralty that the

submarine had not returned to port long after her appointed time, and must therefore be given up as lost. Two were destroyed early in March. The U 8 was sunk in the Straits of Dover by the destroyers *Gurkha* and *Maori*, and the U 12 was rammed by the *Ariel* (Lieutenant-Commander James V. Creagh) on the 10th at a spot not named at the time. The crews were saved in both cases. In



The Newcastle Collier *Thordis*, the first British Merchant-ship to sink a German Submarine

connection with the crew of U 8 the Admiralty took a step which gave some satisfaction to public opinion. It declared that as her officers had in all probability been concerned in sinking unarmed merchant-ships and firing torpedoes at ships carrying non-combatant neutrals and women, "they must be the subject of special re-

from the German Government, sent through the United States minister, that it would make reprisals on the British prisoners of war it has in its power (of whom there were more than 20,000) for any measure of a punitive kind inflicted on its submarine crews by the British Government.

After investigation the Admiralty



U 8's Appeal for Help: Instantaneous photograph of the German submarine about to founder after being attacked by the British destroyers *Gurkha* and *Maori* in the Straits of Dover

striction, and could not be accorded the distinctions of their rank, or be allowed to mingle with other prisoners of war". There were some who, moved by natural sentiments, but who in the heat of the moment wrote and spoke with little thought, would have liked to see them tried as pirates. The legal reasons why this course could not possibly be taken were stated by competent authorities. The practical non-legal reason against it was contained in an official intimation

accepted the claim of a small coasting collier to have destroyed a submarine on the last day in February. The *Thordis*, of Newcastle, a steamer of only 290 tons, was on her way from Blyth to Plymouth, when she sighted the periscope of a submarine which launched a torpedo at her. Captain J. W. Bell avoided the torpedo, and then steered at the submarine, which he rammed. When the steamer was docked at Plymouth it was found that her propeller had been broken off and that



The Dangers of Mine-sweeping: a floating mine has been drawn close under the vessel's stern—an awkward companion until released

her keel plate was damaged. The injury done to the vessel, and the report of the crew that they had seen the surface of the water covered with oil when they struck their enemy, were held to prove that the submarine had been sunk. Captain Bell and his crew subsequently received £1000 subscribed by various donors as a reward to the first British merchant-ship to sink a German submarine. The skipper was also decorated by the king for his action, and given a commission as a naval lieutenant.

Against these losses the Germans were able to put the sinking of the auxiliary cruiser *Bayano* on March 11 on the south-west coast of Scotland. Her captain, Commander H. C. Carr, went down in her, with about 200 of the crew. She was struck on a calm, dark morning and sank in four minutes. Her second in command, Lieutenant-Commander R. A. F. Guy, and twenty-four other officers and men, were saved either by the patrol vessel *Tara* or by the s.s. *Balmerino*. Another steamer, the *Castlereagh*, of

Belfast, which passed over the scene of the loss, and attempted to search for survivors, was chased away by a submarine.

As the month drew to a close there were deceptive signs of less ferocity on the part of the German blockaders. Thus when the U 28, a submarine capable of going 20 knots on the surface, and

therefore a new and powerful craft, captured and sank one of the General Steam Navigation Company's steamers off the Maas Lightship, she towed the boats in which the crew took refuge to a safe place. Whereas earlier in the month several Norwegian boats were destroyed at sight, this same U 28, which stopped two Dutch vessels, the *Batavier V* and the *Zaanstroom*, took them into Zeebrugge as prizes. They were captured on the ground that they were carrying provisions to England and Belgian reservists, and were therefore breaking the "blockade". This act was not technically irregular. But it is to be observed that the German officer had a port of his own close at hand. He was not in the position he would have held if he had been operating on the north coast of Ireland. The incident proved that the efforts of Admiral Hood's squadron to destroy Zeebrugge had not met with full success, since the Germans could still use it as a basis for submarine operations.

The humanity of the German sub-



Drawn by Cecil King

The Sinking of the *Falaba*, March 28, 1915: how the Elder-Dempster liner was torpedoed by the German submarine—with the loss of 111 lives—while the boats were being slung out

marines was, however, very relative. No complaint ought perhaps to be made of the sinking of the s.s. *Vosges* while on her way from Bordeaux to Liverpool. She was sighted on the morning of Saturday, March 27, about 60 miles west of Trevoze Head, and ordered to surrender by signal. Captain Green resolved to do his utmost to escape, and steamed off, manœuvring to prevent the enemy from bringing his torpedo-tube to bear. But the speed of the submarine was superior, and she pursued. The *Vosges* was subjected to a brisk fire from the enemy's gun. The fire of the German, when he could bring his gun to bear, was rapid and well directed. The bridge of the steamer was riddled. The second officer, Mr. Doody, was struck down. Captain Green and the other officers were all more or less hurt. So was a Belgian lady passenger. The funnel was nearly shot away, and the hull also suffered. The chief engineer, Mr. Davies, was killed by a shot which pierced the side. A last shot hit the *Vosges* on the water-line, and she sank. Captain Green was of opinion that the German captain gave the chase up after firing this time, and did not know that he had succeeded. The crew took to the boats, and were picked up by the patrol yacht *Wintonia*, which landed them at New-quay.

In this case the merchant-ship incurred the danger of being fired at by endeavouring to escape. An event which happened next day shocked the world by showing the German submarine war against commerce at all but its very worst. The Elder-Demp-

ster passenger-steamer *Falaba*, which was on a voyage from Liverpool to the west coast of Africa, was sunk on Sunday, March 28, at about midday, some eighteen hours after leaving port. The submarine approached under the British flag, and when within hailing-distance showed German colours. The steamer was too completely at the enemy's mercy either to offer resistance or to escape, and then she carried 140 passengers in addition to her crew of a hundred. All the circumstances which render the use of the submarine against commerce so peculiarly hateful were therefore present. A helpless ship and a crowd of non-combatants were assailed by an enemy who could not have found room for them on board his own vessel even if he had wished, and the German captain did everything, short of launching a torpedo without any warning, to aggravate their position. He swiftly steamed round from one side of the *Falaba* to the other, so as to bring his stem to bear, and launched a torpedo before there was time to clear away the boats. A number of the crew and passengers were on deck when the steamer was struck and sent to the bottom at once. They must have been quite visible. But the enemy not only did not delay delivering his blow, but made off immediately.

But for the fact that the steam drifters *Eileen Emma* and *Wenlock* were at hand, the loss of life would have been still greater than it was. 111 of the 240 non-combatants in the *Falaba* perished. Among them was a Mr. Thrasher, an engineer, who was a citizen of the United States. Several

of those who were rescued from the water died of cold and exposure. It was a vile action, and its vileness was entirely due to the use of such a vessel as a submarine for operations against commerce, aggravated by the callousness of the German officer. Even this dastardly crime, however, was to

be eclipsed by the sinking of the Cunard liner, *Lusitania*, off the south of Ireland, in May; but the story of that crowning tragedy, with its loss of upwards of 1000 non-combatant lives, including those of over 100 Americans, must be left for a later chapter.

D. H.



Drawn by Montague Dawson

The German Submarine and its Prey: an Incident after Germany's Declaration of War against Merchant Vessels in February, 1915

The submarine depicted is one of the later types of the German craft, with exhaust pipe, twin periscopes, and two rear torpedo-tubes.

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